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EDITOR'S NOTE
This book contains proceedings of the International Conference
held in Belgrade, December, 14-15, 2001 organized by the European
Movement in Serbia under the title The Effects of Regional Initiatives in
South Eastern Europe -Towards an Efficient Framework. The readers
will find in the first part of the book an extensive summary and conclusions
of the Conference prepared by Mme Jelica Mini}, who was also instru-
mental in providing support and assistance to the organization of this
event. After the introductory chapter, we have divided the majority of
contributions to the Conference into two parts: the major part includes the
individual studies dealing with the Regional cooperation fora and the role
of the European Union. The final part includes contributions concerning
sectoral and national experience of regional cooperation. We would like to
stress that the editing was merely limited to the placing of different articles
into the book, as well as to some basic language and style corrections. On
the other hand, in no way we wanted to interfere with the proper content
of very diverse contributions of different authors. We consider that the rel-
ative variety of subjects treated could only contribute to the overall inter-
est of this book. Finally, the annex contains the program and the list of
participants to the Conference. In addition, we include in the annex some
factual information about regional initiatives in the form of tables, maps
and original documents (declarations, conclusions etc.).
Although a few months have passed since December 2001, we con-
sider that high quality of the most of contributions to the Conference
would not be altered by the elapsed of time or by the expected changes
brought about in organizing and functioning of some of the regional ini-
tiatives in South Eastern Europe. Both last and this year (2002) have wit-
nessed intense discussions, official and academic ones, concerning the role
and coordination of a plethora of regional initiatives in SEE. Thus, during
the last few months, the Stability Pact in South East Europe was stream-
lined and redirected under the new Special Coordinator guidance; the
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EUs Stabilization and Association Process with SEE countries was
recently (in April 2002) reassessed by the Council and the Commission -
and some new proposals concerning multilateral political dialogue were
launched (the so called Zagreb process); the Cooperation Process in
SEE will also undergo additional transformation under the new -
Yugoslav chairmanship... There was recently a new and valuable initiative
taking ground in Vienna (Danube Coopearion Process). Finally, there is
an emerging, although still timid, appearance of some forms of coordina-
tion between different cooperation schemes in SEE, such as the Informal
Coordination Committee or the common meetings of coordinators of the
SECI, BSEC Organization, Central European Initiative, Adriatic-Ionian
Initiative, the Stability Pact and the SEECP. 
Let us believe that our recent proposals and conclusions had some
effects in this evolution.
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PART ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
AND SUMMARY 
OF THE CONFERENCE
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
of the Conference
by Jelica Mini} *
Introduction
International Conference Effects of Regional Initiatives in South
Eastern Europe -Towards an Efficient Framework, is the final part of the
project run by the European Movement in Serbia in cooperation with
think tanks from Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania.The idea of
the project was to make an assessment of a growing number of regional
initiatives having Balkan countries participation. The main aim was to
identify concrete instruments, mechanisms and contents to make them
more effective and better coordinated. The motive of this endeavour was
to increase the regional involvement and ownership of the process of SEE
integration predominantly initiated and enforced from outside.
The book by the Yugoslav team leader, Dr. Du{ko Lopandi},
Regional Initiatives in South Eastern Europe, 292 pages, was edited in
Serbian and English, and distributed to all participants of the conference
as the hosting institution input to the debate on regional cooperation. The
book was promoted in the Media Center two days before the Conference.
A book review was published in the Economist Magazine, no. 79,
November 26, 2001.
The main contributions to the conference, mostly by the authors
from the region, were 18 conference papers, which are going to be pub-
lished as conference proceedings. The project was supported by the East-
East Program of the Fund for an Open Society and the European
Commission.
___________
* Assistant Federal Minister, Vice-President of the European Movement in 
Serbia.
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112 participants and 16 journalists attended the conference. In two
days, 27 speakers (19 foreign and 8 from the FRY) had their presentations.
The participants were addressed by the Prime Minister of the FRY, mr.
Dragi{a Pe{i}, Minister of National Minorities, mr. Rasim Ljaji}, President
of the European Movement in Serbia, Ambassador @ivorad Kova~evi},
Ambassadors of the EU and neighbouring countries, Deputy Director
General of the CEI, Ambassador Anton Rupnik, regional representative
of European Stability Initiative, Mina Jarvenpaa, representatives of the
World Bank, OESC, of regional and European think tanks and founda-
tions, and other distinguished foreign and Yugoslav speakers.
Besides daily news, the conference was extensively presented in a
special TV program and at four pages of the monthly supplement on South
East Europe, Perspectives, in the Economist Magazine no.83, December
24, 2001. 
Achievements
Regional initiatives in SEE form a specific product at the geopoliti-
cal market of Europe, and their proliferation is a sign of existing demand
and necessity. They are packing the region in different frameworks search-
ing for the most appropriate one. Most of them are temporary, post-con-
flict, bridging the political and economic gap in Europe. 
The general conclusion is that the existence and overall activity of
various regional initiatives in South Eastern Europe were doubtlessly pos-
itive. The regional context provided the appropriate framework for the
solution of bilateral conflicts and tensions. Regional initiatives provided
decisive progress in the peace building process, contributed democratiza-
tion, increased security, and supported macroeconomic stabilization and
structural reforms, as well as integration of the region into the European
structures and the rest of the world. Fighting organized crime, corruption,
illegal migrations, radical extremism and international terrorism, especial-
ly after September 11, 2001, has been increasingly performed at the
regional scale. 
Regional initiatives gave impetus to regional integration, creating
positive momentum for trade liberalization, foreign direct investment pro-
motion and private sector sustainable development in SEE. To a certain
extent they compensate for the declining share of the region and individ-
ual countries in the global economy, being a vehicle to enlarge individual
countries markets and constituting a path for achieving greater interna-
tional competitiveness. Open regionalism in SEE is compensating some
deficiencies of the globalization process providing ground for develop-
ment of missing geographical and ethno-cultural dimension, although
through differentiated configuration of each specific initiative.
10
One of their major achievements is the sustainable and continuous
political dialogue of the regional countries, between them and other
European countries and with non-European countries and different inter-
national organizations being involved in the framework of regional initia-
tives. Practically all European and some major non-European countries
are involved in solving problems of the SEE through regional initiatives.
Institutionalization of the dialogue with the EU requires better communi-
cation between individual applicant countries in the region and those lag-
ging behind, giving them ground to formulate and defend the most sensi-
tive common interests of the region.
They have encouraged cooperation amongst administrations and
business and other circles in the region, facilitated communication and cre-
ated networks of contacts and institutions. NGOs in the region are also
playing the catalyst role in lowering tensions among various ethnic, reli-
gious and social groups, as well as between governmental structures and
civil society, with the growing role in promoting of social cohesion. The
activity of regional initiatives affects public opinion and influence aware-
ness on common goals. They help overcoming narrow-minded nationalism
and the idea of the self-sufficiency of states.
Combining members at different levels of social and economic
development, regional initiatives have provided transfer of know-how,
sharing of good practice, assistance in infrastructure and economic devel-
opment creating environment for collective prosperity. They facilitate the
development of trans-border projects and attraction of international
financial resources, mediating among those who need assistance, those
who could provide it and those who could finance it.
The EU is the most important integrating factor in the countries and
regional initiatives of the SEE. On the other hand, regional initiatives
strengthen the process of European integration. For most of the countries
involved, regional initiatives are instrumental for their individual inclusion
into all-European integration processes, for bringing the whole region
closer, for a radical change in the traditional geopolitical context, for pre-
serving and strengthening of some existing common structures facilitating
European integration.
Many participants stressed that joining of the FRY to regional ini-
tiatives, will considerably contribute their future success and the comple-
tion of the regional frame for stability and prosperity.
Weaknesses
Regional initiatives in SEE were criticized because of the modesty
of their objectives. As compared with Western European examples, none
of the initiatives (except, in part, the Stability Pact) dares to proclaim a
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large-scale or attractive integration project, around which the entire ini-
tiative would assume structure. Spreading rather thinly across too many
initiatives and setting up as donors coordination body, the Stability pact
has created expectations that it cannot hope to meet, with consequent risk
of disillusionment.
Regional initiatives and forms of multilateral cooperation have not
to date really crucially helped Balkan countries to ensure integration into
the EU or to change the political, economic or social environment in the
region in a more essential manner. Sub-regional initiatives have on the
whole yielded only limited concrete results. The reconstruction of Bosnia
and Herzegovina has been one of the most disappointing experiences.
Cooperation amongst neighbours is rather limited, which is a typical
characteristic of economically peripheral regions. In that sense, there can
still be no talk of any essential change in the state of affairs of economic
and social sub-regional links to which regional initiatives would contribute
as compared with the period hitherto.
The Stabilization and Association Process has created a new division
of states formed after the breakdown of Yugoslavia on one side and
Bulgaria and Romania on the other, whereby the European Union has not
properly supported the creation of a single Balkan market. There have
been many initiatives for a free trade zone in the Balkans, but most of
them will remain unfeasible all until the EU continues to favour the poli-
cy of bilateral approach to the states of the region.
With the exception of the SEECP, none of the other six analyzed
regional initiatives represent an autochthonous product of the Balkan
countries themselves. This lack of autonomous integration initiatives has,
amongst other things, led to the reorientation of Balkan countries to sim-
ilar, successful projects outside of SEE. Even up to the present day, the
Balkans has not become an organized regional entity.
The majority of regional initiatives in South Eastern Europe repre-
sent a supplement to European architecture and not a substitute for the
inclusion of SEE countries into the EU and other pan-European organi-
zations. Therefore, lagging behind of the SEE region in the process of inte-
gration in the EU has also a boomerang effect on the role and results of
regional initiatives and their impact on the state of affairs in the region. 
Other weaknesses identified:
!Work programmes are similar and cover the same fields;
!Lack of clear goals and work plans;
! Insufficient influence of the SEE countries on the process of 
shaping various initiatives and planning projects;
!Dominant influence of administrative structures -top-down not 
a bottom-up nature;
!Orientation towards the holding of meetings instead of project 
activities;
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!Vast and sometimes unclear mechanisms;
!Numerous structures which have not found an optimal way to co-
operate in common areas (duplication and overlapping);
!No financial resources of its own;
!Administrative procedures of the international finance institutions 
considerably slowing down the process of final disbursement of 
funds for projects;
!Concrete results achieved are less visible than expected;
!Growing number of same  countries have become participants of 
different initiatives;
! Initiatives have more or less the same partners in European and 
international organizations;
! Insufficient administrative experience of the member states, etc.
Generally, the main concern was the proliferation of sub-regional
groupings in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe with partly over-
lapping memberships and agendas indicating lack of complementarity, and
growing competitiveness among them. There are visible efforts to consol-
idate or even to further strengthen them and expand the scope of their
activities and institutional structures, wasting limited resources in the
region.
Recommendations
The recommendations had three levels and two main sets of issues.
First level is the SEE region itself, the second, stratification of regional ini-
tiatives and their mutual cooperation, and finally, cooperation between
the regional initiatives and the EU. The debate was more focused on the
mechanisms, forms, institutions and general framework of cooperation
provided by regional initiatives, than on substantial issues like real needs,
interests, priorities, expectations and feasibility of common projects.
1. Regional integration - a large-scale or limited project?
In assessing integration concepts a gradual approach, using concrete
achievements is preferred. The experience of European integration has
been that breakthroughs in a few concrete areas were more valuable than
pursuing integration for its own sake across a wide range of issues. The key
concept is functional integration, creating a stable institutional framework
of cooperation in areas in which states have an interest in working togeth-
er to realize concrete benefit. Once established, the incentives and habits
of cooperation are expected to spill over into other areas. Coordinated
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development of regional infrastructure could become a backbone of SEE
integration (like European Community for Coal and Steel), with simulta-
neous development of common market in the fields of energy, transport
and telecommunications.
It is not expected to have uniform SEE cooperation schemes. They
necessary have variable geometries including different number of coun-
tries, and in some cases, even bordering EU countries. There is a differ-
ence between the core initiatives (such as SAP, SP and SEECP) and
some outside supporting initiatives, such as SECI, Central European
Initiative, Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, Black Sea Economic Cooperation,
CEFTA etc. in respect of their influence on the building up of regioness.
However, all of them are expected to contribute to some aspects of coop-
eration in the SEE.
The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the war on terrorism
impose new challenges that need to be taken into account. The issue of the
regulation of security in the narrower and broader senses (soft security
issues) has been seen more and more as one of the key problems in the
Balkans, which cannot be resolved only with economic or social measures,
as it also requires specific methods and solutions on a regional level. The
Kosovo crisis 1999, has led to the launching of a number of frameworks
of cooperation on the level of ministers of defense or internal affairs of
SEE countries. 
Administrative structures and business community have been the
engine of regional cooperation, with increasing importance of new players
-NGOs, media, local communities, educational institutions, culture and
sports. However, it was recommended that the emphasis should remain on
economic issues. 
The European Commission recommendations for the BSEC priori-
ty objectives are basic for any other regional initiative in the SEE, being
instrumental to market extension of individual countries and the EU:
!The promotion of political stability and dialogue, and the strength-
ening of human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
!Transit through the region and the development of the regions 
transport, energy and telecommunications networks, including 
connections to European networks;
!Regional commercial cooperation and the creation of favourable 
conditions to attract EU and other foreign investments, including 
into small and medium size enterprises, while ensuring the com-
patibility of any new arrangements with existing regimes;
!The reduction of drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal immigra-
tion throughout the region.
In case of the Balkans, regional initiatives are also expected to con-
tribute to the process of European integration and to the build up of the
regioness.
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2. Regional initiatives -competition, cooperation or coordination?
The problem does not lie in the number of regional initiatives, but in
the best way to coordinate them and divide work. A certain degree of spe-
cialization is encouraged, assuming that each of them would  concentrate
on what it does best and is equipped to do best in terms of financial and
human resources. Ultimately, the question might arise of the merging of
several initiatives, in which a considerable number of member countries
are the same. 
There is a consensus about the basic need for more concerted activi-
ties of different regional initiatives and between their launched projects, to
act in more harmonized manner in order to create synergy and to avoid
duplication, overlapping and unnecessary loss of already limited human
and other resources. Participating countries are invited to better coordi-
nate work of the officials in their Foreign Ministries in charge of different
regional initiatives.
It is necessary to identify key areas for strategic initiatives where
they can make a decisive contribution, articulate concrete agenda, engage
necessary resources, and lay down a clear time frame.
The practice of fund-raising for a wide variety of different, small-
scale projects should be discontinued. Future funding should be highly tar-
geted to mobilize resources for the priority initiatives, and should only be
scheduled once concrete multi-annual programs have been devised.
The participants of the conference encouraged further gradual and
spontaneous development of a specific network of contacts, information
sharing and mutual cooperation amongst the initiatives themselves (mutu-
al participation at meetings in the capacity of observers, information
exchange, expert contacts, joint high-level meetings in individual domains,
such as transport, the fight against organized crime, etc.). 
The Stability Pact should be redefined, refocused and limited. It
should serve as a kind of interface between SAP and other regional ini-
tiatives, better performing one of its main tasks of channeling and coordi-
nating regional cooperation initiatives. The OSCE was also mentioned as
a possible umbrella Organization.
To sum up, it is recommended that regional initiatives should:
! Increase regional ownership;
!Be more focused and better profiled;
!Have more structured time frame (short, medium, long-term 
tasks);
! Improve links and coordination with corresponding sources of 
financing at the international, regional or national levels;
! Initiate a dialogue among themselves on general topics, specific 
issues and necessary transformation and adjustments;
!Provide better division of labour and synergy;
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!Establish common website with driving issues of each initiative and 
coordinated agenda;
! Improve PR and approach to wider public.
3.  The EU and regional initiatives -international involvement 
vs. regional ownership
There is the need to continue international involvement in solving
the problems of the SEE. It is in the interest of the whole international
community to keep the existing regional cooperation structures function-
ing and to develop them further. Should the countries of the region be will-
ing to work towards supranational institutions in selected sectors then
these should be integrated from the outset with European Union institu-
tions.
As the region of South Eastern Europe will most probably remain
in the waiting room of the EU during this decade, in addition to the
European prospective, it needs some regional prospective - more articu-
lated and determined build up of regional cooperation schemes - in order
to overcome obvious problems that it has been facing since the break up
of Former Yugoslavia (peace, security, reconstruction, development, more
cohesion...). This aim will not be achieved unless there is a full involve-
ment of the EU and its Member States in the process. 
The SAP of EU should overcome its inherent contradiction between
bilateral approach and regional support by integrating and developing ele-
ments and instruments of multilateral cooperation, in parallel to the
Stabilization and Association Agreements. It could be done by continuing
and possibly enlarging the approach of the Zagreb summit (EU plus five
Western Balkans countries) including Bulgaria and Romania. The SAP
should progressively develop elements of some pre-accession strategy for
all countries involved. 
In order to achieve successful stabilization and development in the
region, the EU also has to develop and elaborate a long-term and stable
strategy of relations with SEE, including the strategy of the inclusion of all
countries of the region into its membership.
Cooperation among countries of South Eastern Europe, through
regional initiatives that would have an authentic international capacity,
clearly specified jurisdiction, better elaborated internal structure and its
own budget could overcome the gap that exists between the needs for the
trans-national regulation of certain issues (ranging from environment to
crossing borders) and the still uncertain time of the expansion of the EU
into this region.
In the EU - SEE relationship:
!Dialogue with the EU should produce concrete mechanisms for 
economic integration of the region;
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!Multilateral relations should be prioritized comparing to bilateral;
!Policy of conditionality should be more supplemented with 
strengthening of dialogue;
!Dynamic, open, outward looking approach should be promoted 
connecting the region with the EU and the world economic system.
The region is supposed to become an articulated entity imposing the
principle of dialogue to the developed Europe in order to narrow the gap
between the interests and expectations of the Balkans on one side, and
Brussels on the other. The establishment of a Coordination Committee
comprising of the Stability Pact Special Coordinator, the CFSP High
Representative, the Commission, the EU Presidency and a member of the
South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process is considered as a promissing
sign of emerging partnership between Brussels and the Balkans. 
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OPENING REMARKS TO THE CONFERENCE 
by @ivorad Kova~evi}*
International Conference The Effects and Prospects of Regional
Initiatives in South East Europe is the closing phase of the regional proj-
ect which has endured more than a year and is coordinated by the EPUS
in cooperation with Romanian Centre for Economic Policy from
Bucharest,  Forum CSRD from Skopje, Institute for Market Economy
from Sofia and Institute for International Studies from Tirana.
The Conference will consider the results of activities of eight region-
al initiatives created in the last decade of the past century. It is worth not-
ing that, besides the Process of Cooperation in South East Europe, all of
these initiatives have been created as a consequence of external incentives
or broadening of the existing initiatives. Without prejudging the conclu-
sions of the Conference, one could hardly speak of an extraordinary suc-
cess, whether it is the word of the projects which from the start have not
had far reaching ambitions or those of which, after a pompous announce-
ment, the countries of the region had expected to be some new Marshall
Plan for this region.
The situation, today, is mature for a new step in regional coopera-
tion within the region. It looks as if the war in these parts has irreversibly
ended and that the threats to peace and stability in Macedonia and in
Kosovo, hopefully, represent only minor, although not out of danger, seis-
mic tremor in the  ground subsidence process after a massive earthquake.
And the last country of the region, FR of Yugoslavia has overthrown its
non-democratic regime which had driven the country into wars and
pushed it into xenophobia and isolation. Some of the countries of the
region are members of the European Union, some are candidate coun-
tries, while all the others are potential candidates, which is the key com-
mon determinant of their policies and a strong presumption of regional 
___________
* President of the European Movement in Serbia (EMINS)
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cooperation. This common aspiration towards the united Europe is not in
conformity with individual, isolated and competitive movement towards
Europe. Perhaps, more important than the goal of joining the EU is the
road to that goal, which wont be neither easy, nor fast, and which runs
through internal reforms and regional cooperation and reintegration. This,
after all, is being emphasized by the EU itself. Mutatis mutandis, the
regional initiatives we are discussing today and tomorrow will be fully
effective only if they are complementary and non-competitive and a part
of a common regional and international strategy.
The Agenda embraces the existing regional initiatives, whereby we
should have in mind two other components. One is the strong political will
of the governments of the region to tend towards a broad mutual cooper-
ation without conditioning and yielding of different barriers -by loosening
the visa regime, fast resolution of border and other disputes, conclusion of
the succession process, creation of conditions for refugee return or the
expelled and yielding of other war ramifications, establishing of multilat-
eral and bilateral basis for intensive economic and other cooperation and,
the last but not the least and not less important, by consistent respect for
the assumed international obligations, above all by full cooperation with
the Hague Tribunal. The second important factor which could significant-
ly contribute to the reconcilliation process, restoring of confidence and
intensive human, economic, cultural and other communications and coop-
eration, are multifold initiatives of non-governmental organizations and
more and more developed transborder cooperation of local communities
and other factors.
The Conference is expected to adopt conclusions and recommenda-
tions on further development of multilateral cooperation in the South East
Europe , whereby one should have in mind the announced reforms of the
Stability Pact , Process of Stabilization and Association of potential candi-
dates for EU membership and broader debate on future forms of cooper-
ation in the region. As a suitable basis for discussion may serve the quite
analytical and documented study Regional Initiatives in the South East
Europe, written by Dr. Du{ko Lopandi}, member of the European
Movement in Serbia. 
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ADDRESS OF WELCOME
by Mr. Dragi{a Pe{i} *
I wish to express my particular pleasure for having the opportunity
to welcome this meeting organized by the European Movement in Serbia,
which is consecrated to consideration of achievements and prospects of
the regional cooperation and initiatives in the South Eastern Europe. It is
the word, beyond doubt, of an exceptionally current theme, which repre-
sents not only the matter of research of expert organizations, but to a large
extent encompasses the attention of leading political factors, both in the
region and in Europe at large.
Allow me to express my belief that the regional initiatives are one of
the elements which should exert an additional impetus to the Balkans,
respectively the South East Europe, on its way to the European integra-
tion, the course it has, no doubt, already taken. In that respect, I should
like to point out to some facts: all the countries of the region, perhaps for
the first time in the entire history of the Balkans, have democratically
elected governments, oriented towards modernization, transition and
reforms of the society and economy of their countries; economic indicators
regarding growth, rate of inflation in almost all countries of the region,
after more than a decade of lagging behind, show positive trends; eco-
nomic measures which have been undertaken on national levels ( liberal-
ization of trade and similar) provide ground for an intensive regional
cooperation, as well as for a more attractive position of the region regard-
ing foreign investors; finally, all the countries of the region have been
included in the processes of  the approach to the European Union in the
near or more distant prospect of fully-fledged membership.
Of course, there is also the other facet of the medal. We are still fac-
ing, I do trust more and more sporadic, acts of terrorism, extremism,
revenge , tendencies of further fragmentation of states, while in each coun-
___________
* President of the Federal Government of FRY.
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try there are still the forces of inertion opposing in different ways the trend
of Europeanisation and modernization.
Since the changes of October 2000, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia has, among its foreign policy priorities, included integration in
the European Union and enhancement of regional cooperation. In such a
context, we have invested quite an effort to improve bilateral relations
with our neighbours, in order to achieve the level of relations considered
normal in the other European regions. Let me remind you, that FRY has
renewed or established diplomatic relations with countries with which
these did not exist, the Agreement on Succession between the Former
SFRY successor states has been concluded, numerous bilateral agree-
ments have been initiated or signed in the fields of economy, politics,
transport, culture, media, sports, information, science and etc.. At the
same time, the FRY is actively participating in all regional cooperation ini-
tiatives: we participate actively in a large number of Working groups and
other forms of cooperation within the framework of the Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe, Process of Cooperation in South Eastern Europe,
SECI, Central-European Initiative and Adriatic-Ionian initiative. We
have also applied for membership in the Organization for Black Sea
Initiative and are taking steps to join the CEFTA. Along with this process,
we are preparing the negotiations with the European Union with the aim
to conclude the Agreement on Stabilization and Association. These two
processes -the European integration and regional cooperation -we see as
mutually complementary and supporting activities, rather than con-
fronting processes. In the course of next year, the FRY expects new tasks
and new temptations. Among others, we expect to become a full member
of the Council of Europe and commencement of official negotiations with
the European Union.  The FRY will also try to render special contribution
to the regional cooperation, as the next Chairman of the Process of
Cooperation in the South Eastern Europe.
The South Eastern Europe is a region of huge potentials and hopes,
but with serious problems too. I do hope that this Conference will con-
tribute to find out a real solutions and proposals for cooperation among
neighbours, as means to overcome the problems and realize the potentials.
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PART TWO
REFORMING REGIONAL 
FRAMEWORK IN SEE AND THE
ROLE OF EUROPEAN UNION
TOWARDS REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE
BALKANS:
AN ASSESSEMENT OF THE EU APPROACH 1
by  Othon Anastasakis *
During the post-cold war period, the international community has
been advocating the goal of regional cooperation in South Eastern Europe
as  primary means of creating a more secure and Europeanized Balkan
regional community. As a result, South Eastern European countries have
witnessed a significant number of regional approaches and initiatives, aim-
ing at ambitious political, economic and security goals and the reconstruc-
tion of the region. Yet, despite the plethora of international ideas and poli-
cies, actual regional cooperation has been, at best meager, leading to the
hypothesis that there is either something wrong with the existing regional
approaches and initiatives or there is a lack of willingness from the part of
South Eastern European actors to cooperate with each other, or both.
The following paper discusses the way in which the international
community has been projecting regional cooperation -perceiving, adopt-
ing and implementing strategies and initiatives -in South Eastern Europe.
Special emphasis is attached to the role of the European Union, currently
the most influential external factor, in terms of economic, political and
security presence in the region. The following paper deals with three rele-
vant topics: first, it discusses the main external motives behind the willing-
ness to pursue regional cooperation in the Balkans; second, it describes
briefly the EU strategy in the course of the post-1989 period; and third, it
presents a critical assessment of the international policy of regional coop-
eration in South Eastern Europe.
___________
1 This paper is part of wider project on Regional Cooperation in the Balkans 
and European Integration funded by the Euroepan Commission. I would 
like to thank my colleagues Dr Spyros Economides, Dr Vesna Bojicic-Dzeli-
lovic and Ms Daphne Papahadjopoulos for their constructive comments.
* The London School of Economics and Political Science & ELIAMEP.
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A. External assumptions on regional cooperation
External perceptions and attitudes in the region have defined the
recommended nature of regional cooperation in the Balkans. One can dis-
cern various motives and assumptions behind the international communi-
tys willingness to promote the idea of regionalism in that part of Europe.
Historically, the Balkan region has been perceived as one generating con-
flict of a potentially wider European influence. Successive conflicts during
the course of the 19th and 20th centuries have convinced the internation-
al community that the Balkans have always been a danger zone com-
posed by small, unviable, mutually antagonistic and internally intolerant
states (Mazower, 2000). Such a perception has been very much strength-
ened by post-1989 successive conflicts and wars in the region. The debate
on the current transition in South Eastern Europe has been dominated by
the complexity of ethnic politics and conflicts in the region. Inter-ethnic
violence is often referred to as the persistence of ancient hatreds that are
seen as endemic (Allock, 2000). The fear of the spillover effect has dom-
inated Western thinking since the start of the disintegration of former
Yugoslavia and continues until now to confuse Western policy making.
Despite the negative lessons and experiences of wars in Croatia, Bosnia
and Kosovo, the international community is once again confronted with
the uncertain outcomes of the current crisis in FYR Macedonia. The epit-
ome of regionalism in South Eastern Europe lies, therefore, in its precari-
ous and conflict-prone character. The international community and the
EU are convinced that regional cooperation can lead to prosperity and sta-
bility and can eventually prepare these countries for the major long-term
goal of European integration. As it will be analysed in this paper, region-
al cooperation is regarded as a necessary condition for the development of
European integration at a regional and bilateral level. A number of
assumptions have led the EU to define regional cooperation in South
Eastern Europe not only as the goal , but also the means and condition for
deeper integration with the EU. 
First, based on the post-Second World War EC experience, there is
a firm belief on the positive outcomes of regional cooperation. In fact, the
European Community is proud to represent the most successful empirical
case of regional integration, which led to the establishment of a security
regime in Western Europe through the means of economic integration, a
paradigm that could be emulated in other European post-conflict soci-
eties. From the initial European Coal and Steel Community and the grad-
ual reduction of barriers in the movement of goods, services, capital and
people, the EC developed into a fully fledged common market, an eco-
nomic and monetary union and a prospective political union. This experi-
ence illustrates how regionalism based initially on economic forces and
material interests can help overcome not only economic but most impor-
tant political and security divisions. Interdependence and economic coop-
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eration based on the regional development of trade, investment, environ-
ment and common infrastructure are perceived as significant ways of inte-
grating the new democracies and market economies within wider Europe.
Second, the EC realized - soon after the downfall of communist
regimes -the necessity of a wider united Europe through the integration
of former Eastern communist countries in the European Communities. At
the same time, it was feared that the simultaneous incorporation into the
EU of all Eastern countries, going through the process of a multiple post-
communist transition, would radically affect the unity and achievements of
the EC/EU. It is also critical to remember that during the 1990s, the EU
was going through a comprehensive internal transformation marked by
the Economic and Monetary Union and the development of a hybrid polit-
ical union around the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs. Regionalism
was therefore perceived as a way to manage the integration of a large
number of Eastern countries. Hence, the EU embarked from the begin-
ning on a policy of regional differentiation and gradual convergence to
manage the pace of closer economic association and eventual incorpora-
tion of Eastern Europe. It declared the countries of the Central European
region - Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia - more committed to
democratization and economic reform and thus better equipped for closer
integration. As a result, despite the historical simultaneity of the post-com-
munist Eastern European transition, post-communist Eastern Europe was
almost automatically divided into sub-regions with specific characteristics
and particular transition developments. The EU has been dealing in many
ways with countries belonging to the sub-regions of Central Europe, the
Baltics, the post-Soviet republics (CIS) and the Balkans. The Balkan
region was divided further between the EU candidate countries Bulgaria
and Romania, and the Western Balkans -former Yugoslav Republics plus
Albania minus Slovenia, the latter moving effectively into the more
advanced Central European region. Although the division between
Eastern European sub-groups has never been clear-cut, each region
appears to have its own logic of existence and some common political, eco-
nomic and security regional characteristics, in the eyes of the internation-
al community. What has also been important is that each region has had
its advocate states, based mostly on reasons of geographic proximity, eco-
nomic and security interests. As such, Germany and Austria have placed a
greater emphasis on the integration of Central European countries in the
EU, the Scandinavian countries on the Baltics while the stability of South
Eastern Europe became the primary concern of neighbouring Italy and
Greece.
Third, security has been the primary concern of the international
community in dealing with the regions of Eastern Europe and regional
cooperation is seen as part of a process of confidence-building and securi-
ty at a regional and a pan-European level (Bjurner, 1999). The 1990s have
witnessed the remarkable emergence of regional sub-groupings from the
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Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, based on common geographical space and
proximity. The Central European Initiative (CEI) in 1989, the Visegrad
Group in 1991, the Council of the Baltic Sea States in 1992, the Central
European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) in 1993 and the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992 have been among the most promi-
nent subregional groupings established as a result of the post-communist
transition. By allowing their members to engage in various forms of inten-
sive cooperation, mostly on low politics issues, they aimed at contributing
to security and confidence building among neighbouring states. The Vise-
grad group can be considered a quite successful regional initiative, in that
it managed, from the early stages of transition, to build confidence among
the countries in Central Europe and to strengthen their diplomatic posi-
tion vis-à-vis the West and the former Soviet Union. (Cottey, 1999)
Eventually, the Central European region succeeded in solving its security
dilemma first through the incorporation of Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic in NATO structures in 1996 and a leading role in the race
for EU accession. Similarly, the Council of the Baltic Sea States managed
to bring together countries of different histories, politics and size around
the common interest of a sea basin, focusing on cooperation in the fields
of democratization, trade, environment and infrastructure (Stalvant,
1999). 
Fourth, a central conviction of the international community is that
the issues and problems -economic, political and wider security -in South
Eastern Europe cannot be resolved on a national basis or through bilater-
al policy alone. They are regional in character and therefore require addi-
tional regional measures. In the economic field, intra-regional trade, infra-
structure, energy, telecommunications and banking are par excellence
regional issues and can be approached more effectively from a multilater-
al perspective. At the political level, governments and civil societies can
also benefit by cooperating regionally. Although the process of democra-
cy and state building is carried out by the individual states, there are also
political issues, which are regional in the fields of human rights, corruption
and protection of minorities. Security, or the lack of it, is a predominantly
regional problem and can only be confronted on a multilateral basis. The
regional character of security refers, not just to the states territorial
defence of borders, but to a wider notion of security that includes the com-
bat against cross-border informal networks or dealing with the growing
number of refugees and illegal immigrants. This is regional security and
can only be approached through policies of a regional (as well as national)
character. In fact, the regional has become so predominant in South
Eastern Europe, that it is difficult to distinguish between issues that are
country specific and issues that are regional. Regional issues are those
which require collective and multilateral action by some or all the states in
the region in order to achieve benefits which cannot be attained by indi-
vidual states acting in isolation. (EastWest, 2001) Moreover, the interna-
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tional community is convinced that the efforts by each country to reach the
standards required by the European Union and other European organiza-
tions are also constrained by regional problems. Cooperation between
states in improving security and stability in the region and pursuing com-
mon objectives is believed to help boost the efforts of individual states to
integrate with Europe. For that reason, the EU has placed a strict condi-
tionality on Southeast European regional cooperation, without which it is
denying the deepening of bilateral relations. The EU is based on the belief
that South Eastern European countries wishing to build ties with the
European Union must first prove their readiness to cooperate with their
neighbours. 
B. A brief overview of the EUs regional policy 
in South Eastern Europe
1. 1989 -mid-1990s: The origins of a differentiated approach 
The lack of an international homogeneous regional strategy, the pre-
dominance of individual member states policies and the institutionaliza-
tion of a varied and differentiated EC/EU approach mark the period from
1989 until the mid-1990s. The international community was faced from the
start with a diverse region consisting of countries with different develop-
ments and external relations. At one end, former Yugoslavia by virtue of
its more open political and economic system was the more advanced com-
pared with all the other South East European socialist countries and the
only country to have concluded trade agreements with the EC since 1980
(Uvalic, 2000). At the other end, Albania with an overcentralized,
autarchic and isolated economy was by far the poorest and the most iso-
lated internationally. Bulgaria and Romania were more classical cases of
post-communist transition as their interests were previously tied to the
other COMECON countries. But even in those two cases, there had been
significant national differences as their communist elites had pursued a dif-
ferent mode of communist orientation. The disintegration of Yugoslavia
and the subsequent creation of more states exacerbated the regions het-
erogeneity, it perplexed and diversified international policy in the area.
Competing national interests and domestic disagreements among Western
states and a common foreign and security policy under formation led to
ambiguities and mixed messages rather than a coherent strategy. 
At the bilateral level, the EU employed a variety of approaches and
instruments in South Eastern Europe. It included Slovenia, Bulgaria and
Romania in its financial assistance programmes (Bulgaria 1990, Romania
1991 and Slovenia 1992) and signed the Europe Agreements with Bulgaria
and Romania in 1993 and with Slovenia in 1996. It developed bilateral
relations with Albania in 1992 through the signing of a Trade and
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Cooperation Agreement and the granting of PHARE assistance. With
respect to the remaining breakaway republics of Yugoslavia, the EU
focused mostly on crisis management, reflecting the countries emergency
needs at the time; as for the bilateral framework, this was marked by fur-
ther differentiation within the territory of former Yugoslavia. After suf-
fering the negative effects of the Greek embargo FYR Macedonia signed
a Trade and Cooperation agreement in 1996. The country was considered
(up until the eruption of the ethnic conflict in 2000) the most reliable
Western Balkan regional partner. It was seen as a model for stability
(despite its unstable surroundings) and positive EU political conditionali-
ty in the Western Balkans. Bosnia signed autonomous trade measures and
received financial assistance aiming at reconstruction, institution-building
and refugee return, as a result of the extensive physical and human dam-
age. Croatia was only eligible for trade measures, its PHARE assistance
was adopted in 1995 and immediately suspended due to events in Krajina.
Finally, FR Yugoslavias trade preferential regime was substituted by
sanctions, embargoes and bans, thus constituting a prime model of the
application of negative conditionality. Financial assistance through
PHARE was rather limited for the Western Balkan region while most of
it went for humanitarian purposes and the support of the peace process.
(COM (95) 581 final 1995).
2. Mid-1990s -1999: The introduction of the first Balkan regional
schemes and the Regional Approach
The mid-1990s saw the first regional schemes focusing on the strict-
ly speaking Balkan sub-region, as a result of the war in Bosnia and the
Dayton accord. The Royaumont Process for Stability and Good
Neighbourliness in South East Europe launched in 1996 concentrated on
civil society projects and a multilateral dialogue between journalists, aca-
demics, trade unionists, NGOs and parliamentarians. Before its incorpo-
ration in the Stability Pact, the Royaumonts achievements involved the
strengthening of inter-parliamentary activities, the organization of semi-
nars and conferences and NGO meetings. The South East European
Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the only US initiative, was launched in 1996
concentrating exclusively on economic cooperation and reconstruction of
the region, in the fields of infrastructure, development, trade, transport,
energy, environment and private sector development. SECI has been suc-
cessful in obtaining private financing for small scale cross-border projects
like the Border Crossing Facilitation: Actions to Overcome Operational
Difficulties and the establishment of a centre in Bucharest to facilitate the
exchange of information for fighting cross-border crime. The South East
European Cooperation Process (SEECP) is the only initiative generated
from within the region focusing on political cooperation and political dia-
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logue, covering a wide range of issues from security, economic coopera-
tion, humanitarian, social and cultural cooperation and cooperation in the
fields of justice and home affairs. It is intergovernmental in nature and
although it is non-binding and informal, SEECP provides a forum for dis-
cussion where common positions and joint declarations can be taken, at
the level of political elites.  
While the EU has been from the start supportive, politically and
financially, of all those regional schemes it was also from the early stages
aware of their limits and difficulties; it recognized that the development of
regional cooperation schemes was hindered by many factors, including the
slow progress of political and economic stability under the Dayton/Paris
process, the persistence of bilateral inter-state disputes, the problems with
borders and minorities, the precarious economic conditions and a certain
degree of overlapping or lack of coordination among the various initiatives
(COM (97) 659 final). The first EU attempt to present its own regional
policy came with the Regional Approach. The Regional Approach
towards the four successor countries of former Yugoslavia plus Albania
(the Western Balkan countries), aimed at the implementation of the
Dayton and the Paris Peace Agreements and advocated political and eco-
nomic cooperation among these countries, the establishment of good
neighbourly relations regarding the free movement of goods, services and
people and the development of projects of common interest. This
Regional Approach was accompanied by a detailed and explicit political
and economic conditionality, compliance with which allowed for the
development of bilateral relations with the Western Balkan countries in
the fields of trade, financial assistance, economic cooperation as well as
contractual relations. However, a long list of conditions on democratic
principles, human rights, the rule of law, economic reform, regional coop-
eration and additional compliance with obligations under the peace
treaties made it even more difficult for aid and agreements to come
through. 
As a result during the period 1997-1999 until the Kosovo war, little
or no progress was recorded in the development of deeper bilateral rela-
tions with the Western Balkan countries, based on a close monitoring of
conditionality by the European Commission. (PRES/98/369/9.12.98)
Bosnia remained with trade measures and PHARE assistance but not a
Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Croatia continued to be excluded
from PHARE funding and from negotiations for a Trade and Cooperation
Agreement and Yugoslavia was excluded from most assistance pro-
grammes, regional initiatives and trade preferences, and an exclusionary
EU policy designed to punish political misbehaviour. Overall, the 1990s
EU approach in Southeastern Europe was characterised by an inter-
changeable series of positive/inclusionary and negative/exclusionary meas-
ures, a great diversity of EU bilateral relations with Bulgaria, Romania
and Slovenia in the context of the pre-accession strategy, on the one hand,
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and the Western Balkan countries in the context of the Regional
Approach, on the other, and a punitive form of conditionality directed
mainly towards the Western Balkans. At the same time, financial aid was
mostly directed towards emergency humanitarian and reconstruction
needs.
3. Post-1999 period: The Stability Pact and the Stabilization 
and Association Process
The war in Kosovo forced the EU to re-evaluate its previous strate-
gy and instigated a serious debate on the reconstruction of the area, indica-
tive of the willingness for a more constructive, committed and long-term
approach in the Balkans. The new EU approach was characterised by (1)
the re-organization of the regional framework, (2) the offer of a more
committed bilateral framework of relations (3) the unification of financial
assistance and (4) a more balanced application of positive and negative
conditionality. The new framework, a considerable carrot in the region
came as a response to a crisis situation and within a deteriorating political,
economic and security situation affecting the whole of South Eastern
Europe. This latest EU approach has been based on the regional Stability
Pact, the bilateral Stabilization and Association Process and the CARDS
financial framework.
Following its launch and its high political profile in Sarajevo in July
1999, the Stability Pact was broad in composition and high in expectations
and declarations. As a regional tool for the reconstruction of South
Eastern Europe, the SP is a comprehensive and ambitious framework aim-
ing to act as a stimulus and project coordinator for reform and reconstruc-
tion. It involves the participation of individual states, international organ-
izations and financial institutions, bilateral donors and regional initiatives
to foster democratic processes, strengthen economic and political cooper-
ation in the region, protect human rights and promote a sound market
economy. It is a forum for its members to identify measures and projects
that can contribute to the stability and development of the region. At the
first regional conference in March 2000, donors pledged 2.4 billion euros
and a quick package of regional projects and initiatives was decided. The
overwhelming majority of funds went to infrastructure and the rest to
security and civil society programmes. The focus of the second regional
conference in October 2001 has been on long-term development based on
infrastructure sectors -transport, air traffic, energy, water- support for the
private sector development in the fields of trade, SME and banking as well
as refugee issues, commitments that amount to more than 3 bn euros. 
At the core of the new EU policy is the Stabilization and Association
Process, aiming at a new kind of contractual relationships introducing the
status of a potential candidate for EU membership with a long-term
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prospect of accession of the five Western Balkan countries of the previous
Regional Approach (COM (99) 235). The Stabilization and Association
Agreements (SAAs) are designed for the Western Balkan countries and
are based largely on the experience of the Europe Agreements. There is
however, a major innovation in the SAAs regarding the aim of regional
cooperation. Whereas regional cooperation is encouraged among the
Europe Agreement countries, it is required by the Stabilization and
Association Agreement countries, and is being translated into an explicit
condition for the further development of bilateral relations with the EU.
The 2000 Zagreb summit identified explicitly the areas of regional coop-
eration in the fields of political dialogue, free trade area and justice and
home affairs (organized crime, corruption, money laundering, illegal
immigration, trafficking of human beings and all other forms of traffick-
ing).  
In the field of financial assistance, the EU has introduced a unified
programme for Assistance Reconstruction, Development and Stabiliza-
tion (CARDS), concentrating on the building up and modernization of
institutions, the rule of law, respect for minorities and the development of
market economy. (Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000). To this end
4,650 million euros have been committed for the period 2000-2006 for
investment, institution building and other measures. CARDS is closely
connected with the intensification of the bilateral Stabilization and
Association Process and aims at financing the national necessities of the
countries in the Western Balkan region. Its regional section, the Regional
Strategy Paper for the CARDS Assistance Programme to the Western
Balkans marks a significant new step in the EUs regional approach. It
covers only those parts of the programme which are not country specific
within a budget of 197 million euros for the 2002-2004 period, a 10% of the
available CARDS funding. The Regional Strategy Paper sets out for the
first time a more focused and clear political strategy on four particular
regional issues: integrated border management, institutional capacity buil-
ding, democratic stabilization and regional infrastructural development.
These have been selected because of their contribution to regional coop-
eration and because the support can be best delivered at the regional level. 
C. Some critical remarks
On the basis of the previous presentation there are some critical
remarks regarding the regional strategy of the European Union in South
Eastern Europe. First, there is a confusing definition of the notion of
South Eastern Europe and a difficulty to define which countries belong to
the region. While the Western Balkan core has been targeted by the EU
Regional Approach, all regional initiatives and the Stability Pact have
clearly included Bulgaria and Romania. In a wider sense, South Eastern
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Europe includes Slovenia, Greece, Turkey, Hungary and Moldova each of
these with different levels of developments and degrees of integration with
the EU, but clearly affected by regional developments. Second, all region-
al approaches and initiatives in South Eastern Europe have been post-con-
flict responses and conceived as remedies to serious crises and wars. With
the exception of the SEECP, these have been imposed by external actors,
with limited input from the local actors. Third, regional cooperation in
South Eastern Europe has never been defined explicitly, its nature is elu-
sive apart from generalizations and the identification of opportunities for
projects. Initiatives and approaches are all encompassing and they profess
very vague and ambitious goals. Fourth, while it is assumed that regional
problems require regional solutions, there is a confusion of what is com-
mon among countries and what is regional in Southeastern Europe. Most
countries in South Eastern Europe share similar developmental problems,
which may require national and not regional solutions while other issues
are clearly cross-border and cross-national and can be treated by regional
schemes. Fifth, there is no systematic evaluation on the effectiveness -suc-
cesses or failures -of regional cooperation, although this is an explicit con-
dition for the development of integration with the EU. With the exception
of the candidate countries undergoing the Commissions scrutiny and
annual evaluation, the other Balkan countries enjoy ad hod reports.
Moreover, with the exception of the Stability Pact, there are no reports
evaluating the progress of the other regional initiatives. Some critical
assessments that have appeared, from time to time, reflect the realization
that initiatives have not born the anticipated results. 
Despite the overwhelming objectives, the results have been meagre
and discouraging. The international approaches to Balkan regional coop-
eration aspire to lead to the goal of integration yet the level of regional
integration is very limited as indicated by low trade, poor infrastructural
connections and hard border. They aspire to contribute to European inte-
gration, yet the level of European integration of the countries of South
Eastern Europe lags significantly behind that of Central Europe and the
Baltic countries. They aspire to lead to confidence building yet they have
barely contributed to the building of trust and security. All in all, the
region of South Eastern Europe is mostly identified by its economic back-
wardness, insecurity and its lower degree of integration with the EU. Even
Bulgaria and Romania which have started accession talks with the EU
since 1999, they have been left out of the bing bang enlargement with the
Central European and the Baltic countries which could take place as early
as 2004, according to the 2001 Annual Commission Report on the future
of the accession countries. Moreover, the regions economic backwardness
is exacerbated by its limited economic significance within the EU. The
total GDP of the region of US $100 billion and the GDP per capita is also
around US$ 1600 are well below those of Greece or Portugal. The limited
economic weight of the region is also reflected in the small size of foreign
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direct investment in South Eastern Europe compared with that directed to
the countries of Central Europe. Over the period 1989-2000 the region
received just over US $ 300 per capita of FDI compared with about US $
1200 in Central Europe and the Baltics. (IMF-World Bank, 2001)
Apart from a generic criticism on the notion of regional cooperation
in South Eastern Europe and its weak results, the regional initiatives and
the EU approach have also been viewed critically, reflecting the limita-
tions of the international strategies. The Stability Pact has been perceived
as too broad and ambitious with no clearly defined regional cooperation
meaning. Moreover, despite its threefold function on democratization,
economic reform and security, with respect to the allocation of funds the
lions share (75%) goes to the second working table. The principle
approach to regionalism within the Stability Pact has been the develop-
ment of regional infrastructure through international investment. Within
the Quick Start Package, infrastructure accounts for 75% of total invest-
ment, the majority directed towards road building and transport construc-
tion. Placing such emphasis on reconstruction, the Stability Pact has been
criticised for being unable to address wider structural developmental prob-
lems in the region. (Gligorov, 2000)
It is now consistently believed that there is a need for the reorienta-
tion of the Stability Pact, as it is understood that it originated under the
different circumstances of the end of the Kosovo war and the existence of
authoritarian regimes in Croatia and Serbia. Moreover, it is regarded as an
ambiguous political and bureaucratic mechanism with no clear authority
and guidance. The East West Institute has suggested discontinuing most of
the bureaucracy of committees and task forces, as well as the three
Working Tables and focusing instead on functional integration in selected
sectors in the fields of energy, free movement and organized crime, refer-
ring to the Monnet method of the European Coal and Steel Community.
(East West Institute, 2001) CEPS has suggested that the EU should be the
leader of the Stability Pact and that regional ownership should be more
pronounced. (CEPS, 2001). Moreover, it has been argued that the parallel
existence of other regional initiatives, which in their turn have been criti-
cized for their lack of effectiveness and clarity of purpose, has exacerbat-
ed the coherence of the international strategy in South Eastern Europe.
(ESI, 2000)
Despite such criticism, there are some hopeful signs on the prospect
of regional cooperation in the Balkans. Democratization in Serbia and
Croatia, two key states in the Western Balkans, offers a promising ground
for a more fertile future cross-country relationship. Moreover, the latest
accords on trade liberalization and refugee return under the auspices of
the Stability Pact have been regarded as substantial improvements. By
singing in 2001 a Memorandum of understanding on Liberalization and
Facilitation of Trade, the governments of Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Romania FYR Macedonia and Yugoslavia made an important
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step towards the establishment of free trade area, aiming at the creation of
a network of bilateral free trade agreements by the end of 2002 and allow-
ing for at least 90% of goods to be exchanged freely without tariffs. An
Agenda for Regional Action for Refugees and Displaced Persons has also
been adopted in 2001 addressing a wide range of issues among Bosnia,
Croatia and Yugoslavia with respect to 1.2 million refugees and displaced
persons in their countries in a series of combined bilateral measures.
Overall, it can be argued that following a decade of an ineffective
and unfocused regional strategy, the EU has started to appreciate the real
nature of developmental problems in the region. The Stabilization and
Association Process, the CARDS financial framework and a pronounced
interest by the European Commission and the High Representative for the
CFSP are steps in the right direction. However, despite the more promis-
ing EU strategy there is still doubt whether the EU has been at last able to
adopt the right regional strategy for the right environment. As stated in
the paper, one of the main dilemmas facing the European Unions policy
in the region is linked with the need to coordinate the multilateral with the
bilateral, the national and the regional. The diversity in the EUs bilateral
relations with the individual countries, on the one hand, and the regions
heterogeneity, on the other, have presented serious obstacles in the adop-
tion of a common strategy. Yet, geographic proximity, similar political cul-
tures and common interests and goals can act as the main factors con-
ducive to reform and regional cooperation.  The paper has presented some
aspects of the international and particularly the EU approach in the
region. Having identified the main external inconsistencies, it should be
added that there are also major internal obstacles to regional cooperation
emanating from the resilience of negative and extremist forces in the
region. Regional cooperation would therefore require not only a deeper
insight from the part of the international community into the nature of
Balkan developments - free of misperceptions and preconceived ideas -
but also the local understanding of the necessity to cooperate between
neighbouring countries and peoples sharing common goals and interests.
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THE STABILITY PACT BEYOND EU 
ENLARGEMENT 1
by Wim van Meurs *
The Enigmatic Stability Pact
Applauded at its inception at the Cologne Summit in June 1999, the
Stability Pact (SP) for South Eastern Europe has faced increasing criticism
both from the region and from Western think tanks since. Obviously, the
Pact has failed to live up to most of the high (or exaggerated) expectations.
This is partly due to architectural weaknesses in the set-up of the Pact,
partly to questionable policy decisions, and, last but not the least, the
immensity of its task: A long-term undertaking under pressure to produce
short-term results.   
!At the beginning of the Stability Pact, the decision to place it under 
the auspices of the OSCE has been criticized as an unwelcome 
political compromise: The profile of NATO in the Third Working 
Table was remarkably low, its relations with the US initiative for 
South Eastern Europe SECI remained tense and unproductive 
until SECI coordinator Busek became the EU Special Represen-
tative for the SP in January 2002. 
!Despite the success of the donors conferences, the SP acquired a 
negative reputation as a talk shop and the imprecise system of 
pledges doubts arose concerning the amount of fresh money
involved in the more than 2 billion USD from the March 2000 
donors conference. 
___________
1 This paper is based on research done in the framework of a joint project for 
South Eastern Europe by the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Center for 
Applied Policy Research.
* Center for Applied Policy Research and Brtelsamann Foundation.
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!Originally, its comprehensiveness was celebrated, but after the 
completion of the Quick Start Package, the prioritising of actions 
and agenda setting became an often-heard demand. The strategy 
of the Stability Pact will have to move forward from humanitarian 
aid to development programs, from assistance to sustainability. 
!Regionality as a policy principle and regional cooperation as the 
key to success still lack substance and tend to become fashionable 
buzzwords without correspondence to the realities on the ground.
! In the year 2001 the Stability Pact and its coordinator came to play 
a positive, but ill-defined role in the EUs ad-hoc peacekeeping 
efforts in the Tetovo crisis. The admission of Moldova as a SP 
recipient country in the summer of 2001 also seemed problematic, 
as the former Soviet republic lacks the perspective of EU accession 
given to the Zagreb-5 states of the Western Balkans. 
Rather than indulging in criticism of the SPs set-up and its policy
choices, I would like to look forward to the challenges it faces under a new
leadership in the short and medium term, i.e. a rearrangement of its coop-
eration with the EUs Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and the
possible redesign of the whole European strategy for South Eastern
Europe with the decision on the first round of Eastern enlargement in
2002. 
Nevertheless, the Stability Pact remains one of the most enigmatic
political inventions of the late 20th century:
!Under the Clinton administration some officials at the State 
Department claimed the SP had been a US initiative, but that they 
preferred it to be presented as a German plan. Conversely, their 
counterparts in Berlin as well as in the Stability Pact Office in 
Brussels underlined it had been a genuine German design, viewed 
with sympathy in Washington, but no more. 
!Similarly, many US officials perceived of the SP as a declaration of 
intent with a corresponding media show (in Sarajevo), whereas 
Europeans came to consider the Pact an institutional headache:
!Strategically, the SP is an EU project, closely intertwined with the 
perspective of EU candidacy, offered to the five countries for the 
first time in the context of the Pact. Nevertheless, the European 
Union is only one out of so-many signatories, despite its leading 
role. 
!The actual relationship between SP and SAP, however, is equally 
problematic: The SP Office considers the SAP the EU contribu-
tion to the Pact, whereas the European Commission treats the SP 
as a kind of stepping stone for the Zagreb-5 to reach the level 
necessary for a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).
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Regional and European Integration
The congruence between the Stability Pact and the instruments of
EU enlargement is a fundamental issue. Although the Pact and the
Stabilization and Association Process were parallel inventions in the
first half of 1999, many incompatibilities have come to the fore since. In
some ways, the SP is a substitute for a Common Strategy for South Eastern
Europe. (Later, Common Strategies have been written for Russia and
Ukraine, but the situation in the Balkans did not allow for a delay until the
Amsterdam Treaty introducing the instrument of the Common Strategy
had been ratified.) Conversely, the SAA was based on earlier plans for a
Stabilization Agreement. With the perspective of EU candidacy the
SAA became the South Eastern European substitute for Europe
Agreements of Eastern Enlargement. 
The Stability Pact is based on the EU principle of regionality, the
convoy model in enlargement terms: Regional cooperation will not only
reduce stability risks in the region, but will also move all five states for-
ward on their way to the European Union. Such a strategy needs a critical
mass of more advanced, more stable countries to work and therefore (with
Serbia still under Milosevic dictatorship) Romania and Bulgaria were
added to the list of recipient countries, although its original name had been
Stability Pact for the Balkans. Meanwhile, however, around the 1998
Vienna European Council, the EU had invented the concept of Western
Balkans, to underline the distinction between the EU accession states
and the remaining states of the peninsula. Thus, the territorial definition
of the SP trespasses on future EU borders, whereas (potential) coopera-
tion on the ground often fails to coincide with these five or seven-country
groupings. 
Furthermore, the SP is based on regionality and multilateralism,
whereas the SAAs are based on conditionality and bilateralism. Formally,
regional cooperation is one of the conditions in the bilateral SAA between
each of the five (two so far) Balkan countries and Brussels, but it is hard
to assess and enforce as a condition. The success of regional cooperation
eo ipso depends on at least two and probably more countries in the region.
The EU would be hard-pressed to produce a measuring stick or bench-
marks for regional cooperation. Conversely, the right to become a recipi-
ent country in the SP depends on basic conditions (the Helsinki principles,
etc.) only. In a region with all countries in the same stage of transition and
without mutual animosities, regionality and conditionality might be com-
patible in practice. In a (former) powder keg of ethnic and religious con-
flict like the Balkans and in a region with such glaring differences in tran-
sition progress, there is a structural tension between the two principles:
The first trucks in the convoy or, in another metaphor for regionality, the
locomotives of the train, will  in line with the conditionality of EU (pre-)
accession  leave the region by acquiring a different contractual status
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in their relations with the Union. Even now a country like Croatia, in
many respects is more advanced in transformation than Romania and
Bulgaria, resorts to dialectical formula to combine its readiness for region-
al cooperation with a reminder that each country should be judged by its
own reform merits. EU accession by one or more of the locomotives
with a new status inside the Schengen zone and the common market would
make the train slow down  increasing rather than reducing the dispari-
ties within the region. 
The Balkan region, thus, is artificial in a double sense: in terms of
concrete socio-economic potential and historical preconditions, on the one
hand, and in terms of collective memory and identification, on the other
hand. As no country of nation considers itself Balkanic, the region fails
to install a sense of common purpose and drive  unlike e.g. the Baltic Sea
region or Europe. In the SAP, the SAA are the key, whereas the
CARDS program with its limited regional approach clearly takes the back
seat. Moreover, although sub-regional cooperation and groupings cutting
across the formal borders between the EU-15, the Luxemburg-6, the
Helsinki-6, the Zagreb-5 and the real outsiders like Turkey, Moldova or
the Ukraine make a lot of sense in many areas, Brussels has so far showed
great reluctance to stimulate these form of regional cooperation. For
Croatias economic development closer cooperation with Hungary and
Slovenia is bound to be far more relevant than the Zagreb-5 zone. The
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)  not unlike the Council of
Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in the North  cuts across the future outer bor-
der of the EU. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the countries beyond
that border do not have an accession perspective (yet?), regional (eco-
nomic and/or political) cooperation may be extremely important  even
after EU accession! The experience from Central and Eastern Europe
shows that the competition for EU membership is detrimental to regional
cooperation. Only in the final stages of the accession process do regional
incentives gain ground again. 
Originally, the European Commission envisaged a high priority for
regionality in its Balkan policies, indicating that a free-trade zone would
be a precondition for the accession perspective and implying that the five
states would join collectively. Meanwhile , only two out of five have signed
an SAA that includes almost full (asymmetric) free trade with the EUs
common market. Thus, the level of free trade in an SAA is higher than
that envisaged in the system of bilateral free trade agreements within the
region under the Zagreb process. Implicitly the EU has acknowledged that
the EU pre-pre-accession and its conditionality take precedence over
regionality and the Stability Pact.
Official EU documents, however, have always shunned a prioritisa-
tion between SAP and SP, preferring fluctuating Aesopian formulas, giv-
ing priority to the SAP, but to the SP as well! Thus, the Presidency
Conclusions of the Laeken European Council referred to the Western
Balkans with one uninspired statement only:
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The European Union has taken a full role in encouraging and assist-
ing the countries of the region to continue their efforts in the frame-
work of the Stabilization and Association Process. The prospect of
accession and the assistance provided by the European Union are key
elements in promoting that process, respecting human rights, demo-
cratic principles and internationally recognized frontiers. The
European Council welcomes the appointment of Dr Erhard Busek as
Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact and thanks his predecessor,
Mr Bodo Hombach, for his major contribution to the stability of the
region.
The composite paper to the 1999 Progress Report had seemed to
give priority to the SP for the short and medium term, to the SAP in the
long term:
The multiplicity of initiatives in the Western Balkans has created
confusion. It has also diluted the influence of the EU in the region. As
a first step the EU should work, through the Stability Pact, to stream-
line and focus the maximum international effort. In the longer term the
EU can best contribute to stability in the region by drawing it closer to
the perspective of full integration into its structures, and should confirm
that the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania have the ulti-
mate vocation to become members of the European Union. It should
further develop accession criteria, building on those defined at
Copenhagen, which would make Union membership conditional not
only upon the principles of Article 6 TEU, but upon 
-mutual recognition of each others borders; 
- settlement of all outstanding issues relating to the treatment of
national minorities; 
-establishment of a regional organization for free trade and eco-
nomic cooperation as a basis for closer integration into the Union. 
The bilateral Stabilization and Association Agreements should
make association status conditional upon membership of that organiza-
tion which would also encourage closer political cooperation between
these countries. Inter-institutional links between the EU and the
regional organization would constitute a basis for gradual alignment
with Community legislation and pre-accession strategies for the indi-
vidual countries. The EU, for its part, should encourage regional inte-
gration by contributing to an economic development fund, managed
jointly by the EU and the countries of the region, destined for big infra-
structure projects and institution building.
Conversely, next years strategy paper failed to mention the Stability
Pact and highlighted only the SAP:
At its meeting in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 the European
Council agreed that all of the countries in the region are potential
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candidates of the Union. This perspective should help each country to
accelerate the pace of reform and to begin to align its laws and struc-
tures with those in the European Union. In many areas, experience
gained in the pre-accession process with the candidate countries will be
useful in transferring expertise and know-how to the Western Balkan
countries. The Stabilization and Association process, which is the
framework for the EUs policy in the Western Balkans, is now better
understood in the region and is seen as the road to Europe. It pro-
vides for political dialogue, far-reaching trade liberalization, important
financial assistance and close cooperation in many spheres of econom-
ic and social life. This framework allows each country to move at its
own pace, with technical and financial support from the Union. 
Although the misfit between regionality and conditionality, between
SP and SAP is structural and insolvable in principle, this conclusion does
not warrant denying or ignoring the misfit. Rather, a differentiated
approach is required  giving priority to conditionality where appropriate
and to regionality where possible. Such a strategy of differentiated
(regional and European) integration would have to take into account the
additional requirements of stabilization for the EU (reducing the realistic
level of conditionality), the regionality-conditionality dilemma as well as
the heterogeneity of the region.
After the Big Bang
In the early stages of the SP and in the aftermath of the Kosovo War,
some think tanks advanced more far-reaching proposals for a New Deal
for the Balkans, a Marshall Plan and even accelerated ("virtual or
partial) integration in the EU. At that time, these proposals along the
lines of differentiated integration were way beyond what the European
leaders, still recovering from their audacious decisions to open negotia-
tions with the Helsinki-6 and to give the Zagreb-5 an EU perspective,
would be willing to consider. Moreover, with Milosevic still in power and
with even the most basic stability in the region still uncertain, key precon-
ditions for such a strategy were missing.
Meanwhile, Milosevic in The Hague and with democratic and
reform-oriented governments in each and every state (and state-like enti-
ty) of the region, a new window of opportunity  quite unimaginable until
recently  has been opened. On top of that -like the Kosovo War created
the momentum for the negotiations with the Helsinki-6 and a correspon-
ding change in enlargement dynamics  September 11th has made a big
bang enlargement of the European Union in 2004 the default option, as
confirmed by the Laeken European Council:
The European Council agrees with the report of the Commission,
which considers that, if the present rate of progress of the negotiations
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and reforms in the candidate States is maintained, Cyprus, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, the
Czech Republic and Slovenia could be ready. It appreciates the efforts
made by Bulgaria and Romania and would encourage them to contin-
ue on that course. 
Consequently, after 2004 the EU would have two waiting rooms 
a small room en suite for Romania and Bulgaria, waiting another five
years for accession and a more crowded long-term (ten to fifteen years)
waiting room for the five countries of the Western Balkans.     
This medium-term consolidation of Europe raises two questions: Is
there an added value to having two separate waiting rooms (except for the
permanence of the institutional set-up and policy choices)? Can Europe
afford the stability risk of keeping five or seven countries on its doorstep
for another five to fifteen years? 
An affirmative answer tot the first question would seem to contra-
dict the EU principle of regionality, whereas a negative answer would
imply a complete redesigning of the enlargement strategy along the lines
of regionality and to the detriment of Romania and Bulgaria who
already achieved the status of negotiating candidates. Consequently, the
new design would have to be attractive to both these remaining Helsinki
candidates and to the upcoming SAA states. As no also seems to be the
correct answer to the second question, differentiated integration may soon
be on the European agenda for South Eastern Europe in order to stimu-
late regionality, uphold some conditionality in the self-momentum of
enlargement and come to terms with the enhanced requirement of securi-
ty and stability for the Wider Europe. 
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REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH EASTERN
EUROPE -TOWARDS A NEW INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK?
by Du{ko Lopandi} *
I Introduction: Economy and Cooperation 
in the Balkans - Do Wee See a Light at the end of the Tunnel?
One of the main structural weaknesses of the Balkans/South Eastern
Europe (SEE)1 is its seemingly never-ending process of fragmentation
into smaller and smaller political units. Balkanization is limiting growth
potentials of the region. The mere existence of a number of borders in a
relatively small space is hindering free flow of people, goods, capital and
services, thus impeding creation of economies of scale, needed for devel-
opment. The solution for fragmentation would be the integration of the
countries of the region into a regional institutional framework, together
with its progressive integration into European structures (intra-regional
and extra-regional integration). However, a number of regional initiatives
undertaken until now have failed to produce sufficient pro-integration
momentum. As the process of EU integration is concerned, even
Bulgaria and Romania, official candidates have little chance for rapid
accession into the EU2.
___________
* European Movement in Serbia, Executive Board.
1 We will consider as South Eastern European countries seven transition 
countries (Croatia, Bosnia, FR Yugoslavia, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria 
and Romania) and, when appropriate Greece and Turkey.
2 See the latest Strategy Paper of the European Commission on the process of 
Enlargement (Brussels, November 2001).
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The aim of this paper is to look at institutional aspects of the region-
al cooperation. In the framework of possible restructuring of regional ini-
tiatives, we will examine the regional policy of the EU in the region (the
Process of Stabilization and Association) and the current debate about
the future of the Stability Pact in South Eastern Europe. We will also
examine future potentials for multilateral cooperation of the South
Eastern Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP).
Seven transition countries in South Eastern Europe comprise 56
million people and GNP of about USD 2.200 per capita -roughly half the
income level of the five Central European Countries. The past decade of
transition and conflict has left the region with a legacy of inadequate
growth and declining living standards.3 However, recent studies published
by international financial institutions depict improved situation, which
gives room for more optimism. After political and economic changes in
FR Yugoslavia, there are encouraging, though early signs, of a broad
based improvement in the SEE countries economic performances. Growth
is strengthening and inflation is slowing...4 With the exception of
FYROM, economic growth in SEE rebounded in 2000 and 2001, averag-
ing 4% year-on-year in the region as a whole in the first half of 2001.5
There are also encouraging signs concerning liberalization of regional
trade and management of macro-economic policies. According to the
UN/ECE forecasts, for the first time since the start of transition process,
SEE countries would have the average growth rate in 2001 higher then
Central or Eastern European countries.
Those weak signs of improvements should  also be supported by
bolder regional initiatives, both those from outside and inside the region,
leading to more integrated and restrictions-free business environment.
___________
3 See: The World Bank, The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South East 
Europe, A Regional Strategy Paper, Washington, March 2000, p. 1. Among 
broad literature on the Balkan economies see P. KAZAKOS, P. LIARGO
VAS: The Economic sub-system of the Balkan region: Difficiencies and 
Prospects, Agora Without Frontiers, Vol. 6, No. 3, Dec-Fabr 2001, 275-295; 
Ch. MICHALOPULOS, The Western Balkans in World Trade, An Essay in 
Memoriam of Bela Belassa, October 2001, www.seerecon.org; J. MINIC (ed): 
SEE in 2000, Stubovi kulture, Belgrade, 2000, 243 p; D. DAIANU: SEE 
revisited -can economic decline be stopped? Occasional Papers 21, Institute 
for Security Studies, WEU, October 2000, 32 p. V. GLIGOROV: Trade and 
Investment in the Balkans, Eurobalkans, No. 33, Winter, 1998/1999, 12-17.
4 Building Peace in South East Europe, Macroeconomic policies and structur-
al reforms since the Kosovo conflict, A joint IMF-World Bank paper for the 
Second Regional Conference for SEE, Bucharest, 25-26 October 2001, p. 1.
5 Ibid, p. 9.
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II    Restructuring of Regional Initiatives in South Eastern Europe
Around Three Core Initiatives
New situation in 2001, characterized by disappearance of nationalis-
tic and xenophobique regimes in South Eastern Europe, asks for strength-
ened regional cooperation and some new solutions.6 It is clear that the EU 
will remain the leading and decisive player in the process of regional inte-
gration (1), both because of its objective importance and because of the
political and symbolic importance given to the EU integration process by
respective governments in the region. But the possible adaptations con-
cern also other initiatives, such as Stability Pact in SEE (2) and the SEE
Cooperation Process (3). 
1.   Process of Stabilization and Association as a Pivotal Initiative 
in the Region of See
1.1. The Stabilization and Association Process with the EU repre-
sents the basic component of the EUs regional policy towards the
Western Balkans, which is also made up of some other activities (e.g.
humanitarian aid, unilateral measures, etc.). 
A more specific regional approach to some countries of South
Eastern Europe did not develop until after the conclusion of the Dayton
Peace Accords on Bosnia and Herzegovina.7 The basic objective of the
EU regional approach since 1996 has been the endeavour to sustain and
consolidate the Dayton peace process through forms of the renewal of
regional cooperation and on the basis of EU financial and other support.
It has, however, been shown that EU measures were not adequate with
respect to the magnitude of the problems (economic, political, social) in
the region, as has best been seen in the case of the disintegration of the sys-
___________
6 On recent regional cooperation schemes in the Balkans, see, inter alia: M. 
UVALIC: Regional Cooperation in SEE, South East and Black Sea 
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, Athens 2001; L. DEMETRAPOLOU: The Balkans - 
A Multidimensional Sign within Multiple Discourse, EuroBalkans, 4, 
Autumn 1999, pp. 4-10; L. BILMAN: The Regional Cooperation Initiatives 
in the South East Europe and Turkish Foreign Policy, Perceptions, Sept-
Nov., 1998, Vol. III. No. 3; S. CLEMANT: Subregional Cooperation in the 
Balkans, The Southeast European Yearbook 1997-1998, ELIAMEP, pp. 
217-226; International Commission for Balkans: Unfinished Peace, Belgrade, 
1998, Chapter IV, pp. 133-166; G. PESAKOVIC Process of Regional 
Integration in Central and Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, International 
Problems, 2-3, 1997, pp. 231-248.
7 On the regional approach, see: Commission: Report to the Council and the 
EP, COM (96) 476, Brussels, 2October 1996, as well as conclusion of the EU 
Council of 26 February 1996. D. LOPANDIC: LUnion europeenne et le 
sud-est de lEurope - lapproche globale pur une region particuliere, Revue 
du Marche commun et de lUnion europeenne, No. 418, mai 1998, p. 322-330.
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tem in Albania, as well as other problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
FRY, etc. With the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, there was a redefinition of
regional policy towards the Balkans, and two new initiatives were
launched: the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (instead of the so-
called and totally inadequate Royaumont process, launched after the
Dayton Accords)8 and the Stabilization and Association Process(SAP)
 as an alteration and addition to the hitherto regional approach. 
Unlike the previous regional approach, the SAP is founded on a
redefined strategic principle of EU countries, which was stressed most
clearly in the conclusions of the Council of Europe in Feira (Portugal) and
reiterated at a joint Summit of EU countries and five countries of the
Western Balkans in Zagreb (24 November 2000). There it was stressed
that the five Balkan countries were potential candidates for membership
of the European Union. It would, of course, be necessary to fulfill the
general conditions for EU membership envisaged for candidate countries
from Central and Eastern Europe (the Copenhagen criteria), as well as
specific conditions for Balkan countries (political conditions), which will
not be achieved either easily or quickly.
The basic elements of this process would be the following9
!Political conditionality;
!Evolution of agreements on stabilization and association as a new 
type of EU agreements with the individual countries of the Bal-
kans;
!Development and promotion of existing economic and trade rela-
tions, including the introduction of exceptional trade measures;
!Development of existing financial assistance, particularly by means 
of the new financial instrument (CARDS);10
! Increased support to democratization, the civil society and the 
renewal and development of institutions in SEE countries;
!New possibilities of diverse cooperation in a number of domains, 
such as those of Justice and Home Affairs, security issues, etc.;
!Development of political dialogue, including dialogue at a region-
al level.
___________
8 On the formulation of EU policy towards the Balkans in 1999, see the inter-
esting analysis by L. FRIS, A. MURPHEY Negotiating in a time of Crisis: the 
EUs Response to the Military Conflict in Kosovo, Europa University 
Institute, RSC, No. 2000/20, p. 40. Royaumont process was merged in 2000 
into the Stability Pact activities.
9 On SAP, see: Commission: Communication to the Council and the EP on the 
Stabilization and Association Process for Countries of South Eastern Europe, 
Brussels, 26 May 1999, COM (99) 235, p. 16. Also see: M. EMERSON: The 
EUs Balkan Policy after the Lisbon Summit, Europa South East Monitor, 
Issue 9, March 2000, http://www.ceps.be
10 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabiliza-
tion. This program takes the place of the previous PHARE and OBNOVA 
programs.
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Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) are the highest
stage in the long-term Stabilization and Association Process. After the
conclusion of these Agreements, the partner country has access to com-
munity programs, in the same way as other countries of Central and
Eastern Europe (candidate countries), and can also become an official
candidate for membership of the EU, after filing an application.
It is by no means easy for the partner country to conclude an SAA;
it must fulfill political and economic preconditions, implement diverse
conclusions of a Consultative Task Force11, pass a test of the EU
Commission in the form of a feasibility report12 initiate negotiations on
the Agreement and, finally, negotiate all elements of the Agreement. The
Stabilization and Association Process represents a process and not a state
of affairs or a single event. In the course of this process, the EU is acting
towards support to the development of partner countries and the modern-
ization and adjustment of their legislation to EU regulations. At the end
of this process there stands a Stabilization and Association Agreement,
and, by realizing this Agreement, the partner country can gain the status
of full candidate for EU membership. This is a very complex activity that
requires the mobilization of virtually the entire administration, as well as
major improvement in its activity, particularly in the sphere of the imple-
mentation of regulations. Overall EU legislation is very voluminous and
complex. The adjustment of regulations also presupposes great financial
resources as well as the engagement of important human resources
(experts, translators, administration, etc.).
1.2. Regarded on the whole, the EUs policy towards the region of
the Balkans has had the following general characteristics:
-The Balkans as a whole has long represented a zone of second-rate
interest for the European Union, behind the countries of Central Europe
and some Mediterranean countries. That approach changed drastically in
the last years of the XX century for two reasons (a) on account of the
increased possibility of EU expansion to the East, whereby the Balkan
countries would become their immediate neighbours and (2) on account of
the conflicts in former SFRY and in Kosovo and their effects; A specific
EU Balkan policy was created in the course of the 1990s  only with
respect to the Western Balkans;
-In respect to economic relations, the level of EU bilateral relations
with the individual countries clearly reflects the difference in the interest
in Central Europe, on the one hand, and the interest in South Eastern
___________
11 Joint, ad hoc body, representing the Government of the SAP Country, the 
Commission and the Member States.
12 See, for example: Commision of the EC: Report on the feasibility a Stabi-
lization and Association Agreement with the Republic of Croatia, Brussels, 
24 May 2000, COM (2000) 311 final, p. 26.
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Europe, on the other. That difference is the most evident if we look at
direct private investments. It is less, but still quite marked, in the case of
overall bilateral exchange and credit and other financial assistance (per
capita) of the developed industrial countries to individual Central and
Eastern European countries. In the harsh international competition
amongst individual regions and sub-regions, the aim of which is to attract
foreign private and public financial resources and technologies, the
Balkans is still a region that attracts far less interest on the part of foreign
investors and traders than Central Europe or the Baltic region, although
the state of affairs in the region has somewhat improved in recent years.
-The positive side of EU regional policy towards the Balkans lies in
the fact that it contributes to focussing the attention of political and other
factors on specific problems and difficulties of SEE countries. The nega-
tive side of this approach lies in the fact that it nonetheless contributes to
further differentiation between Central and South Eastern Europe, that is
to candidates for membership (which include Romania and Bulgaria)
and potential candidates (Western Balkans); 
-The backwardness of regions or individual countries in cooperation
and possible delay in gradual integration in the EU will have negative
influence on their long-term economic, scientific-technological and all
other potentials, as well as on their competitive economic position. This
can further contribute to the prolonged destabilization of the region and
the deepening of weaknesses and problems, which can occur in the case of
a blockade of further process of the expansion of the EU to the SEE
region after the first wave of enlargement.
-There exists a certain contradiction in EU policy between the prin-
ciples of conditioned bilateralism (Stabilization and Association
Process), on the one hand, and EU support to multilateral regional coop-
eration in the scope of regional initiatives such as the Stability Pact13, on
the other. Regardless of EU intentions, bilateral cooperation with the EU
and the enlargement process represent for some countries a sufficient rea-
son for extremely cautious cooperation with neighbours, or even blocking
such cooperation14.
-The EU should aim at a long term and sustainable policy towards
the Balkans, which should develop adequate instruments and be coherent
with its overall long-term goals in Europe15;
___________
13 In this context see: The Balkans and New European Responsibilities, Club of 
Three, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Brussels, 29-30 June 2000, p.63.
14 In this sense, the conduct of Romania and Bulgaria, which are candidates for 
EU membership, is characteristic, as is that of Croatia.
15 See H. KRAMER: The EU in the Balkans: another step towards European 
Integration, Perception, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. V, No. 3, 
Sept-Nov 2000; A. Witkowski: SEE and the EU - promoting stability 
through integration? South East Europe Review for Labour and Social 
Affairs, No. 1, 2000, pp. 79-97.
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However, the process to date of Central and Eastern European
countries negotiations on membership in the EU demonstrates a high
degree of hesitation and the lack of readiness on the part of EU countries
to become engaged swiftly in this process. In other words, countries of the
Western Balkans cannot expect rapid entry into EU membership as a
short-term key to resolve their problems, regardless of the EUs princi-
pled stand that all Balkan countries are potential candidates for mem-
bership. Nevertheless, the process of stabilization and association should
remain the key anchor of the overall trend of rapprochement and coop-
eration of SEE countries. 
2.  Reform of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
After more then two years of activities, the Stability Pact has in 2001
found itself under the fire of various critics, publicly by NGOs and some
countries receiving aid, and discreetly from the actual donors themselves
and those that launched the initiative (some EU countries, the USA, etc.).
A mixed assessment has been given in principle16. It has been pointed out
that it is an ineffective forum that cannot manage a large number of dif-
ferent autonomous initiatives that are not mutually linked. The Secretariat
has come under particular criticism. According to some critics, the Pact
has popped like a soap bubble17; it has changed from being the symbol of
great hopes for the region and become a mere forum for the registration
of projects that are initiated and financed elsewhere. The question has also
arisen as to whether the Stability Pact will even survive in the new condi-
tions, when democratic forces have prevailed in virtually all the countries
of the region. The disappearance of Slobodan Milo{evi}s rule in Serbia
has been  used as an argument for the proposal that the Pact be abolished.
At the same time, the new crisis in Macedonia has demonstrated in prac-
tice that the Stability Pact is unable effectively to prevent further crises in
the Balkans. 
Various solutions have been suggested for the future of the Stability
Pact. These include its abolition, specific reforms in its work and organi-
zation, its integration into other bodies/organizations (either in EU struc-
tures or SEECP structures), and the continuation of work according to the 
___________
16 For some assessments and proposals see: East West Institute and the 
European Stability Initiative, Democracy, Security and the Future of the 
Stability Pact for SEE, A framework for Debate, 4 April 2001, www.esi
web.org. I. YUSUFI, Stability Pact and its role in the Development of 
Regional Cooperation in SEE, paper presented at the Conference South 
Eastern Europe and EU Enlargement, 16. 09. 2001, Babes-Bolayai 
University, Cluj-Napoca. 
17 It has been mentioned that about 200 working groups have been created, see 
M. EMERSON and N. WHYTE, The future of the Stability Pact, Europa 
South East Monitor, CEPS, Issue 29, November 2001.
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principle of status quo.18 In that respect, the Conference in Bucharest
October 2001) marked a stage in the downward path of the Stability Pact,
which has lost its initial élan and has not in the meantime gained a corre-
sponding new concept. Nonetheless, bearing in mind the strong support of
FR Germany (as the creator of the idea of the Stability Pact), and there-
fore also of the EU, it can be expected that the Stability Pact will survive
the crisis of its third year of existence and, perhaps reformed, continue
to function in the galaxy of regional initiatives in SEE.
As stated by V. Gligorov, the essence of Balkan problems lies in
development, which means that all objectives must have a long-term
nature. It is, however, not clear how strong is the political support  for the
Stability Pact to survive as a long-term project.19
On a technical level, there exists the clear need for greater coordi-
nation, that is for seeking complementarities amongst the diverse initia-
tives for SEE, which should not be allowed to become a field for mutual
competition, that is for one to steal good ideas and projects from anoth-
er. On the other hand, the participation of a large number of internation-
al agencies and other participants (international banks, private donors,
NGOs, etc.), without some clearer strategic vision of the whole and
stronger coordination, leads to an overlapping of activities and a specific
type of agency parasitism (the existing agencies and programmes that
repeat projects for themselves and not for the needs of the region).
The question arises as to whether todays reality in the Balkans
(excessive fragmentation, smaller and smaller states that lack the corre-
sponding human and financial resources, the lack of a serious regional
plan and development coordination, etc.) can be overcome by superficial-
ly coordinated initiatives, without some more serious institutional form
of linkage, whereby it would be possible to overcome the mentioned struc-
tural problems. If, for example, there is a comparison with the post-war
experience of the Marshall Plan in Europe, it is evident that in the case
of the Balkans there has been no initiative to create an institution such as
the Organization for European Cooperation and Development (todays
OECD). In that sense, the existence of the small administration of the
Stability Pact Special Coordinator is not even sufficient for the adequate
coordination of existing projects. 
A discussion started on the future of the Stability Pact at a meeting
of the EU Council of Ministers in Brussels on 29 October 2001 on the basis  
___________
18 For some commentaries and proposals for reform of the Pact, see: East-West 
Institute and ESI, op.cit; M. EMERSON: About Forming and Reforming 
the Stability Pact, From Balkans to Caucasus, CEPS, Brussels, May 2001, 
www.ceps.be.
19 V. GLIGOROV: Notes on Stability Pact, in T. VEREMIS, D. DAIANU: 
Balkan Reconstruction, Frank Cass, London, 2001, p.18. In the same sense 
see the analysis of K. STANCHEV, Trade, Initiaves, Institutions, paper pre-
sented at the Conference: The effects of regional initiatives in SEE, 14. 12. 
2001, European Movement in Serbia, Belgrade, www.emins.org.
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of suggestions put forward in a letter sent jointly by J. Solana (High EU
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy) and C. Patten
(Member of the EU Commission responsible for foreign affairs). The sug-
gestions refer to the refocusing of the Pact, the strengthening of the role
of local participants, the rapprochement of the Pact to its objectives and
the functioning of the process on stabilization and association with the
EU. Also of interest is the proposal for the formation of a Coordination
Committee made up of the Pact Coordinator, the High EU Represen-
tative (Solana), a member of the EU Commission, the presiding country
and one representative of SEECP.
In the latest appraisal of the Pacts activities provided by the
Secretariat of the Special Coordinator20, the following recommendations
for the improvement of the Pacts activities are being given:
!enhancing the EUs role in furthering the EU approximation of 
Southeast European countries, 
!new instruments to enhance regional cooperation, 
! long-term investment in the region, 
!closing the gap between announcements and implementation of 
assistance, 
! strengthening regional ownership, 
! refining international preventive capabilities, 
!a new (sub-) regional strategy to solve open questions in the 
Southern Balkans, 
!harmonizing the EU SA-process and the Accession process, 
! improving coordination and coherence of international assistance, 
and 
!options to transpose the Stability Pact model to other regions.
The appointment of a new Special Coordinator for Stability Pact for
200221 will be probably the occasion for further institutional reshuffling of
SP present structures.
As is the case with SECI and some other forms of multilateral coop-
eration, the essential issue facing the Stability Pact remains that of finan-
cial resources and factors responsible for individual projects. The Stability
Pact, as such, does not have a budget or the necessary resources to cover
even the most minimal project. The European Union created the Stability
Pact, but it retained the possible resources for the region under its own
control (i.e. under the control of the EU Commission). The financing of
projects depends on donors (international finance institutions and States), 
___________
20 See Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for SEE: 2 1/2 Years of Stability 
Pact: Lessons and Policy Recommendations, Brussels, December 2001, 
www.stabiltypact.org.
21 Former SECI coordinator E. Busek replaced German Bodo Hombach. Of 
course, the Special Coordinator is chosen by the EU States without any con-
sultation with the interested regional countries.
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and it is in their hands, essentially speaking, that the greatest responsibili-
ty for results lies. It is therefore no wonder that excessive expectations in
the region, provoked by indications of a new Marshall Plan and similar
have quickly given way to expressions of disappointment and criticism of
the lack of effectiveness of the Stability Pact.
One of the essential preconditions for the Stability Pact is the corre-
sponding inclusion of SEE countries as active participants in the project,
and not only as more or less passive recipients of assistance. In that sense,
the strengthening of the institutional component of the Stability Pact
would also have to mean financial involvement of the Stability Pact bene-
ficiary countries as participants both in the budget of the Stability Pact and
in other projects.
3.   Can the See Cooperation Process Become a Key Initiative 
in the Balkans?
The Conference on Stability, Security and Cooperation of
Countries of South Eastern Europe, later called the Southeast Europe
Cooperation Process (SEECP) is a continuation of the ministerial con-
ferences of Balkan countries that took place at the end of eighties. With
the onset of the crisis in former Yugoslavia, the activities of Balkan multi-
lateral cooperation, which had been initiated at a Ministerial Conference
in Belgrade in 1988, gradually died away. The Third Conference of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which was to be held in Sofia in 1991, did not
even take place. It was not until the signing of the Dayton Accords and the
pacification of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the conditions
were created for a renewal of autochthonous regional cooperation in the
Balkans  but then under a new name  the Conference on Stability,
Security and Cooperation of Countries of South Eastern Europe (CSSC)
and with new participants22. That initiative was launched in 1996, parallel
to some other similar attempts, such as the Royaumont Process, which
was initiated by the European Union and the SECI initiative encouraged
by the USA. Unlike those other two, however, CSSC/SEECP represented
an autochthonous initiative of the Balkan countries themselves, which
relied on the previous experience of multilateral Balkan cooperation in
the period from 1975 until 199123.  
___________
22 Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, FRY, Macedonia, Albania, B&H and 
Croatia as observer. 
23 ALI HIKMET ALP: The South East Europe Cooperation Process  An 
Unspectacular, Indigenous Regional Cooperation Scheme, Perceptions, 
Journal of International Affairs, Sept/Nov 2000, Vol. V, No. 3.  In the wider 
context about the Balkan cooperation see Th. VEREMIS: Grreces Balkan 
Entanglement, ELIAMEP, Athens, 1995, 141 p.
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In the relatively short period between several grave Balkan crises
(Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia), meetings of ministers of foreign affairs of
South Eastern European countries were held on regular basis: Sofia (6/7
July 1996), Salonika (June 1997), Istanbul (June 1998), Bucharest
(December 1999), Skopje (June 2000), Tirana (May 2001). Amongst those
meetings, of particular importance was the Salonika meeting as, on the
one hand, it established a broad platform for further Balkan cooperation
(the Salonika Declaration), while, on the other, it prepared the ground for
a historical first multilateral meeting of heads of state or government of
Balkan countries. As a result, in this period, a tradition has been estab-
lished of Summit meetings of countries of South Eastern Europe (Crete,
Antalya, Bucharest, Skopje), which represents a particular achievement of
the SEECP. At the third meeting of heads of state of government of SEE
countries in Bucharest, in February 2000, there was the adoption of a
Bucharest Declaration as well as a Charter on Good-Neighbourliness in
South Eastern Europe.
At the fourth formal meeting of heads of state or government
(Skopje, February 2001), full membership of the initiative was returned to
FRY, while Bosnia and Herzegovina went over from status of observer to
that of full member, whereby the initiative now numbers eight sovereign
countries (plus Croatia as an observer). A Declaration was adopted at
the Summit that reaffirmed all ten basic principles of the SEEPC (territo-
rial integrity, equality, abstention from the use of force, inviolability of
borders). The participants called for full cooperation with European
and Euro-Atlantic structures. The summit also adopted a plan of action
for regional economic cooperation.
We can claim that the Process of Cooperation in SEE (SEECP)
which was organized in the period from 1996 to 2001, and onwards,
achieved certain results. Firstly, the conferences were held on the highest
political level of heads of state or government of Balkan countries or min-
isters of foreign affairs, which had been virtually impossible in previous
periods. Besides, these are the only autochthonous initiatives to have
come from within the region, in which external powers have not taken
part.24 That has, in principle, opened up the possibility for improving the
general atmosphere in the region, after the difficult period linked to the
disintegration of the Eastern block, transition, the violent break-up of
SFRY and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the general eco-
nomic crisis in the region. The meetings have also had a positive effect on
public opinion in SEECP member countries. The Conferences, like the
Charter on Cooperation, provide for multilateral cooperation in all main 
___________
24 In the same sense, see: C. TZARDANIDIS: New Regionalism in the SEE: 
Problems and Prospects: the Case of the SEECP in Restructuring, Stability 
and Development in SEE, Conference Proceedings II, SEED Centre, 
University of Thessaly, Volos, 1-3 June 2001, p.7.
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domains of inter-state cooperation, upon lines that correspond to modern
trends of European cooperation and integration: political, economic and
cultural cooperation, ecology, etc. However, those objectives have in the
main remained general and abstract, while there has been a lack of politi-
cal will (and probably also the corresponding resources, particularly finan-
cial resources) to implement even the adopted more concrete decisions
(e.g. meetings of relevant ministers, etc.) over a longer, continuous period.
On the other hand, the Process of (multilateral) cooperation is bur-
dened by a series of shortcomings, which have not prevented the princi-
pled good intentions, put forward at the highest political level, from being
transformed into concrete measures, projects, programmes and forms of
cooperation. In the case of participants, the fact that all countries that
emerged from the region of SFRY do not participate totally and actively
in this Process represents a handicap, despite the fact that SFRY was the
initiator and active participant in this cooperation, while Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia are both geographically and even culturally
located in the Balkans. Like on many earlier occasions, certain bilateral
problems between some countries have proven to be limiting factors that
have hindered the work of meetings (e.g. relations between Turkey and
Greece, FRY and Albania, Greece and Macedonia). A particular problem
in one period was the de facto suspension of FRY from SEECP, whereby
the entire process was brought back to the starting point. 
There is, however, a particularly marked difference between the
high level of the conferences and the extremely wide range of subjects
envisaged for cooperation, on the one hand, and the very meagre concrete
results and implementation of objectives in the five year period of this
cooperation, on the other. The basic reason for this lies in the fact that the
Process of multilateral cooperation in SEE has not made a great deal of
progress towards its own institutionalization: it continues to function on
the principle of an ad hoc inter-state conference, without more specific
working rules, without a political and/or technical secretariat and without
any kind of working/implementing bodies. As experience of international
organizations shows, and particularly the achievements of the European
Union, the objectives and proposals put forward in declarations and con-
clusions from various meetings cannot be realized unless certain working
methods to make them operable are determined, bodies for their imple-
mentation established and deadlines set for the realization of these objec-
tives.
One of the reasons probably lies in the fact that the majority of
countries participating are at the same time included in other, parallel or
similar regional or European initiatives (EU and the PHARE programme,
Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Central European Initiative (CEI),
SECI, etc.), which have their own programmes and projects, with the
result that attention is drawn out on various sides, while the realization
of similar projects in the scope of SEECP would probably be considered
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as competitive and treated as a waste of resources (human, financial).
Even its own participants consider SEECP primarily as a high-level polit-
ical forum, and not a project-oriented initiative.25
In the period to come, the Process of multilateral cooperation in
SEE should nonetheless be defined more clearly. In other words, it should
fight for its own specific place and role in the network of regional initia-
tives in the Balkans and envisage concrete forms of activity (institutional-
ization and working methods) in order to achieve the concrete implemen-
tation of the proclaimed principles of cooperation. There would seem to
be space for complementary activity, that is to say SEECP, as a forum of
high political visibility and one with authentic roots, on the one hand,
and the Stability Pact for SEE or SECI as operative mechanisms that have
organized support of international financial institutions and other poten-
tial donors as well as better experience in the realization of concrete proj-
ects, on the other. Until these shortcomings are overcome, SEECP cannot
become a positive example of so-called new regionalism, about which
researchers in international regional relations have been talking of during
the last decades.26
III Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the regional cooperation in SEE is moving in
a positive direction since political changes took place in Serbia and Croatia
in 2000. 
The objectives of any regional initiative in South Eastern Europe
should encompass the following: contributing to the process of European
integration, helping stabilization, reforms and development in SEE coun-
tries, complement (on the regional level) the EU integration process and
contribute to the build up of the regioness of the SEE. 
SEE cooperation schemes will not be uniform. They necessary have
variable geometries including in some case only five countries (Process
of Stabilization and Association), but in other cases seven (Stability Pact),
nine (SEECP), or even twelve countries (SECI27). In some cases, there is
a direct involvement of EU member countries (Greece, Italy, Austria),
which contributes to the process of EU inclusion.  
Moreover, in the plethora of regional initiatives involving SEE
countries, we could divide between core initiatives (such as PSA, SP
together with SECI and SEECP) and some outside supporting initia-
tives, such as Central European Initiative, Adriatic-Ionian Initiative,
___________
25 In this context, see the mentioned article by A.H. ALP, op. cit.: However, it 
should be recognized that the primary function of the SEECP is political.
26 See, for example: C. TZARDANIDIS, op. cit., p.15
27 SEE Cooperative Initiative, established in 1996 as a proposal of USA.
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Organization on Black Sea Economic Cooperation, CEFTA etc. The last
group of initiatives could help in some aspects of cooperation, but they are
too large (by their membership) to contribute to the specific regional
problems and the process of build up of regioness. 
As specific initiatives are concerned, the following could be sug-
gested:
!The SAP of EU should overcome its inherent contradiction 
between bilateral approach and regional support by integrat-
ing and developing elements and instruments of multilateral coop-
eration, in parallel to the Stabilization and Association Agre-
ements. It could be done by continuing and enlarging the approach 
of the Zagreb Summit (EU plus five Western Balkans countries) 
including Bulgaria and Romania. The SAP should progressively 
develop elements of some pre-accession strategy for all coun-
tries involved;
!The SP should be redefined, refocused and limited. It should serve 
as a kind of interface between PSA and other regional initia-
tives. Moreover, the issue of local ownership of the SP initiatives 
should be strengthened;
!The SEECP should address the implementation and institutional 
issues (instruments, bodies, role of the presidency etc), if it wants 
to become ever something more then a high level diplomatic 
forum.
In conclusion, we can say that the region of South Eastern Europe
will probably remain in the waiting room of the EU during this decade. In
the meantime, in addition to the European prospective, it needs some
regional prospective, i.e. more articulated and aggressive build up of
regional cooperation schemes, in order to overcome obvious problems
that it has been facing since the break up of Former Yugoslavia (peace,
security, reconstruction, development, more cohesion...). This aim will not
be achieved unless there is a full involvement of the EU and its Member
States in the process. Moreover, this regional objective will need some
specific and clear driving integrating projects, which will be politically
acceptable for all, such as common activities in the EU integration process,
the creation of a free trade area, development of regional networks (ener-
gy, communications, transport), common environmental projects (includ-
ing Danube cooperation), common security issues etc. This process can
eventually lead to the build up of some more structured, but provisional
Common Economic Area in South Eastern Europe by the end of this
decade. It would serve as a preparatory step for the EU integration
process. 
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NEW EUROPEAN REGIONALISM 
FOR OLD BALKAN PROBLEMS 
by Yani Milchakov*
The idea of the new European regionalism and the development of
its contemporary forms in practical terms, developed out of the two old
pragmatic observations, regarding the realities in international politics.
The first one has long ago convinced the majority of the people in
the world that the isolated and closed state -the autarchy, has no capabil-
ity to either meet its own needs, or realize on a permanent basis its inter-
ests, let alone enjoy any particular international prestige in total con-
frontation or aside of the trends and processes of global range that shape
political culture and economy, civilization standards and life style, techno-
logical modernization and cultural values. 
The second observation, however, cools-off, to a certain extent, the
excessive integrationist enthusiasm. The experience teaches us that medi-
um and small states cannot carry out comprehensive activities of a literal-
ly global range. The main reason why it is so is clear. It is rooted in the
enormous differences that exist and are hard to overcome in the potentials
of the individual countries in the world -even if we assume that such a
multinational cooperation is not hindered in any way by politics, ideology,
religion, historical or cultural stereotypes.
From this perspective, regionalism can be defined as an original
pragmatic and moderate anti-thesis both to autarchy and isolation, as well
as to the hardly-imagined integration and cooperation on a global scale
everywhere to everyone with everyone in the name of everything.
The natural primary basis for regional and sub-regional cooperation
is created by the neighbourliness or geographical proximity of the coun-
tries, and the common interests deriving from that. Extremely important
role play also:
___________
* Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria 
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
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-the similarities in the socio-political systems and geopolitial orien-
tations,
- the level of mutual economic compatibility and competitiveness, 
the common interest towards third markets,
- the closeness of languages, religion, national mentality, cultural 
and historical traditions,
-the presence of connecting minorities.
Eastern Europe, after the end of the Cold War, experiences a
new, in quality, type of regional and sub-regional inter-state cooperation.
As crucial factors in this respect one can  point out the following:
-the historical opportunity of a free and socially legitimized politi-
cal will when choosing partners in foreign policy,
-the consciousness of the inability of  the reforming post-communist 
European states to realize their goals outside the European and 
Euro-Atlantic integration processes: sovereignty, security, democ-
racy, economic development, modern market structures and social 
prosperity,
-the necessity to finally regulate the problems in bilateral relations 
between individual countries in the region as well as between some 
Eastern European states and states from the EU, according to the 
international standards and in the spirit of all-European values,
-the emergence of zones of potential insecurity and conflict in or in 
proximity to the reforming Eastern European states /the disinte-
gration of the former USSR and the former SFRY, current Kosovo 
and Metohia and Republic of Macedonia/, which brings up the 
opinion within the Euro-Atlantic structures that regional and sub-
-regional cooperation in Eastern Europe would be stimulated as a 
desired and important factor of stability,
-identical internal threats, such as organized crime and corruption, 
radical extremisms on political, ethnic or religious basis, illegal 
migration,
- common environmental risks and potential threats arising from 
industrial catastrophes, natural cataclysms and energy crises,
- common external threats, such as fundamentalist ideological 
import, international terrorism, Great-Imperial chauvinism,
- institutionalization of the dialogue with the EU, requiring better 
communication between the individual Eastern European states 
with integration ambitions and those that are already invited appli-
cants for EU membership, so that they could, in the process of 
their negotiations with the EU, formulate and defend the most 
sensitive common interests of the region.
We can assume, following the birth-date of the Visegrad group /V-
4/, that the new Eastern European regionalism has already a 10-year his-
tory. Up to now, it has resulted in the emergence or transformation of such
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cooperative sub-regional associations like the Central European Free
Trade Area /CEFTA/, the Central European Initiative, the Trans-Asian-
Caucasus-Euro-Corridor Area /TRACECA/, the Southeast European
Cooperative Initiative /SECI/, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
/BSEC/, as well as many Euro-regions. The sub-regional initiatives within
the Stability Pact framework can also be considered, justifiably, in such a
context, especially after the fully-fledged inclusion of the FRY in its activ-
ities.
The contradictory approaches that have been elaborated among
politicians and analysts of the development of these associations can be
summarized as following:
-the institutionalized regional cooperation does not bring about an 
integrated market and does not facilitate the fast integration of the 
Eastern European countries with the EU, as in most cases it is 
dominated by the interests of the lesser developed member-states, 
and in this way it only freezes their economic lagging behind /so-
-called early Czech thesis, formulated by V. Claus/,
- the institutionalized regional cooperation among the Eastern 
European countries is acceptable, but only as long as it serves a 
certain country as an instrument for its inclusion in the all-
European integration processes /so-called Hungarian thesis/,
-regional cooperation should serve as a model of getting the whole 
region closer to the West, with the simultaneous strive for benefits 
for each one state /so-called Polish thesis, to which also aspire 
some of the post-Soviet republics, most of all the Baltic ones/,
-the rapprochement among the Eastern European states provides a 
mechanism to even the starting positions of all of them in their 
efforts towards membership in the Euro- and Atlantic structures 
/so-called early Bulgarian and Romanian thesis/,
-the institutionalized cooperation creates opportunities for a radi-
cal change in the traditional geopolitical context, in which a certain 
country is viewed by the rest of the world /so-called Slovenian 
thesis, evident in the reinforced Slovenian presence in the Vise-
grad group, which should finally estrange the country from being 
defined and considered as a former Yugoslav republic/,
-the institutionalized cooperation should preserve as a facilitation 
the common economic, market and customs structures already 
built, and activate them as a package within the inclusion of the 
region into the EU, following the Benelux model /so-called thesis, 
motivating the CEFTA existence/.
As any other regionalism, the Eastern European one is also an effort
to overcome the structural limitations and contradictions of the interna-
tional economic system, such as:
-models of development which is estimated only through the per-
spective of regaining the capitals being invested in the regions,
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-ever increasing subordination of the states to the directives of the 
Trans-national corporations and institutions,
-increasing gap between rich and poor states and regions,
-marginalization of national and minority cultures with regards to 
the super-technocratic ideologies, world information empires 
and cultural metropolia.
Regionalism simultaneously provides both stability and rationale
corrective to the emerging global status quo. This duplicity has, by the
way, found its expression in the popular dictum Think globally, act
regionally!
Figuratively speaking, regionalism gives to the global electronic sil-
houette of the world economic and communication processes its missing
geographical and ethno-cultural face. 
With regards to the most necessary cross-border cooperation
between Bulgaria, the Republic of Macedonia and the FRY, we should,
most unfortunately, speak of the opposite. The Balkan political inheri-
tance has left to our present day too little modern European foundations
for fully-fledged contacts. It will sound tiresome, if we start to enumerate
all the characteristics that regional infrastructure and communications lack
for such a getting together.
The most important, however, are vision and will, to carry it out.
Todays conference is an example of such a vision and will.
The EU experience in regional politics shows one interesting and
logic regularity: trans-border regions that are included in programs and
funds aiming to overcome their highest structural underdevelopment -
with comparison to the rest of the countries /especially in the cases of
Spain and Portugal/, start to develop faster, thanks to the hot invest-
ments in infrastructure, environment, tourism and services.
We have all the grounds to believe that such an optimistic prospect
will be characteristic for the trans-border cooperation among the people
and cities of the Balkan countries. 
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EU STABILIZATION AND ASSOCIATION
PROCESS AND SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
by Gordana Ili} *
Introduction
European Union (EU) policy towards South East Europe (SEE) is
focused on the prospects of the countries in the region for their integration
into EU structures, i.e. their capability of fulfilling EU criteria for their
Europeanization. EU policy has developed from the so-called the EU
Regional Approach to a much more positive policy framed as the
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). According to the official
classification made by the EU, the South Eastern Europe is defined more
limited than its usual geographic scope (that would embrace Romania and
Bulgaria also1). Consequently, in accordance with the EU vocabulary,
SEE countries  also named as Western Balkans -are the following:
Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, the FR of Yugoslavia and the
FYR of Macedonia. These are the countries belonging to the ex-Yugoslav
package, except Slovenia, but Albania is added instead. 
____________
* G17 Institute -Researcher, European Studies Department, Belgrade
1 The differentiation is made on the basis of political reasons, since Romania 
and Bulgaria are candidate countries for the EU membership, while the other 
SEE countries  Western Balkans are potential candidates. Therefore, the 
Stabilization & Association Process encompass only Western Balkan coun-
tries.
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EU Stabilization and Association Process 
for South East European Countries
In the period between 1991 and 1999, the EU provided substantial
financial and technical assistance amounting EURO 4.5 billion2 to the
countries of South Eastern Europe, which together with humanitarian aid
and bilateral contributions of EU Member States, is estimated to be
around EURO 17 billion3. Despite such impressive statistics, the EU had
not ensured long-lasting stability for the whole region in that period, which
was the crucial aim of the EU assistance. It was the main reason for the
EU to introduce more positive policy towards SEE countries in the form
of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in 1999.
Principal building blocks of the SAP are the following:
-EU credible offer of future membership to the South East 
European countries under the condition of fulfillment of certain 
criteria envisaged in previous Conditionality principles (contained 
in EU Regional Approach);
-Signing bilateral Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 
as contractual form of EU supporting future accession of SEE 
countries to the EU;
-Fostering regional cooperation among SEE countries aimed at 
political stability and economic prosperity in the region;
-Developed EU assistance programs (PHARE, Obnova, CARDS) 
and
-Promotion of political dialogue with the EU.
What is very important to stress is that the EU policy towards SEE
countries is primarily based on the security approach. This fact is the best
illustrated by the EU official statement:
The aim of the European Union is to create in South Eastern
Europe a situation in which military conflict will become unthinkable and
thereby to expand to South Eastern Europe the area of peace, stability,
prosperity and freedom which the 15 Member States have created in the
last 50 years.4
Exactly this point makes the EU policy towards SEE countries very
specific when compared to the EU enlargement policy, which is based on
more economic criteria, as well as geopolitical.
___________
2 Opening up new perspectives for South-Eastern Europe  Stabilization & 
Association Process, European Commission, Brussels, 2000, quoted also in: 
EU, NATO and South Eastern Europe, P. Simic (Editor), G. Ilic, Z. 
Isakovic, I. Krastev, K. Stanchev, IIPE, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Belgrade, 
2002, p. 88.
3 Ibidem
4 http:// europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/index.htm
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Within the EU Stabilization and Association Process there are
regionally oriented EU incentives in the form of economic and of political
encouragement as well. EU economic actions for the region of SE Europe
are:
a) Autonomous trade preferential measures by the EU (Council 
Regulation No. 2007/2000 of 18 September 2000)5 and
b) CARDS aid program, which foresees around EURO 4.65 billion 
for the SEE region in the period 2000 - 2006.6
The trade liberalization between the EU and SEE region took effect
on 1, December 2000 (more than 80 per cent of regional exports to enter
the EU market duty-free). Fully liberalized access to the EU single mar-
ket is also foreseen within the Stabilization and Association Agreements.
CARDS7 aid program was adopted at the end of 20008. Within the
Stabilization and Association Process, the EU aid is adjusted to the EU
political aims for the SEE region and therefore, the aid is conditioned by
the respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, human and minority
rights, fundamental freedoms and the principles of international law9.
CARDS program represents a new EU financial instrument and thus it
has replaced PHARE  (of 1989) and OBNOVA (of 1996) programs. The
main reason on behalf of the EU was to establish single legal framework
for the EU assistance and to achieve efficiency.   
Zagreb Summit (of November 2000) is the EU political action10
aimed at the examination of EU partnership with Balkan countries and
the means by which their democratic and economic reform can be accel-
erated. Zagreb Summit brought introduction of a policy dialogue element
into the EU strict conditionality policy for the region. It was also strong
impetus for improving regional cooperation in the Balkans. At the same
time, in the margins of the Zagreb Summit, the negotiations on the SA
Agreement with Croatia were opened (later concluded in May 2001).
___________
5 Council Regulation introducing exceptional trade measures for countries and 
territories participating in or linked to the EUs Stabilization and Association 
process, amending Regulation (EC) No 2820/98 and repealing Reg. (EC) Nos 
1763/99 and 6/00 of September 18, 2000
6 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news
7 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabili-
zation
8 Proposed in COM (2000) 628 final, Brussels, October 2000
9 See Preamble of the Council regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 of 5 December 
2000 on assistance for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
OJ L 306 of 7. 12. 2000
10 It was French initiative in the capacity of the country chairing the EU (the 
Presidency), but the EU convened the Zagreb Summit on 24 November 2000.
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EU Stabilization and Association Agreements 
for South-East European Countries
Why is the Stabilization & Association Process (SAP) more positive
than previous EU Regional Approach to SEE countries? First of all, the
SAP contains more convincing promise on behalf of the EU to SEE coun-
tries and their future accession to the EU. This promise is based on
worked out aid programs11 and also on a formalized framework for bilat-
eral political dialogue with the EU. The prospect of future integration of
SEE countries into EU was explicitly offered at the Feira European
Council in June 2000. Of course, this prospect of Europeanization for SEE
countries is to be accompanied by the following:
-The institution building process towards democratic institutions,
-The establishment of the rule of law and 
-The developing a market economy in each of SEE countries.  
These are the same criteria determined for EU accession in
Copenhagen Summit in 1993. However, for SEE countries these criteria
are supplemented with the so-called conditionality principles12 (of 1997),
which  consist of general political conditions as well as political conditions
specific for each of the country in the SEE region. The essence of the EU
conditionality policy lies in compliance of concerned countries with the
democracy and human rights principles and an active participation in
regional cooperation.   
In the first phase of SAP, the EU foresees the process that is to lead
to the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). The
opening of negotiations between the EU and specific SEE country
depends on respect of the relevant political and economic conditions on
behalf of the concerned country. Consultative Task Forces between the
EU and concerned SEE countries have been formed with the task of giv-
ing guidelines for governments of these countries in their approaching to
the EU standards and in harmonization of national legal systems with the
EU regulations. After the EU estimated the concerned SEE country has
fulfilled the EU criteria, positive feasibility report marks the beginning of
the SAA negotiations. Negotiations over signing bilateral SAA with the
EU are focused at EUs evaluation of the state of play related to transition
process in each of SEE countries.
___________
11 The EU is the largest assistance donor to the Western Balkans as a whole. 
For the year 2001 over EURO 845 million has been made available for the 
aid programs: Phare, Obnova and CARDS. Internet address: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/index.htm
12 Conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 29 April 1997 on the principle 
of conditionality governing the development of the EUs relations with cer-
tain countries of South-Eastern Europe, Bulletin of the EU, 4/1997, pp. 
132-134.
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In the second phase of SAP, the signing of SA agreement between
each of SEE countries and the EU is envisaged. SA Agreement represents
contractual bilateral commitment on behalf of SEE country to complete
formal association with the EU in terms of political standards and in terms
of creating of FTA after transition period. However, although offering real
EU-integration prospects, these SA Agreements are standing on the EU
Conditionality principles. Consequently, the EUs evaluation is based on
strictly defined conditionality criteria that are to be fulfilled with the view
of a formal association with the EU. SA Agreements are designed to
enhance the relationship between the EU and the countries concerned.
Therefore, SA Agreements encompass trade incentives by the EU in
terms of fully liberalized  EU market access. Besides, economic segments
of the forthcoming association with the EU are contained in the following:
1) Gradual implementation of a free trade area (FTA) with the EU 
and
2) Economic reforms intended to achieve the EU standards adop-
tion in order to make each of SEE countries closer to the EU.
Stabilization and Association Agreements represent bilateral
dimension of the EU measures towards SEE countries that is contained in
SA agreement and is linked with the respect for key democratic principles
and the crucial elements of the EU single market (i.e. four freedoms:
goods, capital, services and labour force) in each of SEE countries. In
addition there are other associated disciplines (competition and state aid
rules, the right of establishment, intellectual property rights, etc), which
are to allow the economies of SEE countries to integrate with the EU.
That is why these SAAs are to be tailor made to each individual SEE
country. Accordingly, each concerned country is to have specific transition
period for the integration into EU structures in the form of formal associ-
ation of a high political value13. 
For the concerned SEE country it is especially important that the SA
Agreement contains the evolutionary clause to status of potential candi-
date, which is differentia specifica comparing with the so-called first
generation agreements, i.e. the Trade and Cooperation agreements with
the EU that existed in the previous period (with Albania and Macedonia).
The SA Agreements are empowered with specific institutional
instruments:
-Expert sub-committees,
-Stabilization and Association Council as a political level meeting 
aimed at supervising the implementation of the Agreement,
___________
13 Exempli causa, in the SA Agreement with Croatia, the EU has granted it six 
years of transition period, after it the establishing of a free trade area cover-
ing goods and services is to be made. COM (2001) 371 final, Brussels, 9. 07. 
2001.
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-Stabilization and Association Committee as operational body and 
-Stabilization and Association Parliamentary Committee.
These instruments are designed to allow SEE countries to prioritize
reforms, adapt them according to EU models, harmonize their legal sys-
tems with the community law and monitor the preparation of concerned
countries for their formal association with the EU. Nevertheless, effective
implementation of the SAA in each of SEE countries is a conditio sine qua
non for the countrys accession prospects assessment by the EU.
Critical approach to EU policy towards SEE region
Let us focus on real and achievable aims such as set in the SA
Agreements for SEE countries. Is it the EU policy in form of the
Stabilization and Association Process going to be centrifugal force for eco-
nomic and political prosperity of SEE region and of the each of SEE coun-
tries? Or it is going to be another nice-packed deterrent strategy for
SEE countries and their hectic wishes to achieve welfare status of most
EU Member States? The answer depends on the angle of analysis, but it
certainly gives basis for reasoned constructive critique of the EU policy.
First of all, although it envisages a tailor-made SA Agreements for
SEE countries, EU policy should be more flexible in terms of adapting to
specific economic, political and geo-strategic facts of the each of SEE
countries. On the other hand, it is also needed to implement one coherent
policy with uniform contractual models  such as SA Agreements.
However, the solution  balance in this dilemma can be in implementing
more carrots  incentives in the EU policy instead of EU sticks. 
The case of the FR of Yugoslavia is obvious evidence of this thesis.
As was shown clearly in the case under Milosevic rule, international sanc-
tions have not caused the change of the regime, but internal peoples anger
and mature social and political awareness of national context marked by
collapsed democratic institutions and distrustful justice systems, and
depressing economic situation.
Secondly, strict conditionality is not sufficient incentive for EU inte-
gration path related to the SEE countries. EU policy for SEE countries is
necessary to be enriched with more policy dialogue measures on the one
side. That means supplementing the EU strict conditionality with various
policy-dialogue activities in order to harmonize the Stabilization and
Association Process better with the real political and economic situation in
the SEE countries. On the other side, it is also important to have the EU
institutional improving, especially the improving of the EU CFSP meas-
ures implementation.
New tendencies within the EU show exactly this trend of trying not
to give the image of the Fortress of Europe to the SEE countries and the
region as a whole, but to offer them the prospect of their inclusion into
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European mainstream. Laeken Declaration (of European Summit in 14/15
December 2001) defined the EU as a success story, for the reason that it
has been at peace for over half a century now. The future of the EU as an
important player in international relations indicates that the Union is open
only to countries, which uphold democratic values, such as: free elections,
respect for minority rights and for the rule of law14. This is important
guideline for all SEE countries, interested in the association with the EU
and later, the EU accession.    
Thirdly, seen from the perspective of the SEE region, it is still an
open issue whether the instruments of political and economic linking with
the EU offered through bilateral system of the SA Agreement within the
SA Process are efficient enough in terms of achieving political stability of
the region. Specifically, the case of the FYR of Macedonia in 2001 with its
internal fierce conflict illustrates trends opposite to desired economic
prosperity and stability in the region. It is not the sole responsibility of the
EU, of course, and it does not depend on the EU measures exclusively, but
however the question of the efficiency of the EU SA Process is open. This
even more  bearing in mind that the EU has concluded in April 2001 the
first SA Agreement in the region with Macedonia15, but that did not pre-
vent later internal conflict in the country (during second half of the 2001)
neither it contributed to the stability in the region.
Subsequently, the EU approach as primary security approach to the
SEE countries has been endangered by the development on the spot.
Having in mind that it is not easy for the concerned country to conclude a
SA Agreement16, it is on the EU  as main trading and political partner of
the SEE countries and of the region as a whole  to develop further incen-
tive measures and conflict prevention actions (together with crisis man-
agement activities) as supplementing segment of the Stabilization and
Association Process.  
However, the newest strategy for aid to FRY shows that the EU has
chosen much more constructive approach to the SEE region and the FRY
as a central country in it, when compared to the years 2000 and 2001 .
More precisely, EU Commission has adopted a new strategic framework
for assistance to the FR of Yugoslavia at the end of 2001. It is a five-year
strategy and for the first three years (2002  2004) it has been earmarked
EURO 960 million for financing this strategy17. The priorities of the assis-
tance are the following:
___________
14 Laeken Declaration  The Future of the EU, Press Release, 15-12-2001, SN 
273/01
15 See COM (2001) 90 final, Brussels, 19 February 2001
16 More detailed in: Du{ko Lopandi}, Regional Initiatives in South Eastern 
Europe, European Movement in Serbia, Belgrade, 2001, p. 191.
17 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news
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-Good governance and institution building (public administration 
reform, justice and home affairs, modernization of customs and 
taxation);
-Economic recovery, regeneration and reform (energy, transport, 
environment and economic development) and
-Civil society and social development (TEMPUS program on uni-
versity education, vocational training and employment).
It is expected that this new EU aid strategy will contribute to politi-
cal and economic stabilization and to development of a closer association
with the EU. It is a positive sign on the path of defining and implementing
more coherent the EU policy that is tailored made to the needs of a spe-
cific country and the region as a whole.
Concluding remarks
There is a mutual interest in establishing closer relationship within
the Stabilization and Association Agreements between the EU and each
of the SEE countries. The SA Agreements are to form a network of uni-
form contractual structure of bilateral relations towards the association
with the EU (but tailor made to each of the SEE countries). It assumes dif-
ferent transition periods for each SEE country depending on its economic
and political situation18.
Expected gains and costs of the forthcoming association between
each of the SEE country and the EU are not precisely measured in the
region and are the subject of varying estimations depending on starting
hypotheses (purely economic, purely political or mixed). It seems that the
association gains are to be expected in a long-term path, while the costs of
adaptation (especially economic costs) are immediate. It alarms public
opinion in many SEE countries, but on the other side there is also an exist-
ing awareness of urgent necessity and advantages of entering European
mainstream. Even so, the EU expressed weak interest towards South
Eastern Europe (Western Balkans) comparing to the EU strategy for
Central European countries19. However, the EU changed positively its
attitude towards SEE countries during 2000 / 2001 with the introducing of
the SA Process in 1999.
___________
18 For example, FYR of Macedonia has 10 years of transition period, defined in 
its SA Agreement with the EU for the creation of free trade area, while for 
Croatia 6 years of transition period is envisaged for the establishing of a free 
trade area in its SA Agreement with the EU. 
19 See similar assessment in: Du{ko Lopandi}, Regional initiatives in South 
Eastern Europe, European Movement in Serbia, Belgrade, 2001, p. 193. 
72
EXPERIENCE 
OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN INITIATIVE
by Anton Rupnik,*
The CEI region
The Central European Initiative (CEI) is the oldest and largest of all
regional cooperation initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe that
emerged in 1989 and thereafter. At present it comprises 17 Member
States: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
Particularly significant for the CEI lately was the admission of the
FRY as 17th Member State of the CEI in November 2000. It marked the
return of that country to democratic rule and to the international commu-
nity. 
From a geo-political viewpoint, the CEI region represents essen-
tially the area between the EU and Russia, a constellation that gives it a
potentially important, even unique political position, considering that
both, the EU and Russia, attach highest priority to consolidating, enlarg-
ing and rendering their more secure  respective areas.
Is the CEI geographically and politically really rounded up? 
According to an early decision of the first CEI Summit
(Venice,1990), CEI should be geographically circumscribed as covering
Eastern-Central European area which gives it compactness and globality
of common interests, and creating profitable cooperation relations with
other regional associations in the North and in the South-East. 
After the admission of the six new members in 1996, the CEI
Foreign Ministers expressed the opinion that the Initiative has 
___________
* Deputy Director General, Head of the CEI -Executive Secretariat
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approached the limits of its organizational capacity as a regional coopera-
tion, with an additional remark saying that the CEI should remain open
for cooperation with third countries (Vienna MFA Meeting 1996, Final
Document).
Before the FRY was included, it has often been said that it repre-
sented the only blank area within the CEI region; however, on the occa-
sion of the accession of the FRY there were no remarks made about the
completeness of the CEI in the present composition.
The CEI has been defined as a sub-regional cooperation initiative
covering the area of the Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe.  If
speaking about the Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, then we
have to state that also the Baltic States, Russia and Greece would belong
to this area. 
As to the CEI relations with the Russian Federation, it has to be
stressed that there are more or less regular meetings between the CEI
Troika (at the level of National Coordinators) and high level delegations
of Russian diplomats. Furthermore, Russia is participating in concrete
projects of two CEI WGs (Combating Organized Crime and Civil
Protection). 
However, as to the three Baltic States, there were some preliminary
sondages from their side on  possible cooperation with the CEI. The
question still remains open whether not to invite the Baltic transition
countries and to offer to the EU a partner encompassing the whole group
of transition countries (except Russia). The other question would be
whether, in such a case, not to invite Germany as the third EU bordering
country (along Italy and Austria) to participate in the CEI. 
The CEI in the European political architecture
According to its basic strategic document (Sarajevo Declaration
1997), the CEI is developing cooperation among and between Member
States in concert with other European and international organizations,
regional and sub-regional groupings. In other words, the CEI under-
stands its role in the European political architecture as complementary
to the mainstream and standard setting organizations, such as the
European Union, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the Stability Pact
for South Eastern Europe.
For all CEI Member States their respective status of relations with
the EU is evidently the key factor or at least one of the key factors for their
overall foreign relations orientation. 
The CEI has been trying during past years to reach a political dia-
logue and/or permanent operative contacts with the EU/European Com-
mission. Several meetings with the EC, however, remained limited in their
results, due to the Commissions rigidity and its primarily bilateral
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approach towards the candidate as well as non-candidate countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. The fact that our member countries can have
direct contacts with the EU bodies through many other regional organiza-
tions  but not through the CEI  is certainly an additional element which
does not increase the attractiveness of the CEI. Said concisely, the CEI is
not yet in the same position that other (sub)regional groupings have in
regard to the EU/EC, and makes it more difficult to define the comple-
mentarity of CEI programmes and projects to the main orientating point,
the EU. On the other hand, it limits on a minimum the possibilities of co-
sponsoring CEI projects by the EU programmes.
The CEI Trieste Summit adopted a new biannual Plan of Action
2002-2003 providing for a political dialogue with the European Union
through joint meetings/consultations of the CEI CNC and/or the CEI
Troika with the representatives of the EU. It will be of decisive impor-
tance for the future of the political dimension of the CEI ,if the political
dialogue with the EU is being established.
It is very probable that some of the dormant WGs are dormant also
by objective reasons. After their establishment ten and more years ago,
not only  the political landscape in Europe has changed completely, but
also many new regional organizations and initiatives have offered new
possibilities for cooperation in various fields where primarily CEI WGs
had been established. 
The CEI strategy of cohesion and solidarity in Europe
In this context it is also worth noting that the recent CEI Trieste
Summit had reconfirmed again the CEI strategy of cohesion and solidari-
ty in Europe, aiming at a Europe without dividing lines and the reduction
of existing differences and disparities in economic and social development.
To this end, the CEI strategy focuses action on assistance to the less
advanced Member States, to the countries in special need of accelerated
development or recovery, as a matter of priority. It is for this reason that
the CEI attaches such major importance to the concerted efforts of the EU
and of the whole international community within the framework of the
Stability Pact for SEE and to an expansion of EU relations with the
Western Balkans and the Western CIS countries. 
The strategic orientation of the CEI of solidarity among our mem-
ber countries that need priority attention in cooperation efforts is the
essential characteristic of the Initiative. In fact, it seems that its name,
Central European Initiative is given a special, programmatic meaning
and significance, considering that, obviously, its Central European mem-
ber countries, EU members and first candidates for EU membership, are
called to cooperate in a virtual strategic partnership and in partnership
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with the EU and other partners of the international community to imple-
ment the CEIs foremost task.
Avoiding new dividing lines in Europe of tomorrow is one of strate-
gic aims of the CEI. So, the question arises how much the countries which
are going to be most affected by the new Schengen borders are involved
into the CEI activities. It concerns first of all Belarus, Ukraine and
Moldova. These countries already expressed their expectations of  a con-
tribution of the CEI for mitigating the new situation. The general question
is whether the CEI is doing enough for a deeper involvement of member
countries into the implementation of our programmes? We still have to
recognise that the predominant part of CEI activities takes place either in
the two EU member countries or in the countries of the first group of can-
didates for the EU accession. The representatives/members from the
countries in question hardly participate in WG meetings and other CEI
activities. The situation would demand an in-depth analysis.
Economic dimension
Speaking of the economic dimension of the CEI two aspects should
be underlined. First, the special relationship with the EBRD and related
activities based on two agreements which established the CEI Trust Fund,
provided by Italy (altogether some 25 Mio USD), and the so-called
Secretariat for CEI Projects as a fund management instrument. Second,
our overall strategic orientation, focusing on cohesion in Europe and soli-
darity in form of priority attention to the less advanced member States, a
policy orientation which, particularly in terms of economic cooperation,
requires coordination and concrete cooperation with the primary actors in
this field, the EU/EC, the Stability Pact process, the other competent
international organizations and financial institutions.
The CEI Fund at the EBRD has allowed us to contribute in a mod-
est way to mobilize considerable EBRD financing for the implementation
of important investment projects in infrastructural development.
Examples are the Wholesale Markets in Croatia, Poland and Bulgaria; the
Sarajevo Airport Rehabilitation; the Electric Power System Reconstruc-
tion in B&H; the Road Projects in Albania; the Railway Project in
Romania. The CEI Fund, furthermore, could be used for some technical
cooperation projects, a micro-credit facility in Albania, the Business
Advisory Service in Croatia, the Commercial Law Training Programme of
IDLI, as well as for co-sponsoring of a number of international events.
The most notable economic CEI activity is certainly the annual
Summit Economic Forum, which had been organized in recent years in
Zagreb, Prague, Budapest and Trieste under the main responsibility of the
Secretariat for CEI Projects.. The three days of the Summit Economic
Forum provide an exceptional opportunity to receive first hand informa-
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tion on CEI countries investment projects and prospects and to network
with key decision-makers of the business community, banks, international
organizations and financial institutions, as well as top government officials.
The programme comprises panels, round tables, seminars, interest group
meetings, exhibitions -with country and company stands, a project infor-
mation centre and social events. Past fora have regularly attracted
between 1000 and 1200 participants, including a large number of media
people. The last SEF gathered already 1800 participants! And their first
reactions expressed by means of questionnaires have been highly positive.
Apart from financial resources provided by individual member
States for their programme initiatives, such as the Czech Training
Programmes, the CEI Fund at the EBRD had been the main source of
project financing. Using these resources is conditioned, however, by the
donors rules and regulations which narrow considerably their allocation.
In spite of all efforts undertaken by the Fund Manager, these tight and lit-
tle transparent regulations prevented the Fund from becoming an appro-
priate tool for priority oriented project implementation.
The second aspect, the application of our strategy orientation to eco-
nomic cooperation, can, obviously, only be achieved in close cooperation
of all mainstream organizations and institutions, with whom the CEI can-
not compete, neither in terms of financial nor human resources.
Nevertheless, the investment facilitation programme, which is being initi-
ated by the CEI Secretariats in cooperation with the Stability Pact
Investment Compact, might become a practical and concrete contribution
to our goals. One of the first examples can become the Slovenian SME
development programme for Macedonia, B&H and Montenegro.
At the very beginning, the CEI Member States were not ready to
enter the discussion about possible annual contributions, e.g. about the
establishment of an own CEI fund. Italy has taken over the operational
costs of the CEI-Executive Secretariat in Trieste. On the other hand, CEI
member countries seconding ES staff members have to provide their
salaries and accommodation costs. In time, it became more and more evi-
dent, that many projects would not have been implemented, if they hadnt
at least a minimum sponsoring fund. After a longer discussion, the MFA
adopted (in Milan in June 2001) a decision on establishment of a CEI
Cooperation Fund,  having an initial annual budget of 300.000 Euro. The
Fund will be available  in  2002 and set up by annual contributions of mem-
ber countries. It should facilitate the implementation of CEI programmes
and projects. Regardless of its low limits, it will represent a decisive ele-
ment in the implementation of the CEI Plan of Action 2002-2003.
Cultural dimension
It represents a number of ongoing or annual events such as the
Mittelfest Festival in Cividale del Friuli, the International Writers
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Gathering in Vilenica (Slovenia), the Amber Road Project, regular train-
ing programmes, especially for diplomats, in Dubrovnik and Duino (near
Trieste), as well as individual programmes, initiated by the CEI WG on
Youth Affairs or the WG on Culture and Education. It also comprises the
activities of the WG on Science & Technology which have recently been
significantly enhanced by a cooperation Agreement concluded by the
CEI-ES with the ICS/UNIDO, which envisages for the current year a pro-
gramme of some 18 workshops on environmental and other subjects.
The third pillar of CEI cooperation, the mobilization of our regions
extraordinary cultural diversity and wealth, has received a very substantial
push through the initiatives of the University of Bologna to establish an
academic CEI network of Universities in the region. A conference, organ-
ized in Forlì, a city between Bologna and Ravenna, was dedicated to
examine the post-communist transition and the role of the CEI. It had a
double objective: to present the results of a two-year research programme,
to which more than 60 experts from CEE countries had contributed, and
to discuss the outline of a political document outlining the possible focus
of activities of the CEI.
The Italian CEI Presidency launched, during the CEI Summit in
Trieste, a new project proposal of a CEI University. It is intended to
bring together Italian (the above mentioned and the institutions from
Trieste, Gorizia etc.) and university institutions from CEI member coun-
tries in order to create a joint system of training of young people in the
European spirit.
On the occasion of the recent CEI Summit, the first edition of the
CEI Youth Forum was organized jointly by the WG on Youth Affairs and
the Italian CEI Presidency (contributing a generous support to the young
participants from our less advanced member countries).
The fields of cultural cooperation and youth activities are the ones
where the NGOs would have to play a dominant role.
Involvement of the NGOs into the CEI cooperation has been one of
the postulates of the founders of the CEI which had never been imple-
mented. There are several fields of activity where it would be the only nat-
ural solution to call relevant NGOs to the implementation process of the
projects. However, the experience shows that the officials remain quite
reserved with regard to such solutions. Indeed, there is always the problem
of financing travel and operational costs of the involved NGO partners. 
Parliamentary dimension
It was established in 1994 under the Italian CEI Presidency with the
aim to help solving the problems of the governmental dimension of CEI
cooperation and, in particular, the problem of the deficit in democratic
rules in the functioning  of international institutions, as the parliamentari-
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ans defined their own role. At the beginning, the parliamentarians held
their meetings two weeks before the meetings of  CEI Prime Ministers and
Foreign Ministers.
Due to the lack of appropriate administrative mechanism, the co-
ordination among national parliamentary delegations of CEI countries
and in particular between them  and the inter-governmental bodies has
been a permanent reason for complaints by the Parliamentary Dimension
about not being appreciated as an equal CEI body to the inter-govern-
mental ones. In this sense, the CEI Parliamentary Assembly (Rome, 26
October 2002) requested the CEI Guidelines and Rules of Procedure to be
amended. That could be done first at the next CEI Summit, e.g. in
November 2002 in Skopje.
Meanwhile, there is a way of carrying out a pragmatic solution: the
CEI-Executive Secretariat informs the PD about any relevant event; the
chairpersons of CEI WGs have been called to closely cooperate with the
chairpersons of the parliamentary ad hoc Committees.
Coordination  among sub-regional groupings
The proliferation of sub-regional groupings in Central, Eastern and
South Eastern Europe with partly overlapping memberships and agendas
has in fact become a characteristic phenomenon during the last develop-
ments in the region. It seems that all of them -although in varying degrees
-are at present eager to consolidate or even to further strengthen and to
expand the scope of their activities and their institutional structures.
Parallely with their establishment and growing, the sub-regional ini-
tiatives became aware of the need for a minimum coordination of activi-
ties among them. There were several reasons for this:
!The work programmes are similar and are covering the same 
fields;
!More and more countries have become participants of different 
initiatives;
!The initiatives have more or less the same partners in the 
European and international organizations.
As the OSCE did not respond to its role of the umbrella organi-
zation for all sub-regional initiatives, they initiated the meetings on their
own (Geneva, Istanbul).
The approaching establishment of the Stability Pact for South Eas-
tern Europe has increased the need for coordination. It was also for this
reason that the CEI Executive Secretariat initiated and organized in May
1999 in Vienna the first coordination meeting on the Stability Pact which
was attended by all relevant international organizations and regional
groupings, and co-chaired by myself and the EU Presidency.
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A completely new situation for the sub-regional initiatives arose
with the establishment of the Stability Pact working structures. Soon after
its establishment, it became clear that the new overall cooperation body
for South Eastern Europe was not ready to involve already existing work-
ing mechanisms and structures which had been offered to this purpose by
the sub-regional initiatives in SEE region. Whatmore, the sub-regional ini-
tiatives were ignored by the SP structures.
If it was politically a kind of confirmation of the CEI strategy of
cohesion and solidarity in Europe without dividing lines, it was also, on the
other hand, a real shock for the CEI. Namely, we could  notice how the
Stability Pact has been more and more attracting CEI activists  and how
they moved to the SP with their project proposals which had been first
submitted to the CEI. 
For CEI member countries in the region there couldn.t have been a
dilemma anymore whether to cooperate with the SP;  they had to choose
the closest cooperation with the SP, including  in the fields where the CEI
had been already involved.
We have tried to adjust a part of our work programmes to get them
more compatible to those defined by the SP. We had managed to involve
our WG on Minorities into the implementation of the work programme of
the WT1. The same goes for the WG on SMEs.  We have tried to enhance
the activities in the field of culture  as a niche where the SP was not
involved. 
It would have been more than natural, if the countries participating
in different sub-regional groupings had taken over a part of the responsi-
bility for the coordination among them. We, in the CEI, tried several times
to pass operational links to our neighbouring initiatives through such
mediators. However, we could not register any success in this effort. That
shows, among other, that in the Foreign Ministries of our MS there is a
lack of coordination among the officials dealing with different sub-region-
al initiatives.  (The chart in annex shows the interconnection in the partic-
ipation of CEI countries in other initiatives).
Risks of overlapping and duplication of (planned) activities have
been aggravating. A competition between totally unequal partners could
only be counter-productive. The dilemma of the CEI has been perfectly
defined by Mr. Renato Ruggiero, Italian Foreign Minister  representing
CEI Presidency 2001, as he asked whether  it is realistic to encourage a
certain degree of specialization of the different initiatives, with each of
them concentrating on what it does best and/or is equipped to do best, in
terms of financial and human resources? Or is it better to accept a degree
of competition among different organizations. In other terms, should we
try to rationalize the work of different regional organizations, or should
we leave them free to develop autonomously.
As regards the CEI, there would not be many chances of competing
with such competitors like the Stability Pact: a kind of specialization would
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be the only reasonable way. It would, consequently, mean a coordination
with other sub-regional initiatives, and, in particular, with the norm setting
European organizations.
The expectations that the last meetings of CEI Prime Ministers and
Foreign Ministers on the occasion of the Trieste CEI Summit (November
2001) would give an answer to this dilemma had not been fulfilled. It is evi-
dent that we have to try to get an answer both by direct agreements among
sub-regional groupings and by the OSCE as the natural coordinating place
for sub-regional initiatives. The OSCE relations with regional and sub-
regional organizations would have to be led by the guideline from coop-
eration to coordination.  It would be advisable to enhance the coordina-
tion among sub-regional initiatives under the aegis of the OSCE as well as
their individual cooperation with the OSCE  for achieving synergies in
implementing our common goals: strengthening the all-European integra-
tion processes.
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Membership / participation of CEI Member States in European
and international organizations
SAP  Stabilization and Association Process, 
PCA  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
AII -Adriatic Ionian Initiative, 
BSEC -Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, 
CBSS - Council of Baltic Sea States, 
CEFTA -Central European Free Trade Agreement, 
SECI -Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, 
SEECP -Southeast European Cooperation Process
Membership in the OSCE and UNECE is not registered as all CEI coun-
tries are members in those organizations.
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THE ROLE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 
IN PROMOTING PEACE, STABILITY 
AND  PROSPERITY: THE CASE OF THE BLACK
SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION
by Yiannis Papanicolaou*
Introduction
South Eastern Europe since the beginning of the 90s has been swept
by the winds of change.  
Parts of the area did not finally avoid to plunge  into bloodshed put-
ting  at times the whole region at  risk of upheaval. 
The economic difficulties and the social costs of transition led to an
upsurge of nationalism and political populism.
The evolution of key economic variables like output, productivity
and employment have been following the characteristics of a U-curve.
Unfortunately, Western governments and the international financial
organizations overestimated the capabilities of the local economies and
societies to transform themselves. Consequently, they requested unrealis-
tically fast rates of adjustment, while the external economic and technical
assistance was much lower than what was required.
At the same time, local politicians oversimplified in their political
programs the magnitude and range of the necessary reforms and created
unrealistic expectations. The lack of experienced and talented leaders
combined with objective difficulties led most governments to a failure to
deliver their promises and as result great disappointment, disillusionment
and mistrust.
Bearing in mind that in most countries domestic production has fall-
en by 40-50% in the last decade, that most public expenditures for schools,
___________
* Director General of the International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS).
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hospitals, pensions, subsidies to housing etc. have been also scrapped and
that because of privatization and other reasons unemployment has exceed-
ed the level of 30% - 40%, it is clear that big numbers of the population
are unable to cover even their most basic needs.
It should not be a surprise therefore, that the average person feels
very insecure about the future, there is a lot of corruption and crime, the
ground is fertile for nationalist or opportunist political parties and people
become very cynical and individualistic. To sum up, the countries of the
region have often found themselves trapped into a vicious circle in which
social and nationalistic tensions impeded their efforts for economic
change, while poor economic performance burdened the investment cli-
mate and thus aggravated social tensions and political instability. 
So the issues of stability and security in the broader sense emerged
as the major priorities.
The Balkan countries have realized that the only way for maintain-
ing peace and promoting stability and prosperity is inter-Balkan coopera-
tion and integration into the wider European and Euro Atlantic struc-
tures.
For Greece, the successful integration of the Balkan area into the
European structures will make it possible  and for its northern neighbours
to find themselves in the same geopolitical group for the first time since
the interwar period and reestablish their historic economic and cultural
relationships.
The process of integration between the economies of the Balkan
area will be largely reinforced as non- economic problems subside. 
The Balkan region, despite its present problems, being strategically
located between W. Europe, the Black Sea and the Caspian basin, the M.
East and the Eastern Mediterranean, will inevitably find its proper role in
the new European architecture of tomorrow, which  will be upgraded even
more in the future as the center of gravity  of the EU  will  move towards
Eastern Europe.
For the countries that will become eventually full members of the
EU, admission to it will bring with it stability although on the way, a lot of
pressure on the socioeconomic structures and the political systems should
be expected which may for a period of time increase the potential for
instability in the region.
For the other countries that will remain outside the enlarged EU,
the situation may become even worse.
There is a real danger that in the arc stretching from North  East
Russia down to the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Caspian and
the Eastern Mediterranean, what is called Borderland Europe, instability
may increase.
It is therefore important for the EU, the USA and  international
institutions to become more imaginative and forward looking and to par-
ticipate jointly in schemes of regional cooperation which will bring stabil-
ity and economic growth in the region. 
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Greece is ready as a credible partner to participate actively in such
schemes as it does already in all regional initiatives that operate in South
Eastern Europe and the Black Sea.
The role of the EU enlargement
At this point, I would like to say a few things about the process of
European integration and its impact on the stability and security of the
countries of the European periphery and in particular S.E. Europe.
There are many people who believe that the longterm real choice for
Europe is either integration or conflict.
The extension of globalization since the 1970s has led to a substan-
tial interdependence among societies and economies.
High levels of interdependence however do not of themselves deter-
mine either cooperation or conflict, but they increase the stakes of rela-
tionships. Sometimes they foster a sense of common interests, at other
times they may lead to a sense of vulnerability and threat.
What matters is how and whether the interdependence is managed.
When interdependence is poorly managed it can be a source of conflict.
Whether conflict or cooperation will prevail depends in part on whether
international institutions moderate state interests and in part on how
domestic politics shape national strategies.
In this context, the eastward enlargement of the EU acquires a cen-
tral role in reuniting Europe and making up for the divisions of the Cold
War.
The collapse of communism was an historic opportunity to reunite
Europe. The aspirations of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe
were expressed by their expectations to return to Europe. West
Europeans too felt that the EU should open its doors and eventually
encompass the whole of Europe. The essence of a Europe whole and
free was the overcoming of borders.
After eleven years it is clear that borders are not about to disappear,
but to shift and threaten to become a new dividing line in post  communist
Europe.
Wherever the EU decides to draw its border it will be seen by some
as arbitrary, unfair and insulting. Yet it cannot do without borders. But at
the same time, clear, firm and hard borders threaten the EUs capacity to
manage its relations with the wider Europe some parts of which will not
be able to meet the conditions of membership for many years and other
parts no doubt will always remain outside.
As the prospect of joining Europe acts as a major motive for the
candidate countries, the idea of exclusion has equally important negative
consequences.           
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The EU must find ways of a more active engagement in the prob-
lems of the world beyond its border. Border management implies deepen-
ing cooperation with the candidate countries and the new  neighbours in a
wide range of fields. 
What is really needed is a partnership with the EUs new  neigh-
bours that would support their economic development, socio-political sta-
bility and administrative capacities and respect their close historical, eth-
nic and cultural ties with states beyond the EUs new eastern borders.
Achieving economic development in Eastern Europe is very much
in the long  term common interest of all Europeans, on both economic
and security grounds.
A wider Europe program is required which should provide politi-
cal order, security and economic stability to the whole of Europe.
The role of regional cooperation 
In recent years many discussions have taken place about the
advantages of regional economic cooperation in promoting the develop-
ment of the participating states. The issue of regional cooperation can be
also addressed from another perspective.
Should the countries whose aim is to be integrated into Europe join
the continental and the Euro Atlantic structures individually or through
some form of preliminary regional cooperation?
It is not accidental that after every crisis in SE Europe new regional
initiatives were introduced.
Why is this part of Europe the area with the largest number of
regional and international programs and initiatives?
Because it is being recognized as the main obstacle to European
integration and to the enlargement process in the South East European
instability context.
And that the establishment of peace and stability in South Eastern
Europe on the basis of the European values of democracy, human rights
and the rule of law is an absolute and pressing necessity both for the coun-
tries of the region and for the future of peace and security in the whole of
Europe and the wider European  Atlantic space.
Unfortunately, it was only after Kosovo that the need was realized
to move away from crisis management into a longterm policy and that the
EU should offer to all countries of the region the prospect of integration
into the European structures.
In this context regional initiatives are very valuable because not only
they create a framework of wider cooperation within the region, but they
facilitate the relations of the participating member states and the area as a
whole with the outside world too.
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It should not be forgotten that the emerging new regionalization is
part of a process which aims at creating order when the old order (based
on bipolarity, confrontation and the balance of power) has vanished. Yet
we must remember that the pursuit for order still remains; the difficulty
being that instead of one overarching order there seems to be a tendency
towards smaller suborders.
A very good example of an area where confrontation has been fol-
lowed by cooperation is the Black Sea Region.
The Black Sea Economic Organization
For many decades the countries of the Black Sea belonged to two
totally opposing political and military blocs. With the end of the Cold War
the countries of the region have jointly decided to revive the cooperation
spirit despite the fact the BSEC is one of the most diverse subregional
groupings.  Its eleven member states differ in:
a. Their economic and military potential, geostrategic inter-
ests  and even geographic size.
b. Their cultural, social and religious traditions.
c. Their affiliation with and their attitudes towards the Euro  
Atlantic structures.
Despite those differences the member states of the BSEC  have con-
cluded that their common interests prevail and that  through cooperation
they can promote them in a better way.
On the 25th of June 1992 when the Summit Declaration of the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation was signed by the Heads of States or Govern-
ments of the eleven member states, its signatories set as their aim to ensure
that the Black Sea becomes a sea of peace, stability and prosperity.
The BSEC has so far accomplished significant progress in achieving
its basic goals. Nevertheless there are some areas where more progress is
desirable and significant problems remain unsolved. To name but  a few:
1.   There  is a  low efficiency in implementing adopted decisions.
2.   There is a lack of clear vision of priorities and a unifying core for 
the BSECs  activities. 
Intraregional  trade and  investment  are rather insignificant.
The free trade area objective is not only a longterm, but a difficult
one too, given the different economic development and trade regimes of
BSEC member states, as well as their different status vis-a-vis the
European  Union.
3. The  majority of member states face serious financial difficulties.
4. There exist  serious regional, political and ethnic problems.
In order to meet the challenges of the new century  and achieve clos-
er cooperation among its members:
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1. The individual economies must be strengthened and the profound 
discrepancies and differences in levels of economic development 
be eliminated.
2. The BSEC area  needs outside  financial support.
3. Closer links have to be established between the BSEC and the 
EU. BSEC countries have emphasized  from the very beginning 
that they consider BSEC as an integral part of the European 
architecture and they relate directly the development of regional 
cooperation and the process of European integration. BSEC 
should also develop stronger ties with the states of the Caspian 
basin and Central Asia.
4. There is a strong need to improve efficiency in decision taking and 
to develop better mechanisms of implementing adopted decisions.
5. If foreign capital is to be attracted in the region, as well as serious 
businesses and businessmen from abroad, greater stability and 
confidence should be achieved. Foreign investment does not 
depend only on strictly economic matters, but on the overall 
prospects of a region. Therefore, BSEC countries have to become 
more successful in facing and fighting together not only their  eco-
nomic problems, but also new security threats as organized crime, 
terrorism, illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and radioactive 
materials and illegal migration.
6. BSEC countries must focus cooperation on a number of concrete 
areas of activity where the region either possesses a strong com-
parative advantage or there is a wider European or international 
interest for it.
In this context the BSEC should develop a common energy market 
and an interconnected power system. It should also develop a 
regional transport infrastructure integrated into the European and 
Central Asian networks. 
A  New  BSEC  Concept
What is really needed especially now that the BSEC has become,
since the 1st  of May of 1999 a fully fledged regional  economic organiza-
tion, is a new BSEC concept  for the present and the future, which would
be accompanied by a ten year working program consisting of a few, but
important large projects of interest to all or to as many as possible partic-
ipating states. In this context, permit me to indicate a number of key issues
of strategic nature which are vital for BSECs future. 
1) Economic and Political Matters
The BSEC has to decide about  its identity and scope. Starting from
the latter given the magnitude of open and potential conflicts in the area,
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the outright politization of the BSEC would entirely paralyze the whole
process.
On the other hand, given the fine line that separates economic from
political decisions it is important  that high level meetings  are character-
ized  by greater political  will, solidarity and commitment.
Cooperation on soft security issues should be encouraged.
A decision should also be taken on an enlargement strategy as it is
foreseen in the Yalta Declaration. It appears that rather soon the FRY will
become the 12th member  of the BSEC.
Emphasis   should be given also in solving through common efforts
of as many local conflicts as possible.
BSEC will not  be able to attain a credible standing in the family of
international organizations if it is characterized  as an area full of conflicts
and potential instability.
2) Energy
The BSEC should place itself as a tangible and credible participant
in the discussion about Caspian Sea oil and its transportation to  the  world
markets.
On the issue of pipelines,  instead of having a common strategy that
would balance various national interests, BSEC countries have let it
become a source of big ethnic  rivalries, civil wars, even territorial disputes.
The risk is that the rest of the world  and in particular the big oil
companies may lose gradually their interest, if the construction of new
pipelines continues  to  be delayed with deadlocks, disputes and power
plays among the big players like the United States, Russia  and China and
the smaller regional ones.  
3) Environmental  Issues
The Black Sea with coasts providing home for about 160 million
people is becoming  one of the most polluted in the world. 
Intensified oil shipments, construction of oil terminals and oil fuel
spills from vessels lead to a contamination of water and an adverse impact
on the fishing industry and tourism. Fighting pollution should have a
prominent position on the BSEC list of priorities. In this context, the
Caspian Sea should also be included in any action plan, because it plays a
crucial role in preserving  the environmental  balance of the wider system
and cannot be ignored.
Another relevant issue is the need to secure the necessary supply of
fresh high quality water at affordable costs in order to satisfy the increas-
ing demand  for urban, industrial and agricultural purposes.
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To this end, ecosystems have to be properly protected, while end-
users must develop a better understanding about priorities and exercise
the necessary self restraint.
4)  Coordinated  Efforts to Forward  Transition
On the subject of economic reform, expectations raised by the col-
lapse of communism have been bitterly disappointed.
An unfetted  free market, unsupported by institutional infrastruc-
ture, has left most of the countries with widespread poverty and despair;
large numbers of unpaid workers  and military personnel; mafia  control of
key sectors of the economy;  a small disreputable class  of newly rich whose
wealth is based mostly on theft and asset stripping and an impoverished
military that is unable to perform even elementary security functions. The
initial wave of enthusiasm for the West has been replaced by pervasive dis-
trust. Special difficulties have also been experienced in making a simulta-
neous transition to political democracy and a market economy.
Those hurt by economic change use their franchise to block neces-
sary reforms.
In this  regard the key to a successful  transition is effective state-
building (which includes Government, Parliament, Politicians, Civil
Servants). Countries are suffering because their governments are too weak
to  provide the elementary public goods  on which tolerable  social life
depends, chief among which are law   and order and the utilization of the
governments budget in order to rectify the  distortions brought about by
uncontrolled markets.
Instead of each country trying to achieve transition along, it is much
more efficient and sensible to do it in a coordinated and cooperative man-
ner.
One can learn from the mistakes of the others and benefit from their
success stories. In addition the positive results of reforms are reinforced if
neighbouring countries move in the same direction since positive results
spill-over.
On the other hand, the problems of this transition should not be
underestimated by the West and its big financial institutions as it has hap-
pened so far. 
Concerted action of all involved is absolutely  essential, if   we are to
avoid very serious problems.
5) The EU and BSEC  
Another key issue is the relation  between the process of European
integration and its impact  on the countries of the Black Sea.
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From the point of view of the interests of the countries of the Black
Sea the most important solutions are those which open  new opportunities
for their inclusion into a stable European order.
The upgrading of the relations of the EU with BSEC as a regional
organization remains a key objective for the future. The EU will not
exploit its full growth potential if the BSEC area continues to stagnate
and  lag behind from the advanced western economies. The EU must rec-
ognize the need  to develop along with the Northern dimension, and the
Black Sea dimension too.
6) BSEC and the Caspian Basin
It is well known  that the Caspian Sea and its  wider neighbourhood
are at the center of international attention not only for its enormous ener-
gy resources, but also from the geopolitical point of view. The recent trag-
ic events after the 11th of September have made C. Asia and its neigh-
bourhood  one of the hottest parts of the world.
An analysis of the geopolitics of energy in our wider region should
include South Eastern Europe, Russia, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea,
Central Asia down to the Persian Gulf. In this whole area an intense polit-
ical and commercial  game is played for the control of energy resources
and export routes.
Some analysts compare the situation to the Great  Game,  the
nineteenth-century rivalry between  Victorian England and Tsarist Russia.
The identities of  the key players, their goals  and their methods may have
changed,  but the stakes involved are the same: power, influence, security,
wealth.
Despite the huge oil and gas potential of the Caspian basin, present
infrastructural weaknesses and inadequate capital investments make the
drilling and transportation of this wealth to international markets prob-
lematic. Oil companies and the countries of the region are in the process
of sorting through proposals for medium and longterm import routes
including feasibility studies, cost estimates and risk assessments.
Currently, at least one dozen alternatives are under consideration.
All options are complicated because they  either pass through politically
unstable areas, involve high costs due to distance  and geological condi-
tions, or are politically unacceptable because they offend the strategic  sen-
sitivities of one or another  of the key regional players.
I do not intend of course to analyze or even touch those key issues. 
The point that I am trying to make is that the strategic interests of
the BSEC and the Caspian Sea countries in this field either coincide or are
complementary. Therefore, it is very important to encourage their coop-
eration as much as possible. A further enlargement of the BSEC with the
participation of more Caspian states could be a very positive move in that
direction.
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7)  Scientific Cooperation
I  would like to add one more item to the list,  namely, scientific
cooperation.
Despite their present economic problems all BSEC countries have a
very valuable resource which is to my  opinion their biggest asset for the
future; their scientific and their academic potential.
In order to take advantage of this asset we have to ensure that
research is related to the real  needs of the productive sector of the econ-
omy and of society.
I sincerely believe that the scientific communities of the BSEC
region can be of tremendous value  not only of the economic growth of the
BSEC countrie, but for Europe as a whole and the wider area.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to underline that the one polar  interna-
tional system that prevails after the collapse of the former Soviet Union is
characterized by much greater instability and insecurity especially for rel-
atively smaller countries.
At the same time, the globalization of the international economy
makes national economies much more  vulnerable and volatile.
As a response to these problems we witness the emergence of a vari-
ety of regional  groupings and cooperative initiatives. Participation in such
groupings is perhaps the only way for countries to safeguard their security
and promote their economic growth.
Nevertheless, regional cooperation is not a panacea. It is an
extremely complex process which promises benefits and opportunities, but
at the same time brings with it new challenges and unavoidable risks and
dangers for all participants. Regional cooperation in order to be success-
ful, has to be supported by an adequate organizational structure, necessary
human and financial resources and the will of the participating member
states to sacrifice some narrow-minded national interests for the benefit of
the region as a whole. 
Regional cooperation creates winners and losers. The real question
is not whether the gains of winners outweigh the losses of losers, but
whether losers are somehow compensated by winners, through redistribu-
tive mechanisms. Redistribution in its turn presupposes solidarity. In the
text of the Maastrich Treaty, the Treaty of the European Union, the sig-
natories of it express the desire to deepen the solidarity between their
peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions.
If solidarity is essential for a group of industrialized countries like
the members of the EU, it is obvious that the integration of developing
economies and the economies in transition of our region, into the world
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economy in a way that improves the living conditions of the people and
secures peace, stability and security, requires solidarity to an even greater
extent. Solidarity is a basic precondition. To this end, perhaps even more
important then policies at the national and international level are the
transnational contacts between societies not only at the level of invest-
ments and trade, but mainly through educational and cultural exchanges,
links between towns, cooperation between political parties, academics,
media and active citizens.  
People to people and nation to nation solidarity can be promoted
mainly by people like you, who can foster tolerance, respect for human
rights and a political culture based on higher moral values. 
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NEW REGIONALISM AND THE BSEC 
by Charalambos Tsardanidis*
Introduction
The decade following the end of the Cold War has witnessed a
resurgence of regionalism. The number, scope and diversity of regionalist
schemes have grown significantly, enabling distinction to be drawn
between the old regional wave in the in the 1960s and the new chara-
cteristic of the post Cold- War period.
The new regionalism of the 1990s emphasizes the viability of the
regions in the global multipolar order, created in a spontaneous process
from the states in a comprehensive multidimensional process with a strong
regional identity. Therefore, the direction in which regionalism evolves is
likely to have a major impact on the future of the international political
and economic order.
The new regionalism has the following characteristics:
First, megaregionalism. An extremely wide range of countries are
included (or expected to be included)  in economic arrangements.
Second, economic and political great powers, which formerly were
giving regional arrangements, are now playing important role in regional-
ism.
Third, regionalism today encompasses both developed and develop-
ing countries, small and large countries. Developing countries have
responded to the globalization of the world by adopting interdependence
strategies designed to secure investment from and access to the globaliza-
tion of the world economy by adopting interdependence strategies
designed to secure investment from and access for the markets of the 
___________
* Director, Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens.
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developed countries.1 This is dramatically true when speaking of the
European Association Agreements of Central European states, of the
members of BSEC, Mercosur, and of Mexico in NAFTA.
Fourth, there is a very wide variation in the level of institutionaliza-
tion, with many countries groupings consciously avoiding institutional and
bureaucratic structures of traditional international organizations and of
the regional model represented by the EU.
Fifth, new regionalism has a multidimensional character. The divid-
ing line between economic and political regionalism becomes even harder
to draw in the new regionalism , fed both by the end of the Cold War and
the decentralization or regionalization of security concerns, and by devel-
opments in the global economy. 2
Sixth, the current process of regionalism is more from below  and
within than before, and that not only economic, but also ecological and
security imperatives push countries and communities towards cooperation
within new types of regionalist frameworks. The actors behind regionalist
projects are no longer states only, but a large number of different types of
institutions, organizations and movements 3
Seventh, unlike most old groupings the new ones are characterized
by overlapping membership by countries in a number of different group-
ings (for example, membership of Greece in the EU  in BSEC and in
SEECP. It would appear that the primary motivation for this multiple
membership is to secure access to different regional markets, particularly
where regional blocks demonstrate protectionist tendencies against non-
members. 4
The basic objective of this paper is to examine in what extent BSEC
is a major departure from the earlier static, inward-looking, import- sub-
stitution and protectionist policies evident in the region and promotes a
more dynamic, open, outward-looking approach, connecting the EU  with
Central Asia and the region of the Caspian Sea and the whole Black Sea
area with the world economic system.
___________
1 C. Tsardanidis, Reasons for the development of regionalism in the age of 
globalization, Andriatica, Vol.4/5. No.6/7. 1998 p.33. 
2 A. Hurrell, Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics, 
Review of International Studies, Vol.21,1996, p. 332
3 B. Hettne, Globalization and the New Regionalism: The Second Great 
Transformation in B. Hettne- A. Inotal- O. Sunkel (eds), Globalism and the 
New Regionalism, London: MacMillan Press, 1999,p.7
4 See A.S. Bhalla- P. Bhalla (eds), Regional Blocs. Building Blocks or 
Stumbling Blocks?, London : MacMillan Press, 1997,p. 18-19.A
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BSEC as an Example of  Open Regionalism
Some analysts5 define open regionalism in terms of three analyt-
ical elements, namely:
First open policies in relation to official barriers to trade ( protec-
tion). Open regionalism means that policy is directed towards the elimina-
tion of obstacles to trade within a region, while at the same  time doing
nothing to raise external tariff barriers to the rest of the world.6 In other
world the intraregional trade expansion is being accompanied by growth
in interregional trade.
Second, the role of regional cooperation in reducing non-official
trade barriers such as transport and communications barriers, risk and
uncertainty resulting from imperfect information and social, psychological
and institutional factors.  
Third, regional integration through market processes, independent
of the government.  The actors behind regionalist projects are no longer
states only, but a large number of different types of institutions, organiza-
tions and movements
Fourth, open regionalism is much more outward looking than was
the case in the past and emphasize links with other regions. It is extro-
verted rather than introverted. In some ways, the new  open regional
arrangements are a response to the increasing competition under a global
economy, and for many, they represent a first step towards enabling
economies to benefit from the process of globalization.  Open regional-
ism is thus one way of coping with global transformation, since an increas-
ing number of states realize that they lack the capability and the means to
manage such a task on the national level. 7
Leaders from both the CEECs and the former Soviet Union have
been quick to perceive that a commitment to regionalism is likely to
receive the approval of the international community, notably the EU and
the advanced industrialized countries, and is therefore a policy worth pur-
suing. The states who are queuing to join the EU have therefore sought to
demonstrate their regionalist credentials through their commitment to
regional groupings such as the Central European Initiative (CEI) or the
BSEC.8
___________
5 See R. Garnaut,  Open Regionalism.: Its Analytic Basis and Relevance to 
the International System, Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 5, No.2, 1994, 
p.273.
6 See A. Gamble- A Payne, Conclusion: The New Regionalism in A. 
Gamble- A. Payne, Regionalism and World Order, London: MacMillan 
Press, 1999, p.251.
7 B. Hettne- A. Inotal- O. Sunkel,  The New Regionalism: A Prologue in B. 
Hettne- A. Inotal- O. Sunkel (eds), Globalism and the New Regionalism, 
London:  MacMillan Press, 1999,p. XVII.
8 Y. Valinakis, The Black Sea Region. Challenges and Opportunities for 
Europe, Chaillot   Papers. No.36, July  1999.p 18
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The BSEC approach is a major departure from the earlier static,
inward-looking, import-substitution and protectionist policies evident in
the region. The BSEC promotes a more dynamic, open, outward-looking
export oriented approach. In other words, from a closed regionalism to an
open regionalism. By the BSEC Istanbul Declaration, the participating
States  were committed to expand their mutual trade in goods and serv-
ices and ensuring conditions favourable to such development  by continu-
ing their efforts to further reduce or progressively eliminate obstacles of
all kinds, in a manner not contravening their obligations towards third par-
ties. While this seems to represent a commitment to an across the board
elimination of all barriers to trade among members, it must be noted that
the obstacles mentioned here refer mostly to structural barriers.9
However , the special meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs with par-
ticipation of the Ministers responsible for economic issues on February 7,
1997 in Istanbul approved The Declaration of intentions on the creation
of a zone of free trade of BSEC by proclaiming that the time to study the
ways and means for gradual formation of a zone of free trade of BSEC as
a part of the European Architecture. Nevertheless, the European
Commission, although during bilateral consultations with BSEC in April
1997 had expressed its readiness to act as the partner of the member states
of the BSEC in the creation of a regional zone of free trade, in practice put
forward a number of conditions like the following: The approach to the
creation of a free trade zone should be gradual and designed for a long
prospect,  the existing agreements between the EU and  member countries
of BSEC should be taken into account, the admission  to the WTO of the
BSEC states should be completed before the creation  of a regional zone
of free trade.10 After a thorough  examination it  adopted a rather less
ambitious position which was reflected in the BSEC Economic Agenda for
the Future towards a more consolidated, effective and viable BSEC part-
nership. The Agenda envisages the ambitious objective to set up a BSEC
Free Trade Area (FTA) to be achieved gradually, and step by step, taking
into account the Customs Union, the European Agreements as well as the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements of some Member States, and
taking into account the obligations resulting from membership in the EU
and WTO, as well as other international organizations.11
___________
9 See S. Sayan- O.Zaim,  The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project  in 
L. Rittenberg (ed), The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet 
Era.Westport, Connecticat: Praeger, 1998, p.119.
10 See E. Borisenko- A. Kononenko- I. Semenenko, Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation from Regional Initiative to International Organization.
Istanbul: Uzman, 1998, pp.134-137.
11 See BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future: Towards a More Consolidated, 
Effective and Viable BSEC Partnership,  approved  by the 4th Meeting of the 
BSEC Council of Ministers, Moscow, 27 April 2001, Romanian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol.7, No.1-2,p.354.
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Furthermore, geography links the region and provides two models
of international relations that knit the regional security issues together-
the balance of national interests with the necessity of sustainable develop-
ment.12 This kind of approach being adopted by the member states of
BSEC promotes international competitiveness, better trade performance,
infrastructure building, environmental protection, good governance, coop-
eration in science and technology, education and training, liberalization,
and structural adjustment. In sum, it aims at dynamic and action-oriented
objectives. It envisages intra-regional trade, but not at the expense of
extra-regional trade. It promotes the greater involvement of non-govern-
mental sectors and puts more emphasis on the private sector13. Having
emerged as a new regional structure of multilateral and multidimensional
cooperation at the crossroad of three continents, the BSEC duly reflects
the specificity of this part of the world14. The new approach stresses the
need for the progressive integration of the newly independent states in the
world economy. 
With the entry into force of the 1998 Charter, ratified by the parlia-
ments of all eleven Member States, the BSEC was transformed in 1999
into a regional economic organization with legal identity on the interna-
tional scene.15
New regional cooperation is promoting overall development by
encouraging closer economic ties and greater interdependence and is
introducing more political stability into the region. Most BSEC countries
stress the connection between the development of subregional coopera-
tion and the process of European integration and would like to see the
BSEC as a kind of collective institutional mediator between themselves
and various international multilateral structures16. More particularly 
___________
12 See G. Herd- F. Moustakis, Black Sea Geopolitics: A Litmus Test for the 
European Security Order?, Mediterranean Politics, Vol.5, No.3, Autumn 
2000, p.131.
13 E. Ozer see three distinctive features in the model of BSEC: First, it intro-
duces a new concept of multilateralism in economic relations among its mem-
bers and into the region wherein the economic activities hitherto have been 
bilateral and state induced. Second, it aims to create a common economic 
heritage among the member states and third, it has a flexible and pragmatic 
approach. See E. Ozer, Concept and Prospects of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation, Foreign Policy/DisPolitika, No.1-2, 1996, p.85-86.
14 See E. Kutovoi, Black Sea Economic Cooperation/BSEC/:Current Acti-
vities, Prospects for the Future, Romanian Journal of International Affairs. 
Vol.3, No.1, 1997, p.83.
15 A. Christakoudis, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC): Objectives, 
Opportunities, Development, Etudes Balkaniques, Vol.36, No.3, 2000, pp.
3-17.
16 See O. Pavluk, The Black Sea Economic Cooperation: Will Hopes Become 
Reality? in A. Cottey (ed), Subregional Cooperation in the New Euro-
pe. Building Security and Solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea. 
London:MacMillan Press, 1999. p. 144. See also G. Konidaris, The Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation Scheme in G. Hook- I. Kearns, (eds), Subregiona-
lism and World Order, London: MacMillan Press, 1999.
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BSEC would like to serve as a Euroasian bridge, i.e. as a link between
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The fact that the Black Sea
region is, apart from Afghanistan and Pakistan, the second natural exit of
Central Asia into the wider world, presents another potentially favourable
economic factor.17 This in turn boosts investment and enhances the
prospects of obtaining aid from European and international financial
organizations.
Finally, another positive feature of the new regionalism, the  bot-
tom-up process has been adopted by the BSEC by involving local author-
ities, non-governmental organizations and professional groups from all
participating states,18 like the Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC
(PABSEC), the BSEC Business Council (BSEC-BC), the Black Sea
University and the International Center for Black Sea Studies, reinforcing
the expansion of civil society in all the member states.19
At the geopolitical level Black Sea regionalism is in one important
respect uniquely significant compared to the wider Europe's other region-
al dimensions. It involves three very large European actors (Russia,
Ukraine, Turkey) in a quite balanced and non-hegemonic setting as well
as small Albania and the three Caucasian states20 It is also the most
diverse among all the other regional cooperation schemes in Europe.
BSEC unites eleven countries which differ very greatly, in many areas:
economic and military potential, geostrategic interests21. For these rea-
sons, BSEC is not yet a region in being. It is a region in the making.
Accepting the meaning and implications of that metaphor, as N.
Ecobescu points out, might reveal how great and how important are both
the expectations and tasks BSEC is presumed to fulfil.22
___________
17 See M. Stoj~evi}, Black Sea Economic Cooperation-Present and Perspec-
tives, EuroBalkans,Autumn 1998.p.27.
18 See. E. Ozer, The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the EU, Per-
ceptions, Vol.1, No.3, September- November 1996, http//www.mfa.gv.tr/ 
grupf.percept/13/13-6.htm.p.2
19 For a description of the BSEC institutions see P. Naskou- Perraki, Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation. Institutional Dimensions. Athens: Ant. N. Sak-
koulas, 2000.
20 M. Emerson- M.Vahl, Europes Black Sea dimension-model European 
regionalism, pret-a porter. Paper presented at the Halki International 
Seminar, 31 August- 3 September 2001.p. 24.
21 See O. Pavliuk, The Black Sea Economic Cooperation: Will Hopes Become 
Reality? in A. Cottey (ed), Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe. 
Building Security and Solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea. London: 
MacMillan Press, 1999, p. 137.
22 N. Ecobescu, BSEC Institutional Building: Achievements and Prospects, 
Romanian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.5, No.4 1999, p.140.
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New Regionalism, BSEC and the European Union
The existence of  regionalist  projects is clear enough, although they
are very different from one another. A key theoretical and practical ques-
tion is what they signify. Are they compatible with globalization, even steps
towards it, or do they foreshadow a turn away from the cosmopolitan world
economy and a return  to the closest, antagonistic regional blocs?23
A key objective of the BSEC is to develop a regional strategy. This
strategy should highlight the comparative advantages of the region, prior-
ity sectors for investments, the cost and benefits of regional cooperation
and the economic role of the region in the context of the wider European
economy.24 In this sense the future transformation of the BSEC into a
dynamic fullyfledged regional economic organization opens new opportu-
nities for the elaboration of a new strategy for its development. This strat-
egy requires a new sense of partnership, based on trust and confidence and
a higher level of political and economic collaboration with other regional
blocs and more particularly with the EU.  
According to the documents adopted in 1997-2000, the BSEC is
striving to establish closer cooperation with the EU. Such approach is
based upon the BSEC understanding of the EU growing role on the
European continent.25 A new impetus to the BSEC-EU cooperation was
the adoption by the BSEC member states in April 1999 of the EU-BSEC
Platform for Cooperation by which they emphasized their willingness to
cooperate closely with the EU. This defines means of cooperation for
implementing the strategic objectives of the BSEC for closer integration in
the economic area constituted by the BSEC and the EU. In the coming
years priority must be given to the development of a balanced, mutually
beneficial cooperation between the BSEC and the EU. As the Halki doc-
ument on BSEC in the XXI Century-New Challenges and New  Oppor-
tunities, visualises BSEC should  secure the greater integration of the EU
and BSEC with more members of BSEC eventually acceding to the EU as
full members. Like the EU, BSEC member states should broaden  the
fields of cooperation beyond the strictly economic sphere. This requires
closer contact and greater sharing of information between  relevant BSEC
structures and various EU supported initiatives26
___________
23 A. Gamble, Regional Blocs, World Order and the New  Medievalism in M. 
Telo (ed), European Union and  New Regionalism. Regional actors and glob-
al governance in a post-hegemonic era, Aldershot: Ashgate, 201.p.24.
24 BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future: Towards a More Consolidated, 
Effective and Viable BSEC Partnership,  approved  by the 4th Meeting of the 
BSEC Council of Ministers, Moscow, 27 April 2001, Romanian Journal of 
International Affairs, op.cit.
25 See S. Goncharenko, Trends and Developments of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation,  Romanian Journal of  International Affairs. Vol.6. No.3-4, 2000.p. 41.
26 See BSEC  in the XX Centuriy-New Challenges and New Opprtunities, 
Halki, Greece 8-15 Septembe 1999 meeting Document Romanian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol.5, Nop.4, 1999, pp. 293-315.
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This cooperation should be built up according to the Platform in the
following priority areas:
-development of network infrastructure (transport, energy and 
telecommunications); 
-trade and creation of favourable conditions for foreign direct 
investments; 
-sustainable development and protection of the environment, 
including nuclear safety; 
-science and technology;
-combating terrorism and different forms of organized crime.
On the basis of the Platform relevant subsidiary bodies should elab-
orate concrete proposals for cooperation. Joint meetings of relevant work-
ing bodies of the BSEC and the EU as well as conferences, workshops and
seminars of experts in concrete fields of common interest would play a
useful role in building up new opportunities of productive cooperation
between the two organizations. The BSEC should furthermore be creative
and systematic in identifying and developing promising projects of mutual
interest.27 An important indicator of BSEC growing importance are the
observer status granted in 1999 to France and Germany and a long line of
other states waiting for a full membership or observer status in the
BSEC.28
However, regionalism like globalization is normally uneven in its
impact. Certain places and sites will be integrated while others are mar-
ginalized. The cores act as powerful magnets which drag other states into
their orbit, and with the collapse of alternative models of development,
this trend has become more pronounced.29 No Central and Eastern
European state for example involved in a subregional group, including
BSEC, believes that the group can or should offer anything like NATOs
defence guarantees, or that it can go beyond freer trade to a true single
market and other profound integrative effects similar to those of the
EU.30
Which will be the policy of the European Union given its dominant
role in the region, its direct links with all the countries of the Black Sea
___________
27 See Platform for Cooperation between the EU- BSEC.  approved by the 13th
Meeting of the Meetings of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi, 30 April 1999.
28 See Mr. E. Kutovoy paper on Prospects for the Future Development of the 
BSEC in the Conference, BSEC in the 21th Century: New Chalenges and 
New Opportunities, Halki Island, 8-12 September 1999, organized by the 
International Center for Black Sea Studies and the Hellenic Foundation for 
European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), p.3.
29 See A. Gamble- A Payne, Conclusion: The New Regionalism in A. 
Gamble- A. Payne, Regionalism and World Order, op.cit, p. 158-59.
30 See A. Bailes, The role of subregional Cooperation in Post Cold War 
Europe: Integration, Security, Democracy in A. Cottey (ed), Subreagional 
Cooperation in the New Europe.Building Security and Solidarity from the 
Barents to the Black Sea, op.cit, p.159.
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region  and the attraction it holds for many of them? Will the EU work
towards, having an integrated approach to the Black Sea region, as in the
case of the Barcelona Process and the Northern Dimension or it will
design a new dividing line in Europe?31 Undoubtedly Black Sea areas
strategic importance to the West and more particularly to the EU is
invaluable. This strategic importance, which will be further reinforced by
enlargement, is due to the following reasons:
First, the region with a population of 190 million, provides a poten-
tially important market for the EU goods a vital trade link between
Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. Overall, the EU trade with the
Black Sea littoral states is increasing; the EU is also an important partner
for the countries of the region. The growth rates of both exports and
imports of BSEC countries to and from the EU are accelerating fast.
When, however, comparing the evolution of the two growth rates, BSEC
imports from the EU countries far out weighting the increase in exports,
thus increasing the trade deficit between the two regions. It is expected
that BSEC-EU trade will increase in the future as long as the privatization
policies continue, the European GDP  increase and the building of trans-
port infrastructure decreases the distances between the EU and the BSEC
countries32. Necessary institutional reforms for the development of trade
between BSEC and the EU countries include the liberalization of trade
policies, the decline in the share of barter trade transactions, the demo-
nopolization of state trading, the liberalization of exchange rate, and the
privatization of the economy.33 In one of the largest markets of the region,
Turkey, the EU accounts for almost half of the total trade; in the case of
Bulgaria and Romania, the EUs share is in order of fifty to sixty percent.
Second, it is a vital transit route for energy resources for Europe.
This is of particular importance given the huge natural resources, espe-
cially energy resources, of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia. The Black
Sea states are cooperating in Phare and Tacis funded initiatives on the
rehabilitation, modernization and rationalization of interstate oil and gas
pipelines, in particular the so called INOGATE ( INOGATE stands for
Rehabilitation Modernization and Rationalization of Interstate Oil and
Gas Pipelines in the NIS) programme. Cooperation in the field of energy
between the EU and the BSEC, as well as between the BSEC countries
themselves, has been pursued mainly through the BSEC Energy Centre in
Sofia. Parallel initiatives have already been taken on specific issues (i.e.
the Balkans Energy Interconnection Task Force). It is clear that the BSEC 
___________
31 See V. Chechelashvili, BSEC: Paving the Way to Viable Partnership,  
Romanian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.6 , No. 3-4, 2000, p. 25. 
32 P. Kazakos- P. Liargovas- C. Papazoglou- E. Efthimiou, Economic Rela-
tions between the European Union and the Developing Economies of the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), The Southeast European Year-
book, 1998-99, p.181.
33 Ibid, p.220.
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has rich energy resources whilst the EU and its members have capital, and
these elements can be combined to the advantage of both.34
Third, BSEC is a valuable transportation route connecting Europe
with Central Asia and with the Caucasus Area. For this reason the EU
sponsored joint initiatives involving all Black Sea countries. The third Pan-
European Conference in Helsinki in June 1997 endorsed the concept of a
Pan-European Transport Infrastructure Investment Partnership, which
shall promote the establishment of all the necessary components for a
future Pan-European Transport Network on the territory of the European
Union, its extension to the acceding countries and to the New Indepen-
dent States (NIS). The development of this Network will be in accordance
with the Community Guidelines for the development of a Trans-European
Transport network.
The Pan-European Transport Network consists of the following
components:
!The Trans-European Transport Network on the territory of the 
European Union (TEN);
!The ten Pan-European Transport Corridors situated in the acced-
ing countries and beyond in the NIS The TINA (Transport Infra-
structure Needs AssessmentNetwork), which is composed of the 
ten Corridors and the additional network components within the 
candidate countries for accession;
!The Pan-European Transport Areas covering maritime sea basins: 
Black Sea, Mediterranean, Adriatic/Ionian Sea and Barents/Euro 
Arctic Area (PETrAs);
!and several Euro-Asian Links, notably TRACECA (Transport 
Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia).
The Black Sea Pan-European Transport Area is a link connecting
the littoral countries of the Black Sea, with each other, the Central and
Eastern European countries through the Pan-European Transport
Corridors, the Caucasian Isthmus, towards Central Asia through
TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia) and the
Mediterranean Pan-European Transport Area.
Fourth, the EU is interested in resolving the several conflicts in the
Black Sea area. Regional cooperation among the Black Sea states makes
an important contribution to efforts to bolster peace, security and political
stability in the region.  The fact that BSEC brings together representatives
of all Black Sea states can be considered an achievement in itself . BSEC
has helped create a favourable  psychological atmosphere in a region torn
by conflicts in all forms and shades. The results are all the more impressive
in the face of the diversity of the problems of the region.35
___________
34 See. M. Dartan, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). A New Regio-
nal Integration Project, Marmara Journal of European Studies. Vol. 3, No.
1-2, 1993/4, p.146.
35 See E. Ozer, The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Regional Security, 
Perceptions, Vol. 2, No. 3, September-November 1997. p. 104.
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Fifth, although the BSEC may not have to deal directly with purely
political issues in the near future, the nature of economic cooperation
itself is likely to create a framework conducive to more stability and secu-
rity. At the same time, it may require some commitment of political
means, in order to sustain the results. In other words, if economic cooper-
ation is to advance beyond the present stage of technical consultations,
there needs to be a certain degree of political will in order to enable the
ongoing projects to evolve into areas of national policy.36 The BSEC could
thus gradually play an indirect role in the further de-escalation of local
conflicts by acting as an informal forum of consultation. The EU  is con-
cerned for its security policy that the exclusion of some neighbouring
countries from the EU accession  process should not cause a negative
exclusion effect, undermining their progress in the political and econom-
ic transition towards modern European standards and values.The EU
should therefore be interested in extending as widely as possible the mode
of cooperative relations vis a vis Russia and Ukraine. A close link of the
EU with BSEC can usefully complement the progress made already in the
Northern Dimension in establishing regional cooperation across the fron-
tiers of the enlarging EU, not only with Russia, but with Ukraine,
Moldova, Georgia  and Azerbaijan as well.37
The European Commission in 1997 prepared a document on the
possible establishment of formal  institutional links with the BSEC. This
increased support of the EU for subregional cooperation in general, and
for the BSEC in particular, contributed significantly to the increased activ-
ities of the BSEC. In  report on the BSEC, the Commission has suggested
the following priority objectives:
! the promotion of political stability and dialogue, and the strength-
ening of human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
! transit through the region and the development of the regions 
transport, energy and telecommunications networks, including 
connections to European networks; 
! regional commercial cooperation and the creation of favourable 
conditions to attract the EU and other foreign investment, includ-
ing in small and medium enterprises, while ensuring the compati-
bility of any new arrangements with existing regimes; 
! sustainable development, the protection of the regions environ-
mental integrity and nuclear safety; 
! the reduction of drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal immigra-
tion throughout the region.38
___________
36 See. Y. Valinakis, The Black Sea Region. Challenges and Opportunities for 
Europe, op.cit.p. 22.
37 See  M. Emerson- M.Vahl, Europes Black Sea dimension-model European 
regionalism, pret-a porter, op.cit. pp. 16-17.
38 See Commission of the European Communities. Communication from the 
Commission to the Counci, Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea area:State 
of the play, perspectives for EU action encouraging its further development, 
COM(97) 597 Brussels.14.11.1997. p.8-9
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The Commission also suggested that it should obtain the observer
status in BSEC on behalf of the EC.
However, the EU despite the fact that it has adopted a positive pol-
icy towards regional cooperation schemes its attitude towards BSEC has
been described as apathetic. It has placed too much emphasis, for exam-
ple, on the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which lists the
European Commission as one of its founding members. On the other
hand, the EU involvement in the BSEC framework has not been substan-
tial, with the exception of the transportation and energy sectors39. The
EUs present official position is that cooperation with BSEC should pro-
ceed on an ad hoc basis, without institutional links. As Sir John Hunt
points out in his Report submitted to the WEU Assembly the Black Sea
area appears to attract less interest from European organizations -
whether from an economic, political or defence point of view40. It seems
that the European Commission as well as many states  consider that BSEC
before  becoming a close partner of the EU (a subregion linked with the
EU, like the Euro Mediterranean Partnership, the Council of the Baltic
States, the Council of Barents / Euro-Arctic Region and the Stability Pact
in the South Eastern Europe) should  overcome a number of problems.
These problems among others are: the deep historical, cultural and politi-
cal divergences between the BSEC member states, the unstable economic
and social situation prevailing in most of the BSEC states, the internal tur-
moil and disputes on minorities and the bilateral conflicts still prevailing
all around the Black Sea area as well as the  inconsistency  of BSEC states
foreign policy in implementing regional cooperation, as a number of coun-
tries give priority to the  achievement of their own  foreign policy purpos-
es in the region by other means, not covering the mechanisms of  BSEC.41
This approach adopted by the EU could not be explained easily as
regional cooperation schemes like the BSEC may serve the main objec-
tives of the EU in the area. Although the lack of a viable security arrange-
ment to replace the spurious set piece balance of the cold war is a handi-
cap that still has to be overcome if the economic potential of the region is
to be developed fully for the benefit of all concerned, the strategic impor-
tance, of the Black Sea region, as it has been outlined above,  demands  a
more sustained priority within Europes foreign relations and the CFSP.
___________
39 See Y. Valinakis, Greece and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Group  
in V. Coufoudakis- H. Psomiades  A. Gerolymatos (eds), Greece and the 
New Balkans, New York: Pella, 1999, p.136
40 See Parliamentary Cooperation in the Black Sea Area. Report submitted by 
Sir John Hunt on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations. WEU Assembly. Doc. 1544. 4-11-1996.
41 See E. Borisenko- A. Kononenko- I. Semenenko, Black Sea Economic Co-
operation from Regional Initiative to International Organization, op.cit, 
p.129.
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Furthermore, BSEC is not of course a regional group which could be
considered as a path towards integration with the EU, like the Central
European Initiative or a creation of the EU itself like the Council of the
Barents / Euro- Arctic Region (CBEA),  the Council of the States of the
Baltic Sea (CSBS) or the Stability Pact in South East Europe.  For BSEC
to have been a home grown organization is an important quality in terms
of its political legitimacy, and is also its political achievement in introduc-
ing  a cooperative structure in a region beset by serious conflicts or ten-
sions.42 However, the long term interests of the BSEC countries lie with
the EU for the majority of BSEC members joining of the EU remains the
final objective. For this reason, BSEC could act as a complement to
EU/NATO integration and a buffer for enlargement related tensions43.
The BSEC could also promote suitable means for the dissemination to and
adoption by its members of certain norms, standards and practices as well
as principles and policies of the EU which have taken shape over years of
accumulated experience and which have stood the test of time44 In this
sense, the BSEC is, and will be, increasingly, seen by both parties as a pre-
liminary and complementary cooperation process for joining the
European integration as part of an overall Pan European strategy.45
Therefore, closer cooperation between the BSEC and the EU is increas-
ingly becoming a priority not only for BSCE members, but also for the EU
itself. Deepening and extending EU-BSEC relationship might also
encourage individual EU members to more actively support the BSEC
and its specific projects.46
___________
42 See  M. Emerson- M.Vahl, Europes Black Sea dimension-model European 
regionalism, pret-a porter, op.cit. p.23.
43 BSEC, according to A. Bailes could relativize the loss felt by those member 
states who do not get into the EU or NATO at first attempt, and mediate 
some of  the tensions between existing members of these groups, applicants 
and local powers opposed to enlargement. For more details see A. Bailes, 
The Role of Subregional Cooperation in Post Cold War Europe: Inte-
gration, Security, Democracy in? in A. Cottey (ed), Subregional Coopera-
tion in the New Europe. Building Security and Solidarity from the Barents to 
the Black Sea. op.cit. p.161-162.
44 See Y. Valinakis- S. Karaganov, The Creation and Evolution of the BSEC: 
An  Assessment, The Southeast European Yearbook, 1997-1998, p. 285. 
45 T. Aybak, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and Turkey: Exten-
ding European Integration to the East?  in T. Aybak (ed), Politics of the 
Black Sea. London: I.B. Tauris, 2001, p.55.
46 See. O. Pavliuk, Black Sea Economic Cooperation: Dynamics, Challenges 
and Prospects, The Southeast European Yearbook, 1997-1998, p.326.
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PART THREE
SECTORAL AND NATIONAL
EXPERIENCE OF THE REGIONAL 
COOPERATION
TRADE, INITIATIVES AND INSTITUTIONS1
by Krassen Stanchev , IME*
Rationale 
International initiatives, like, e.g. the Stability Pact, assume that eco-
nomic freedom, prosperity and rooted democracy would bring normality
back to the region and would integrate it. There is a tacit belief that if
economies are more interdependent, governments and people are less
likely to resort to violence, since companies and citizens have much to
lose.  At the same time, both the Stability Pact and the EU Stabilization
and Association Agreement failed to prevent March  August 2001 crisis
in Macedonia, because it was tackling issues away from the nature and the
causes for the crisis.
The crisis has demonstrated that the Balkans have a broad , but
poorly defined development agenda. Factors that support and are likely to
support the search for development and prosperity in the near future are
the following:
! In most countries the transition to market economy and democra-
cy has become irreversible;
!Leaders express commitments to follow the path of sustainable 
growth and prosperity combined with a vision (re) building their 
___________
1 Krassen Stanchev, in cooperation with Martin Dimitrov and Petya Mandova, 
and using the insider knowledge on institutional matters from: Zef Preci of 
the Albanian Center for Economic Research; Sead Kreso and Dzenan Don-
lagic, from the Sarajevo University; Davor Galinec, National Bank of Cro-
atia; Trajko Slaveski, Association for Modern economy in Macedonia; 
Gorana Krstic, of the National Statistics in Belgrade and Liviu Voinea, of the 
Romanian Center for Economic Policies. [First contributions on constitu-
tional matters are expected by September 17.]
* Institute of Market Economics.
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nations.  In a response to this the international community launch-
es a number of supporting initiatives; 
!They all justify the need for an explicit local ownership and the 
inclusion of the Balkan social capital in global competition.
Political wishes, however, still need to be translated into practicali-
ties and policy measures. The irreversibility of reforms although being
there to stay often lack intrinsic motivation to cooperate (typical for low
income societies) and democracy functions as mere competition for dis-
cretionary power.  
Terrorist attacks of September 11 and the war on terrorism impose
new challenges that need to be taken into account.
It is already a conventional wisdom that long-lasting Balkan contro-
versies stem from the unfinished formation of nation-states in the region
(a process, which in other parts of Europe occurred between the 17th and
19th centuries) and that this process contributes to intra-regional econom-
ic disparities. Kosovo is undergoing such nation-state formation. FR
Yugoslavia is defending its national pride and territory.  Montenegro is
embarking on the nation-state path.  Macedonia faces the challenge of
defending its status quo.
In the 20th century most countries have used some form of soft
ethnic cleansing; e.g., the last pre-Yugoslav case was the expulsion of
Bulgarian ethnic Turks in May-June 1989 to neighbouring Turkey (after
they were deprived of their property rights).  Similar events or negotiated
exchanges of population, not very different from cleansing and depriva-
tion, have been reoccurring in the last 120 years or so. Memories are alive
while there is no critical mass of orientation towards the future.
While economic and political links between the Balkan countries
and the international community improved in the second half of 1999 and
2000, in 2001 the attempt of the UN and the NATO to contain conflict
within the borders of Kosovo failed.  The aggression leaked from this
UN protected territory into a neighbouring Macedonia, a country, which
originally had no formal involvement with the conflict in the province.
The question of 2002 is how to make all these diverse backgrounds
work towards stabilization.
Reform paths, sizes and structures of the SEE 
Trade (re)orientation
What is behind the EU and NATO orientation?  Why countries seek
the EU accession and association and stabilization treaties? What the
trade justifies, and what is the role of EU trade policies, assuming that this
policy is one of the few handy means of foreign policy towards countries
outside the Union, including the Balkans?
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Balkan countries faced different challenges.  Slovenia from day one
of its independence has 60% trade with the EU. Bulgaria was nominally
independent, but completely locked in Eastern markets: its COMECON-
trade in 1970 - 1980s averaged around 60%, in Czechoslovakia it was 51-
-52%, Romania -less than 30%, Hungary and Poland -40% and 50%.2
Non-transition Balkans, Greece and Turkey, are also different  one
being a part of the EU single market, and the other -in a free trade agree-
ment with the EU and virtually free trade relationship to Middle East (and
Israeli) markets. The issue is whether and how it is possible to convert this
diversity into mutual benefit. The Balkans does not constitute an econom-
ic notion, rather a political one.  If the Balkans orient towards the EU -the
countries have either association or stabilization and association agree-
ments  is this orientation producing economic interdependency that sup-
ports stability and prosperity, and if yes, when?  
Like elsewhere, a critical mass of publicly supported orientation to-
wards prosperity requires that there is a political consensus for structural
change and exports to sophisticated markets. This consensus is expected to
contribute to higher flexibility and lesser dependence on export receipts
from physical access to major trade partners when conflict and/or non-tar-
iff barriers interrupt traditional trade routes. That is, no regional integra-
tion alone is a substitute for general reform and restructuring efforts.
In terms of trade to GDP, there is a significant difference between
Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), and Macedonia with their
greatest ratios of trade to GDP, the medium ratios of Croatia and
Romania, and the smaller international exchanges of Albania, and FR
Yugoslavia (FRY). In Albania, reasons are in the size of the industries,
productivity levels and the wide spread informality. In FRY the ratio
reflects distortions of embargoes, sanctions and military conflicts.
Trade openness: 1998 (in%)
Source: World Bank3
___________
2 Rumen Dobrinski, Transition Failures: Anatomy of the Bulgarian Crisis, 
Vienna, WIIW, 1997, p.7.
3 Trade Integration for SEE in the Context of the Stability Pact, World Bank, 
2000, p. 55.
113
Albania
B&H
Bulgaria
Croatia
Yugoslavia
Macedonia
Romania
Exports +
Imports/GDP
34
83
91
61
40
91
58
The greater openness of Bulgaria and Macedonia is an evidence of
getting some fundamentals right: established trade directions and con-
tracts, cooperation links and routes with a probability to cluster interna-
tionally. Utilization of these opportunities, however, would depend on
general conditions and structures that support trade and development,
which we consider below.
Payment systems
A recent study of 125 firms trading in the region from five countries
and territories (Albania, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro)
provided evidence that the payment system on the Balkans is in status
nascendi.  There is abundant anecdotal evidence that it is not much differ-
ent in Serbias trade and that it is lacking formal institutionalization
between Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia.4
One third of all payments to trade in the Balkans are claimed to be
in cash.  A possible explanation of this situation is that thus tax payment is
avoided, and moreover, if the money origin is illegal, using banks is not an
alternative at all. Together with barter the non-bank component in the
payment system equalizes the bank segment. It look as if, however, that
the system operates through correspondent links with banks outside the
region or at least through branches of institutions located in Greece and
Turkey. Preferable payments are in DM (respectively Euro). Local cur-
rencies are used three times less than DM (41% of the payments) and
USD (26% of the payments).
Mutual penetration of bank sectors is zero, with the exception of
some Turkish and Greek banks. Foreign ownership in banking sectors
used to be a rare phenomenon until recently. The presence of foreign
(international) banks ranks from more than 80% of the respective sectors
of Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina to zero in FR Yugoslavia and
Kosovo. A common practice used to be transferring payments to a neigh-
bouring country via international correspondent banks or still using cash,
and, in FR Yugoslavia, for instance, to have an account in some of the ex-
republics from where to carry in cash. Domestic, not to mention regional
(or of regional significance) commodity exchanges, do not exist or func-
tion badly.  Links between capital markets are at the level of irregular cor-
respondence. Cross-border clusters are exception, even between countries
never torn by recent wars and conflicts (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania).5
___________
4 Obstacles to Trade, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness: Ten Case 
Studies of Balkan Business, Sofia, The Balkan Network, 2001; the sources 
also available at: www.balkannetwork.org
5 Petya Mandova, Krassen Stanchev, To Cluster or Not: Cross Danube Firm 
Level Cooperation, (http://www.ime-bg.org).
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The size of the region (backgrounds of being of interest)
The dependency on international initiatives, constellations and
agreements and the inability to cope with past legacy in the Balkan coun-
tries is jeopardized by the fact that these are low income of these
economies.
Bulgarias GDP per capita is 1/5 of the EU lower rank economies.
The average SEE GDP per capita at market exchange rate in 1998 was
USD 1,793.  Lowest GDP per capita had Albania (USD 1,110).  Highest
GDP per capita had Croatia -USD 4,635. The total SEE GDP was USD
94.92 billion. It is 0.32% of the nominal value of the 1998 world output.
If we exclude Romania (which is roughly 40% of the total SEE), remain-
ing SEE GDP for 1998 is USD 58.12 billion, i.e. 0.2% of the world output.
(Average per country means 0.033%). Excluding Romania, the total SEE
GDP was roughly 1/12 of the combined 1998 public procurement budget
of the EU member states.
CEE Per Capita GDP as Percentage of the West 6
GDP per capita comparison suggest that between 1870 and 1989,
neither market nor central planning could generate prosperity at best
available standards. CEE countries did not change its relative position vis-
à-vis Western Europe and the West in general. The situation of the Balkan
countries is likely to be worse than in the CEE.
After more than ten years of transition to market economy, the SEE
countries have restored between 70 and 80% of their pre-reforms GDP
levels. As a result of the complicated situation in Serbia (in terms of eco-
nomic and political aspects in the last few years) this indicator has lower
value there, compared to the other countries in the region. B&H, as a
newly emerged country, is a statistical exception with 621,8% GDP growth
in 1994 - 2000. (In terms of real GDP growth per capita, it is fairly typical
SEE country).
___________
6 Ivan T. Berend, From Plan to Market, From Regime Change to Sustained 
Growth in Central and Eastern Europe, Economic Survey of Europe, 
UNECE, 2000, No 2/3, p. 49, a quotation of A. Madison, Monitoring the 
World Economy 1820-1992, OECD, Paris, 1995, p. 212.
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Regions
Western
Europe
Overseas
West
1870
44
32
1913
44
30
1938
44
35
1973
45
38
1989
40
32
GDP per capita in USD at PPP (Purchasing Power Parity)7
When comparing the Central European countries growth with
those in SEE, we cannot miss the point of restoration of 1989 GDP per
capita levels. In 2000 the Central Europe countries have with almost no
exception reached the level of 1989. The pace of SEE is roughly twice
slower. (The unique exception is Albania although , because of the very
low benchmark of 1989 , it remains among the lowest in the region.)
If we compare Bulgaria with Ireland -a country, which made a dif-
ference in terms of fast convergence, aggressive pro-growth policies and
pro-FDI policies (after 1987) and reasonable use of the EU structural
funds, Bulgaria in terms of nominal GDP per capita is below Ireland in
1960.  When Ireland started its acceleration towards higher income of the
EU countries in the early 1990, its nominal GDP per capita was 6.7 times
higher than Bulgarias in 2001.
A recent research of WIIW allows an attempt to foresee the capaci-
ty of the two biggest Balkan countries (Romania and Bulgaria) to catch up
with the EU and make a comparison with Hungary and Russia.
Bulgarias GDP per capita at PPP is 24% of EU average in 2000.
For comparison, the Central European transition economies have two or
three times higher value of the indicator. 
Is convergence to EU really happening?  The forecast for 2015 pre-
sumes that Bulgaria will have 32% of EU average GDP per capita (if GDP
growth is twice faster than in the EU, at 4% per annum).  If we attempt to
speculate on the provisional EU conversion terms (in GDP levels), assum-
ing 8% growth for Bulgaria and 2% for EU countries, we achieve that the
convergence will actually happen in 25 years. 
___________
7 Source: Wiener Institut fuer Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (WIIW) 
Database
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Albania
B&H
Bulgaria
Croatia
Macedonia
Romania
Yugoslavia
1995
2571
n.a.
5390
5610
4060
6210
n.a.
1996
1277
n.a.
4990
6330
4170
6630
n.a.
1997
2692
n.a.
4790
6730
4260
6330
n.a.
1998
2893
n.a.
4950
7040
4380
6030
n.a.
1999
n.a.
n.a.
5170
7110
4530
5920
n.a.
2000
n.a.
n.a.
5610
7600
4920
6240
n.a.
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Private sector and SEE economic growth
In 2000 all SEE countries have registered positive economic growth.
In countries like Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia it is a third or fourth
consecutive year of growth; other countries had interruption of growth
performance, which is to be attributed to a variety of factors (see the table
below on GDP growth).  
When we reflect upon national statistics it is obvious, however, that
in all the countries the development (as reflected in GDP) has been led by
the private sector. This is a common denominator for the region and is
clearly observed in individual countries.  The graph below summarizes the
role of private and public sectors growth in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Macedonia and Romania, in 1993-1999. Serbia and Bosnia and Herze-gov-
ina (B&H) are not included due to missing data on private sector in GDP.
The 1993 reflects the end of the explosive emergence of the private sec-
tor in SEE.  In 1994-1999, we observe gradual slowdown in the private sec-
tor growth rates, which put together with the stabilization of the slowdown
in the public sector during 1997-1999, appears to be the indicator for
restructuring of these economies. The leading role of the private sector is
obvious -70-80% of GDP in all countries, and it often compensates for the
decline in the public sectors. By the end of the 1990s the public and pri-
vate shares in economic growth tend to converge, but country-level data
still indicate the leading role of the private sector.  In this sense we may
assume that direction of reforms  private sector based market economy 
is, by and large, established.
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A comparison of SEE and Central European emerging economies
shows that the Balkans restore their pre-reform GDP level at (roughly)
twice slower pace than leading EU accession countries.
Trade conditions 
A fundamental condition for EU policy intervention is in trade; not
because of the need to intervene in trade, but because this is the most
often used (and readily available) policy implemented by the Union to
tackle both internal and external affairs.
General peculiarities
EU is the biggest trading partner for all SEE economies.  On the
other hand, in 1998, transition Balkan countries together had merely 1.6%
of the EU imports and 4.4% of exports.  It is no major market for the EU.
Excluding Bulgaria and Romania, it is less than 1% of the EU imports.  In
other words, as mentioned before, the size matters: if there was and if
there still is an inefficient allocation of international policy effort to the
Balkans, the explanation is perhaps in the relative economic insignificance
of the region.
The positioning of the countries of the region vis-a-vis the EU mar-
ket and the alternative Balkan market has its own peculiarities.  Tables
below shows the distribution of main trade partners in 1998, one of the rel-
atively normal years of the last decade when trade was not interrupted by
stability shock and most of the economies performed well.  
Balkan Ranks of Trade Partners (Import, percent in 1998)10
___________
10 Source: IMF Direction of Trade, own calculations.
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Partners
and ranks
Balkans
(includ-
ing Slo-
venia)
EU
I
II
III
Industri-
al world
AL
6.9
79
38.7
(Ita)
24.4
(Gre)
7.9
(Ger)
81.9
B&H
43.4
41.5
14.7
(Ger)
11.8
(Ita)
4.9
(Aus)
44.8
BG
3.4
44.6
13.9
(Ger)
7.9
(Ita)
6.4
(Gre)
53.4
HR
12.1
58.1
20.5
(Ger)
19
(Ita)
5.1
(Fra)
71.1
FRY
17.4
72.6
25.2
(Ger)
22.7
(Ita)
8.8
(Aus)
78.9
MK
28.9
52.8
14.4
(Ger)
13.8
(Ita)
8.9
(Aus)
57.7
RO
1.5
56
17.5
(Ita)
17.4
(Ger)
6.9
(Fra)
65.4
Balkans
11.5
56.1
65.1
For Bulgaria, the proximity matters in the trade with Greece - a
third partner since 1994 and an  EU member.  Bosnia and Herzegovina,
FR Yugoslavia and Macedonia have around 1/5 or higher portions of their
trade with  neighbouring Balkan countries.
Balkan Ranks of Trade Partners (Export, percentage in 1998)
Source: IMF Direction of Trade, own calculations
In the exports the situation is basically the same.  But it is obvious
that Croatia exports rather extensively to the neighbouring countries.
Again Bosnia and Herzegovina, FR Yugoslavia and Macedonia have rel-
atively high neighbour shares in their exports.  Data for other years do not
suggest a different picture.11 At the same time it is obvious that these
three countries experienced internal civic conflict and violence. A possible
explanation for this coincidence of larger regional trade exposure and
internal conflict is that the greater the trade the greater the temptation to
resort to physical (direct) control over trade roots and territories, in order
to extort taxes.
SEE countries are net importers of goods and services  a trend that
appears to be intrinsic to all the countries in the region for the last 3 years.
It is reflected in the current account statistics. 
___________
11 The constellations have changed with regard to Bulgaria: in 2000 its Balkan 
trade tripled, due to petroleum exports to FR Yugoslavia and the free trade 
agreement with Macedonia, which in 2000 equaled Russia in Bulgarian 
exports.
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Partners
and ranks
Balkans
(includ-
ing Slo-
venia)
EU
I
II
III
Industri-
al world
AL
3
88.8
58.9
(Ita)
12.8
(Gre)
8.3
(Ger)
94
B&H
39.3
50.9
22.3
(Ger)
18.8
(Ita)
4.5
(Aus)
54
BG
7.7
47.9
13.1
(Ger)
10.9
(Ita)
9.2.
(Gre)
56.7
HR
25.3
45.8
18.4
(Ger)
17.3
(Ita)
2.3
(Fra)
53.4
FRY
25.9
71.7
28
(Ita)
25.5
(Ger)
5.3
(Fra)
71.7
MK
22.8
51.8
22.4
(Ger)
11.4
(Ita)
3.7
(Bel)
65.9
RO
3.3
62.8
22.3
(Ita)
19.5
(Ger)
5.9
(Fra)
70.7
Balkans
11.5
58
65.6
SEEC Current Account Balance in % of GDP 12
SEE inter-regional trade 2000 (in milion USD)*
* The statistical information is provided by the National Statistic Services of the 
SEEC.
The peculiarities of the registered flows are interesting. For instance,
there is a 2.6 fold difference between Macedonias exports to Yugoslavia
(USD 333.3 million) and official Yugoslav figures for imports from
Macedonia (USD 130 million). This is a reflection of the trade between
Kosovo and Macedonia, and gives a hint as to the size of the stake of those
who would eventually control this exchange.  
The obvious explanation is the low competitiveness of goods and
services produced in the Balkans.  On policy level, this situation leads
often to attempts to foster exports through artificial measures: direct and
indirect subsidies and protection to sustain domestic industries, jobs,
etc.  Such policies are very difficult to apply towards major markets, in the
SEE case  towards the EU.  For this reason they take place in other direc-
tions, including SEE itself. At the same time, the omni-presence of trade
deficits is to some extent natural; it reflects restructuring. An indicator
here is the import of the so-called investment goods. In the Standard 
___________
12 Source: Country national statistics
* The data for 2000 includes the half of the year (January  June 2000)
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Albania
B&H
Bulgaria
Croatia
Macedonia
Romania
Serbia
1992
n.a.
-4.2%
8.0
n.a.
-8%
n.a.
1993
1%
-10.2%
5.6%
0.6%
-4.5%
n.a.
1994
2%
-0.3%
5.7%
-4.6%
-1.4%
n.a.
1995
1%
-10%
-0.2%
-7.7%
-5.2%
19%
n.a.
1996
-2%
-27%
0.2%
-5.8%
-6.5%
-7.2%
n.a.
1997
-11%
-32%
4.4%
-11.6%
-7.4%
-6.7%
n.a.
1998
-1%
-24%
-0.3%
-7.1%
-8.8%
-7.2%
n.a.
1999
-4%
-19%
-5.5%
-7.3%
-3.3%
-3.8%
n.a.
2000
-4.6%*
-16%
-5.8%
-2.8%
-3.6%
-3.8%
n.a.
Albania
Bulgaria
Croatia
Macedonia
Romania
Yugoslavia
Exp.
0.078
n.a.
10.1
n.a.
10.4
0.3
Imp.
26.4
n.a.
0.4
n.a.
0.1
1.1
Exp.
-
-
4.2
26.9
289.5
23
Imp.
-
-
7
97.4
87.8
324
Exp.
1.42
n.a.
-
47.7
19.2
19
Imp.
12.89
n.a.
-
57.4
3.7
43
Exp.
2.54
110.3
59
-
14.2
210
Imp.
24.7
25.8
54.9
-
1.9
130
Exp.
0.23
86.3
3.3
n.a.
-
23
Imp.
5.98
230.2
19.2
n.a.
-
145
Exp.
7.26
374.5
107.2
333.3
137.9
-
Imp.
9
23
30.6
189.7
65.3
-
Albania Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Romania Yugoslavia
Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) they are reflected in the following
categories: manufactured goods classified by materials, machinery and
transport equipment and miscellaneous manufactured articles. For the
entire period in question for all the countries, the imports exceed 50% of
all the imports.13 It shows pressures to restructure and attract FDIs that
might compensate for lack of competitiveness and shortages of capital.
In general, however, Balkan countries trade over 60% with the EU
and the industrialized West, but not with one another.  This fact might be
justified by following reasons:
a) Regional integration of a low-income economy with low-  
-income countries usually makes an economy poorer;
b) The demand is weak and relatively unsophisticated and 
competitive companies choose more complex markets;
c) The countries in the region have relatively similar product 
and quality structures;
d) Instability of the regional markets in monetary and politi-
cal terms;
e) Inefficient contract enforcement and dispute resolution; 
tariff and non-tariff barriers; companies also avoid risks 
related to civic conflicts and insurgencies.
Trade options: Bulgaria
In order to understand specifics of trading with the EU and the
Balkans, and make a case for the existing cooperation and trade opportu-
nities in the region, we focus on Bulgaria.  
We are confident that Bulgaria deserves this attention and may
serve as a representative example of the region due to the following cir-
cumstances: a) it is an average country in terms of demographics, nominal
and PPP GDP per capita b) it lacks extraordinary events and conflicts,
which could deviate major patterns of economic policies and behaviour,
and c) it has the average history of economic reforms, with its ups and
downs and attempts to resort to different reform philosophies.
This is a brief case study, which outlines the regularities of changing
trade partners in the second half of the nineties and deficiencies and dis-
advantages of different trade directions in order to highlight the role of the
SEE.  In addition we provide detailed analysis on revealed comparative
advantages for different commodity groups, nine of them altogether and
where possible we give a five-year time service (from 1995 to 1999). This
approach helps us to identify sectors where SEE market plays a special
role vis-à-vis the EU and CEFTA. We omit any discussion of services, 
___________
13 See, for instance, data on imports by commodity groups for SEE for 1999 in: 
Vladimir Gligorov, Vasily Astrov, Prospects for Development in South-East 
Europe, Vienna, WIIW, Bank Austria, 2000, p. 20.
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although transport and tourism are the sectors with the fastest growing
share in Bulgarias exports.  We also avoid discussing Bulgarias perform-
ance on markets different than the EU, CEFTA, CIS and SEE, because
we think that such analysis would add details to the description of
Bulgarias trade performance, but will contribute a little to the delibera-
tion on regional cooperation and its status for supporting stabilization. 
From 1990 to 1991, Bulgarian exports contracted four times in
absolute terms. This is a unique case of such a shock in the Balkanss
recent economic history; exports shrank in other countries as well but with
a fifth or a quarter. In the reform years exports grew in absolute terms
only in Romania.14 Bulgaria behaved like all other countries of the region.
Trade and economic growth depend on the development prospects
of major markets. Bulgaria, similarly to other SEE countries, depends seri-
ously on international trade. Presumably, in the years to come, the growth
prospects of the EU and other major partners would be of virtual impor-
tance to the growth potential of the country. The same is true for all the
countries in the region. Another peculiarity here is that Bulgaria enjoys
beneficial asymmetric 10-year trade agreements with the EU, signed in
1993. By 2001 some preferences will fade away. Another important factor
are the non-tariff barriers of the EU, which could impose a serious obsta-
cle for Bulgarian companies (industrial and higher value added goods
mostly), but there is a need for special and highly specific research on the
matter.  Available sources allow for only general impressions15. Other
SEE countries have signed similar, though not identical, agreements late-
ly and they would presumably face similar challenges.  Bulgarias per-
formance might hint at patterns to be avoided or followed.
Bulgarias trade options on the EU and the Balkans markets
We evaluate comparative advantages on trade on the basis of the so-
called revealed comparative advantage (RCA).  A positive and high value
of RCA for a particular commodity approximates the take off point, which
companies may (or may not) convert into better competitiveness of differ-
ent commodities on different markets.  We have calculated RCA, accord-
ing to the conventional formula:
___________
14 See a comparative table in Vladimir Gligorov, Vasily Astrov, Op.cit. p. 21.
15 See, for instance: Stanislav Daskalov, Dimitar Hadjinikolov, The Impact of 
Technical Barriers to Trade on Bulgarias Exports to the EU and to the 
CEFTA countries, Sofia, European Institute, 2001.
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RCA on Bulgarias trade: Summary*
*Legend: SITC 0 - Food and live animals
RCA values between 0.7 and 1 (+++) SITC 1 - Beverages and tobacco
RCA values between  0.35 and 0.7 (++) SITC 2 - Crude materials, inedible, ex-
cept fuels
RCA values between 0 and 0.35 (+) SITC 3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and 
related materials
RCA value 0 (0) SITC 4 - Animal and vegetable oils, 
fats and waxes
RCA values between 0 and -0.35 (-) SITC 5 -  Chemical and related products 
RCA values between -0.35 and -0.7 (- -) SITC 6 - Manufactured goods classi-
fied chiefly by material 
RCA values between  -0,7 and -1 (---) SITC 7 - Machinery and transport 
equipment
SITC 8 -  Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles
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- is revealed comparative advantage in production of commodity i in respect 
of a given country
- is the value of exports of commodity i to a given country by country j
- is the value of imports of commodity i from a given country to country j
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The more is the value added the less is the RCA on the EU and
CEFTA markets. 
The concentration of RCA is yet more frequent on the EU market,
presumably because of the asymmetric agreement still in force. Even on
those remaining RCAs the intensity is very minimal, and perhaps tempo-
rary.
The SEE market is a concentration of Bulgarias RCAs; it compen-
sates for lack of position in other directions; however current account sit-
uation shows that the Balkans serve as compensatory market only in the
sense that it harbours remnants of non-competitive products to other mar-
kets and from the legacies of the past industrial structures. 
Bulgarias presence on SEE market is diverse and hardly speciali-
zed. It covers almost evenly the entire SITC classification. Although there
is an obvious interest to maintain this presence, the improved restructur-
ing of other economies will result in a challenge to improve the competi-
tiveness of Bulgarian companies trading in the Balkans. 
2001 crisis in Macedonia, to which Bulgarias exports almost equal
those to the USA or Russia, is a warning about the risks associated with
greater Balkan exposure and must signal political efforts to maintain sta-
bility in the region as a pre-condition for trade and cooperation.
Policy initiatives and development options
2001 Constellation
A factor, which is difficult to account for, is the impact of September
11 terrorist attacks on the individual economies and the region as a whole.
We assume that the following new realities must be taken into account: 
There is a coincidence of different impacts: the economic slowdown
in the EU and the USA, the crisis in Macedonia and September 11.  In this
constellation it is difficult to distinguish between the weights of individual
factors. However, our general reasoning suggests that the former two
impacts are of more direct nature and would be more significant for the
economies of the Balkans, at least in short-medium term.  
It is likely that the combined impact will be less FDIs, at least in a
medium-term perspective: 
SEE is being considered a risky region, and, under circumstances,
this image would still be scaring investors away.
Domestic capital markets are in status nascendi, this aspect of
underdevelopment would prevent direct impacts similar to the so-called
capital flight to quality.  The reorientation and slowdown of the portfolio
127
investment would hardly have an impact on SEE since it never enjoyed
such investment. Only two countries, Bulgaria and Romania16, are
exposed to international financial markets where they trade their foreign
debt securities and Eurobonds.  Country performance here would depend
more on the performance on the reform front, but other countries that
would provisionally tap international sovereign debt (or corporate credit)
market will face difficulties. Respectively, the borrowing for the needs of
the Balkan economies will be more expensive. This also means that these
countries can hope for finance predominantly from development banks
IMF, IBRD, EIB and EBRD.  In other words, typical government involve-
ment in transition and development issues would remain relatively high.
The nature of the provisional war on terrorism does not suggest it
would be instantaneous.  We think that there will be a longer-term reallo-
cation of both equity and fixed-income investment towards companies and
sovereigns that would spend more on the prerequisites of this war and on
industrial sectors that serve security issues.  Balkan economies have limit-
ed if not any presence in such industries, but governments will be expect-
ed to ensure needed security surveillance, i.e. to spend more on security
issues. There is also an obvious shift in the political attention and in aid
provision, on which Balkan countries tend to rely upon. Also it is clear that
September 11 destroyed a considerable amount of wealth17, that devel-
oped economies and US can repair the damage, but it will just divert the
capital from other opportunities, one of them being investment in emerg-
ing market in the search for better returns.
Political economy and undercurrents counteracting stabilization
Declared objectives of Balkan economic recovery fall into the area
of socio-political engineering of a neighbour-success development pat-
tern, which intends to:
!Compensate to certain extent for the declining share of the region 
and individual countries in the global economy,
!Be a vehicle to enlarge individual countries markets, and consti-
tute a path to a better competitiveness. 
However, there are different undercurrents, which prevent these of
happening. 
___________
16 Attempts to raise funds directly on the market are typical also for Croatia 
(there are issues of government US dollar denominated T-bills, depositary 
receipts of Zagrebacka banka, etc.) but respective amounts are negligable 
and maturity is short term (for T-bills average maturity is less than a year.)
17 The total costs of the terrorist attacks on WTC and the Pentagon are yet to 
be assessed; the most realistic estimate we know of is that of George Horo-
wich of the Perdue University.  He gave his back-of-the-envelope calculation 
of USD 200 billion speaking at special session of the Mont Pelerin Society 
Regional Meeting in Bratislava on September 12, 2001.
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1. The crisis in Macedonia raises the issue of its possible impact on
Bulgaria and the rest of the region.  Though it is difficult to make a clear-
cut judgment, it is important to highlight some background and probable
further developments. 
We do not think that the August 13, 2001 Framework Agreement
will secure the hoped-for stability. The conflict has been internalized
and it is already a domestic affair.  
Supplies and logistic support were never cut off from the National
Liberation Army (NLA), which has not stopped using violence to negoti-
ate constitutional and human rights matters. In addition: there has been a
further fragmentation of the Albanian troops as well as attempts to unify
its command and logistics.18
These findings have given rise to a bitter feeling of unfairness in the
minds of ethnic Macedonians and under the circumstances there is a risk
that the dominant opinion (on both Macedonian and Albanian sides) is
that the deployment of NATO troops will amount to a partition of the
country.  Remote benefits of the EU accession and association agreements
for Macedonia and Albania are unlikely to curb fighting sparked by the
vacuum of positive expectations for the future. 
Global economic divisions are different from those the world lived
in even a decade ago.  Reform leaders coped with legacies of the COME-
CON and in re-oriented their capital and trade flows. These economies
seek a niche in the global economy. The political process of building a
nation state in mid-late nineteenth century manner, when homocentric
European alliances were presumed as territorial expansion of economic
influence, is rather odd. Then, the territorial identity was perceived as a
precondition of prosperity, as governments bargaining chip to seek rents
from one alliance or another. Balkan nations, then, had fallen victims of
these notions, fighting several wars with one another. Now, prosperity
depends on competitiveness and innovation, on whether a national econ-
omy falls into the group of technology producing or technology consuming
economies.  If in the nineteenth century it was somehow politically justifi-
able to fight for territorial influence in the Balkans, in the end of the twen-
tieth it was not. The region does not provide for natural resources on
which other economies would depend, and, thus, there would be no need
to control and protect investment and trade routes.
2. At the same time, it is obvious that the three countries with the
largest amount of trade in the region, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FR 
___________
18 Meanwhile, actions taken to restrict outside supplies to the troops have been 
both sporadic and late. In June 2001 US companies and citizens were banned 
from trading with Albanian extremists, and the first week of August saw 
the detention of seventeen alleged ALA aides in Kosovo. The impression is 
that the EU and US envoys, though successful in moderating animosities and 
bringing about the signing ceremony, have no coordinated support for further 
policies and actions.
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Yugoslavia and Macedonia, simultaneously or one after another experi-
enced civil conflict and violence. A possible explanation for this coinci-
dence between larger regional exposures to trade and conflict is that the
greater the trade, the greater too the temptation to resort to physical
(direct) control over trade roots and territories, in order to extort taxes.
If we were right assuming that Bulgarian case is rather typical for the
Balkans, the following conclusions seem relevant:
The regional exposure of trade may exist as a strategy of penetrat-
ing larger markets. If it is so the Balkans are unlikely to provide a sustain-
able refuge to otherwise non-competitive products and services. For the
first three SITC categories comparative advantages of different Balkan
economies must be rather similar, given the fact that Bulgarias RCAs val-
ues are just slightly positive. Countries of the region have embarked on the
integration path in different years and have different statuses vis a vis the
European Union and the European market. Bulgarias aged experience in
asymmetric agreement with the EU tells that asymmetric agreements are
not necessarily good.  
3. Since growth and cooperation is led by the private sector it is up
to the companies to utilize both the agreements and the opportunities on
the Balkan market that may temporarily compensate for missing compet-
itive positions in all other directions. The merit of the Balkan market is
that it provides an enlargement of the domestic market and leaves compa-
nies some room to seek effects similar to those of economies of scale. At
the end of the day, competitiveness on the EU and CEFTA directions
coincide.
Number of observations suggest that cooperation and regional com-
petitiveness depend on qualities of the company strategies and that condi-
tions under different free trade and other political agreements would work
if and only if companies are enough flexible to enhance their products and
services. There is a need for additional research, but even company case
studies we had in mind working on this paper19 provide abundant anec-
dotic evidence that success in regional trade and possibly cooperation is
linked to foreign investment. The conventional wisdom is that both
domestic and foreign investment would capture gains from trade and
cooperation if there are impersonal structures of contract enforcement,
transparent company structures and easy access and exit to and from mar-
kets.  Since we discuss Balkans as a region, distinguishing between domes-
tic and foreign companies has little sense. The company survey we used in
the third part of this paper as well as the assessments of the working group
members give sufficient evidence that these pre-conditions of trade and
cooperation are hardly in place.
___________
19 See: Obstacles to Trade, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness: Ten Case 
Studies on Balkan Businesses.
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4. The above reasoning is rather obvious.  The important fact is the
lag behind the pace of Central Europe transition economies, and the more
important is -why there is this lag. In order to answer this question, we
would like to start with mentioning that in principle all post-communist
countries, even those that were the fastest to restore their pre-reform GDP
per capita levels, spent considerably more time to do so in comparison
with the countries, which were renovating economies after the World War
II damages. All core European countries that suffered vast destruction as
a result of the war managed to reach their respective pre-war levels of
industrial output and per capita levels of GDP by the end of 1947 or mid-
1948. Germany was an obvious exception, but even it was at the level of
pre-war by mid-1950. There is abundant evidence that the Marshall Plan
was no reason for these successes.20
One of the available explanations in the literature of these countries
had very little in the way of narrow special-interest lobbying or carteliza-
tion in the early years of their post-war democracy.21 We believe this is
to a great degree true, but what is behind is the lack of basic institutions
that could promote growth and prosperity, among them: enforcement of
private property rights and contracts, non-partisan rule of law and com-
petitive political system.
In addition, all available sources suggest that: there is a relatively
recent period of price stability22; there is a progress with structural re-
forms in Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia; across the region it is possible
to assume that there was a gradual improvement of the business environ-
ment for foreign investors via decreasing the risk characteristic before
2001.
Policy responses 
1. There is no shortage of international initiatives, as well as of the
desire to be a member of those initiatives and structures. 
___________
20 See, for instance, Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe: 
1945-1951, London, Mathuen & Co. LTD., 1984. 
21 Mansur Olson, Power and Prosperity, Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist 
Dictatorship, New York, Basic Books, p. 169.
22 With the exception of Serbia and Romania.  The previous period, 1994-1998, 
however marks high (double digit) inflation level in most of the countries 
(excluding Macedonia and Croatia after 1995) with peaks in Bulgaria, 
Romania (76% in 2000) and Serbia (48.7% in 2000).
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Notes: Brackets mean either a procedure to join (ratify) or status of
an observer and/or unclearly defined membership.
In addition to the listed initiatives and institutions, Bulgaria and
Romania are members of the Central European Free Trade Agreement
(CEFTA).  It seems however, that these initiatives and domestic and
regional policies proceed, as if, on two parallel, rarely interchangeable lev-
els.  Kosovo does not have and cannot have a place in the above table due
to its undecided status. Membership of Macedonia in almost all relevant
initiatives and institutions and the Stabilization and Association Agre-
ement with the EU seem not to contribute to the stability of the country.
As mentioned already, the EU trade policies often represent the
available instrument for international policies.  UTA between the EU and
the so-called Western Balkans are enforced in 2000.  Bulgarian experience
with asymmetric trade benefits demonstrates that they do not necessarily
work.  There could be also an effect similar to adverse selection: non-com-
petitive economic structures strip rent from the trade with the EU and dis-
appear only when benefits expire. Policies are up to the governments;
competitiveness is up to the companies. Given the negligable volumes of
EU imports from SEE rent of outdate economic structures do not matter
for the EU. But they might have and presumably have political conse-
quences for the Balkan economies and societies. In addition, UTA do not
treat areas of significant (at least politically) Balkan sectors, like agricul-
ture, wines and fishing.
There are political difficulties arising from different trade policies,
pace of the EU accession, and from joint initiatives. Two examples: 1)
Croatia has problems negotiating free trade agreements with Romania
and Bulgaria, because the latter would lose their advantages vis-a-vie
Croatia as the EU accession countries; 2) In June 2001, SEE countries
signed in Zagreb the so-called Memorandum for Trade Facilitation and
Liberalization, which might turn counter-productive.  More specifically, it
envisages liberalization via bilateral agreements; they will take time to
negotiate and would evoke attempts to freeze the exchange within
Balkans at levels of current advantages (and protections).
2. In all SEE countries, domestic policies have been delaying
reforms. Wars and conflicts aggravated and still keep high country risks
and worsened the illnesses of lack of institution building. Therefore,
regional initiatives and policies must not be perceived as a substitute for
core market and democratization reforms.
The fact of the matter is that the undecided status of Kosovo and the
failure to organize a representative democracy is reproducing the chetnik
(i.e. guerilla) model of tactics familiar from late nineteenth  early twenti-
eth century national movements of the Balkans.24 These tactics have revi-
___________
24 Arben Xhaferi put these points more bluntly: I explain [the outbreak of vio-
lence in Macedonia] as ethnic competition: to whom does the state belong? 
(An interview for IWPR)
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talized the political rhetoric and inter-ethnic attitudes of the past, jeop-
ardizing the fragile trust that business and trade opportunities were begin-
ning to make and scaring away private sector and foreign investment in the
region.
3. Since there is no indigenous, presumably being established by the
entrepreneurship strata, critical mass for cooperation and thinking about
the future, the attention again must be directed to more or less pure polit-
ical conditions.  
There are two main political preconditions to convert the region into
the recovery and development path.  
The first is to avoid the legacy risks.  Such risks may occur when new
realities reproduce the heritage of the 1990s or when post-Kosovo initia-
tives, opportunities, policies and instruments are rejected by local or Wes-
tern democracies, and fail to behave in an economically rational manner.  
The second condition is to avoid deeper divisions of legitimate exe-
cution of power in the Balkans.  It is likely that geographic location; prox-
imity and availability of traditional (pre-1999) trade routes and markets
will have a predominant importance in the short and medium term.
Companies from and economies in the Balkan countries will naturally
seek diversity and alternatives to pre-World War I links and routes.  The
philosophy of both governments and chetniks here has often been that
nations (not companies) compete; seeking rents from others is a norm, as
is the ethnic competition in Xhaferis words.
4. Domestic and intra-regional conditions that would eliminate
sticky political and economic divisions in SEE are as follows:
!To avoid consistent failures of Balkan countries and leaders to 
agree on long-lasting peace agreements and constitutional orders;
!To reduce discrepancies in economic rules of the game within the 
region25 and between different speeds of market and democratic 
reforms, including those related to EU-accession; and
!To re-address aspirations to build nation-states at the expense of 
others, combined with a lack of respect for human and minority 
rights.
___________
25 See: Krassen Stanchev, Market Reforms in the Balkans: Barriers and Chal-
lenges, Ivailo Dichev (editor),  Balkan Transitions, Sofia, ACCESS, 1997.
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STABILITY PACT WORKING GROUP ON TRADE
LIBERALIZATION AND FACILITATION
by Iani Bogoevski*,
I am very pleased to have this opportunity to address this meeting,
as Chairman of the Stability Pact Working Group on Trade Liberalization
and Facilitation and to share with you some of the experience gained by
our Group since its establishment in January 2000.
As you are aware, many initiatives were launched around this time.
In many cases, these initiatives, including the Trade Working Group, were
launched on the basis of a vague recognition that something in the partic-
ular area for example, trade relations among the countries needed to be
promoted or improved. This is not a criticism it merely reflects the urgent
desire at that time of both the countries of the region and the internation-
al community to move as quickly as possible to promote political and eco-
nomic stability in the region.  
However it did mean that Groups such as ourselves were created
without a clear and /or common understanding of our objectives and
therefore it was difficult to answer questions such as;
!What exactly we should work on?
!Who should be involved?
!How should we work? 
This uncertainty was compounded by the fact that we were created
under the auspices of the Stability Pact  a brand new international organ-
ization that was itself trying to clarify its roles, responsibilities and modus
operandi and its relationships with individual governments and multilater-
al organizations that comprised its membership.
Therefore like many other groups, we struggled to determine the
range of our responsibilities, the best way to meet these responsibilities 
___________
* Chairman of Working Group on Trade Liberalization, Stability Pact.
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and what resources we required to undertake our tasks. I have to tell you
it took us the best part of a year to get clear answers to these questions.
However when, in October 2000, Mr Fabrizio Saccomanni, the Chairman
of the Economic Working Table of the Stability Pact  Working Table II,
instructed our Group to accelerate trade liberalization in the region we
were able to put forward a strategy to meet this demand.  
In January 2001, we convened Trade Policy Forum in Geneva fol-
lowed immediately by a Ministerial meeting at which seven countries
endorsed a Statement of Intent to liberalize trade in the region. They
requested the Working Group to prepare a Memorandum of Understan-
ding on Trade Liberalization and Facilitation before the end of the Swe-
dish Presidency.
On 27 June, 2001, the Stability Pact Office hosted a special Mini-ste-
rial meeting in Brussels. This meeting concluded with a formal Signing
Ceremony for the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Liberalisa-
tion and Facilitation.  Moldova and the Signatories to the Memorandum
also signed a Statement of Intent on Trade Liberalization and Facilitation.
The EC Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy and the US Ambassador to
the EC, Richard Morningstar attended the event along with representa-
tives from the World Bank, and the WTO, and officials from Hungary,
Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the USA.
This Memorandum is an ambitious document. It commits the Signa-
tory Countries to take concrete trade liberalization and facilitation meas-
ures. These include:
!To complete a network of bilateral Free Trade agreements (FTAs) 
between all countries of the region by 31 December, 2002, in accor-
dance with specified  provisions.
!To identify and abolish non-tariff barriers to trade;
!To assess the potential for regional cooperation in trade in servi-
ces;
!To harmonize legislation across a number of trade related areas;
!To increase cooperation in areas such as standards and accredita-
tion, competition and intellectual property rights; and 
!To maintain open trade regime and pursue further trade liberali-
sation within the context of the WTO.
The task now facing the Working Group is to facilitate the imple-
mentation of these commitments by the Signatory Countries. This accel-
eration in trade liberalization and facilitation in South East Europe will
increase investment and economic growth in our region.
At the recent Working Table II meeting in Sarajevo, we reported on
the concrete progress being made by the Signatory Countries in meeting
the terms and conditions of the Memorandum.  We focused in particular
on the status of the various free trade agreement negotiations and on the
assistance being made available to facilitate this progress. I am pleased to
report that the countries are making a special effort to ensure that a net-
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work of bilateral free trade agreements are in place by the deadline of 31
December 2002. The most recent news is that Bulgaria and Croatia signed
a FTA on 4 December and Albania and Macedonia are due to sign their
FTA on 21 December.
So how did we make the transition from a bunch of individuals from
different countries and organizations, all committed to improving trade in
the region but all with different ideas on what to do, to an integrated team,
focused on specific goals and with a clear strategy to achieve these.
I believe that the following factors were critical to our success:
1.   Political Will 
Trade liberalization is vital for economic growth in our countries but
it is not an easy option. 
From the outset, there was broad agreement among the countries of
the region and the international community that improved trade liberal-
ization would contribute to economic and political stability in the region.
This Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated BY the Signatory
Countries FOR the Signatory Countries with support and encouragement
from the international community. This shared ownership is important.
Our Governments must maintain their commitment to the process.
Political support and encouragement from the multilateral organizations,
particularly the European Commission, and individual third countries has
a valuable role to play in maintaining our Governments resolve.
2.   Appropriate Representation /Membership of the Group
Following the Trade Policy Forum in Geneva, the participating gov-
ernments, in response to the Stability Pacts request, appointed high-level
representatives to the Working Group. Thus we have high quality and
consistent input from THE senior trade policy officials who are responsi-
ble for advising Ministers on trade policy and conducting the various trade
negotiations. I would like to commend the representatives from the region
for their hard work and their willingness to go the extra mile in order to
make progress.
We have also benefited from the participation in the Group of trade
experts from the European Commission (DG Trade), the World Bank, the
World Trade Organization and other international bodies.  These techni-
cal experts were complemented by the active involvement of the
Chairman and Director of Stability Pact Working Table II and officials
from bilateral governments.  The availability of  on-the-spot  advice and
guidance during our meetings as well as their encouragement and com-
mitment to the process throughout has been invaluable.
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3.  Technical and Financial Support
Another crucial factor for the success of our Group is the manage-
ment, technical and financial support provided by donors specifically for
Group activities.  For example:
!The United Kingdoms Department for International Develop-
ment has been our main supporter since the establishment of the 
Group. It funds technical, management and administrative sup-
port to the Secretariat of the Working Group.  The Secretariat pro-
vides the Group with timely, efficient and effective technical, man-
agement and administrative assistance through a small core team 
of management and technical staff, supported as necessary by spe-
cialist advisers.
!The Commercial Law Development Programme of the US 
Department of Commerce is delivering a series of trade-related 
seminars and workshops as well as providing ad-hoc technical 
advice. The CLDP also provides practical financial support for 
Working Group meetings by covering the travel and accommoda-
tion costs of the representatives from the Signatory Countries.  
This contributes greatly to the consistency of representation.
!The Swiss Government has funded a study on non-tariff barriers to 
trade in the various countries and is considering further support on 
this issue. 
!The European Commission and the Slovene Government agreeing 
to co-fund a seminar for ministry and customs officials on this 
complex but critical area.
!We are in discussion, with the Swedish authorities, on the prepara-
tion of a comprehensive study on trade in services in the region.  
The Working Group is specifically charged under the MoU to 
commission such a study.
!France, Germany, Ireland and Switzerland have also indicated 
their backing for our efforts and we are discussing how to make the 
best use of this support.
4.   Focus on Specific Goals
The remit of the Working Group  trade liberalization and facilita-
tion  can be interpreted very broadly and we suffered initially from con-
fusion among representatives as to the exact role and responsibilities of
the Group. I believe our decision to focus on trade liberalization and to
define a road map for liberalization in the form of a Memorandum of
Understanding was vital to our success. It allows us to devote our scarce
resources to doing a few things well instead of trying to be all things to
all men.
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The Stability Pact Working Group on Trade Liberalization and
Facilitation provides the countries of the region and the international com-
munity with a unique forum for dialogue, exchange of information and
ideas and coordination of assistance for trade liberalization and facilitation
in South East Europe. 
Yes, there will be obstacles and bottlenecks to overcome in the com-
ing year as we seek to negotiate MoU compliant FTAs and yes, we must
also ensure that progress is made on the other elements of the MoU.
However, I am confident that if we can maintain the factors that I have
listed we can maintain our success.
By success, I dont just mean improved trade liberalization among
our countries I also mean the ability to move beyond the past misunder-
standings, conflicts and clashes and to cooperate together for all our ben-
efit. Yes it is ambitious, no it will not be easy but we must try for all our
futures.
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CRISIS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
AND ITS POSSIBLE IMPACT 
ON THE INTEGRATION PROCESSES 
IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
by Zoran Jachev*
Speaking of the Republic of Macedonia and the prospects for its
integration in the EU and NATO, one year ago and today, unfortunately,
is quite a different thing. The events in the last year in and around Mace-
donia changed many things and nailed the country down at the bottom of
the list for Euro and Euro-Atlantic integration processes. The country has
passed through a conflict, which took place when almost everybody in the
region and Europe thought that the crisis in Kosovo would be the last one
in the Balkans. Most of the people of the region, including Macedonian
citizens, thought that the Balkans would finally stabilize and integrate in
European and Euro-Atlantic structures. But, it turned out that, for
Macedonia, the light at the end of the tunnel, which was looking like the
way out of it, was the train.
In the beginning of the crisis, there were two main questions -why
Macedonia, which seems to have a relatively stable inter-ethnic relations,
quite good record of democracy and reforms, and, why now, when inter-
nal and external conditions are not in favour to this kind of events.
For better understanding of the reasons of the crisis, it is very impor-
tant to know what was the momentum when the conflict started -right
after three important events for the future of the Macedonian State and
democracy:
!Signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with 
European Union, which, among other, provides conditions and 
obligations for further development of the rule of law, fight against 
___________
* Executive Director Forum -Center for Strategic Research and Documen-
tation Skopje, Republic of Macedonia.
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organized crime, corruption and money laundering. Together with 
similar obligations and activities in other countries in the region, 
the space for organized crime started to become more and more 
narrow. The reaction from the structures of organized crime was 
creating conditions for a new conflict, in order to prevent the cre-
ation of legal rules of the game in the region. The weakest point 
on the map and the spot where it was easiest to do that was the 
Republic of Macedonia.     
!Signing the Agreement that defines the border between Republic 
of Macedonia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is one of 
the few really new elements in the Balkans policy and security 
issues -a border, which has never existed before, in the last five 
centuries. Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia considered that 
border as something unacceptable, something which separates 
them, preventing them to keep their quite close and vivid relations. 
Beside that, Albanians from Kosovo considered that after gaining 
the status of protectorate of International Community, they should 
be the partners in the estimation of the border between Macedonia 
and Yugoslavia, in the part running along Kosovo.  
!The Decision of Macedonian Parliament to conduct a census under 
all international standards and monitoring of OSCE and the EU, 
which had an intention to finally  clarify the dispute over a number 
of ethnic Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia. There were 
claims that the percentage of ethnic Albanians in the total popula-
tion of the country is much higher (even up to 40%) than official 
23,9%, according to the last census. That claim was a base for the 
demand of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia to become a constitu-
tional entity, not an ethnic group or minority.  
All these events are crucial for further stabilization of the country
and its democratization, reforms and integration in the Euro and Euro-
Atlantic associations and the reasons for the crisis were closely linked to
them. This conflict couldnt be provoked and reached the level that it did,
if there were no combination and linkage of different internal and exter-
nal reasons that provided conditions for it. On the list of external reasons
for the crisis, most important were:
!Export of the instability from Kosovo, which was the result of 
the existence of armed militant nationalistic and paramilitary 
structures which were the rest of allegedly disarmed and dismissed 
UCK (KLA). They are out of control of democratically elected 
leadership of the protectorate, while KFOR and UNMiK and 
some of their structures are closely connected with organized 
crime in the region. These structures operate on  both sides of the 
border and are not interested in the stabilization of the region, 
because in that case it would be difficult to maintain their financ-
ing and existence. They are interested in preserving this situation 
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of relative disorder in Kosovo, lack of control on the border 
towards Macedonia, which is very suitable for their operations and 
intentions. 
!Existence of a regionally organized crime network, in which one of 
the most important roles is played by Albanians from Kosovo, 
Macedonia and Albania, especially in the field of trafficking of 
drugs, arms, women, cigarettes and prostitution. Substantial part of 
these activities in the region is coordinated from the centers in 
Kosovo, western part of Macedonia and northern Albania. The si-
tuation is even worse in Kosovo, since international forces and ad-
ministration are not able to control these illegal activities, which 
make Kosovo the Eldorado for organized crime. Organized cri-
me bosses are not interested in the stabilization, democratization 
and integration of the region, because that would narrow the pos-
sibilities for their businesses. 
!Lack of clear and efficient strategy of the International Communi-
ty for solving the problematic tendencies in the region, especially 
in the part of it inhabited by Albanians, which seems to be the last  
troubled zone in the Balkans. The desire and efforts of the 
International community for stabilization, democratization and 
association of the region are obvious at the level of strategy, but 
there are problems at the level of its implementation.    
External reasons wouldnt be enough for this kind of  crisis, if there
were not conditions in the Republic of Macedonia, which contributed to it,
such as:
!Lack of strategic vision and planning of Macedonian (both ethnic 
Macedonian and ethnic Albanian) political elite, regarding  possi-
ble development of the events in the country, after the crisis in 
Kosovo. It was more that obvious that, during the events in 1998, 
1999 and 2000 in and around Kosovo, instability would spillover to 
Macedonia, mostly because of the participation of ethnic Alba-
nians in UCK (KLA) in Kosovo and close relations between Alba-
nians in Kosovo and Macedonia. Many reports of the security 
structures of the Republic of Macedonia from that period have 
clearly pointed out that some of the structures of UCK (KLA) are 
operating from or on Macedonian territory and that they are using 
it as a logistical base. It was naive and dangerous to expect that 
after the end of the conflict in Kosovo, UCK (KLA), together with 
the weaponry stored in Macedonia, would disappear. On the con-
trary, a part of the weapons and fighters, in order to preserve them 
from disarming, that was conducted by International forces in 
Kosovo, were dislocated from there to Macedonia.  
!Lack of the rule of law, high level of corruption and the influence 
of regional organized crime network in the Republic of Macedo-
nia, had produced territories in the western and north-western part 
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of the country  out of control of the authorities. Organized crime 
structures, consisting of Albanians from Macedonia, Kosovo and 
Albania easily gained control over those outlaw territories. 
Many villages in the areas inhabited by ethnic Albanians were lit-
erary transformed into a real heaven for trafficking of cigarettes, 
drugs, arms and some of them had probably beat the world record 
in the number of prostitutes per capita. When the infiltration of 
UCK (KLA) from Kosovo to Macedonia started, it was almost 
impossible to cooperate with the local ethnic Albanian population 
in the villages where the police was absent for  years. That was one 
of the most important reasons why UCK (KLA) established con-
trol over such a big part of Macedonian territory in a very short 
period of time.
The events of 2001 in Macedonia have influenced not only the sta-
bility of the country, but also the integrative processes in the region and
confirmed that:
! Integration processes are vulnerable and can be easily disrupted, if 
the establishment in some country is not being sincere in building 
the rule of law and the International Community fails to recognize 
and (or) doesnt want to react to such conduct.
!There are structures and powers in the region and out of it, which 
are against the stabilization and association of the region, which 
must not be underestimated. The timing of the crisis,   
!Organized crime network is strong enough to jeopardize both the 
efforts for stabilization and integration of the countries in the 
region, as well as the one of International Community. 
! Improving mechanisms of International Community for conflict 
prevention or conflict resolution are not efficient enough, if imple-
mented on ethnic group(s) -they produce results only if there is a 
state structure to be applied on.
!Desire for creation of a greater state -one of the most danger-
ous tendencies for integration processes in the region has not 
diminished, but is still alive and active.
The development of the situation in Macedonia, after the Consti-
tutional changes, seems to run in a positive direction, but it is still too early
for real optimism. The reasons for that can be found in the fact that almost
all of the real factors of the crisis have not been solved with the
Constitutional changes:
!UCK (KLA) is everything else but disarmed and dissolute, even 
after the operation Essential Harvest -aimed at disarming Alba-
nian paramilitary formation which had operated in Macedonia.
!Because the status of Kosovo cant be solved in the foreseeable 
period, radical paramilitary formations from this protectorate will 
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keep producing instability and radiate it around, especially to-
wards the weakest border -the Macedonian one.
!Resolving  the reasons of the crisis, because of their complicated 
nature, is far beyond the capacities of present Macedonian politi-
cal elite (both ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian).
!The most powerful player in solving the crisis -International Com-
munity, still doesnt have a clear and efficient strategy to solve the 
regional problems in the areas where ethnic Albanians are living.
In addition of these challenges, there are couple of other, which
occurred during the crisis:
!As a reaction of existence and activities of Albanian paramilitary 
formations, there are reasons to believe that the establishment of 
ethnic Macedonian paramilitary forces has began. 
!The focus of interest of the International Community is and will be 
concentrated on activities after September 11 - campaign in 
Afghanistan and fight against terrorism in other parts of the world 
will decrease the attention devoted to the Balkans.
Since the reason of the crisis, challenges on the way of solving it and
situation in and around Macedonia seem very complicated, what should be
done in order to reach the final conflict resolution and improve the situa-
tion? It is about high time for coordinated action of Macedonian political
elite and the International Community to design a common strategy and
methodology for its implementation in order to prevent further destabi-
lization of the country and the region. The basis for future activities has to
be the following: 
!Regaining of the territorial integrity and functioning of the state 
authority, according to the Framework Agreement, Constitutional 
changes and the laws, as the results of the activities.That process 
will be slow, full of challenges because of the existence of Albanian 
paramilitary formations, which are not under full control of any 
legitimate political subject in the country.   
!Disarmament of Albanian paramilitary formations and ethnic 
Macedonians, who used to be a part of the security forces and 
arent demobilized yet. Without disarmament, the most probable 
future for Macedonia would be Lebanonization - situation in 
which the main players in the country are not going to be the 
state and the society, but the paramilitary formation(s). 
!Relaxation of interethnic relations is one of the most important 
processes for stabilization of the country and must be carried out 
on the mutual agreement of both (ethnic Macedonian and ethnic 
Albanian political elite, media, non-governmental organizations, 
intellectuals and other moderate structures. This will also be a slow 
process and must be supported, as much as possible, by the Inter-
national Community. 
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!Economic reconstruction, increasing of the rate of employment 
and standard of living in order to avoid social disorder, which can 
occur and additionally destabilize the country. Macedonia needs 
quick financial support for overcoming the gap into the budget and 
to revitalize the shaken economy, especially because the most dif-
ficult period is yet to come.
!Democratic and fair elections should be organized, as soon as the 
situation on the ground becomes stable enough to provide condi-
tions for that. Elections of that kind would be the base for redistri-
bution of political power in the Government and the Parliament, 
which wouldnt have the burden of direct participation in the crisis 
and would have more wisdom in dealing with it.   
!Building of the rule of law and reducing the corruption are one of 
the crucial elements for stabilization of the country and contribu-
tion to the stability of the region. Without that it would be difficult 
to expect that International Community would give substantial 
financial assistance for economic reconstruction, democratization 
of the state and society.   
In order to achieve the above mentioned, Macedonia should assist
the International Community in the design of comprehensive strategy for
overcoming the effects of the last years crisis. That strategy should be
built on four basic elements:
!Support of democratization of important political parties in 
Macedonia, both ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian, since 
most of them have no democratic atmosphere, procedures and 
practice. The support should be focused to internal democratic 
opposition structures inside of the biggest political parties in the 
country.
!Support to the development of civil society, especially policy insti-
tutes (think tanks) which would assist to the establishment to cre-
ate more consistent agenda of the country, that can be implement-
ed. The support should be focused at organizations dealing with 
interethnic relations, building of the rule of law, economic devel-
opment and anticorruption.
!Support of the development of independent media, which would, 
more then before, be responsible in reporting and creating of the 
public opinion. The support should be focused on sustainability of 
the media and implementation of international standards of jour-
nalism.
!Support of the local communities, which will have more important 
role than before, according to decentralization process envisaged 
in the new Law on Local Self-government. The support should be 
focused on the improvement of the capacities of the services on 
local level in delivering public goods.
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If domestic and international factors fail in achieving these goals and
the conflict starts again in spring, as some of the information from differ-
ent sources anticipate, the regional integration would face a huge chal-
lenge, due to:
! If there is a next phase of the conflict, most probably, it would be 
much stronger, more violent and with vast dimensions. In that 
case, it would be almost impossible to isolate it only on the territo-
ry of the Republic of Macedonia. That conflict has all the chances 
to open in full scale, the so-called Albanian issue, in all neigh-
bouring countries around Albania and Kosovo. Also, it can be the 
worst example for other minorities, which exist in all of the coun-
tries in the region, on  how to improve their status.
! If one or more countries in the region cant be active and con-
structive partners in the regional cooperation, because of the secu-
rity problems on their territories, integrative processes would be 
slowed down. In case of stronger conflicts in Macedonia, it would 
absorb a high level of other key interests of the neighbouring coun-
tries. That, together with hidden expectations of some structures in 
neighbouring countries, of the outcome of the crisis, can seriously 
slow down the integration of the region.  
! In case of a new conflict, usage of the corridors No. 8 and No. 10, 
perhaps the two most important infrastructures in the region, 
would be seriously jeopardized. They cross each other less that 10-
km from the village of Arachinovo, where the strongest confronta-
tion during the crisis took place. That could decrease trade among 
the countries in the region and influence their economic develop-
ment.
This challenges would influence all important elements for integra-
tion processes - security, economy, cooperation and democratization.
Reopening of the conflict and crisis in the Republic of Macedonia is defi-
nitely not an issue that should be underestimated. All available potentials
of the Republic of Macedonia, countries in the region and the Inter-
national Community, should be used to prevent the events which have
serious chances to take place in and around the Republic of Macedonia,
after melting of snow in the mountains on the borders towards Kosovo and
Albania. 
Finally, it would then be clear whether the contemporary peace in
the country is the result of political efforts of domestic political factors and
the International Community or only the consequence of impassable
routes for exports of the instability.
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WEAK STATES -THE  SEARCH 
FOR SECURITY IN SEE
by Albert Rakipi*
What are the Weak States?
Although the phenomenon of weak states has not been uncommon
in the arena of international politics, there has been relatively little
research on weak states.  There has been increasing concern with the weak
states during the first decade of the aftermath of the Cold War.  This con-
cern came about mainly due to the negative impact that a number of weak
or failed states had or could have not only on their national security, but
also on international security issues. 
The impact of negative spill over effects of weak states on the inter-
national arena has been increasing primarily due to the end of the Cold
War. Previously the deep separation into two opposing blocs and into a
third unallied one limited the impact that weak states could have on the
international arena. Another factor that has deepened the negative impact
of weak states on national and international security issues is the changing
nature of conflict in todays world.  Most of the conflicts or wars during the
last decade have been intra rather than inter state ones. Such were the
wars that took place in the Balkans, wars that took place within the
Yugoslav Federation. Thus, the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and later on in
Bosnia were wars within the Yugoslav Federation until when the interna-
tional community decided to recognize these countries as independent
states.  The latest conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
was an internal one, as it was the case also with the 97 disturbances in
Albania.  The Kosovo war is another example of intrastate conflict.  It was
a war that took place within the rump Yugoslav Federation composed of 
___________
* Director of the Albanian Institute for International Studies.
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Serbia and Montenegro, despite the fact that the parties in the conflict rep-
resented different nations and ethnicities. Moreover, the conflict in
Kosovo is one of the best examples that demonstrate the fact that intra
state conflicts constitute a real threat to the international security and
order and not only that of the local actors involved.
It is fair to say that international peace, however, does not seem to
be jeopardized by war, or conflicts between states. The issue now is how to
secure peace within states.
According to Kalevi Holsti (1996) the assumption that the problem
of war (conflict) is primarily a problem of relations between states has to
be seriously questioned... The security between states in the third world,
among some of the former republics of the Soviet Union and elsewhere
has become increasingly dependent upon security within those states. The
classical formula were: International peace and security provide an envi-
ronment in which domestic politics can unfold untroubled by external dis-
turbances. The equation is now becoming reversed. The problem of con-
temporary and future politics, it turns out, is essentially a problem of
domestic politics1
A functional global response to the serious threats that terrorism
poses to global security, requires that special attention be paid to weak or
failed states.  To a great extent the roots of international terrorism lie in
aching societies of weak states.  
But, what are weak or failed states? Weak or failed states are inca-
pable of sustaining themselves as members of the international communi-
ty.2
The civil wars, violence between communities, ethnic conflicts, col-
lapse of governments, poverty and on top of it organized crime 
turned a number of the new states, that were declared or are being 
declared independent, into ungovernable land. Although there is 
no clear definition of each of these two categories there is a very 
evident commonality. This commonality relates to the weakness of 
institutions. In fact the major difference between weak and failed 
states is the degree of weakness of the institutions. When state 
institutions are weak, but still functional to a certain extent, the 
state is classified as weak.  If the institutional weakness is such that 
it incapacitates their functionality the state is considered to be 
failed.
___________
1 Kalevi Holsti, The State, war, and the state of war, Cambridge University 
press, 1996, p.15.
2 See Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, second edition. Harvester Wheat-
sheaf, see also Lawrence Freedman, Weak States and the West, Society, 
Nov/Dec 94, vol. 32 issue 1 p. 17) and Gerad B. Helman, Steven R. Ratner 
Collapsing into anarchy, Current, June 1993 issues 353, p 33). See Also Albert 
Rakipi, Weak States -new dynamics of security, Romanian Journal of Inter-
national Studies 1999.
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What is important here is the concept of weaknesses of these states.
According to Barry Bussan States ... vary in terms of their degree of
socio-political cohesion which is the very essence of what qualifies them to
stand as members of the category of states ... When the idea and institu-
tions of a state are both weak, then that state is in a very real sense less of
a state than one in which the idea and institutions are strong.3
In order to clarify the concept of weak states, Barry Buzan empha-
sizes the fundamental differences between weak and strong states and
between big and small powers. Weak or strong states refer to the degree
of socio-political cohesion, while big and small powers refer to the military
and economic power in comparison to other states. According to Barry
Buzan being a strong state in terms of institutional functioning does not
depend on military or economic power. Weak powers such as Austria,
Holland, Norway or Singapore or Switzerland are simultaneously strong
states, while such relative big powers as Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria,
Pakistan even big powers China or Russia used to be and in some cases
continue to be weak.4
Nonetheless there is a connection between being a big or relatively
big power and a strong state. For instance, while Slovenia already has or is
on the way of consolidating a strong state, it can never gain the status of
power, even in the regional context. Or although Switzerland has a state
that operates perfectly, it does not aspire to become a European power,
much less a world power.
The Search for Legitimacy
Lack of legitimacy is the primary source of state weakness in a num-
ber of South Eastern European states in general and in the Balkans in par-
ticular.  Here, it is important to note that legitimacy does not pertain to the
respective governments within the state, but has to do with the relation-
ship between the state and the citizens in its most general meaning.  Thus,
legitimacy pertains to the experience that the people have to get organized
in a modern state and to the extent that the state is accepted by its citizens
as necessary in order to fulfill their need to be politically and socially
organized. In this respect the Balkan states do not enjoy a high degree of
legitimacy. At the very least, the extent to which the state is accepted and
respected by the societies of Bosnia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania is much
less as compared to that of the Western European ones.  
There is an ongoing debate among scholars as to why the state devel-
oped in Europe as the form of social organization.5 The modern state
___________
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 See Charles Tilly, ed., The formation of Nation States in Western Europe
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.
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emerged in Europe along with the coming of industry  and  of  complicat-
ed commercial arrangements the modern industry and commerce need-
ed something like the state.6
If the Balkan states, and a number of South Eastern European and
other states in the region, are weak one should first look at the origins of
these states, and how they were created, in order to understand why they
are weak. It is important to ask; what necessities brought about the cre-
ation of these states? They emerged relatively later then their Western
European counterparts. The national movements that anticipated and set
the grounds for the creation of these independent states were, with few
exceptions, motivated by nationalism or resulted from the opposition to
imperial or colonial systems. In any case these movements were not set in
motion by the immediate necessities of modern industries and commerce.
The movement that led to the creation of the state in Western Europe was
a massive one, and although it was led by the emerging elite of the time it
had a substantial popular backing. In the Balkans, on the other hand, the
concept of the state was conceived and encouraged by the elite that iden-
tified the state with power.
The idea and the need for a state in Western Europe is more deeply
felt as compared to that in societies of Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina or even in Romania and Bulgaria. States in industrial
societies after more than 500 years of development, have become strong
in the sense that for the first time in history, they enjoy popular legitima-
cy.7
In the Balkans, and generally in South Eastern Europe, as well as in
all the third world countries, a state tradition was lacking and therefore
this could not be the source of the legitimacy for the state, i.e., the long
experience of the co-existence of the state and the citizens which in time
translates the former in the eyes of the public into a necessity. 
The reason why there is a low acceptance of the state in countries
such as Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria and so on should be
sought in the authoritarian regimes or the communist dictatorships that
came to power in these countries at the end of the Second World War.
The state during the period of dictatorship was used against certain seg-
ments of the population.  For nearly half a century the citizens of Albania,
and those of the other countries in the communist bloc, at the very least
did not conceive of the state as a necessity and at the very best, more than
half of these societies, thought of the state as an instrument of repression
that ensured the survival of the communist regime. The societies in the
communist countries were deeply divided into those who supported and
those who opposed the communist system. For a relatively long period of
time in the human conscience of the Balkan countries and other countries 
___________
6 See Phillips Shvely, Power and Choice, McGRAW-HILL, INC, fourth edi-
tion 1987.
7 Kalevi Holsti, The State, Fear and the State of War, Cambridge University, 
press 1996).
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in the communist bloc, the authoritarian regimes, and in the worst scenario
extreme dictatorships, were identified with the state. Therefore, for the
citizens of these countries the state never enjoyed legitimacy and was even
perceived to be an evil for at least half of the society.  For certain segments
of the society on the other hand, as it was the case not only for Albania,
the state was a source of income and an instrument that was used to sub-
jugate the rest of the society. However, the phenomena of a clientele state,
such as nepotism and localism that are still very present ten years after the
fall of communism do not originate from the totalitarian states in the
Balkans. These are not solely Balkan phenomena. It is probably fair to
argue that the deep backwardness, economic underdevelopment and the
isolation of these states from each other nourished and still nourish, a hun-
dred years later, perceptions of the state as the primary source of person-
al gains.
The weakness of the state in most of the Balkan countries cannot be
explained by the heritage of the communist period. The economic and
political stagnation, the slow pace of the reforms or even the scarcity of
ideas on how to reform and modernize the society has its roots in the peri-
od before that of the communist regimes. Even before the Second World
War these countries were closed agrarian economies with a very limited
industrial sector.
In the meantime Western Europe had began, for at least two hun-
dred years to practice liberal ideas in both the social and the economic
realm. These ideas would find fertile ground and develop in the Balkans
much later. For most of the countries in South Eastern Europe the liberal
ideas and practices would develop simultaneously with the democratic
ones. Usually Liberalism and Democracy tend to go hand in hand.
However it is possible for a country to be liberal without being particu-
larly democratic, as was  eighteenth-century Britain.8
Greece is perhaps another example where economic development
and the development of liberal practices in general increased and strength-
ened the legitimacy of the state, despite the fact that democratic process-
es in Greece were interrupted by episodes of autocratic rule. Spain could
be another example of the co-existence of autocratic rule on the one hand
and liberal economic practices on the other.  
Some instances of liberal practices in the region began to develop in
the twentieth century, but they were rare and far between the whirlpools
of conflict and violence. In the case of Albania such were a few years
under the rule of King Zog I during which the state enjoyed some sort of
legitimacy. Yugoslavia under Tito is another example in the Balkans
where in the absence of democratic procedures the government experi-
mented with liberal economic policies that were not completely unsuc-
cessful. 
___________
8 Francis Fukuyama, The end of History and the last Man, Avon Books, inc 
1992.
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After the WWII most of the countries in the region, and particular-
ly Albania, would become the grounds of some of the wildest experiments
of the communist regimes that were trying to develop the Marxist concept
of the state.  According to this concept the state is simply an instrument of
power.
The Legitimacy of Statess Institutions
At the essence of the existence of the state ever since its inception
and under all kinds of regimes is the need to gain legitimacy or the trust
and approval of the society. Legitimacy vests the government and its struc-
tures with the authority to act.
Thus, another source of state weakness or failure in the Balkans or
elsewhere has to do with the legitimacy of governance.  Countries such as
Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and many former communist
countries began liberal economic policies and at the same time democrat-
ic procedures in order to determine who would govern the country. So,
two processes had to take place simultaneously: the economic develop-
ment and the transformation of the economy, completely centralized in
the case of Albania and partially liberalized in the case of Yugoslavia.
Also, for the first time in the history of many former communist countries
the legitimacy of the state would be determined through the open compe-
tition for power among different political groupings and through the par-
ticipation of a public that had the right to elect and be elected.
Would this imply though that the governments that were in place in
Albania and Yugoslavia, as well as other countries of the former commu-
nist bloc, before the dawn of democracy lacked any kind of legitimacy?
Any government in any regime needs some kind of legitimacy in order to
stay in power and to take action on behalf of the society. As Socrates
explains in Platos Rebulic, even among a band of robbers there must be
some principle of justice that permits them to divide their spoils.9
The communist government that came to power in Albania in 1944
did enjoy certain popular support. It was a legitimate government in the
eyes of the public since it came out of the movement that put up the major
resistance against the fascist invaders. At the time the legitimacy and
power of this government could have been hardly successfully contested
by another political movement. This was true for most of the communist
governments that came to power in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.
They did enjoy some legitimacy as organizers of the anti-nazi-fascist resist-
ance.  The other political groupings in these countries appeared compro-
mised in the eyes of the public due to their alleged collaboration with the
nazi-fascist invaders.
___________
9 Francis Fukuyama, The end of History and the last Man, Avon Books,inc 
1992.
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Thus, for a relatively long period of time the communist govern-
ments continued to enjoy popular support and a considerable amount of
legitimacy.  This was also due to the achievements of these governments in
first decades after the WWII. In the case of Albania for example the com-
munist government strengthened its legitimacy by conducting land reform
at a massive scale. In a country where conditions of extreme poverty pre-
vailed at the time, any steps towards the betterment of the life of the peas-
ant in an overwhelmingly rural society gave a real boost to the legitimacy
of Hoxhas communist government. The reforms, especially those in the
agricultural sector, brought relative improvements in the living conditions
of the populace, at least within the first two decades immediately after the
WWII.  
In a similar fashion the popularity and legitimacy of the Soviet gov-
ernment increased due to the rapid economic development of Soviet
Union after WWII.
Hitlers Germany in the 1930s is another good example on how a
government attains legitimacy through successful economic reforms and
development. What solidified Hitlers hold on Germany and gave him a
degree of legitimacy by the end of the 1930s was the results of his early
policies. He reduced unemployment he built the autobahn system of
superhighways; he even pioneered the Wolskswagen bug automobile.10
Titos Yugoslavia is another good example that shows how a gov-
ernment can enjoy legitimacy through economic achievements. While in a
number of communist bloc countries the economies were entering periods
of recession and deep economic crises, the citizens of Titos Yugoslavia
enjoyed living standards that did not set them very far apart from other cit-
izens in the developed Western European countries. 
What the above examples have in common is not simply the fact that
they demonstrate that economic achievements bring about legitimacy for
the government. Another commonality the previous examples share is the
fact that all the above mentioned countries were fascist or communist dic-
tatorships at the time. Thus at this point one could ask: Was it due only to
their economic successes that these governments and their legitimacy were
not contested for a certain period of time? To answer this question it is
important to emphasize that in these dictatorships, both of the left and of
the right, alternative views and processes were either routed from the very
beginning or simply forbidden by law. Both in the case of a left wing dic-
tatorship and in that of a right wing one the so called civil society was
smothered or subjugated. There was no free speech and the media was
completely in the hands of the government.
The communist Albanian government as well as many others of the
former communist bloc managed to stay in power for many consequent 
___________
10 See Phillips Shvely, Power and Choice, McGRAW-HILL, INC, fourth edi-
tion 1987, p.110
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decades despite the fact that economic development came to a halt. In fact
the economic situation worsened, the country remained undeveloped,
unemployment was large and poverty was soaring. 
Therefore, when the Eastern and South Eastern European countries
broke away from the communist system, they could not claim legitimacy
simply on the prospects of future economic growth, but also on the prem-
ises of open democratic procedures and free competition of different polit-
ical groupings through the participation of the citizens and the public opin-
ion at large.
Almost all of the post-communist governments that replaced the
communist ones in this part of Europe enjoyed an utmost popular legiti-
macy. The coming to power of these governments marked the end of the
one party rule that had exhausted the population, ruined the economy and
had disappointed the hopes of many. The governments that came to power
in the early nineties were identified with the change from a totalitarian to
a democratic system and they opened a new epoch for the people of the
countries that had suffered under communism. The Albanian government
of the Democratic Party, the first Albanian opposition that precipitated
the fall of communism in Albania in 1992 was most probably as popular as
the Albanian communist government of 1945, probably enjoying substan-
tial legitimacy in the populace at large.
The experience of Albania, after 1992, and in fact the experience of
every former communist country shows that in an open society where var-
ious alternatives compete freely it is of primary importance to first secure
the legitimacy of the institutions through democratic elections, and only
afterwards seek legitimacy through economic successes. Thus, if at present
time a number of Balkan countries classify as weak states the reasons
should be sought in the distortions of those democratic procedures that
legitimize the institutions of governance.  
In the rump Yugoslavia, Serbia has just started to draw from this
source of legitimacy for her government and institutions. During the last
parliamentary elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even in Croatia
the standards needed for these elections to be considered free and fair
were not met. Macedonia is another good example where distortions in
the electoral processes added to the internal problems of the country that
resulted in a security crises not only for Macedonia, but also for the entire
region. The prevalent political conflict and unsustainable stability in
Albania ever since 1996 can be attributed to the movement away from
democratic procedures and standards. Ever since 1996 there have been
serious violations during the electoral processes and the results of the elec-
tions have been contested by the two major political spectrums.  A pre-
condition for self-sustainable stability in these countries is the consolida-
tion of democratic procedures to regulate the transfer of power from one
political party to another. In most Balkan countries power has not yet
been transferred through free and fair elections.
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But how does the absence of legitimacy emerge in the weak states of
the region?
Multiethnic states count for the bigger part of weak states.  In such
cases the societies can not become communities ,because of their division
over ethnic basis. (Macedonia). But the phenomenon is endemic even to
nation states (Albania). Under this situation the institutions do not func-
tion or function with serious deformations. There is a striking level of
politically motivated violence, questionable and even unconstitutional use
of the police and secret services.
In both categories, multinational and national, the absence of insti-
tutional legitimacy is the main for generating instability and even anarchy.
The legitimacy of institutions is connected to democracy. Following the
end of the Cold War, democracy is considered as the sine qua non for val-
idating governance. 
Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, even Serbia, can be
classified as weak states. This is due to either the absence or violation of
the legitimacy of the institutions. Of course, the degree of weakness varies
from country to country. State control over the media is easy perceptible
in each of the countries. Physical violence, loss of jobs on political motiva-
tions or on ethnical basis, political arrests etc. 
A common feature of all weak states is the identification of the state 
with the government. Security of government is mischievously inter-
preted as security of the state. So, if the government is endangered, the
state and the nation are endangered. However, although the identifica-
tion of the state with the government is present in almost every weak
state, it manifests itself in a variety of forms. For instance, in Albania,
if the government collapses, the state collapses too; when a new gov-
ernment takes the office, the new state starts to build. 
Whereas in FYROM, the legitimacy of the institutions is questioned
by the ethnic Albanians who account for no less than 40 % of the coun-
trys population according to Albanian sources and no more than 22%
according to official sources.
The weak states combine structural weaknesses with a regime,
which is inherently divisive in representing only one part of the communi-
ty11. This is the case with Macedonia where the state has been established
as the Macedonians national state to represent their collective rights. The
Macedonian experience, but also the experience of other multiethnic
states poses the critical question: is the institution of free and fair elections
sufficient in order for the institutions of the state to be legitimate and the
state to be strong? The parties of one ethnicity may win the majority in
free and fair elections. Therefore, they will not find it necessary to involve
political parties from other ethnic group(s) in the government. Here the 
___________
11 Steven R. Ratner Collapsing into anarchy, Current, June 1993 issues 353, p 
33.
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state is involved, not the government. By winning the majority in free elec-
tions, a certain ethnic group sets up its own state and deprives groups from
other ethnicities from the right to state institutions. The Macedonians try
to cover up the national state they are building ever since their UN mem-
bership under the presence of a few Albanian ministers in the Cabinet.
Meantime, the Albanian presence in the army, police, education, secret
service, foreign service, etc.. is almost inhibited.
Legitimacy Through International Communitys Actions
The International Community is another source of legitimacy for the
weak states. This legitimacy does not simply derive from recognition.
Weak and even failed states have been recognized internationally and are
members of the United Nations. However, there are other states that func-
tion quite efficiently, i.e., and stronger states that have not been recog-
nized internationally. These state exist de facto, but they have not been
recognized de jure12. Such are Northern Cyprus and Taiwan.
If weak states are incapable to ensure their own normal survival, one
would expect the international community to intervene. The engagement
of the international community in order to support the weak states is nec-
essary, as the weak states are not capable of maintaining themselves as
members of the international community. This is not to say that the inter-
national community has always shown the same willingness and inclination
to come to  aid of the weak states. In those instances when the presence of
crises driven weak states has endangered or could potentially endanger the
interests of the powers and institutions that constitute the so called inter-
national community, the attention and the assistance given has been
greater, swifter and more effective. This engagement of the international
community has appeared quite early if we remember the forms of protec-
torate that the League of Nations and later on the United Nations pro-
posed in order to come to  help  some new and weak states at the time.  
How does the international community serve as a source of legiti-
macy for the governments of the weak states?
First of all, through economic aid, through programs for economic
aid and reforms financed by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund or other regional financial institutions. Most of the former
communist countries, including the Balkans, had immediate financial and
economic needs when they began the reforms after the fall of the commu-
nist regime. Thus, the legitimacy that can be drawn is twofold. On the one
hand through the support received by these international institutions, and
on the other through the higher chances of economic success that such a
support brings about, which in turn means more legitimacy.
___________
12 For the concept of De facto State see Scot Peg, De facto State and Interna-
tional society.
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Thus, at least initially a lot of economic aid and later on many eco-
nomic programs of the European Union, or from EU members, in coun-
tries like Albania, but also Romania, Bulgaria helped the first non-com-
munist governments to reduce the social costs of the reforms that were
necessary in order to move from a centrally planned to a market economy.
At the same time, a series of economic agreements or simply economic
programs of the International Monetary Fund, European Union and so
on, were viewed and propagated by the post communist governments as
achievements in the field of democratic transformation. Almost all the
first post communist governments viewed NATO and the EU member-
ship, or any steps towards such membership as an indicator of their dem-
ocratic rule, or as a passing grade for their legitimacy. Albania was the first
country that signed the partnership for peace agreement and applied for
NATO membership.  This happened due to the determination of the polit-
ical elite that put up a resistance against the communist regime to tie up
the future of the country with the West and its institutions.
It is fair to say though that the relations of the first post communist
Albanian government with NATO, the EU or other Western countries
were viewed as a source of legitimacy for the Albanian government by the
international community itself. The same scenario took place, with little
variations in Romania and Bulgaria, the only major difference being that
in Albania ever since the establishment of a multi-party system there was
no major political force that would oppose, at least publicly, the western
orientation of the country. When the Socialist Party (the former Com-
munist Party responsible for the total isolation of Albania and the fifty
year enmity towards the West) came to power in 1997 it maintained the
orientation towards NATO, the EU, the USA and other Western institu-
tions in its foreign policy.
Secondly, but not second, the international community serves as a
source of legitimacy for the weak states through the special role that insti-
tutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) has taken upon itself. The legitimacy of the post-90ties govern-
ments can no longer come from the barrel of the gun, since free and fair
elections are not only perceived essential for legitimacy, but also as an
international norm. However, free and fair elections that have been
accepted by all the actors still remain a challenge for a number of Balkan
countries that still have to hold such elections in order to complete the
peaceful transferring of power from one political party to another. OSCE
and other institutions, such as ODIHR have not only observed, but also
conducted arbitration regarding various electoral processes in these coun-
tries. Although OSACE Missions have the status of the observer in elec-
toral processes and write reports containing suggestions, it is fair to say
that their conclusions are widely accepted as the final say regarding the
validity of the elections. While in Kosovo, OSCE organized the elections,
the conclusions of similar OSCE missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
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Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania as well as a num-
ber of former Soviet Union Republics were used as the criterion upon
which the validity of the election process and the international standards
were evaluated. This role of the international community seems to be not
only necessary, but also desirable especially for those weak states that
manifest a conflictual political culture. However, in a number of cases
double standards have been used by the international community in eval-
uating and legitimizing election results.
There has been a tendency especially in the Balkans to make a
compromise with the international standards with regard to free and fair
elections, i.e. escaping from these standards, which started with the elec-
tions of September 1996 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was followed by
elections of April 1997 in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia, and it reached its
peak with the Parliamentarian elections in June 1997 in Albania.13
In the case of Macedonia, for example, the international community
shunned away from major problems in the Macedonian  Albanian rela-
tionship within the newly created state of Macedonia. The internal
Macedonian problems pertaining to the consolidation of the common
institutions were either postponed or ignored by the international com-
munity. The attempt to preserve regional stability at the expense of
domestic problems was the prevailing theme of the international commu-
nity in the Balkans, Macedonia and Kosovo for a long time.
The outburst of armed violence in the spring of this year (2001) tore
that deceiving veil of a multiethnic state, unveiling thus the undemocratic
methods and procedures this state was functioning upon. The control of
the state, the decision making process and even the executive branch were
in the hands of the Macedonian ethnicity; the army, the police force, as
well as other security bodies were almost entirely composed of Macedo-
nians14. The very decision to crush the armed uprising through the use of
violence implies that the Albanian population, although it did have some
representatives in the government, was not consulted and left out of the
decision making process. The media and the political elite also reflected
the deep division between the two major ethnicities.  
However, Macedonia had been viewed by the international commu-
nity as a success story of ethnic co-existence15. When the Balkans became
engulfed in a series of wars, preserving the territorial integrity of Macedo-
nia was thought to be a decisive need. Through all its actions and initia-
tives the international community gave its unreserved support to the
Macedonian government, making it immune to criticism. In this way the 
___________
13 See Albanias parliamentary election of 1997 prepared by the staff of the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Albania  newspapers, 
Albanian edition August 1997.
14 See Albert Rakipi,  Albanian in the Balkans, AIIS 2001, Albanian edition.
15 Macedonias Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, International Crisis Group 
2 August 2000).
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international community ignored or postponed those matters that were
eating away the internal stability of the country. Legitimate concerns
about the security of Macedonia quite often have been used as justifica-
tions in order to postpone difficult decisions about problematic internal
matters16. The international community is thus at least partially responsi-
ble for creating a false or at least unreal image of harmonious ethnic co-
existence in Macedonia. Thus, one of the issues that have been continu-
ously contested by both Albanians and Macedonians is the percentage of
the Albanian population in Macedonia. According to official sources,
Albanians do not constitute more than 22% of the entire population of the
country, whereas the Albanians claim 40% of the population if not more.
The real number of the Albanians is certainly greater than that given by
the official census17. However, the second census that was monitored by
the international community under the auspices of OSCE (1994) gave a
number that is almost identical to that of the government statistics,
22.09%.
Another instance in which the international community turned a
blind eye, was the reduction of the number of Albanian deputies in the
Macedonian parliament, by reorganizing the electoral districts so as to
favour the Macedonian electorate.  Those electoral districts assigned as an
Albanian electorate had on average 1.5 times more voters than those with
a Macedonian electorate.  
The parliamentary elections of 1996 in Albania were characterized
by serious shortcomings. The opposition withdrew, undermining the elec-
toral process. The international community through OSCE reports did not
accept the distorted victory of the Democratic Party undermining thus the
legitimacy of the government and its institutions.  
In the 1997 early parliamentary elections the international commu-
nity backed a compromise that denied access to half of the country to one
of the two major competing political parties. The international communi-
ty recognized the results of the elections as acceptable given the circum-
stances of 1997 crises in Albania. This meant a movement away from those
democratic standards that had been considered sacred and a legitimacy
test up to then. Perhaps, given the circumstances, this was the lesser evil,
however basing a four-year term for the winning party upon the results of
such elections which did not contribute to the stability of the country. The
government that came to power was viewed as illegitimate by the opposi-
tion and its electorate. At the same time those who came to power through
the armed rebellion felt obliged to include in important sectors of the
administration, such as the security and the finances, individuals that were
identified with the armed wing of the Socialist Party, for which there were
allegations of connections with the organized crime and smuggling activi-
___________
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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ties. This in turn undermined the legitimacy of the government and its
institutions, delaying thus further the rule of law.  
Last parliamentary elections in Albania were also characterized by
serious violations, and neither it, nor the institutions that came out of these
elections were recognized as legitimate by the opposition. The interna-
tional community which deeply influences the domestic policies of
Albania, while recognizing the serious violations that occurred during the
elections, seems to have been led by considerations other than democrat-
ic procedures, such as regional stability, when concluding that the elections
were acceptable18. The parliamentary elections in Albania took place
while Macedonia was going through its worst internal crisis ever since it
came into existence.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that weak states are not a new phenomenon in the
international arena it is important to note their increasing importance in
world politics due to irreversible globalization trends.  In todays world the
negative impact that a weak state has on national security and stability can
quickly affect regional and international security and stability parameters.
It is for this reason that deeper research of and understanding of the weak
state phenomena is needed. As the examples from the South Eastern
European countries at the root of the weak state phenomena are the legit-
imacy crisis, weak institutions and old trends and mentalities.  The concept
of legitimacy is very important here. It has to be understood both in the
framework of the state and that of governance. In the state context it per-
tains to the shred traditions and experiences that the citizens have had in
building and living under a common state. Legitimacy of governance on
the other hand while it is related to the legitimacy of the state is also close-
ly connected with efficiency and democratic procedures that are open and
fair.
Here the international community has an important role to play.
Not only because the international community serves as a source of legit-
imacy, but also because it upholds democratic standards and procedures.
In many weak states the international community has gained a status that
allows it to arbitrate among different political groups.  For this reason it is
important that democratic principles and norms be applied uniformly
across different countries and scenarios and be sacrificed due to short-
term security and stability concerns. Only in this way can sustainable, pros-
perous and democratic stability be achieved, and the weak states strength-
ened.
___________
18 See Albanian Parliamentary election the report of OSCE. See also James 
Petiffer, Albanian newspaper, Albania edition.
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA -ECONOMY 
ON CROSS-ROAD: BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
by Dragoljub Stojanov*
Part I  - Wants and interests
B&Hs government is obsessed with enthusiasm to join the EU as
soon as possible. The enthusiasm is shared by majority of B&H  population.
B&Hs alike the other transition countries expect the clear gains of
joining the EU. Between the others (political, civilization, cultural, etc.)
economic gains are of critical importance for B&Hs society. Expected
economic gains might be summarized as follows:
! free  access to EU market,
! fiscal transfers  from EU,
! increased  employment  opportunities,
! increased expectations regarding possibility to find well paid jobs, 
! inflow of foreign direct investment, as  dominant means for eco-
nomic development  and export generation.
Wants and interests of EU could be summarized in such a way as it
did professor Mencinger in his Enlargement and Convergence paper.
For (EU) potential benefits of enlargement are scanty and it is believed
that costs of enlargement would for a long period exceed the benefits.
Existing trade with CEECs represents only 3 percent of EU trade, so the
enlargement would not  turn small markets into large markets, real oppor-
tunities for FDI have lagged behind expectations, and the EU countries
can under existing arrangements already enjoy the benefits of cheap
labour in CEECs.
Economic moral thus appears to be clear; enlargement towards the
East proclaimed a political necessity and a historic opportunity will most
likely be overdue and decisions will be based  on political grounds only.1
___________
* Economic faculty Sarajevo.
1 Mencinger, J.(2000) -Enlargement and  Convergence, paper presented at the 
international conference Ten Years of Post-communist Transition Bologna.
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Part II    Economic reality
If economic benefits  of enlargement for the EU countries are not
clear enough, and if they are not simulative enough to speed up the pro-
cess of enlargement, we could put the following hypothesis:
Economic gap between B&Hs, and other transition economies  and
the EU is to wide in order to be filled up easily and in short time.
Nominal convergence  between B&H economy and the EU, and real
convergence between them  are so wide  that  they cant be closed up in
less than two-three decades. They specially cant be closed if B&H gov-
ernment continues with economic policy based on Washington Consen-
sus.
Speaking aboutnominal convergence one could describe B&H
economy  as an economy with the following properties:
- inflation rate   2%,
- convertible currency
- fixed exchange rate pegged to DEM
Prof. Branko Horvat in  his Novi Put-New Deal for Croatia points
out, for instance, that Croatian GNP at the moment  makes about 25% of
the average of the EU GNP. To join the EU specific economic criteria
should be met. An accession country has to reach a GNP which is equal to
60% of the EU average GNP level. Horvat considers that If Croatian eco-
nomy resumes economic growth with the rate of growth of GNP at 5 % an-
nually, Croatia will need 40 years to reach 60% of the average EU GNP.2
Next to it, Horvat points out  that an accession country must follow
 nominal criteria  of convergence such as:  prescribed inflation rate, pre-
scribed  level of budget deficit and prescribed  level of public debt. At the
moment Croatia  fulfils not  nominal target. Instead, the country has  huge
foreign debt ($ 10,500 mln which makes 54.9% of GDP in 2000), and huge
current account deficit of  $  1,100 mln in 2000.
Both, huge current account deficit and  huge  foreign debt  lead to a
conclusion that vitality of CEECs, i. e. their ability to grow without
reliance on foreign savings, is weak and fading. In fact, the existing gap
between the EU and CEECs, (including Croatia) might escalate rather
than diminish, making a delayed accession even more difficult than a pre-
mature one.3
B&Hs economy is even more far from convergence criteria than
Croatian. In fact, B&H economy is still an aid-driven economy. In terms
of real convergence one could describe B&H economy as economy
with:
___________
2 Horvat, B. (2000) -Novi Put  New Deal for Croatia unpublished paper, 
Zagreb.
3 Mencinger, J. op, cit.
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!unemployment rate of 40%,
!huge foreign debt  close  to 51% of GDP
!ever increasing balance of payments deficit (export covers import 
by 22%)
Formal acceptance of acquis communautaires is much more easy
business to do, than fulfillment of the conditions of  real economic con-
vergence between the EU and B&H economy.
For real convergence an alternative model of economic develop-
ment is needed in comparison with presently applied Washington consen-
sus. 
Part III  - Another Possibility Balkan economic integration 
or the Stability Pact
If Croatia will need 40 years to reach 60% of the EU GNP level as a
precondition for successful economic accession to the EU, B&H economy
would need at least 50 years.Therefore, question could be asked: is there
any other more quick, more efficient and more acceptable method of  clos-
ing the gap of real convergence between the EU and B&H? 
International community, whatever that means, has offered an alter-
native method of economic development to the B&H and to the other
Balkan countries. The Stability Pact  is the offered alternative.
The Stability Pact aims at strengthening countries in South Eastern
Europe in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human
rights and economic prosperity, in order to achieve stability in the whole
region. Those countries in the region which seek integration into Euro-
Atlantic structures, alongside a number of other participants in the Pact,
strongly believe that the implementation of this process will facilitate their
objective
Economic aspect of the Stability Pact might  be summarized as the
objectives to: 
!Create vibrant market economies based on sound macro policies, 
markets open to greatly expanded foreign trade and private sector 
investment, effective and transparent customs and commercial/ re-
gulatory regimes, developing strong capital markets and diversi-
fied ownership, including privatization, leading to a widening cir-
cle of prosperity for all our citizens
!Fostering economic cooperation in the region and between the 
region and the rest of Europe and the world, including free trade 
areas.4
___________
4 The Stability Pact ,1999.
163
The Stability Pact, Economic Issues and Transition process: 
theoretical aspect or how to get  from a repressed to an open
and integrated economy
1. May we recall the reader that the most questionable point of the
proposal: how to transform a repressed economy into a small open econ-
omy (SOE), or how to transform former non-market into a modern mar-
ket economy, made by such famous  names as: J. Sach, D. Lipton, P.
Kenen and Gros-Steinher, the IMF, among the others, starts from a
proposition that a repressed economy can be transformed into a SOE sud-
denly, overnight, but effectively and without incurring any significant and
unbearable social cost upon the citizens of the repressed economy. 
Before and since the beginning of the transition process in the coun-
tries of EE there have been different opinions of the group of respectable
economists such as: P. Nolan, E. Phelpes, B. Horvat, J. Mencinger, M. Pani
enabled us to mention at least some of them.5
How much real where those optimistic propositions in terms  of
both: the theoretical postulates and practical achievements? Could the
rapid transformation stand the economic, social and political costs stem-
ming from such a drastic and revolutionary move? Can they stand the les-
sons from the historical standpoint, if the history does have any historic
value for those processes?
Let us start a mental experiment stressing out the main component
of a model of the economy, which is  supposed to be accepted and prac-
ticed in the reforming (transition) countries overnight.
SOE (small open economy) is, by definition, integrated into the
world economy on the principles of an efficient and developed market
economy. SOE accepts the rules of the game coming out of the H-O-S the-
orem. In other words , market integration of the country into the world
market equates countries price level with the price level of the world mar-
ket.
The law of one price holds for SOE and the effects of commodi-
ty arbitrage brings out its effects. Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine
(PPP) also holds through. The interest arbitrage holds through by defini-
tion. SOE deeply integrated into the world market becomes not only
___________
5 Horvat. B, (1993) Program for Economic Development in Croatia, 
Mencinger. J (1995), Economics of Desintegration, in Economic Price of the 
Peace, Paris,.
Murakami. J. (1996)An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis-A Vision 
for the Next Century, Stanford Un. Press.
Panic. M, (1994) Managing Reforms in the EE, Cambridge UN.
Stojanov. D, (1999)Bosnia-Macro-economic Policy Issues Relating to the 
Transition to a Market Economy, in Heuberger.V, Riegler. H and Vidovic. H 
At the Crossroads: Disaster or Normalization? The Yugoslav Successor 
States in the 1990s Peter Lang, Wien.
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price taker, but also becomes rule taker. Foreign trade is the leading
sector of the economic development for SOE. The whole system of the
foreign economic relations of SOE should be prepared on such a basis,
which means that the system is ready to accept free movement of labour,
goods, capital and know-how between SOE and the world market.
The range of macroeconomic policy management on disposal to
SOE is very limited, having in mind the level of economic independence
betweenhomecountry and the world market . The free capital flow to a
great extent decreases independence of economic policy (monetary and
fiscal) of the SOE from the world capital market. SOE must follow the
world level of prices, wages, production costs and productivity of labour.
If foreign exchange rate of the country is firmly pegged to DM,
domestic prices of SOE cannot deviate from German price level. The
world price level and free movement of capital put a great constraint on
the freedom of domestic monetary and fiscal policy. SOE is obviously fully
integrated into the world economy. It is understandable, per definition,
that the SOE is a market economy with convertible currency.
From the aim of our paper we consider McKinon thesis expressed in
paper How to Manage a Repressed Economy as particularly relevant.
McKinon said International agencies and foreign experts often react to
this situation by advocating the liberalization of trade, financial and fiscal
processes. And if difficult transition to a liberalized economy can be suc-
cessfully carried out, the empirical evidence does indeed suggest that the
economic welfare of the average citizen will improve dramatically.6
That is a fine peace of contemplation, but a  question might be posed
again: how to succeed following such an approach without sacrificing
much of the well being of people?
The Case of the British Pound and Marshall aid -a fine, 
but non -learned lesson
Great Britain decided to declare convertibility of the pound in  1947,
being persuaded by the USA.
Concerning the issue professor M. Panic from Cambridge UN. artic-
ulates in his paper Managing Reforms in The EE: Lessons From The
Post-war Experience of Western Europe the following  attitude:
In theory UK experiment with convertibility of the pound would
have succeeded had the Government been prepared to introduce precise-
ly those measures-deflation, unemployment and devaluation-which had
failed so spectacularly in the 1930 that European countries determined not
to resort to them again.7
___________
6 McKinon. R, (1981) - How to Manage a Repressed Economy, IFS Princeton 
UN.
7 Panic. M, (1994) -Managing Reforms in the EE: Lessons From the Post-war 
Experience, Cambridge UN.
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Namely, USA had granted to the UK a large loan in 1945 under two
specific conditions: to make the Sterling convertible within a year, and to
abolish all discrimination against exports from the USA by the end of
1956. The convertibility of the pound was introduced in July 1947, and
ended abruptly in the following month, by which time most of $ 3,5 billion
of the loan had been used to meet the demand for dollars at the existing
exchange rate. Professor Panic stresses out that given relative strength of
the two economies and currencies, the most surprising thing about this
episode, is that anyone could have expected a different outcome.8
Immediately since the Second World War, Western Europe has not
yet been ready for such a drastic move. Western Europe was in fact a
repressed economy according to Mc Kinon,s definition of  the repressed
economy. Western Europe has been faced with 
a) dollar shortage, 
b) low level of capacity utilization,
c) high level of unemployment ,
d) increasing inflation rate, 
e) failure of market institutions.
(US technological superiority over Western Europe was judged to
be so great in the second half of the 1950, some experts expected the dol-
lar shortage to last for some time to come, perhaps even permanently. As
a result trade liberalization was gradual and selective9)
The attitude of professor Panic with respect to the sequences of the
process of economic liberalization was widely shared by J. Williamson. He
has pointed out, before he has become an intellectual leader of Washing-
ton consensus, that a right model is the one, which, broadly speaking,
Europe followed during the Marshall plan, that is :
First, liberalize imports of critical inputs; especially inputs needed 
for tradeable production.
Second, devalue to the point needed to gain (and maintain) a com-
petitive exchange rate.
Third, borrow anything that may be needed to restore (and  main-
tain) full capacity operation of the economy as soon as possible.
Fourth, advertise your intention to liberalize import as circum-
stances permit.
Fifth, once the economy is operating at full capacity, use payments 
improvements to liberalize imports across the board. When you 
have finished liberalizing imports, start thinking of liberalizing the 
capital account or appreciating the currency.10
___________
8 Panic. M, -Managing Reforms...
9 Panic. M, -Managing Reforms...
10 Wiliamson. J, (1987) -Discussion, in Growth Oriented Adjustment Pro-
cess, the IMF 1987. p. 96.
166
In the similar domain is (was) S. Fisher thinking that Consistent
with domestic monetarism of the old Chicago school, international mone-
tarism did not pay particular attention to growth policies. It relied on non-
interventionist microeconomics stability to allow market to produce the
right allocation of resources, both at the moment of time and intertem-
porarily.11
Marshall plan has been created and put into force soon after  the
failure of the experiment with  convertibility of the pound.
The Arguments for the Stability Pact 
and Balkan Economic Integration
Following the knowledge of the standard, but not the main-stream,
economic theory, the historical experiences and present state of affairs of
transition economies as well, we could, possibly, draw several conclusions
such as:
1. Macroeconomic stability should proceed the privatization process.
Particularly in the regions such as: Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia for
example, where unemployment problem has, besides the economics, very
serious ethical and political considerations.
2. Privatization process is a long  lasting process. It will take 10-15
years, possible even more,
3. Privatization process is a very expensive one. The case of former
DDR is clear enough. Transfer of funds from Germany to former DDR
has been eating away 150 billion-DM per year at least,
4. According to the World Bank data between 1980-1989.there have
been privatized less than 1ooo companies all over the world. Privatization
process has enormously gained in the power and speed, since 1994.
Therefore, the process becomes more complicated and questionable from
the standpoint of economic efficiency reached in a transition country.
There is a historical difference with regard to the privatization process,
which takes place in a mature market economy and in a former socialist
economy. In the latter case we privatize the whole economy and transform
the whole political, social and economic system. This is a revolutionary
move!
5. Privatization of state assets without restructuring of those assets
neither guaranties an increase of economic efficiency, nor the increase of
GDP,
6. Fundamental prerequisites for a successful restructuring of the
assets are the following:  
a) capital,
___________
11 Fisher. S, (1987) - Economic Growth and Economic Policy, in Growth 
Oriented Adjustment Process the IMF, 1987.
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b) improved management, 
c) institutions building 
d) time  
e) market  
f) adequate macroeconomics management.
The Balkan countries do not have any of those preconditions ful-
filled! One of  the possibilities to build at least some of those precondi-
tions, could be the creation of a regional economic integration alike one
which has helped Western Europe to become an economic union at the
end of the day.
For both historical experience and the knowledge of economic the-
ory run against a possibility of a rapid, efficient and painless transition
from a repressed into a SOE. In practice, newly created countries in the
Balkan region have already introduced their own currencies and their own
customs systems. They try to follow their own, independent, way towards
a market economy. However, all of them are lacking the capital, market
infrastructure, and managerial experience. Their currencies are made con-
vertible by decree. The countries usually run a serious balance of pay-
ments deficit, they have a budget deficit, they are faced with internal liq-
uidity, high unemployment, and increasing poverty. FDI are lacking in the
region and specially in countries like Croatia and B&H. Besides, those
countries do have very limited market, the market which could hardly be
attractive for FDI.
Therefore, one of the most important issues the Balkan countries
have been facing so far is:
Should they proceed with their independent ways towards the eco-
nomic development paying no attention to the cost of such a independent
economic development or,
Those countries could do better joining each other in a way, which
could be similar to one undertaken by Western European countries since
the Second World War?
In the context of the  need for a rapid economic development in the
Balkan region, SECI initiative and the Stability Pact provide Balkan coun-
tries with an additional impetus for economic development.
The Stability Pact  an economic illusion and an empty box
The Stability Pact provides the framework for a bright and prospec-
tive economic development of the Balkan countries. 
However, one may say that the Stability Pact is still loosely defined
in terms of the technicalities for a successful economic solution.
The Pact pleads for free trade area, but it does not define the area
more closely. The Pact would like to see the economies of the Balkan
countries forged together, but do not provide ready-made answers regard-
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ing practical solutions. The Pact favours economic growth, as an unavoid-
able prerequisite for advancement of peace and democracy in the region,
but it is almost empty concerning the answer to the following questions:
!Should the member countries pursue monetarist type of economic 
policy or they could resort to some Keynesian economic solution,
!Should countries respect NIRU (non-inflationary rate of unem-
ployment) hypothesis, regardless of the level of unemployment 
(unofficial unemployment currently in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
close to 40%), 
!Should countries  keep their currencies  convertible regardless of 
the fact  that the conditions for convertibility are not fulfilled,
!Should countries keep their currencies pegged to the Euro in the 
form of currency board type of pegging, paying no attention to 
danger of the effects of deflationary forces,
!Should the member countries stick, generally speaking, to the rules 
of the so-called Washington consensus, or they can do better 
switching to the kind of Developmentalism or Supply-Side eco-
nomic for productivity, competitiveness and convergence as 
defined by professors Murakami, C. Pitelis, or to some extent J. 
Stiglitz?
Let us, here, for the sake of contemplation remind the reader on the
basic postulates of theWashington consensus: These are :
!Slash public spending, even on food subsidies for the poor,
!Redirect public spending for high economic return,
!Broaden the tax base,
!Liberalize interest rate,
!Let the exchange rate be competitive,
!Liberalize trade,
!Permit free foreign investment flow,
!Privatize state companies,
!Deregulate entry of foreign capital,
!Secure property rights.
!Expect economics growth mainly from Free market machine 
and foreign direct investment as two main driving forces for eco-
nomic development.
Let us in this concept mention the comments concerning the topic by
distinguished professors: J. Stiglitz and C. Pitelis as follows:
J. Stiglitz:
Yet China did not follow the dictum of the Washington consensus.
It has emphasized competetion over privatization: standard economic the-
ory says both are required for an efficient market economy. The  Washing-
ton consensus emphasized one, China the other. We see the track record.
It should not be surprising Privatizing a government monopoly is often
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likely to create a private monopoly with high prices and continued ineffi-
ciencyTopics left out by the Washington consensus are perhaps even
more telling: financial markets, competition and regulations, transfer of
technology, development of institutions -to name, but a few whose impor-
tance has been increasingly recognized.12
C. Pitelis,Cambridge Un.
Real convergence (between the EU and CEECs) can be attained
through a different increase in productivity and (thus) competetiveness. In
the medium term there is no other way. Macroeconomic policy can only
contribute in the short run. A nominal convergence can contribute to
macroeconomic stability, but putting things into place. Hovewer, it is
insufficient, virtually by definition. Attainment  of nominal convergence
by all parties implies a comparative advantage for no one. This emphasizes
the importance of Supply-side(Industrial) policies for productivity, com-
petetiveness and convergence.
Supply-side (industrial policy) in its more general sense can be any
type of government policy which affects production. This could evidently
encompass all types of government policy, including macroeconomic.
While the latter may strongly influence industry, here it will be taken as
the background against which supply-side policies can be applied. In this
setting we can define supply-side policies as the government policies
intended to affect production directly and specifically towards achieving a
particluar objective Lastly, industrial strategy will be taken as the exis-
tence, or otherwise of a well-thought out and reasonably consistent and
coherent set of industrial policies (along with required resources and
mechanism for implementation) which aim at realization of a long-term
objective concerning industry in particular and,through it, the nation more
generally.13
Part  IV -An Alternative Approach
I would like to  add to those comments a very elaborated  concept of
the Balkan economic integration provided  by professor B. Horvat in his
The Theory of International Trade-An Alternative Approach.14
Professor B. Horvat builds his vision of  the Balkan economic coop-
eration starting from the creation of a customs union for member coun-
___________
12 Stiglitz. J. (2000) -Interview in Australian Financial Review, May 25, 2000- 
and What I Learned From World Economic Crisis, Internet, April 2000.
13 Pitelis. C, (1998) -Supply-Side Strategy for Productivity, Competitiveness 
and Convergence between the CEESs and (in) the EU, Study Project under 
way. ACE-PHARE.
14 Horvat. B, (1999) -The Theory of International Trade, Macmillan, p. 171.
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tries. Economic future of the Balkan integration he forges on an  econom-
ic paradigm very similar to Piteliss Supply-Side for productivity, compet-
itiveness and convergence and to Murakamis concept of Developmenta-
lism.
Main benefits for both: the member countries and for outsiders that
could  derive from such an integration (let us just mention a few of them)
according to B. Horvat are the following:
1. Increase of mutual trade of member countries and creation 
of large market which makes possible the specialization 
and other  effects,
2. As the size of market increases many times, there is  plen-
ty of scope for the economics of scale of all sorts,
3. A combined barraging power of a customs union makes 
possible the gains from the terms of trade,
4. A large market stimulates competition which in turn stim-
ulates efficiency. It also makes possible a more intensive 
research and development which foster efficiency,
5. A larger and growing market makes it possible to solve 
more easily the problem of some ailing industries (ship
building, steel, textiles),
6. Larger market and trade creation stimulates the fuller use 
of capacity and larger investment leads to a higher rate of 
growth. As a consequence, unemployment rate will be 
more easily eliminated,
7. Large market attracts foreign productive capital and re-
duces the brain drain,
8. There is also an extremely important non-economic effect. 
An international union is conductive to a greater interna-
tional tolerance. The latter, in turn, helps in establishing 
greater internal democracy and political stability.15
Concluding remarks
For some time from the beginning of the  transition  process of the
former socialist economies it was believed by both:
a) indigenous people, that is, politicians and  majority of eco-
nomic experts, and 
b) international community politicians and  the most influen-
tial economic experts that the transition countries can 
manage efficiently and successfully their destiny individu-
ally, on their own.
___________
15 Horvat. B. op. cit.
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Recently, however, first the SECI initiative and then definitely the
Stability Pact introduced economic cooperation between transition coun-
tries and particularly the Balkan region countries as: the first best, neces-
sary and the most promising solution for the better future of both:
!countries in question, and
! the international community as a whole , with particular reference 
to Europe.
However, the Stability Pact as the first best solution for the coun-
tries in point, needs still to be elaborated in more technical details in order
to be productive as much as expected by its promoters. The action ought
to be a quick one, because we may be running out of time soon.
We might  conclude that the Stability Pact ,if unchanged, does not
promise to the B&H economy and the Balkan econmies alike, an eco-
nomic growth  necessary to bridge the  gap in real economic indicators
between itself and the EU.
Joining the Balkan economic union under the condition of the
Stability Pact could be vesting of time for  B&H economy.
Professor Horvat Novi Put and  the model of the Balkan econom-
ic integration as described in  the book is more promising in terms of eco-
nomic growth, and should be much more acceptable from the point of view
of B&Hs economy. But, the proposal is far from present political reality,
both in B&Hs politics and in international political circles.
Therefore, the second best solution which is an independent way
towards the EU, and which is  so far based on the Washington consensus,
paradoxically  looks as the first best solution for B&Hs society.
Still, there is a warning; the income disparities between B&Hs and
the EU countries could be increased substantially  with resumption of the
present type of economic policy.
The quicker B&Hs joins the EU, the lower future disparities in
income between it and the EU would be.
But, still we have to conclude that politicians, and not economists
decide.
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THE ACHIEVED RESULTS OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF BALKAN CHAMBERS
by Sne`ana Ra{eta*
The Association of Balkan Chambers was founded in September
1994 in Magalia (Romania). At that occasion, the founding Assembly was
held and the Statute of the Association adopted. The Association consists
of national chambers of commerce of eight Balkan countries: Greece,
Bulgaria, Macedonia, FR Yugoslavia, Turkey, Albania, Romania and
Cyprus. It has its structure and bodies - the president, secretariat and
working groups.
Upon the decision of the General Assembly of the Association,
every year one of the eight member countries chairs the Association. The
president of the national chambers of the chairing country serves as presi-
dent of the Association and the very chambers of commerce organizes the
work of the Association during a one year period.
The first seat of the Association in 1995 was Belgrade.
In 1996, the Association was chaired by the Bulgarian Chambers of
Commerce, in 1997 by the Union of Chambers of Commerce of Greece, in
1998 by the Chambers of Commerce of Macedonia, in 1999 by the Cham-
bers of Commerce of Romania, in 2000 by the Union of Chambers of
Turkey and in 2001 by the Chambers of Commerce of Cyprus. In 2002, the
Association of Balkan Chambers of Commerce will be chaired by Albania.
Since its founding, in the past seven years, within the framework of
the Association a number of activities had been carried out. 
Some twelve sessions of the General Assembly of the Association, a
number of Secretariat meetings and several meetings of expert working
groups were held, such as:
- WG for trade and industrial cooperation,
- WG for establishing of commerce-information network
___________
* Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia.
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- WG for information and marketing
- WG for economic-legal regulatives
- WG for  finances, banking and insurance
- WG for transport
- WG for tourism
All of these meeting have considered numerous questions dealing
with the cooperation of economies of Associations member countries.
The Association has its gazette ABC NEWS, but had also pub-
lished other commercial publications: The Business Guide and The
Catalogue of Trade Fairs in the Member countries.
The Association was presented and introduced on several occasions
during international trade fairs organized by the chairing country.
The basic work preoccupation of the Association is focused on how
to improve the economic cooperation among Balkan countries, above all
the increase in goods exchange and industrial cooperation. Also, the ways
of bridging the problems in foreign trade procedures were sought, as well
as the gradual establishing of a free trade zone in the Balkans.
The chambers of commerce of the Balkan countries have organized
a significant number of meetings of their economic delegations which had
resulted in the increase of the overall volume of foreign trade exchange.
Statistical data show that the participation of FR Yugoslavia in the goods
exchange with the Balkan countries, in the overall volume of foreign trade
with the world, has increased from 7.7% in 1992 to 21% in 2000.
The Association has adopted o Code of Conduct in business opera-
tions, the so called Trade Code, which had been adopted by all members
of the Association. The norms in the Code are compliant to the norms con-
tained in the Codes of similar Associations in Western European coun-
tries. 
All the members of this Association have signed the Agreement on
cooperation of international trade arbitrages attached to the chambers in
member countries, by which companies from Balkan countries are being
recommended to envisage on a contractual basis the competent Arbitrage
attached to the chambers of commerce in the country of the defendant
when resolving disputes.
In the field of economic-information linking of the chambers of
commerce, the exchange of information has been secured through the
adopted formular by means of fax or electronic mail. The Information sys-
tems of member countries chambers are linked on-line. A common infor-
mation project has been defined which is currently been adjusted to the
project SEC NET( the common project IC EX YU Republics).
In the fields of finances, banking and insurance the creation of the
Balkan banking forum and Insurance forum has been proposed. At the
Workshop of the Association, held in September this year and organized
by the FRY Chambers of Commerce, a proposal on the establishing of a
Balkan bank for development was placed having in mind the fact that the
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increased economic activities of the countries in the region needfully
impose the necessity of a more adequate financial surveillance which is not
possible to achieve in modest conditions of the banking systems of indi-
vidual countries.
The cooperation of the Association with the European Chambers
(EUROCHAMBERS), ICC, ASCAME, DIHK and other economic asso-
ciations in the world has been established. The Association, together with
the chairing Chambers of Cyprus has rendered strong support to the
chambers of Balkan countries which are not the members of the Euro-
chambers, while the FRY Chambers of Commerce had once again
acquired the associated member status at the Eurochambers annual
Congress in October this year in Slovakia. 
Of particular importance is the cooperation realized by the As-soci-
ation with the Federation of German Chambers, the so called ABC-DIHK
project. The ABC-DIHK project with the seat in Sofia has been estab-
lished more than a year ago. The goals of the project consist of the assis-
tance in realizing ABC programs which are aimed at promoting economic
cooperation, adjustment of economic legislative with the EU standards,
reduction of trade and investment barriers, improvement of the conditions
for foreign investors, advise and categorization of small and medium en-
terprises, getting access to credits for small and medium enterprises, etc...
Within the Project, numerous seminars and consultant meetings
were held on these themes for the economists and representatives of the
Chambers of Balkan countries. 
Regardless of the significant achieved results, we are of the opinion
that the Association can perform better and more which may be achieved
by means of improved organization of its work. A part of the members
(Yugoslav Chambers of Commerce, Cyprus) is of the view that the As-
sociation should institute a permanent Secretariat or at least a permanent
seat of the Secretariat, upon the model of ICC, Eurochambers and other
international organizations. In this way a working continuity would be
secured, by which one should avoid neglectance of some agreed tasks, dur-
ing the presidency of one national chamber, once the seat of the Associa-
tion is being moved to another country. It looks as if the majority of the
Association members are against such a solution, but the definite decision
on this question will be brought at the forthcoming session of the Associa-
tions General Assembly.
Secondly, the Yugoslav Chambers of Commerce has tried to activate
the working groups as the backbone of concrete economic cooperation
within the framework of the Association. 
At the forthcoming session of the Associations General Assembly
which will be held in December this year in Nicosia, the Yugoslav Cham-
bers of Commerce will propose several projects for the next year -parti-
cipation of the Association at:
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- 24 International tourism and sports trade fair in Belgrade, from 10 
to 13 March 2002;
- BIRE International trade fair for Balkan reconstruction, from 4 to 
7 June 2002 in Belgrade;
- International regional conference of the countries-signatories of 
the Memorandum of Understanding on trade liberalization and  
facilitation (Business Forum on Trade Liberalization). The Yugo-
slav Chambers of Commerce, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
and Federal Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations will take 
part in its realization. Having in mind the fact that the countries-
-signatories of the Memorandum should sign bilateral agreements 
on free trade until the end of 2002, we are of the opinion that it 
would be of particular importance to hold such a common mani-
festation or meeting which would be attended by representatives 
of international organizations, governments, chambers and eco-
nomic actors of the region. The organization of such a meeting 
demands significant working, but also financial engagement. The 
Yugoslav Chambers of Commerce will, together with other organi-
zers of the meeting, address the international organizations and 
foreign institutions for assistance in terms of realization and fi-
nancing of the project.
For a successful functioning of the Association of Balkan Cham-
bers it is necessary to have full accordance and the support of Balkan
countries governments.
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INTEGRATION OF SIX BALKAN COUNTRIES
THROUGH THE CO-PROJECTS ESTIA 
AND OSPE -A COMMON DENOMINATOR FOR
FUTURE ACTIVITIES
by Miodrag Vujo{evi}*
Introductory Remark
In this paper the most recent experience from the work on regional
spatio-environmental scheme of sustainable development is reported. The
scheme applies to six Balkan countries, viz., Albania, Bulgaria, FR Yugo-
slavia, FYR Macedonia, Greece and Romania, and refers to two co-proj-
ects in the field of spatial and environmental planning/policy, which have
been carried throughout the period 1999-2001, i.e., ESTIA and OSPE. The
first three parts extend the basics about the projects discussed and the
accomplishments achieved so far. Then, more details are given about the
countries national spatial and environmental planning/policy systems and
practices, as well as on the planning/policy information support which is
discussed in more detail. The paper concludes with a number of proposals
as to the scope of possible future activities. 
ESTIA
ESTIA is the acronym for European Space and Territorial Integra-
tion Alternatives: Spatial development strategies and policy integration
for the South Eastern Europe. It is implemented under the framework of
the INTERREG IIC Operational Programme for the Central, Adriatic,
Danubian and South Eastern European Space (CADSES) (also: VISION 
___________
* Economist/spatial planner, Institute of Architecture and Urban Planning of 
Serbia.
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PLANET). There has been a close cooperation with the CADSES, being
a parallel Austrian/German initiative with Italian participation. The
INTERREG II Community Initiative continues the function of the
INTERREG I and the REGEN Initiative. The INTERREG Initiative was
established in 1990, aiming at preparing border areas for a Community
without internal frontiers, whilst the latter dealt with the missing links in
the trans-European networks for transport and energy transportation.
Therefore, two distinct strands of the INTERREG II  implementation in
the period 1994-9: INTERREG II, dealing with the cross border cooper-
ation, and  INTERREG II B, dealing with the completion of energy net-
works (being one of the seven priorities selected for the Community
Initiatives for the period in question). The INTERREG Initiative intends
to address and handle a number of development problems, both across the
internal border of the Community and in external border areas, to con-
form to broadly understood sustainable development and the protection
of the environment.  INTERREG C is the more recent development of the
INTERREG Initiative, for the period 1997-99, a third strand relating to
transnational cooperation on spatial planning and its increasing impor-
tance within the entire European territory.
The ESTIA shares the overall agenda with many equivalent Euro-
pean regional projects (e.g., The Baltic States, VASAB 2010, started in
1992 and encompassing 11 countries or parts thereof; CADSES, VISION
PLANET, started in 1997 and comprising 17 countries or parts thereof;
North Sea, NorVision, started in 1998 for 7 countries or their parts; and
North Western Metropolitan Area,  NWMA Vision, started in 1999, for 7
countries or parts thereof).
The ESTIA was initiated and has subsequently been coordinated by
Greece, being the only member state of the EU among the six counter-
parts, other five countries encompassing Albania, Bulgaria, FR Yugosla-
via, FYR Macedonia and Romania.
The Project is a part of the overall European spatial development
scheme (i.e., the ESDP) and overlaps with a number of analogous region-
al schemes of cooperation and integration, viz.: CADSES, Adriatic-Io-
nian, South-East Mediterranean and the Black Sea Area. In general, there
are three broad groups of countries participating in the entire exercise: (a)
countries member states of the EU. (b)  countries  listed for the first wave
of accession to the EU and its enlargement. (c) countries still waiting for a
more definite term of accession, yet already preparing for it in many
respects (perspective members). (d) countries with still unspecified inclu-
sion/exclusion terms.
The ESTIA comprises four major objectives:
!Comparative description of the major features of spatial develop-
ment trends and spatial development policies.
! Investigation on the requirements for the establishment of effec-
tive scientific support, networking and information mechanisms on 
spatial development.
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! Identification of the strategic priorities pursued by the national 
and regional agencies responsible for spatial development and 
planning.
! Identification of the major components for the formulation of a 
common framework for spatial development policy integration 
and coordination.
The ESTIA covered three large work packages, viz.:
!Perspectives on spatial development and planning (main trends 
and administrative systems).
!Approaches and views on spatial structure (monitoring and evalu-
ation of main problems).
!Guidelines for spatial priorities and policy integration (policy for-
mulation and policy implementation).
At the beginning of the whole exercise, five key ESTIA deliverables
were scheduled, viz.:
!Directory of spatial planning agencies.
!Design and pilot use of an Internet server.
!Profile of spatial planning systems.
!Production of a Compendium on spatial priorities.
!Framework for the integration of spatial policy.
OSPE
ESTIA has been paralleled by and partially overlapping with a co-
project, i.e., OSPE, which is the acronym for the Observatory for Spatial
Planning and Environment. OSPE has also been performed in the frame-
work of the DAC/OECD Programme of the Greek Ministry of Environ-
ment, Spatial Planning and Public Works (1999). 
OSPE has been envisaged as a network of research institutions from
the six member countries listed, with the regional centre and the national
focal points, the latter coordinating the activities of various actors from the
sub-national spatial and environmental planning/policy levels.
The key mission of OSPE consists of observing, analysing and dis-
seminating the basic spatial and environmental information in the member
countries. Its other three roles comprise related research work, elaborat-
ing spatial development documents and communication supportive to the
fulfillment of the key mission. 
Its rationale stems from the lack of comprehensive and systematized
data on spatial and environmental phenomena in the ESTIA/OSPE coun-
tries (variably though at the national and the national and sub-national
levels). On the other hand, given the varying legacies of spatial, economic
and environmental planning and policy in the OSPE/ESTIA countries, as
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well as the newly emerging pan and regional European schemes in this
planning/policy field (including various aid, re-development and recon-
struction schemes and programmes), there has been an urge to develop a
common approach to collecting, processing and interpreting of the most
significant basic data and indicators, in order to acquire as clear as possi-
ble picture on the existing situation and future development perspective.
Main ESTIA/OSPE Activities and Results 
As from the fall of 1998, four large meetings have taken place with
all counterparts, i.e., in Thessaloniki (October 1988), Sofia (March 1999),
Bucharest (September 1999) and Thessaloniki (March/April 2000), fol-
lowed by consecutive proceedings and other related volumes. The two
projects were coordinated by Professor G. Kafkalas of Spatial Develop-
ment Research Unit, Department of Urban and Regional Development
and Planning, Aristotle University of  Thessaloniki (in the sequel: SDRU),
and Professor P. Getimis, of the Institute of Urban Environment and
Human Resources, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences,
Athens (in the sequel: UEHR).  Some 50 spatial and urban planners, envi-
ronmental planners, economists and other experts from all six countries, as
well as from a number of other than ESTIA countries, have been con-
tributing on all the themes, issues and topics indicated above, as well as
some other issues (e.g., future economic development and integration in
the Balkan region, historical and current cultural patterns in the broader
area, problems of European integration and enlargement, theoretical and
general problems of planning in the transition period, new institutional
and organizational arrangements in the transition period, problems of
peripherality in development, protection of natural and cultural heritage,
etc.)  to comprise more than 70 particular essays and other contributions.
Within the member countries, the leading research institutions in the spa-
tial and environmental field took on to coordinate the research and other
activities within the respective national realms. In effect, achievements
were many, written and non-written (i.e., many tangible and intangible
results).1
___________
1 From FR Yugoslavia, the Institute of Architecture and Urban Planning of 
Serbia (IAUS), Belgrade, performed the major role in both Projects. The fol-
lowing experts, mostly from the IAUS, took part in the ESTIA and OSPE 
over a period of more than two years (in alphabetical order): O. D`elebd`ic, 
D. Djordjevic, V. Jokic, I. Lazic, K. Petovar, B. Stojanovic, B. Stojkov (natio-
nal coordinator, for a major part of the exercise), S. Subotic and M. Vujo-
sevic, the author of this paper, spent the period of October 2000 - February 
2001 at the Institute of Urban Environment and Human Resources (UEHR), 
Panteion University of Athens, taking part in the completion of the OSPE 
and scheduling of the ESTIA/OSPE-plus activities.
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As for OSPE, in particular, a vast and comprehensive work has been
done so far concerning the collection and processing of a large number of
spatial, environmental and socio-economic basic data and development
indicators. So far a fairly standard survey-analysis approach has been
applied and a considerable amount of data has been amassed, followed by
an attempt to formulate at least a broad notion of future possible plan-
ning/policy directions (i.e., general goals and strategies). As a result, there
is now a much better understanding of spatial development patterns and
trends in the regional context. At the beginning of the entire exercise, it
was fairly unknown what sets of basic data and indicators would be of
interest for particular participants. This provided a three-fold  idea: first,
to develop a number of various planning/policy information schemes, at
different governance levels; second, to test the aspirations and expecta-
tions of the preferences of the counterparts and help them define their
preferences, so that the final choice of common data and indicators
(another common denominator) is made upon a more elaborate insight
into both the available information and the priority needs for the future
cooperation; and third, to provide a planning/policy information base that
is supportive to elaborating a range of more concrete concepts of sustain-
able development.2 In some cases, these varying schemes overlap in terms
of planning/policy coverage, scope and contents, and can consequently be
used for various purposes. Thus, on the basis of an initial blue-print (later
modified though)3, a number of specific tasks were performed in the 1999-
-2001 period, viz.:
!The provisionally available selected data and indicators have sub-
sequently been presented and discussed within a pilot exercise.
!An adjusted list of some 80 indicators of state, pressure and 
response type, grouped into seven classes, was worked on in the 
___________
2 To note, as yet it has not been decided unanimously by all counterparts about 
the range of sets of basic data and indicators that would be used in the follow-
-up projects and programmes. 
3 The initial scheme of sustainable development basic data and indicators was 
developed at the Institute of Urban Environment and Human Resources, 
Panteion University of Athens, to be subsequently slightly modified upon the 
interaction and discussion among the OSPE/ESTIA partners. The final 
scheme comprised  (i.e., adjusted initial scheme)  seven classes of basic data 
and indicators, each comprising a distinct number of subclasses and data/indi-
cators. The ultimate list encompassed the total of 78 DI, to care for: (a) A 
more appropriate groupings. (b) More precise definition of some indicators. 
(c) Suggestions obtained from some counterparts relating to the use of alter-
native data/indicators. The DI covered were requested specifically and sepa-
rately for the NUTS Level II and III, with the exception of a small number of 
DI that would apply to specific areas only (e.g., coastal areas). It has been this 
scheme that served as a template upon which the basic data and indicators 
have been collected and processed so far within the OSPE.
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UEHR and disseminated to the counterparts in other five coun-
tries, as the basis for collecting and presenting of additional data 
and indicators.
!The data and indicators obtained were subsequently processed and 
mapped, to result in a set of consolidated planning/policy informa-
tion, as well as in a number of proposals as to future common activ-
ities in this field. (The proposals in question strongly rest on a fair-
ly comprehensive assessment of the now available data, as well as 
on an appraisal of additional information which could be provided 
in a reasonable time period and costs.)
!Two additional sets of basic data and indicators of a prelimina-
ry/tentative character have also been worked out, to be subse-
quently discussed with the counterparts (all searching for a com-
mon denominator), and to predictably support the future formu-
lation and implementation of the post-ESTIA and OSPE docu-
ments on sustainable spatial development at supra-national, 
national and sub-national planning/policy levels. The former rep-
resent a further elaboration of a set which had already been 
worked out in a rudimentary form and presented at the Third 
ESTIA meeting in Bucharest (September 1999), whereas the lat-
ter, more focused on a larger range of sustainable development 
issues proper, was defined during the finalization of the OSPE 
(Fall 2000).4
!Upon a template/request worked out at the UEHR, the counter-
parts extended comments and suggestions concerning the appro-
priateness of the initial information scheme and the future net-
working and institutional and organizational arrangements within 
the OSPE network (i.e., its Regional Centre and National Focal 
Points).
!At the very end of the first phase of the ESTIA/OSPE project, a 
set of core data and indicators was developed, upon which a quick 
and rough assessment of the spatio-ecological situation in the 
member countries could be performed. In the first place, the exer-
cise would be centred at the national/state planning/policy level. 
Subsequently, this may also be extended to the areas for priority 
cooperation, once they are designated and agreed upon.
!An overall planning/policy evaluation scheme has also been 
worked out, to serve as a general methodological framework for ex 
ante, ex post and ex continuo planning/policy evaluation for the 
activities in question.
___________
4 The latter set also more emulates the aims and objectives of the ESDP, while 
the former basically follows standard patterns of more environmentally  ori-
ented information schemes.
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Although the information has been sought for at various plan-
ning/policy levels, the emphasis was put on the collection, mapping and
interpretation of indicators at the NUTS Level II and NUTS Level III.
The general idea within the two co-projects has been the seeking and
promotion of sustainable development, as a central development theme/
option applied in the ESTIA/OSPE region and elsewhere in Europe and
at global level. Its pillars are: environmental quality; social justice; and
competitiveness of the local/regional, national and supra-national produc-
tive systems. As disaggregated, its key aims and objectives are (emulating
the correspondent pan-European categories):
!Economic and social cohesion and integration.
!Spatial integration (especially of the internal cross-border areas 
and external zones of cooperation).
!Sustainable development.
!Competitiveness of the productive systems.
!Equality of access to infrastructure, knowledge and innovation 
(development of harmonized basic infrastructural networks).
!Balanced development of urban systems and rural areas (spaces).
!Protection, conservation and promotion of the natural and cultu-
ral environment/heritage.
The seven ultimate ESTIA/OSPE deliverables comprized the fol-
lowing documents/projects:
!The Spatial Planning Systems and Agencies in South Eastern 
Europe.
!The ESTIA and OSPE home pages on the Internet.
!The Pilot Spatial Planning Observatory (subsequently consolidat-
ed and established as a network of research institutions in the 
field), including also a number of related schemes of spatial and 
environmental planning/policy basic data and development indica-
tors.
!The Spatial Planning Priorities in South Eastern Europe (being the 
final ESTIA deliverable). 
!A programme on the future cooperation among the counterparts, 
comprising a number of sets of parallel activities scheduled. 
!The OSPE Final Report (in Greek) also provides extensive metho-
dological and substantive explanations concerning the definition, 
construction and use of the indicators applied, as well as their car-
tographic interpretation and analysis.
!Finally, the respective final reports of the two Projects, encom-
passing also a number of proposals for future cooperation, were 
presented and discussed along side with other 21 Greek DAC/ 
OECD projects, at the International Conference Balkans, Black 
Sea, S.E. Mediterranean, Caspian Sea, Environment, Spatial Plan-
ning, Sustainable Development, held in Athens on 27th January 
2001.
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!Ultimately, a programme of short and mid-term activities has been 
prepared at the UEHR and SDRU, to bridge the interim period.
To sum it up, it appears that at least five group of activities have
been partly or entirely accomplished so far:
! Defining frame of reference.
! Opinion making.
!Rounding-off a number of sets for planning/policy information 
support.
!Understanding particular spatial situations, trends, problems and 
development concepts.
!Understanding international relations and inter-dependencies 
within which pertaining locales of the regions exist and function.  
Preliminary Findings Concerning the so far Completed Activities
There has also been a specific important moment that strongly influ-
enced the research done both within the ESTIA and OSPE (albeit more
laterally, than explicitly formulated), i.e., to exert a positive influence on
the entire political culture of the region regarding the spatial and environ-
mental complex. Namely, the majority of the individual experts engaged
are spatial/urban and environmental planners, otherwise fairly frustrated
for a widely spread disregard for spatial and environmental dimension of
development in their respective countries (especially in the domain of eco-
nomic development). In essence, the actors of the two projects seem to
have been serving as framers of a new spatial and organizational order in
the six Balkan countries (at least at the level of the expertise provided).
Perhaps, even more ambitious aspirations may have been at stake, though
not that often exposed, namely, to instigate decision-makers in the OSPE/
ESTIA member countries inject spatial/urban and environmental consid-
erations into macro socioeconomic and sectoral policies of respective cen-
tral governments. Secondly, an another idea has also been more than
flirted with, to help resuscitate a more planning approach to develop-
ment policy, being now grossly shattered as from the very beginning of the
post-socialist/communist transition. However, it should be noticed that
such a particular task  awareness-raising for the spatial dimension (i.e.,
conditions, impacts, side-effects, implications, etc.) of the transformation
and development processes in the transition period, especially with the
decision makers in the constituent countries  is still at the very beginning
of its realization. It appears as in the future more stable institutional and
organizational arrangements would be needed to reach more ecologically
oriented spatial planning and policy.
Consequently, the two projects represent typical example of plan-
ning/policy exercise where the prime purpose of it (at least during the ini-
tial phases)  was not some final product  but the communication itself, or,
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process itself (at least at the beginning of the exercise). To that extent, it
resembled the model described as establishing forums/arenas for commu-
nication (cf., Sager, 1994). One of the very important results of the so far
performed ESTIA and OSPE activities has been a face-to-face interaction,
which may possibly save time and energies between the partners who had
not known each other previously. Subsequently, as the progress was made
in mutual knowing and understanding of each others problems and aspi-
rations, it has become clear that hard products could be possible and
acceptable to all as well. It roughly followed the direction as it reads. At
first, initial conceptions were primarily articulated at various surveys, fol-
lowed by rudimentarilly sketched first visions, based on the diagnosis
which were prepared (approximately, during first three meetings), to later
more assuming contours of more ambitious predictions. However, such
prognosis have not been so far developed to a level from which they could
be directly implemented. What has recently been accentuated was a
sequence of predictables and/or preferables that could ultimately result in
a number of follow-up activities that could safely be undertaken. Albeit,
for example, the contribution of the Yugoslav team,  the third meeting was
already tackling the problem of planning/policy information support (e.g.,
via developing set of appropriate spatial development indicators and elab-
orating on possible institutional and organizational arrangements), the
problem of implementation was for the first time directly addressed as
early as at the Sofia meeting (March 1999). The whole exercise has been
supported by a prolonged diagnosis (of planning/policy systems and prac-
tice, institutions, organizations, development trends etc.), to endure till the
very last moment of the entire exercise. This was going along side with the
efforts to emulate and operationalize the pertinent propositions of the
ESDP and CADSES.
Having completed the steps listed, it appears that there is now a
need to proceed with the follow-up activities that would be oriented
towards:
!Producing a number of  development planning/policy documents, 
for the entire region and/or for a number of priority areas (i.e., 
objectives and instruments to implement them).
!Assessing foreseeable consequences and implications thereof for 
various spaces, sectors, governance levels, social groups, other spe-
cific interest groups, etc.
!Providing additional planning/policy information support.
!Working on the so called extra-planning/policy factors.
In this regard, it should also be pointed  that in the ESTIA/OSPE-
plus activities partners will have yet to learn how to collaborate in the
proper preparation of planning/policy documents. The already established
fora, and particularly so the imminent Spatial Planning Forum (SPF) and
OSPE-plus with its backbone and additional network components are
expected to well serve such a purpose, albeit a number of other arenas and
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actors which will also have to be introduced to this end as from now
onwards. The sooner are the partial interests, preferences and aspirations
explicated, the easier will to embark upon this work, so that it sees how
large is the maneuvering space of the possible.  Within such a framework
outlined, of particular importance is to continue mutual learning and
understanding on the following issues:
!Perhaps, a number of new, priority and/or flag and/or pilot/demon-
stration projects  would also be needed, to, first, realize a more 
action oriented approach, and, second, to better market OSPE/ 
ESTIA-plus activities among various actors. Flag and pilot/demon-
stration projects of the kind may well be conceptualized, organized 
and implemented via a number of areas of priority common inte-
rest.
! In the future so far designated planning/policy areas should be 
identified more precisely in terms of their contents, which implied 
that many more participants from each country are needed, their 
contributions to be organized around the national core teams. 
Conditio sine qua non for all projects will be - to better incorpo-
rate local and regional ideas and concerns. So far, the national gov-
ernments have been addressed in the first place (which is explain-
able vis-à-vis the relative weakness of any other actors) and the 
professional (which is also explainable), and much so any other 
actor (NGOs, regions, etc.). This state approach has to be consid-
erably modified in the sequel, to involve a number of other actors 
from the first, second and third sectors.
!Concomitantly, the new knowledge is also needed on the most 
appropriate procedures by means of which this could be reached. 
Albeit the issue of expertise it is not likely to be as serious as that 
of political backing, it should nevertheless be understood as of the 
same importance.
!Predictably, more political backing to the follow-up activities will 
be needed. Namely, the more spatial of the planning/policy docu-
ments are produced that have a direct impact on specific develop-
ment implementation, the more difficult will be to achieve consen-
sus on the content of those products, and the greater the change of 
(political) rejection. In this respect, a balance will have to be 
sought for between projects that are practical, on the one hand, 
and the predictable political scrutiny and possible rejection they 
may be attended to.
!Accordingly, a well-designed strategy is needed, to provide for a 
conceptual and logistic framework for a prudent undertaking and 
implementing of the future activities.
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Concluding Remarks  Proposals for the Future 
The past experience from the co-projects ESTIA and OSPE offers
many guarantees for a safe continuation and possibly larger number of
follow-up activities. Provided the preparatory steps are undertaken on
time, some of them may be proceeded almost immediately, though as
many should be more systematically prepared for. Preparatory activities
should focus, specifically, to making up the deficiencies that were not pos-
sible to remove during the past phases of the ESTIA/OSPE. Specific per-
tinent issues are grouped here into six sets, viz.:
!Mission of the OSPE/ESTIA-plus activities.
!Development planning/policy systems and practices. 
!Priority areas for cooperation.
!Priority common research.
!Planning/policy information support.
!New planning/policy theory and heuristic framework.
Final comments and proposals in this part go to the issue of the exist-
ing development planning/policy documents. They appear in all countries
except Greece to be grossly outdated: the new analysis of the events from
the collapse of socialist system is needed, the new diagnosis of the existing
situation as well, new strategies of alternative development as well, and
ultimately new documents too. Everything should be replanned/reworked.
In general, almost all existing plans and other policy documents are fairly
thin on the implementation policies and other policy statements which
should be pursued under the prevailing circumstances, as they often repli-
cate patterns which applied to the former times and are of almost no rele-
vance now. Especially, the notion of sustainability, which is more often
merely flirted with than is elaborated in full detail, would also have to be
given more concrete content and meaning.
Priority areas 
As pointed to several times in this paper, the regional/local profiles
and/or project profiles represent one of the cornerstones for the follow-
up activities. They will have also to be decided upon and developed as
soon as possible, to comprise sets of appropriate basic data and indicators
for priority areas and development programmes and projects of relevance
for the ESTIA counterparts. The extensiveness and detailness of data/
indicators will inevitably vary, depending basically on three groups of fac-
tors, i.e.: (a) the characteristics (fixities) of the territorial entity and/or pro-
gramme/project in question;  (b) the scope of development problems; and
(c) the scope of development planning/policy aims and objectives. Fol-
lowing the OSPE Final Report (Executive Summary), it has been envis-
aged that the priority should be given to pilot and/or demonstration pro-
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jects and programmes, out of the areas proposed. It should be noticed
that the term area does not apply to the territorial/spatial entities only,
but to all sectoral, social or other phenomena, problems and processes that
may be of some interest to address for the counterparts (either within the
multilateral arrangements, or within specific bilateral ones). In general,
eligible may prove to be some of the following priority areas/sectors:
! Innovation areas/industrial parks and/or newly discovered areas -
investment promising locations
!Areas with extremely high unemployment.
!Areas where the establishment of small and medium-sized enter-
prises should be given priority.
!Priority areas for private-public partnership.
!Areas isolated in geographical/transportation terms.
!Areas suffering from huge brain drain (i.e., emigration, exodus, 
and similar).
!Areas with low standard of living.
!Areas with the obsolete economic structure (motif: economic and 
ecological restructuring/conversion, ecological development, 
etc.).
!Heavily polluted/degraded/devastated areas.
!Areas with the most pressing problems concerning refugees.
!Areas harbouring the most precious and/or fragile biodiversity 
potentials.
!Common coastal areas.
!Priority water management zones (basins, rivers, lakes, etc.).
!High-risk areas.
!Specific cross-border areas.
!Problems of refugees, returnees and other persons of similar con-
cern.
!Other specific problem-areas.
Priority future common research
The past experience on the two projects seems to emphasize the rel-
evance of the following priority research issues:
!Theoretical and methodological aspects of sustainable develop-
ment planning/policy in the transition period.
!New institutional and organizational arrangements.
!Problems of division of work between planning/policy, market 
and other mechanisms and instruments of societal guidance and 
control.
!Problems of planning/policy interaction and communications (pro-
cedures for preparing, passing and implementing of development 
decisions).
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!Problems of vertical, horizontal and other coordination.
!Planning/policy evaluation.
! Visioning-versus-implementing problem.
!Spatio-ecological impact analysis of the consequences of develop-
ment planning policies at various supra-national, national and sub-
-national governance levels on the OSPE/ESTIA spaces and 
locales.
!The impact of privatization or urban lands on the new planning 
approaches and modes.
!Comparative development advantages and prospects of the Bal-
kan region endangered or/and lost due to the NATO bombings of 
the FR Yugoslavia.
!Planning/policy information support/knowledge base.
!Content and format of the new generation of development docu-
ments at supra-national, national and sub-national levels.
! Education for Europe in the Balkan countries.
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PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY 
IN POST-TOTALITARIAN SOCIETIES IN SEE
by Alina Mungiu Pippidi
In troubled waters: Context of the Romanian Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA)
The passing by the Romanian parliament of a Law on Classified
Information in January 2001 provoked a real storm in the Romanian
media. The draft had been lingering in the Parliament since 1993 and had
managed by 1999 to get approved by both Chambers, albeit in different
variants. In line with the Romanian Constitution, differences between
drafts adopted by the two Chambers are subject to mediation in a special
committee. As the media was strongly against the draft, it was agreed
informally that it would be buried in this stage until a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA from now on) will be passed. However, after the
elections of November 1999 the initiators of the first draft, the Party for
Social Democracy, returned to power and only a few weeks later the law
was adopted in a final form and sent to the President for promulgation. In
its final form it still did not have a clear definition of classified, leaving it
largely at the discretion of the authority, but introduced an article stating
every citizen is responsible under serious penalty to guard secret informa-
tion even it came by chance into his or her possession. Faced with the vocal
opposition of the media and the civil society, endorsed by some reputed
international NGOs such as Article 19, the government defended itself
claiming the regulation of classified information is needed in the process
of Romanias joining NATO and the European Union. The Romanian
media had not forgotten, however, that under the same President Ion
Iliescu the Romanian parliament rushed in 1991, before even the adoption
of a new Constitution and when the country was barely liberated from the
strongest totalitarian regime in Eastern Europe to pass not a FOIA, but a
National Security bill sealing the archives of Ceausescus secret service for
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50 years. Many of the initiators of that bill were also behind the classified
information draft of 1993 and managed to return in the 2000 Parliament.
The media and the NGO community feared that in the absence of a law
granting access to information, attempts to classify it could only further
foster corruption and give discretionary powers to the politicized bureau-
cracy and secret services, which had never been brought to proper
accountability.
The international and national context was such that the Romanian
government could ill afford such a scandal. Ion Iliescu had returned to
presidency for a disputed third term and his party to government after
elections that had scared Western countries due to the high rates of sup-
port for radical populism. The government was concerned to change its
image in the Western media, where Ion Iliescu was seen at the kindest as
an alternative preferable to radical nationalist Vadim Tudor, so the least
of two evils. But the decisive event was a ruling of the Constitutional
Court, which on procedural rather than substantive grounds declared the
bill unconstitutional and won more time for the nascent coalition of
media and NGOs opposing it. After this event, the President and the
Prime Minister changed strategy overnight, dissociated themselves mod-
erately from the initiators of the draft and agreed it should be put on hold
until a FOIA was passed to create a general regulatory framework of
access to information. 
The NGO community and the opposition parties in the new
Parliament had already come together for the suit to the Constitutional
Court, which was done by the parties with the consultation of the civil soci-
ety. As a draft for a FOIA had actually been proposed by the National
Liberal Party a year ago and was lingering in the media committee of the
Chamber of Deputies the civil society seized the opportunity to speed the
procedure for its adoption. Things were further complicated by the cre-
ation of a Ministry of Public Information (MIP from now on) in the new
government, which announced it would advance its own bill. The new
draft would have however a much longer path to travel needing lengthy
approval procedures by other instances before coming to the media com-
mittee. Between the Liberals who refused to give up their advantage of
having a draft already in the process and the Ministry which produced sur-
prisingly fast a draft in no way worse than the Liberals one  but neither
were actually satisfactory for the civil society -the Romanian Academic
Society, a think-tank, decided it was time for the civil society to arbiter
among parties, on one side, and improve substantially the FOIA drafts, on
the other. The decision was taken in the space of two days, immediately
after the government circulated its draft and the liberals announced they
would block it by advancing their own in the media committee. SAR called
for an arbitrage at its headquarters the government (MIP), the Liberals
and the civil society organizations involved so far. The meeting started at
about lunch time on Friday, March 23 and by the end of normal office
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hours a civil society coalition was forged behind a new version of the
FOIA, both the liberals and the government were won for the new version
and they had in the same time agreed among themselves a procedure to
bridge the conflict. The new version imported many things of the govern-
ment draft, as well as other articles put forward by SAR and the Romanian
Helsinki Committee (APADOR-CH) into the Liberals project, which was
the most advanced in terms of procedure. The following Tuesday the
media committee moved to adopt the draft and sent it for the vote of the
Chamber of Deputies. By summer 2001 the two Chambers had passed the
FOIA1, and after the mediation committee in September the President
promulgated it. Many elements were needed, however, for that meeting at
SAR to be so spectacularly successful and more background is needed to
understand both challenge and accomplishment.
Strange closed society: Romania after Ceausescu
In 1990 a Romanian newspaper published the transcript of a radio
conversation between police units setting up some window smashing next
to a peaceful protest rally in order to intervene in force. In 1991 a news-
paper published the transcript of a very confidential debate on choosing a
challenger for the Romanian presidential elections. Also in 1991 a whole
collection of files of the former secret service of Ceausescu, the Securitate,
were found in a ditch only partially burnt, and made the headlines of the
newspapers for the rest of the year. In 1994 a Romanian newsmagazine
published large excerpts from what was supposed to be the best kept
secret of post-Communist Romania: the investigation file on the alleged
terrorists who had killed almost one thousand Romanians in December
1989, proving the investigation had been stalled deliberately by the mili-
tary attorneys. Transcripts of government meetings and even the Supreme
Defense Council have been budding in the print press. Photocopies of a
secret correspondence of an Arab Embassy in Bucharest speaking of train-
ing camps for snipers in the Romanian mountains came in the mail of
more than one newspaper in 1995. The spectacular dacha of the head of
the Romanian secret service, an officer of Ceausescus feared Securitate
but also of the revolutionary Court which shot his former boss, was filmed
with a hidden camera by a disguised TV crew and made it into the main
newscast of the public television in 1997. The Museum of Holocaust in
Washington had been for years denouncing the restrictive legislation, and
even more restrictive practice concerning the Romanian archives, to
acknowledge in 2001 that they had managed to acquire more from Ro-
mania in the end than from any East European country. Since 1996 to 
___________
1 This law was adopted by Senate at 13 September 2001 and by Chamber of 
Deputies at 18 September 2001.
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2000, as Romania was ruled by a coalition of parties having a hard time to
keep together, each of its members could read in the media what the oth-
ers had privately slipped on himself or his party, which more often than
not led to more bickering.
What can account for such openness in post-Ceausescu Romania?
First and foremost, pure indiscretion: talk is cheap in Latin cultures and
the word is out on anything, regardless how secret, often missing accuracy
due to this pure oral mechanism of generating data. This loose treatment
of specific information in an otherwise near closed system is always
explained by the private interest to disclose information for ones own
needs, either by want of good terms with the media or by need of a bribe.
In other words it is a sign of the widespread failure of Romanian individ-
uals or institutions to achieve that sort of impersonal bureaucratic behav-
ior in which institutional rules are obeyed not out of fear, but of willing-
ness to submit to discipline. Politicians commonly accept a micro tape-
recorder in their pocket when entering would-be confidential meetings.
Assistants with the D. A.s offices are paid about 75 USD per month, so
with 200 USD one can get the most secret file. Blackmail in order to get
information is also current, from the threat to publish biased articles
against the agency denying a journalist information to the more general
menace to portray the post-Communist governments negatively in the
Western media, where theyve never enjoyed a great reputation anyway. 
Are these examples proof that post-Ceausescu Romania succeeded
in turning what used to be the poster case of a closed society into an open
one? Hardly so. While one can find out from his or her newspaper what
the topic was in the most selected and supposedly confidential meeting-
completed by the imagination of the journalist and a spite of accuracy,
which is a characteristic of the Romanian print press, there are consider-
ably more important things one cannot find out. There is no way of know-
ing, for instance, how the representative elected by your county voted on
this or that topic-for the simple reason that all important votes in the
Romanian Parliament are either secret or not recorded down per MP. You
cannot find out how your tax money was spent because this information is
not published, you cannot have it on request and indeed in many cases it
is not even organized properly so that one could make some sense of it. If
you need to get a copy of your familys property records from the public
archive it would take years and without a bribe you may find out it was
lost. Courts often summon public agencies to send information needed in
on-going trials, and it always takes months to years and serious help from
the interested party for the data to finally reach them. On top of all, the
National Commission for Statistics, barely reformed from Communist
times, can topple one with tons of irrelevant data, but a few useful things,
as those are not even computed. 
The pattern of obtaining public information in post-Communist
Romania can therefore be characterized fairly as erratic rather then
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restrictive: one could not foresee very well a particular development due
to the large importance of the human factor. Generally speaking, whoev-
er enjoys either social capital  connections -or capital per se  money, or
some good to barter, often influence due to a public position-can get
almost anything unless having the exceptional bad luck to fall upon a civil
servant who is fearful, honest or both. 
Accountability as the crux of the matter
In the early nineties, when the Romanian media was recently liber-
ated and an Anglo-Saxon model of journalism was temporarily prevailing,
young investigation journalists trained by American foundations had a
future and were pursuing clean paths in courageous ways. Later on, after
the media came to be owned entirely by domestic publishers with deep
roots in the Communist propaganda establishment and the post-Com-
munist corrupt business establishment, recruitment of journalists has come
to avoid such potentially trouble-makers. The focus is now on people who
have the right connections so they can get in the information required. The
information is then bargained: in some cases it is exchanged against anoth-
er good and it never reaches print: in others there is nothing to exchange
or the deal does not work out, so it is published as rewritten by an editor
able to write a bit more than the original information gatherer. Long cam-
paigns against a person in the media are usually blackmail campaigns and
when a deal is reached the bad guy is refashioned as a good guy instantly.2
This also explains why the Romanian media has never lobbied for a free-
dom of information act in the past decade except agreeing to it half-hearti-
ly in almost private workshops. The initiator of the Liberals draft, Senator
and lawyer Eugen Vasiliu thought to address by the way of an unique draft
the two problems, privileged access to information by corruption and traf-
fic of influence means only and its misuse once obtained. Therefore he
included in his original project a section on regulations against widespread
disinformation and libel through the media. Consequently, the draft beca-
me unpopular with publishers who boycotted or criticized it. Vasiliu
improved the draft with the help of international expertise gathered by the
Centre for Independent Journalism, but except a handful of NGOs and
historians lobbying for the revision of a restrictive archives law passed in
1996 he was still badly missing allies for the FOIA in general and the pro-
ject in particular.
___________
2 The Economist published a few years ago a piece on the rates of hidden 
advertising in the Romanian media: the fact is, except in the electronic media 
erratically monitored by the watchdog Council of Audio-Visual hidden 
advertising is increasingly less hidden and the misuse of information for 
blackmail or biased presentations of reality is more and more frequent. The 
problems of the Romanian media were sketched by Richard Hall in Patrick 
ONeills 1998. See also Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina 2000, in Foreign Policy ...
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The Romanian Academic Society had reached its concept on a
FOIA through a different way. Quite a few of its leading experts have also
been involved with media management and the legislative process,3 so
they were highly skeptical the Vasiliu draft could have been implemented
even if by some miracle it could get adopted. Feedback from ordinary
viewers of public television hinted to the fact that the target group mostly
at disadvantage was not the media, but the people missing both money and
influence to barter for information. Due to poor laws on property restitu-
tion, the Romanian judiciary has become entangled in over a million law-
suits over property rights by the late nineties. Since all these cases were
about formerly nationalized property by the Communist state, most of the
evidence needed to solve them was buried in public archives. The trials
lasted for years, paralyzing the judiciary and the real estate market due to
the inability and reluctance of state agencies in providing such records gra-
tuitously and timely. SARs idea was that a set of regulations and policies
were needed to solve the daily jams of routine information rather than the
grand cases of terrorists files and other high media profile topics. Due to
its diagnosis of the Romanian public sector, a topic it had researched thor-
oughly, SAR also considered that the classified information law was sim-
ply a non-enforceable law, like most laws passed in the post-Communist
transition. The law sent a bad signal, however, to the administration as it
made guarding information rather than distributing it the rule of the game
and as such encouraged even further the access by means of bribe or extor-
tion only. 
By 2000 SAR has come to identify the key issue of the Romanian
public sector in the low vertical and horizontal accountability. This con-
clusion was supported by a huge amount of data. In 1998-2000 SAR
designed and implemented a regional Freedom House project in three
countries, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, consisting in surveys of the
general population, the MPs and an objective assessment of institutions
of accountability4. The latter included besides institutional analysis the
exercise of sending a clear and informative letter soliciting a public author-
ity to dispatch its last year activity report or the next document that could
replace such a report. Based on this query which was renewed a number
of times, SAR built an accountability index (see Appendix 1) which was 
___________
3 For instance the director of SAR, Alina Mungiu Pippidi, had been in charge 
of the reform of the Romanian public television and the revision of the pub-
lic broadcasting legislation for two years between 1996 and 1998 and had also 
run a national newsmagazine in the early nineties.
4 Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina,  Government Accountability in East Central Europe; 
Governance, Accountability and Institutional Social Capital in the Third 
Europe. A survey of Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, Romanian Academic 
Society and Freedom House with the World Bank Institute, 2000.
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measured in the three countries5. The government agencies were infor-
med a score was to be attributed to them on the basis of both the timeli-
ness of the answer and the quality of the report sent. Results from this
exercise as well as the analyses of the surveys led to a number of policy-
relevant conclusions:
1. The three countries surveyed presented a similar picture of 
widespread perception by abuse and mistreatment of ordi-
nary citizens from the part of civil servants. The perception 
ten years after the fall of Communism was still that of a 
public administration ruling over people rather than deli-
vering a service to them. In all the three countries majori-
ties reported encounters at least one time during the past 
decade with mistreatment and abuse from the public 
authority (see Appendix 2).
2. Reports of mistreatment were strongly correlated with the 
frequency of bribing civil servants by citizens, a behavior 
which was also acknowledged by a majority of respondents 
(see Appendix 3). This indicated strongly that bribe is 
nothing else but an extra-tax the citizens pay for what is 
more often than not his or her right, in many instances to 
get public information. The 1991 Romanian Constitution 
had granted in Article 31, paragraph a, that a persons right 
to accede public interest information cannot be hindered, 
and in paragraph 2 that public authorities are compelled to 
ensure the correct information of citizens in matters both 
of public and private concern. 
3. The self-reports from the general survey were supported by 
the exercise of querying public authorities on the last years 
activity reports. It turned out that except in few cases such 
___________
5 We tested transparency through a simulation exercise leading to building of 
an accountability index. The request for the previous year activity report or 
a similar document was addressed to the following central institutions: i) 
Parliament (Senate and Chamber of Deputies); ii) Government, Ministries 
and major agencies; iii) Constitutional Court; iv) Ombudsman. In order to 
speed up the process, we addressed the request directly to the institutions 
department in charge with the PR and with the relationship with civil socie
ty. The grading system is from 0 to 5, 5 meaning sending in due time (a 
month) a comprehensive report, 4 is attributed for a brief presentation of the 
1999 activity and a presentation of the department in charge with public rela
tions activities also in due time, 3 was granted if the material received was on 
information on the PR department only, 2 points for indicating only sources 
of information or for requesting additional data on the project with no follow 
up in due time. We scored 1 point the loose information provided in more 
than 30 days and 0 points the poorest performance, when there is no reply at 
all.
200
a report did not even exist. Some newly founded PR 
offices, which had been created to improve the relationship 
of the agency boss with the media sent instead their own 
report on this specific activity that they have made to justi-
fy their existence. The majority of government agencies, 
including the Information Department of Government at 
the time (2000) either did not answer at all or gave totally 
uninformative answers. The accountability indexes of the 
three countries were close among themselves and to the 
bottom of the scale (see Appendix 1).
4. The MPs showed less concern than the general public on 
the matters of governance. The general public in the three 
countries displayed however real anger with the political 
class. The public considered only a minority of civil ser-
vants and even a smaller minority of MPs (around 10-15% 
in the three countries) worked in the public interest and 
preferred experts to politicians, single unit constituencies 
to electoral party lists and referendums to votes of repre-
sentatives. Ratings of institutions of vertical (proportional 
electoral system) as well as horizontal accountability 
(Courts, Prosecutors Office) were therefore equally bad.
5. The public contributes however itself to its mistreatment 
by the administration. It turned out most of the public did 
not report mistreatment, had little or no idea where to 
complain if abused, and did not report fraudulent behavior 
such as bribe when encountering it. Bribing instead of 
claiming one rights emerged as the most frequent behavior 
when encountering mistreatment from the part of the 
administration. The most competent citizens turned out to 
be the most educated, well off and who had encountered 
abuse significantly more.  
6. It makes little sense, therefore, to speak of corruption 
when describing the pattern of relationship between the 
Romanian administration and the public. Corruption, as an 
infringement of impersonal administrative behavior is 
more of an effect than a cause. The crux of the matter lies 
in the widespread incapacity of ever attaining that general-
ized impersonal behavior, which is the symptom of a mod
ern bureaucracy. Fighting corruption and promoting trans-
parency are therefore closely linked and should be regard-
ed as part of an overall strategy of state building6.
___________
6 Stephen Holmes has already suggested that when analysing the failed assis-
tance effort of the Russian judiciary.
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7. The comparative perspective of the project led to interest-
ing conclusions. Romania had an official Ombudsman, but 
due to another non-enforceable law, which regulated it, the 
Ombudsman was quite powerless and did not have any 
incentives to take a more public profile. Bulgaria had a 
NGO acting in this capacity, which being more vocal 
seemed to do quite a better job despite its unofficial posi-
tion. Bulgaria had passed a FOIA in 1999, Slovakia fol-
lowed suit in 2000. Of the laws passed, the Slovakian one 
was the most ambitious, demanding for the ex-officio pub-
lishing of all possible data and introducing two steps of 
responsibility, administrative and judicial, for the civil ser-
vants denying a citizens right to freedom of information.  
Assembling the puzzle and gaining momentum
SAR had barely wrapped up these conclusions and published the
first two rounds of analyses of the data in November 2000, when the
change of political power in the Romanian elections and the consequent
scandal of the classified information law broke out. Since the beginning of
the scandal in late January and the meeting at SAR on March 23rd SAR
moved to publicize results of its study but in the same time to synthesize
the debate. The result was the publishing of a widely disseminated work-
ing paper comparing FOIAs in European countries, proposing to stop the
progress of the classified information act and its replacement with FOIA,
reviewing both the liberals project and the governments and publishing
the Slovak law as a model worth following7. This working paper was con-
ceived as an advocacy instrument as well as an awareness-raising tool. It
included in one booklet everything necessary for a member of the media
committee of the Parliament or a journalist to form an opinion without the
need to look elsewhere. It was distributed indeed to all Committee mem-
bers when the debate started. SARs point of view was enforced also by
interviews in newspapers and on TV along the same lines8. The most orig-
inal of those was SARs insistence that if a poor and ineffective law was to
be passed the situation created would be worse than with no law at all,
since the topic would slip from the public agenda and the government
would achieve its objective of showing the West it is democratic without
granting anything in exchange. 
___________
7 Fartusnic, Ciprian and Iordache, Romanita, Liberalization of information 
access, Public Policy Working Paper # 20 Romanian Academic Society 
(March 2001)
8 The Romanian public television dedicated a talk-show to the issue organized 
by producer Daniela Constantinescu and host Adrian Ursu and timed pre-
cisely that week.
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SARs criticism of the Vasiliu draft was also specific. The draft had
come under attack by APADOR-CH, a human rights group, mainly for
failing to protect media freedom. Meanwhile the government had secured
for its own draft the approval of the Romanian Press Club, a publishers
association. SAR considered both the draft of Vasiliu and the draft of the
government failed to put enough pressure on the administration and in the
same time to grant it the means to implement the law. During talks at SAR
it was argued that administrative responsibility, therefore the right to
appeal at a superior instance in the same agency is necessary because most
citizens do not have the means and the leisure to sue the respective agency
in Court. The higher authority was therefore compelled by law both to sat-
isfy the request for information promptly and to take administrative meas-
ures to sanction those responsible for the delay. Furthermore, in the
reunited draft it was introduced the need for every agency to have a spe-
cialized office dealing with both information requests and the publishing
of ex-officio information. 
SAR invited at the meeting all the organizations which had been
active in the advocacy campaign. From the media it invited the grass-root-
ed, recently founded League of the Romanian Journalists, created specif-
ically to counter corruption and malpractice in the media. The League
demanded that journalists receive special treatment, and backed up
strongly by the Center for Independent Journalism it managed to per-
suade those present that a shorter deadline to grant requested information
for the media was needed, the 10 days allowed in the law being improper
for journalists who might need the data for a piece of news that same day.
Therefore it was decided that for journalists the information would be dis-
closed immediately or at a maximum in the next 24 hours. APADOR-CH,
the other very active discussion partner was especially concerned to
reduce to a maximum the exception from FOIA and secure some frame-
work to annihilate the law of classified information. Exceptions were
reduced and a few items to this effect included in the agreement. Besides
its own agenda, the civil society organizations fought hard to persuade the
government and the Liberals the two projects can be happily synthesized
in one, together with the additions of the meeting. It was clear that a pub-
lic competition for taking credit for the law among political actors was
unavoidable, but the parties were brought to the point where they agreed
on one project only. The politicians present were a Liberal MP, Mona
Musca, member of the media committee of the Chamber of Deputies
together with Eugen Vasiliu, author of the Liberal draft, and the MIF
Secretary of State Dan Jurcan, author of the government draft. To enforce
the partners commitment and preserve the new essential points agreed
upon at the meeting a statement was instantly drafted. It went as follows:
The representatives of the undersigned government organizations 
assembled at the headquarters of the Romanian Academic Society 
have decided to form a coallition in order to act in a consistent and 
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coordinated way for the adoption of a Freedom of Information 
Act. To achieve this objective we have agreed upon the following 
suggestions to be included in the FOIA draft at the debate in the 
media committee of the Chamber of Deputies.
And it ended with:
If the government promotes the law in a form infringing the prin-
ciples laid out in this document, the undersigned will resort to eve- 
ry possible instance and means to prevent it from being adopted.9
The government and the Liberal Party were mentioned in the state-
ment as having been present at the meeting. However, SAR refrained
from letting the Liberals sign the coalition agreement, as it had to be clear
no political capital was targeted. Afterwards, both the Minister of
Information and the Liberals capitalized as much as possible on the pas-
sage of the FOIA. The truth is both had merits in adopting a FOIA in a
very close format to the one agreed with the civil society. The end of the
statement included an actual threat that the civil society would not rest but
create a stir in the domestic and foreign media, as well as at the level of
international instances if the law did not turn out in the form agreed. It
showed the decision of the civil society to act as a block and addressed
directly the main concern of the government party in that moment, the
international public opinion. And so it worked. 
It was a three hours group meeting, successful due to goal-oriented
moderating of the group discussion, the use of instant transcripts and the
negotiation on spot of the form agreed to put in writing. At some point an
article from the Slovak law was translated from English into Romanian
directly into the recommendations list after an argument made by SAR.
Decisions were reached by consensus and after signing the document in
the end both a FOIA and a coalition to follow it throughout the adoption
and the implementation process was forged. The government representa-
tives behaved professionally and they played later a large part in having
the government accept the result of the deal they had forged on place.
Later, during talks on the implementation, new NGOs also stepped into
the process, but again SAR required that opinions on implementation
should not be sent individually by NGOs to the Ministry but agreed and
put forward strongly by the coalition. The government received this very
well and convoked a final one-day meeting with coalition members to
agree on the norms.
___________
9 Besides the organizations already mentioned the memorandum was signed 
by Pro-Democratia Association, GRADO, Apple and also attended by a 
Board Member of the Romanian Association of Transparency.
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The Day After
The policy of implementing the FOIA is obviously as important as
the draft itself. The law has all the necessary provisions and levers to make
it enforceable. Nevertheless, in order to make a difference with the long
battered Romanian administration, used to many changes of rules and reg-
ulations which are never thoroughly applied, and with the Romanian pub-
lic, used to solve things on spot by the easiest means there is still some way
to go. In June already, before the law was even adopted by the Senate,
SAR has sent around to coalition members and a few selected Romanian
agencies its proposal for a policy of implementing FOIA. This proposal
outlines a few principles for an assistance strategy in implementing the
FOIA, conceived in two distinct phases:
Year One: Achieving state building: empowerment 
of the government
The first need which arises from FOIA is to build the capacity of  the
PR offices. These offices had as sole task to deal with journalists and
organize PR campaigns so far. Most public agencies do not even have such
an office, and they are now required under the law to create such an office
in the first year after the FOIA is enacted (Article 4). The information
officers dealing with the implementation of FOIA have not only the task
of satisfying requests for information, but also of publishing ex-officio for
the first time a large volume of documents, and the editing of a newsletter
which had become compulsory under the law. Also, whenever they have
computers they are required now to develop a web site and post all the
information in electronic format as well. This presupposes a number of
skills and operations, as follows:
1.1 To produce the list of documents specific for their institu-
tion, which need to be published ex-officio, according to 
the law.
1.2 To gather the relevant data from within the public agency, 
an operation of collecting the information needed for post-
ing or the satisfaction of individual requirements.
1.3 To organize the data in a meaningful and ready-to-use for-
mat.
1.4 To publish the data in the most user friendly format, which 
is in the same time the best value for money, due to restrict-
ed capacity of local budgets.
1.5 To systematically collect and use feedbacks on the success 
of the above in order to achieve consumer satisfaction, 
that is, to satisfy the need of the public which uses the infor-
mation.
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The difficulty of these tasks should not be underestimated; consid-
erable expertise transfer is needed for the law to make a difference. Wages
in the public sector are about the national average (100 USD per month),
so individuals with writing skills prefer as a rule to work in the media or
the PR departments of private businesses. The most knowledgeable per-
sons on what kind of information is the most solicited and what formats
are the more convenient are the journalists who cover the area of the
respective public agency or local government. These are people soliciting
on a daily basis information from these offices or from civil servants in
charge so they really know the weak spots, the information stored to be
given away only if bribed, and so on.  Capacity-building programs of these
PR offices must involve as an essential resource these journalists, at least
for the editing of the newsletter and activity reports.
Year Two. Bringing the consumer in: empowerment of the 
community in the accountability process 
Let us assume the public agencies would meet some success in
achieving the tasks set for the first year of implementing the FOIA, at least
formally. They will publish some documents and for the first time the pub-
lic would have the right to read the spending report and the budget. We
have shown, however, that most of the public is neither willing nor com-
petent for such a task. We are dealing with a population made either of
peasants or the first urban generation, used to long abuse by Communist
authorities. Two thirds of this public consider nevertheless most civil ser-
vants to be corrupted, but only a part of them had any encounters with
civil servants at all. What is needed here is some intermediate agent to act
on behalf of the public, competent enough to check expenses reports but
independent enough to be able to follow suit in any event. It may turn out
the reports are fair and accurate and this must be made public by an inde-
pendent source, as the low trust of Romanians in their own public institu-
tions is becoming a problem in itself. Or it may turn out that they are not,
essential data is missing or is misused and then action must be taken, in the
last instance in Court, as the FOIA allows. Again this cannot be done by
ordinary citizens but needs some intermediate agent.
Reading a budget and suing the government require certain skills.
The solution is then to empower local NGOs or other community organi-
zations to act as auditors and Ombudsmen, checking reports and filling
complaints on behalf of citizens in the first years after the law is passed.
This requires training for organizations volunteering to act in this capaci-
ty and the creation of a national network.
The story of assistance for FOIA in Romania has its pluses and its
minuses. It was not luck only that made instant transfer of best practices
via the regional Freedom Forum program so successful. Rather it was a
good concept: the thorough research and the field-testing previous to
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adoption of a model. What was the main problem FOIA had to address
and could reasonably solve, besides the symbolic issues? Answering this
question was the main stake in the whole process, and this is where SARs
Freedom House program was able to give an answer. The implementation
strategy outlined below is only the next chapter of the same answer.
Final reflections on the future of transparency in status societies
To tell of the free access of information is to tell of freedom.
Democratic theory uses concepts such as individual freedom and political
rights; it examines formal institutions as embedded in formal rules such as
Constitutions, and informal institutions or procedures. It distinguishes
between substantive or procedural democracies, electoral democracies,
and consolidated or unconsolidated ones. Most of these classifications, if
not all, address only distinctions among the political processes in a given
society, however, and not the society itself. In the case of rural and post-
communist societies it is the nature of the society as a whole that might
well be distinct from a modern society, not just the nature of the political
society, and this bears importantly on the outcome of the democratization
process. The superimposition of communism on traditional rural societies
led to a sort of neo-traditionalist or status societies governed by unwritten
rules more than formal laws10. The explicit modernizing design of Com-
munism was doomed from the start by the essential contradiction embed-
ded in the communist power structure, the legitimating of status groups
such as nomenklatura enjoying domination monopolies, and by the enfor-
cement of the hierarchy even over the ideology. Romania passed from a
peasant variant of status society to a Communist one, and it is the survival
of its basic features until nowadays that hinders importantly the develop-
ment of an open society and a free market. 
Rural societies are comparable with communist ones due to the
prevalence of another type of authority over the modern legal rational
one. Traditional authority is prevailing in a rural society, as varieties of
charismatic authority take the upper hand in the communist one. Both
types of societies are, however, far from the legal rational type found even
in pre-modern societies on their way to capitalism. Both have unpre-
dictable patterns of distributing social and legal rights from a rational
standpoint, but fairly predictable for whoever is acquainted with the pat-
terns of authority which generate unwritten rules of the game. Weber orig-
inally defined status societies as societies dominated by status groups and 
___________
10 This argument draws importantly on the work of Kenneth Jowitt (Social 
Change in Romania.1860-1940, Berkeley: University of California, Institute 
for International Studies, 1993); see also Alena Ledeneva Unwritten Rules: 
How Russia Really Works, CER Essay for Centre for European Reform, 
London, 2001
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ruled by convention rather than law. The firm appropriation of opportu-
nities, especially of opportunities for domination always tend to result in
the formation of status groups. The formation of status groups in turn
always turn to result in monopolistic appropriation of powers of domina-
tion and sources of income... Hence, a status society always creates... [the]
elimination of individuals free choice ... [and] hinders the formation of a
free market11. 
Of course, there are no ideal-types in the real life, but Romania
nears in many periods of its contemporary history this model of a status
society. The concept is crucial because such collectivistic hierarchical soci-
eties place only a limited value on individual freedom, making the concept
of liberty itself quite meaningless; furthermore, personal and not imper-
sonal relations are the norm in this type of society. The word freedom
itself is strikingly missing from Romanian political literature besides the
national independence meaning. The government is not the sole actor
that infringes individual freedom, and in many cases its influence is indi-
rect; the structure of the society itself allows uneven access to freedom of
choice according to group membership. Accession to a status group by
outsiders is possible at any time, but only within the rules of the game.
Treatment from public authorities varies according to the group one
belongs to and emancipation is usually sought from ones status as a per-
sonal endeavor and not as a societal design. 
Communism, a variant of the same type of society itself imposed
other status groups and changed the hierarchies, but kept the overall
model. Intellectuals who were not sent to prison due to their opposition
were included among the privileged. Professional associations were creat-
ed, such as the Unions of Writers or Journalists, designed as official sta-
tus groups which after an initial shock in 1990 were able to survive and
manifest themselves as such. MPs, bureaucrats and journalists do all make
status groups, and the treatment of public information among them is sub-
ject to the rules of status, not open society.
The slow, modest, often contradictory or ill-aimed reforms in
Romania since 1990 were unable to pin down this structural problem and
address it fully and this is the main reason why so many of them failed mis-
erably to achieve any difference. Post-communist societies are complex
societies: the legacy of communism often comes as this entangled mix of
complicities in which victim and perpetrator have become difficult to tell
apart. Unwritten rules prevail over written ones not only due to habit, but
also to a less understood bounded rationality of their own. 
What makes the still unfinished success story of FOIA a break-
through is a mix of various elements. First we have a small group of 
___________
11 Originally from Weber, Economy and society, quoted after Weber, On cha-
risma and institution building, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, p
177-180.
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Western-educated intellectuals, mostly with an American background or
belonging to American-sponsored Romanian NGOs12 able to work
together and put forward a project drawing on a cultural model of open
society shared by this group, but on behalf of the society as a whole. In so
doing they also acted to mobilize other actors, under the banner of self-
interest this time, actors enjoying considerable influence, such as political
parties or journalists associations. They were then able to take advantage
of circumstances by acting promptly on the basis of good research, knowl-
edge of best practice in a similar environment, good leadership and mutu-
al trust relations. Similar actors can reproduce every one and each of those
in any other analogous setting. 
APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1: Accountability Index
INSTITUTION ROMANIA    BULGARIA SLOVAKIA
Score Score Score
Senate 4
Chamber of Romania 4
Government of Romania 22
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 0 1 1
Ministry of Agriculture 0 3 4
Ministry of National Defense 5 5 0
Ministry of Culture 0 3 1
Ministry of Internal Affairs 0 1 1
Ministry 
of National Education 0 1
Ministry of Finance 1 1 0
Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce 0 1 4
Ministry of  Justice 4 1 1
Ministry of Public Works 0 0
Ministry of Public Function 0
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Protection 0 3 5
Ministry of Transport 0 1 2
Ministry of Environment 3 4 0
Ministry of Health 1 5 0
National Agency 
for Communication 0
___________
12 The expert within the Ministry of Information who drafted their project had 
been shipped to the States by USAID just weeks before.
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INSTITUTION ROMANIA    BULGARIA SLOVAKIA
Score Score Score
National Agency 
for Tourism 5
National Agency 
for Regional Development 5 5 0
National Agency 
for Science & Technology 0
Constitutional Court 5
Ombudsman 5
National Audit Court 0
State Ownership Fund 5
Consumers Protection Office0
General Customs 
Department 0
Anti-Monopoly Office 5
Administration 
of State Material Reserves 1
Office of Geodesy, 
Cartography 
and the Cadastre 1
Office of Normalization, 
Measurements and Testing 5
Statistical Office 0
Bureau of Industrial Property 5
Office of Public Procurement 1
Accountability index 1.75 2.64 1.51
Scale ranges from 0  no response to 5- full satisfactory response (in terms
of timeliness and content) at the request to provide the last years activity
report or an equivalent document. The country index is a simple average
of the scores granted per national agencies queried.
APPENDIX 2: Frequency of abuse and mistreatment 
How spread corruption is?
Romania% Bulgaria% Slovakia%
Almost all officials 
are involved 25.8 9.0 18.1
Most officials are involved 43.7 53.9 46.2
Few officials are involved 28.8 23.3 28.7
Scarcely any official 
is involved 1.8 0.9 1.7
No answer 0.0 12.9 5.3
Total 100 100 100
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What is the cause of corruption?
Romania% Bulgaria% Slovakia%
A. Low wages 
in the public sector 24.7 20.8 8.0
B. Low moral standards 
of civil servants 12.1 9.9 18.0
C. The law is too permissive 13.1 13.5 12.0
D. The law is not applied 11.3 11.8 9.3
E. Those in power striving 
at making fast money 19.2 33.7 39.2
F. Communism corrupted 
people 5.2 1.8 4.3
G. People are 
fundamentally dishonest 4.5 4.0 4.5
H. This is the custom 2.9 0.5 0.8
I.   Other 1.1 3.9 4.1
Total 100 100 100
Has an official mistreated you after 89?
Romania% Bulgaria% Slovakia%
Yes 59.2 34.4 61.3
No 35.8 59.8 31.1
No answer 5.0 5.9 7.6
If mistreated by a civil servant, which is the most likely your reaction?
Romania% Bulgaria% Slovakia%
Complain to the 
proper authorities 12.5 25.4 35.2
Offer him something 
to get a fairer treatment 23.0 4.6 9.3
Let it rest 39.3 40.4 41.7
Other. Which? 5.4 3.3
Does not apply 19.8 10.4
No answer 0.0 15.9 13.7
Total 100 100 100
Do you know where to fill in a complaint if mistreated by (percentage rep-
resent those who do know):
Romania% Bulgaria% Slovakia%
Civil servants 
at the local government 60.6 49.1 63.6
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CNT.
Financial inspectors 44.1 39.5 50.0
Telephone company 57.0 28.5 73.7
Court 45.7 24.4 50.5
Mayor 37.6 36.0 55.6
Doctor/medical staff 54.9 51.6 73.7
Member of Parliament 18.8 17.5 28.8
Central government 
agency/institution 19.6 19.2 30.5
Public ratings of performance of civil servants 
Professions working 
in public intreste Romania% Bulgaria% Slovakia%
Teachers 70.9 49.3 86.4
Union Leaders 43.2 13.4 36.4
Lawyers 42.0 26.3 40.3
Members of Parliament 11.0 9.0 15.5
Judges 27.5 13.4 37.5
Civil Servants/Central Govt. 16.5 15.1 25.9
Civil Servants/Local Govt. 33.8 18.4 34.2
Professors 71.0 28.3 72.6
Public Journalists 76.1 56.0 66.8
Private Press 79.7 57.7 67.1
Print Press 75.9 57.5 71.0
Priests 75.7 27.9 29.7
Doctors 60.1 38.8 67.5
APPENDIX 3: Correlation between bribing and abuse
How often do you have to bribe?
Romania% Bulgaria% Slovakia%
Always, if you want 
things done 13.7 1.3 8.2
Sometimes 53.4 28.3 47.7
Never 28.2 66.2 39.8
No answer 4.7 4.1 4.4
Total 100 100 100
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Do you agree that there is no fair treatment without having to bribe some-
one?
Romania% Bulgaria% Slovakia%
Certainly yes 14.1 10.8 7.7
Depends on luck 53.4 34.2 57.2
Unlikely 22.3 32.6 18.0
Certainly not 10.3 6.9 11.5
No answer 0.0 15.6 5.6
Total 100 100 100
Crosstabulation of Engaged in business with How often do you have to
bribe?
Business Total
%
YES NO
% %
Always 13.5 13.8 13.7
Depends 57.1 52.9 53.4
Never 27.1 28.2 28.2
Explanatory model 
Predictors Regression coefficient
(Standard Error)
How often did you have to bribe? 0.641
(0.220) ***
Wealth 0.431
(0.030)
Age 0.025
(0.034)
Size town 0.022
(0.027)
Education -0.036
(0.044)
Legend: * predictor significant at p≤ 0.1; **p ≤0.05; ***p≤0.001 
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SLOVENIA 
AND REGIONAL INITIATIVES IN SEE
by Toni Kaiser*
Republic of Slovenia is taking an active role in the activities of the
different initiatives in the region which are supported by the international
community and are contributing to the common goals i.e. democratization,
economic prosperity and security of the South Eastern European region.
We share our common belief that the activities of the different
regional initiatives such as Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, South
Eastern Cooperation Initiative (SECI), Central European Initiative (CEI)
and others successfully contributed to the progress made towards demo-
cratic consolidation, improving the security environment, as well as macro-
economic stabilization and structural reform in the South Eastern Europe.
Regional initiatives are supporting and contributing toward faster integra-
tion of the region with the rest of the world and within the region itself and
are creating positive momentum for enhanced trade and its liberalization
as well as is attracting foreign direct investment and trough that sustain-
able development of the private sector.
Achieving further progress in stability long term peace and prosper-
ity in the region requires from the different regional initiatives a renewed
focus on longer-term challenges. Doing that, it is important to take into
consideration, that most of the region is already moving beyond urgent
reconstruction and humanitarian relief towards longer-term economic and
social development issues.
To achieve this goal we see the basic need for more concentrated
activities of different regional initiatives and between their launched proj-
ects, to act in more harmonized manner in order to create sinergy and to
avoid duplication, overlapping and unnecessary loss of already limited
human and other resources.
___________
* Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the Stability Pact for SEE
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We see as one of the major achievements of the different regional
initiatives, the sustainable and continuous political dialogue as well as
enhanced communication links between the countries of the region.
Regional initiatives are also, trough their different fora, enabling
enhanced dialogue between countries of the SEE and other European
countries as well as with other non European countries and different inter-
national organizations, which are taking active part within the frameworks
of the regional initiatives.     
Since our colleagues from the Center for the Promotion of Small and
Medium Enterprises will give separate contribution concerning the
Slovenian projects and activities concerning the development of small and
medium enterprises, within the framework of the Central European
Initiative, we would like to concentrate more on the general assessment
regarding the activities of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and
in particular of Slovenian activities within that framework.
The Assessment of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
After Two Years
Activities of the Republic of Slovenia in the Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe  (SP SEE) contribute to the realization of Slovenias for-
eign policy goals, i.e. (that is) Euro and Euro-Atlantic integration and its
long-term strategic orientations such as democratization, stability, securi-
ty and economic prosperity of South-Eastern Europe and its integration in
the EU. Social and economic development of SEE region can provide
greater stability for the whole Europe and consequently for the whole
world.
In the last two years, the SP SEE has developed various structures,
procedures, activities and instruments which are of a long-term political
nature with the concrete practical arrangements in the SEE region. The SP
SEE has managed to establish a broad spectrum of close cooperation and
contacts between regional governments themselves and with non-govern-
mental organizations dealing with the existing problems. All this is con-
tributing to solving the problems or at least to gaining control over them.
The contribution of the SP SEE to the implementation of projects in the
most vital segments of SEE societies is a mediator among those who need
assistance, those who could provide it to them and those who could finance
it. From Slovenias point of view, the SP SEE is an appropriate and effi-
cient mechanism to achieve necessary changes in the SEE region. Still, it
would be wrong to assume that the SP SEE structures could solve all prob-
lems in the SEE region, even those for which it has not been set up. 
The SP SEE is definitively neither a crisis manager nor peacemaker
nor substitute for governmental structures and other international or gov-
ernmental institutions in the SEE countries. However, in its structures and
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procedures, the SP SEE contains all the elements needed for necessary
political support, normative solutions, transfer of know-how and expe-
riences, examples of good practices, assistance in infrastructure and eco-
nomic development, assuring collective security with necessary mecha-
nisms creating environment for regional development and collective pros-
perity. Another valuable contribution of the SP SEE is, undoubtedly, the
process of establishing the partnership among all participants in the
process. Taking into consideration the latest terrorist attacks in the Unites
States, the SP SEE may provide certain elements for the fight against this
modern threat with its various initiatives and working groups and its abil-
ity to adapt to new needs of the environment it is working in.
Activities of the Republic of Slovenia
Slovenia is active in all the PS SEE structures. Presently, it is chair-
ing the Human Rights and Minorities Task Force (in cooperation with the
Council of Europe) in the Working Table on Democratization and Human
Rights; (in the first half of 2001, Slovenia co-chaired the above-mentioned
working table); it leads and co-finances certain projects; in the economic
and security fields, it supports and is active in nearly all existing common
initiatives of the SP SEE. 
Slovenia is a mediator in both directions: on the one hand, it is famil-
iar with the situation in the SEE countries; on the other hand, it is closely
acquainted with Western and Central Europe and is prepared to share its
own experiences in the process of accession to the EU and in reforms and
institution-building process in the SEE countries.
In the first half of 2001, when Slovenia co-chaired the Working
Table on Democratisation and Human Rights, it organized various inter-
national meetings and conferences and realised additional small events
and projects. 
The meeting of non-governmental organizations is particularly
meaningful for the future activities of the SP SEE. The NGOs gave impor-
tant contribution to the work of the above-mentioned Working Table and
presented to the SP SEE participants the existing obstacles in the process
of close cooperation in numerous segments. Recently, Slovenia has estab-
lished a Centre of Non-governmental Organizations with a view to impro-
ving the organization of the civil society and hopefully giving it a visible
role in promoting its ideas and interests. From the SP SEE point of view,
non-governmental organizations are an important catalyst for tensions
arising among various ethnic, religious and social groups as well as bet-
ween governmental structures and the civil society. We have to be aware
that the NGOs are becoming a more and more important element of social
cohesion.
The parliamentary component is of crucial importance for improv-
ing regional cooperation and personal contacts with other relevant parlia-
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mentary institutions in Europe. Parliaments of the SEE countries have the
political power to support activities and project implementation in all
three Working Tables. The Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia has
adopted basic attitudes on Slovenias participation in the SP SEE activities
from the very beginning and has constantly been following the latest
developments in the SP SEE process through the forwarded information.
In the SEE countries, Slovenia is implementing numerous long-term
projects, assisting institution-building, with a view to being adapted to
European standards, transferring know how and experience and pro-
viding experts for various initiatives of the SP SEE.
Advantages and Weaknesses of the SP SEE
Advantages:
Closer cooperation of the SEE countries (numerous meetings and
conferences; problems are dealt from multilateral aspect whenever it is
possible and projects have to have a regional component);
Practically all European and even some major non-European coun-
tries are involved in solving the problems of SEE;
Many international organizations and associations are included in
this process;
Positive incentive for necessary changes and reforms;
Fund-raising activities are organized;
Closer cooperation with other countries representing broader
region;
In the SEE countries, the process of European integration has been
initiated.
Weaknesses:
Vast and sometimes unclear mechanism;
Numerous structures which have not found an optimal way to co-
operate in common areas (danger of duplication and overlapping);
No financial resources of its own;
Problem of administrative procedures of the international finance
institutions considerably slowing down the process of final dis-
bursement of funds for projects;
Insufficient influence of the SEE countries on the process of shaping
various initiatives and planning projects, particularly in the Working Table
on Democratization and Human Rights and the Working Table on
Security Issues. 
Slower and less visible concrete results than expected were achieved
in the given time.
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Conclusion  the way ahead
It is worth mentioning again that the Government of the Republic of
Slovenia has confirmed its willingness to continue with its engagement and
commitments for further contribution of Slovenia to the SEE region and
for the future of the SP SEE with all its structures. Slovenia strongly
believes in the need of international involvement in solving the problems
of the SEE. It is convinced that it is in the interest of Slovenia and of the
whole international community to keep the existing SP SEE structures
functioning and to develop them further. In the last two years, many of the
projects have shown positive and concrete results. It is clear that some
time is needed to create necessary networks of people of good will and to
detect problems and obstacles to be overcome. Now, it is time to continue
with this work and build on this solid foundation. Slovenia cannot imagine
the future without the SP SEE because there are needs for normalisation,
stabilization and prosperity of the SEE region. For all those mentioned
reasons, Slovenia is convinced that the SP SEE will have a strong political
and financial support of the international community in the years to come.
We have to be honest and admit that there are some strong critics of
the SP SEE in Slovenia. Fortunately, they are not a voice of the majority.
Their opinion is that the work done by the SP SEE is just the duplication
of the work already covered by the other existing international institu-
tions, organizations and forums. We do not agree with such a position. If
this were true, then there would be some tangible results and no need for
further involvement of the international community in this part of Europe.
This view is a simplification of the role of the international organizations
and does not take into consideration the differences between the interna-
tional organizations and initiatives. Those who know the nature and the
endeavours of the SP SEE will agree that it is its mission to bring togeth-
er all existing actors in the SEE region and to avoid unnecessary bureau-
cratic obstacles.
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STABILITY PACT: ECONOMIC LIMITATIONS
AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES
by Blendi Kajsiu*
The Balkans and the Stability Pact: The Economics of the Pact.
Besides, democracy and peace one of the major objectives of the
Stability pact was to promote economic prosperity for the countries of the
region.  It was assumed that economic prosperity and interdependence
would bring about a more stable and peaceful region.  In fact many region-
al initiatives seemed to justify this assumption as they were mainly focused
on joint projects aiming at improving infrastructure and communications
across neighbouring states, projects that were supposed to promote eco-
nomic development. One of the most attractive aspects of the Stability
Pact, were indeed the funds that were raised by the donor countries, as
well as the propaganda that the Pact could and did generate for the respec-
tive governments.
Despite the high expectations that the Stability Pact raised in certain
countries, in its essence it was not much more than a political commitment,
or a reaffirmation of the political commitment of the West towards the
region. Now it has become obvious to all the relevant actors that the
Stability Pact did not succeed in its lofty objectives. The Pact itself prema-
turely assumed that the region had reached a period of stability not long
before the Macedonian crises broke out. At this point various debates
have been going on as to the whys and the wheres of the Pact failures.
There seems to be some general consensus on the fact that more regional
initiatives are needed if such endeavours are to succeed in the future.   
As I will try to show later on, economic cooperation alone is not
enough for regional integration and stability. It is of primary importance
that the countries express and live up to their political will to create a sta-
___________
* Albanian Institute for International Studies.
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ble and prosperous region.  For this to happen a clear vision of the Balkans
is necessary. A vision that has to accommodate the interests and concerns
of all the parties involved. While we know that part of this vision are
democracy, peace, economic development and prosperity, strong institu-
tions and human rights, more work is needed not simply to define this
vision, but also to make it a reality. Furthermore, a vision of a peaceful
Balkans should neither be conditioned nor limited by ideas of economic
progress and integration.  In this context it is important to understand that
stability is a necessary, although not sufficient precondition for economic
stability and not vice versa.  Eventually economic development and coop-
eration and stability will be processes that reinforce each other, but for this
to happen stability remains a precondition.
The Limitation of Economics in the Balkan Context. 
There is no doubt that economic cooperation, development and
interdependence increase the chances for a stable, prosperous and peace-
ful environment. It is not clear though to what degree this could happen in
the Balkans. This is not due to any special characteristics of the Balkans
that nullifies economic benefits, but due to  the fact that  there is little eco-
nomic interaction among the Balkan countries, at present, and the chances
for much greater interaction in the future remain very slim. If we take a
look at the economic activity of some Balkan countries we shall see that
their major trading partners are not from the region. Thus, Albanias
major trading partner is Italy. Bulgarias major trading partners are Italy
and Russia. Croatias major trading partner s are Italy and Germany,
FYROMs major trading partners are Yugoslavia, Germany and Ukraine.
Whereas in the case of Romania the major trading partners are Italy and
Germany.1
As the Balkan countries move closer to EU, on an individual basis,
their incentives to trade with the neighbouring states that might be slight-
ly behind decrease substantially. Moving closer towards the EU means
opening up ones markets to that of the other EU members, this is benefi-
cial for the joining country, at least in the long term, since the EU pur-
chasing power is substantially greater than that of the entire Balkan
region. Tariff levels, trading terms and EU financial markets will facilitate
the entrance of the joining country in the EU markets while making it
increasingly difficult for the former to trade with those countries outside
of the EU, especially Balkan ones.
Moreover, at present most Balkan economies remain poor imita-
tions of market economies that they are striving to become.  It is still very
uncertain how successful they will be in becoming functioning market 
___________
1 CIA factbook. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
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economies.  Most economists agree that liberalization, privatization and
the reduction of the role of the state in general are key components of this
process. This kind of thinking implicitly assumes that markets exist
although they are in dis-equilibrium. In the context of most Balkan
economies such an assumption is not warranted. Economists and policy
makers have become increasingly aware that the markets are distorted at
best or in-existent at worst. The free flow of information, i.e., the invisible
hand of Adam Smith is not working since information is neither free nor
flowing, but rather leaking within certain circles.  
Under these circumstances the debate whether there should be
more or less state intervention becomes particularly acute.  In the same
fashion it needs to be debated further whether liberalization or protec-
tionism is the best policy for the infant Balkan economies.  Even within the
existing bias towards liberalization it is becoming increasingly clear that
liberalization needs to be more cautious and better focused in those areas
where the economy might enjoy a certain comparative advantage.   Un-
fortunately all of the above debates should result into policy making,
which does not seem to be the primary occupation of politicians in the
Balkans nowadays. Decision making processes and policy directives are
presented as conditionalities to Balkan governments from above, IMF,
World Bank, EU and alike. While international community should not be
blamed for this, since Balkan governments all too often have proved inef-
ficient and corrupt, it is important to question the effectiveness  of these
policies given the lack of domestic policy-making and the current status of
most Balkan economies.  
This is not to say that economic interaction will not and should not
increase in the region as these economies grow and try to integrate in the
Euro-Atlantic Structures. In fact the increased cross border cooperation is
a reality in the Balkans. So far it seems to be one of the most successful
forms of economic cooperation in the region. Nevertheless while cross
border cooperation increases the economic dependency among different
regions within different states, almost erasing state borders it still remains
uncertain whether cross border cooperation alone could be the driving
force behind integrative processes for the Balkans as a whole since it has
its limitations as far as national policy making is concerned.  Although the
idea of building bridges in the border areas, especially those populated by
minorities has become fashionable, we should not forget that these bridges
can quite easily become barriers for the sake of national objectives at
the expense of local interests.  In any case cross border cooperation should
not simply be seen as a precondition for regional integration but also as its
outcome.
It would be erroneous to assume that economic successes will nec-
essarily bring the region closer together and make it more stable, peaceful
and prosperous.  Nurturing such view only indicates a lack of understand-
ing on the challenges that the Balkans face to integrate as a region, not
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into the EU structures, but first into a viable and prosperous community.
These challenges go far beyond the realm of economics.  They extend from
purely economic factors to history, mentality and above all perceptions.
The obstacles to Balkan integration result not only from the perceptions
that Balkan peoples nurture towards each other, but also by the way in
which the region is perceived in the West.  The Balkan paradigm of his-
toric legacies, ethnic hatreds and bloodsheds, weak states and poor democ-
racies has first of all created biases towards economic solutions.  Secondly
it has pressed most Balkan countries to move away from a Balkan identi-
ty and redefine themselves in reference to the West.  This in turn has made
it increasingly difficult for cooperation, other than economic to develop.  
Cultural Integration and Exchange
Initiatives, such as the Stability Pact reflect the biases of those who
have devised them. The idea that free trade, economic cooperation and
interdependence improve chances for regional integration was first ap-
plied in the early stages of the EU when the European Steel and Coal
Community came to existence. A similar approach is being applied to the
Balkans, the implicit assumption being that economic development and
interdependence will bring the countries closer together and reduce
chances of future conflict. Such an idea seems to have worked in the case
of EU. It is inconceivable nowadays that France and Germany could go to
war with each other given their degree of economic integration.
It is important to note  that for quite some time Europe, or at least
Western Europe, has been more than an economic community. It has been
a historical, cultural, intellectual and artistic entity as well. Only later on
did it start becoming a successful economic community. EUs economic
achievements cannot be understood and appreciated independently of its
cultural and historic aspects. Not only was Europe an abstract community
of the mind, and why not also of the heart, it also increasingly became a
community where people and countries, with few exceptions wanted to
belong to. Despite the multitude of meanings that the word Europe has
come to bear in the course of history, at present time it certainly has a very
positive connotation. When we say Europeanization, we mean moder-
nization, enlightenment, progress, culture, humanism, democracy and fre-
edom.
The contrast becomes stark when we place the word Balkanization
next to Europeanization. There could not be a better way to come up with
an oxymoron. The Balkans also exist as an abstract entity of the mind, and
very rarely of the heart. Whether we like it or not it encompasses our
shared historical, cultural and intellectual endeavours. Nonetheless, the
word is not a house where our intellectual thought rests, but the prison of
our identity. A prison of the mind, as well as of the body that most want to
break free from. Thus, in the words of the Greek Foreign Minister, Greece
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is a country that escaped its past, which was the Balkans, and this in turn
is a measure of success.2
While most people could be proud of being a Serbian, Albanian,
Bulgarian, Romanian and so on, very few, if any, could proudly uphold, or
want to uphold their Balkan identity. Therefore, regional integration in
the case of the Balkans, even under the best economic scenario, would
remain a handicap for as long as most countries shun away from identify-
ing themselves in regional terms. This necessitates a re-conceptualization
of the region that focuses more on the Balkan individual rather than
Balkan legacies, historic hatreds and ethnic bloodsheds.  The focus on the
Balkan individual, however that will come to be defined, will not only
point out the diversity and cultural variety of the region, but also a num-
ber of values that bind Balkan peoples together and endow the region with
character of its own.  This will have to be a multi-dimensional process, but
also one through which we will rediscover ourselves.  
Since a large part of the Balkan image has been the creation of the
West any debate on the Balkans will have to involve also the western
scholars and intellectuals. In fact so far we have accepted the Balkans not
only as it is, but also as it has been served to us. A dark place, backward,
full of economic failures, historical hatreds, ethnic cleansing, disfunctional
states, suffocating democratic and economic initiatives. These are all very
obvious, and unfortunately quite common phenomena in the Balkans.
Nevertheless, it is important to ask: Are these Balkan phenomena?  Ethnic
cleansing was neither invented nor ended in the Balkans.  The same can be
said about genocide,  totalitarianism, dictatorships and other undemocra-
tic phenomena. Some of them were born and perfected in Western
Europe, and not very long ago.  
This is not to say that we should shun away from responsibilities.  In
fact in order to make the process of the rediscovery of the Balkans inclu-
sive full responsibilities should be accepted, difficult as they may be.
Accepting responsibilities is a far more challenging task than it might
seem. It should not simply be a political process or decision. It requires
breaking down certain myths, and ensuring more understanding among
the Balkan peoples. Only then individual and collective responsibilities
will be faced.
For this to happen it is time that we increase not simply our eco-
nomic, but also cultural interaction. In this way we could create a region
we want to inhabit and not escape. In this respect regional initiatives are
vital, as well as the funding from the Stability pact. Cultural exchange
means free movement of ideas, works of arts, intellectuals, students and
people in general. A process during which we do not simply get to know 
___________
2 Albanian Institute for International studies. Stability Pact, just around the 
corner: A Total Balkan Approach.  Tirana 2000, p 20.
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each other, but also better evaluate our own culture and history while con-
tributing to the making of a regional one. 
Some concrete initiative regarding cultural, academic and intellectu-
al exchanges could be as follows:
Artistic and Cultural events. Such events could include initiatives
about familiarizing ourselves and the general public with the best literary
works of our countries.  As of now I have not yet found a translated copy
of the Brigde over Drina by Ivo Andric. Perhaps the book has been
translated and I was not able to find it, nevertheless it is not yet known in
the wider public circles, and this cannot be surely attributed to its quality.
The same could be said about Ismail Kadares works that while known
within certain intellectual circles have not yet reached a larger audience in
the Balkans. These are books that should not only be made available to
the wider public, but even become part of school curriculum.  Our students
study Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Hygo, Goethe and other major European
writers, but are not at all familiar with regional writers. In order to look at
ourselves through our own and not simply through European lenses per-
haps we should familiarize ourselves not only with our national cultural
heritage, but also that of the region where we belong. In order for this to
happen it might be necessary not only the meeting of foreign ministers, but
also of the ministers of the education and intellectuals.
Other cultural and artistic events could be movie and theater festi-
vals.  Such initiative has been already undertaken by the Skampa Theater
in Elbasan, Albania.  However in order for these initiatives to be success-
ful financial and institutional backing is necessary.
Academic Exchanges and Cooperation are very important in the
framework of Stability Pact, since a lot of instability  in the region has been
incited by academic circles. Academic forums with participants from the
countries of the region as well as from Europe could be useful in dis-
cussing, debating and revising the history of the region.  These debates and
discussions should not simply be limited to national histories, but also
include the place of the Balkans vis a vis Europe, which is why it is impor-
tant for European scholars to participate.
Balkan Studies Departments. In the context of academic debates
and exchanges it is important to develop Balkan Studies Departments
near the major national universities. These departments could be financed
not only by government funds, which in most cases are limited, but also
through Stability Pact funds. Once established and they could create aca-
demic networks and exchanges that would facilitate the exchange of infor-
mation and create the necessary environment for regional academic coop-
eration to take place.
South East European Studies Institute. Perhaps it might be neces-
sary to create a Balkan Studies institute that brings together the most
prominent scholars of the region, as well as Balkan scholars from else-
where. Such an institute would not simply duplicate the work of other
organizations, but rather coordinate and complement it. An institute
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where all countries have been represented with their scholars could also be
used in order to revise the regional history not from nationalistic perspec-
tive, but rather from a more scientific and fact driven one.  This could be
a very lengthy and difficult process, but I believe worth trying.
Summer Schools. While all the above initiatives might prove useful,
there is also a real danger that they end up being elite activities, where
more or less the same people participate at different times. Thus, closed
circles of academics might be created and little progress be made. For this
reason it is important to include not only the old elite, but also the emerg-
ing ones. Summer schools could be organized with students from different
regional countries participating. Such schools would not simply be of an
academic character, they could also serve as venues through which youth
from the region can get to know and socialize with each  other. Informal
friendships could do a lot more about breaking down myths than any con-
ference or academic debate. Here again the international community, or
the Stability Pact could provide part or all of the funding.
Exchange Students. This is another way in which bridges could be
built across different countries of the region.  Exchange programs among
different universities of the region would give a chance to students to bet-
ter know and understand the culture of the neighbouring states, or other
Balkan states.
Sport Events. While in the past there were quite a few Balkan sport
activities such initiatives seemed to have died out at present.  Reviving
these activities would not only draw large numbers of people, but also be
aid to the creation of a regional identity.
Conclusion
All of the above initiatives have in common the search for greater
cultural exchange and understanding. Even when political initiatives and
commitments have been achieved, peace has not been won in this region.
Unfortunately, quite often academic and intellectual circles have been the
ones devising some of the most nationalistically inspired and chauvinistic
policies that later on have been used by opportunistic politicians.
Therefore, we need a new vision for the region as a whole, and greater cul-
tural and intellectual cooperation in order to create,sustain and live up to
such a vision.  This is not to say that the Balkans need to be idealized, but
that they need to be critically interpreted. No single Balkan country can
live up to such a task alone.  If sustainable and prosperous peace is to pre-
vail more than good political will is needed. First we have to win over the
prejudices we have about each other and the region, change our mentali-
ties, and only afterwards will political and economic cooperation  be suc-
cessful.
225
Of course these processes should take place simultaneously, but in
any case it must be understood that they will be long term and gradual as
well as comprehensive. In this aspect more emphasis should be placed in
the framework of the stability pact on cultural exchanges along with eco-
nomic cooperation and development. Geography, destiny or fate has
obliged us to inhabit the Balkans, whether we like it or not. Therefore,
before trying to escape it, we might also decide to face it.
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International Conference
THE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL 
INITIATIVES IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
- Towards an Efficient Framework -
Belgrade, SAVA Center, 14/15th December 2001
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Sonja Liht, President of Open Society Fund
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Success Stories
Moderator: Mr. @ivorad Kova~evi}, President of the European Move-
ment in Serbia
Jelica Mini}, CEI and SECI national Coordinator, Assistant 
FMFA
SECI/CEI cooperation: lessons learned
Antun Rupnik, CEI Secretariat, Deputy Director General 
Central European Initiative: Programs and case studies
Yiannis Papanicolaou, ICBSS, Athens
The role of Regional Cooperation in Promoting Peace, Sta-
bility and Prosperity: the case of BSEC
Wilfred Nartus, Ambassador, Embassy of Belgium, Belgrade
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EU stabilization and association process - experience of EU 
Presidency
Krassen Stanchev, director, IME, Sofia
Trade, Initiatives and Institutions
Charalambos Tsardanidis, director, IIER, Athens
New regionalism, BSEC and SEECP
16.30-17.00 Coffee break
17.00-18.00 Discussion
20.00 Dinner
Saturday, December 15, 2001
9.00  10.00 2nd Session: Reforming Regional Framework in the SEE?
Moderator: Jelica Mini}, Vice-president, EMINS
Predrag Simi}, Adviser to the President of FRY
Can SEECP become a driving force of regional coopera-
tion?
Yani Miltchakov, Ambassador of Bulgaria, Belgrade
New European Regionalism and old Balkan problems
Du{ko Lopandi}, European Movement in Serbia
Issues and prospective for SEE regional cooperation
Wim van Meurs, Bertelsmann Foundation
The Stability Pact beyond EU enlargement
Othon Anastasakis, LSE, ELIAMEP
EU and regional initiatives in SEE- evolution or reform?
Minna Jarvenpaa, European Stability Initiative
Reform of the Stability Pact
10.00-10.30 Discussion
10.30-11.00 Coffee break
11.00-12.00 3rd session: National and International Incentives and Ob-
stacles to the Regional Cooperation
Moderator: Krassen Stanchev, director, IME, Sofia
Zoran Jachev, FORUM-CSRD, Skopje
Crisis in Macedonia and a possible influence on euro inte-
gration of countries in the region
Damir Grubisa, IRMO, Zagreb
Croatia and multilateral cooperation in SEE
Dragoljub Stojanov, Faculty of Economy, Sarajevo
B&H economy on crossroad: between East and West
Gordana Ili}, G17 Institute, Belgrade
EU policy in SEE and FRY
Blendi Kaisiu,  Institute of International Studies, Tirana
Albania and regional initiatives
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15.00-16.00 4th Session: Sectoral Issues for Regional Cooperation
Moderator: Danijel Panti}, Secretary General of EMINS
Jani Bogoevski, Chairman of WG on trade liberalization, 
Stability Pact
Achieving the free trade in SEE
Zdenka Kova~, director, Center for SME development, 
Ljubljana
Developing entrepreneurship and cooperation on the level 
of CEI-SBDC
Jela Ba}ovi}, Co-chair, WG on Social cohesion, SP
Improving social cohesion in SEE
Sne`ana Ra{eta, Chamber of Economy, FRY
Achievements of ABC 
Miodrag Vujo{evi}, IAUPS
Integration of six Balkan countries through the Co-projects 
ESTIA and OSPE
16.00-16.30 Coffee break
16.30-17.00 Discussion and General Conclusions
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ANNEX  III
Table I: SEE Countries - Participation in Regional Initiatives
+ member
- no participation
o observer
CEI - Central European Initiative
CEFTA - Central European Free Trade Area
BSEC - Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation
SEECP - Cooperation process in South Eastern Europe
SAP - Stabilization and Association Process
SECI - South East Europe Cooperative Initiative
SP - Stability Pact in South Eastern Europe
AII - Adriatic-Ionian Initiative
DCP - Danube Cooperation Process
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Coun-
try
CEI CEFTA BSEC SEECP SECI SP DCP AII Total par-ticipation 
in RIs
EU 
Status
Bul-
garia
+ + + + + + + - 7 Acc. 
Pr.
Ro-
mania
+ + + + + + + - 7 Acc. 
Pr.
B&H + - - + + + + + 6 SAP
FRY + - - + + + + + 6 SAP
Mace-
donia
+ - - + + + - - 4 SAP
Cro-
atia
+ - - 0 + + + + 5+0 SAP
Alba-
nia
+ - + + + + - + 6 SAP
Gre-
ece
- - + + + + - + 5 Mem-
ber
Tur-
key
- - + + + + - - 4 Can-
did.
Table 2: Fields of Activity of Regional Initiatives in SEE
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SP
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
18
SECI
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
10
BSEC
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
16
CEI
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
13
SEECP
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
9
CEFTA
*
*
2
AII
*
*
*
*
4
Field
Human rights/Minorities
Good governance/local 
government
Media
Parliamentary cooperation
Migration/Asylum/
Refugees
Trade
Infrastructures
Business/MSE/Private 
sector
FDI
Telecommunications
Environment
Education/Culture
Human resources/Youth
Science/Technology
Energy
Agriculture
Banking sector/Finances
Transport
Tourism
Social development
Military reform/coopera-
tion
Justice and Home affairs
Fight against organized
crime
Anticorruption
Civil protection
TOTAL
ANNEX  IV
SOME RECENT DOCUMENTS CONCERNING
REGIONAL INITIATIVES 
IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
I   EU-STABILIZATION AND ASSOCIATION   
PROCESS IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
1. General Affairs Council of the European Union
Conclusions (13 May 2002)
Western Balkans: 2002 Annual Council Review of the Stabilization &
Association process for South Eastern Europe
The Council conducted its annual review of the Stabilization and Association
Process for South Eastern Europe (SAP), covering Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, in line with its 9 April 2001 conclusions. It welcomed the European Com-
missions first annual report on the SAP, and fully endorsed its recommendations.
Recalling its Conclusions of 29 April 1997 on the regional approach and of 21
June 1999 on the SAP, as well as the final declaration of the Zagreb summit of 24
November 2000, the Council confirmed that the SAP, including its strategic objectives,
its economic and political conditions and its instruments remains at the heart of EUs
policy towards the region. It confirmed the SAP countries status as potential candi-
dates for membership.
The Council, including through the SG/HR and the Special Representatives,
will continue to support this process, fostering a stable and secure environment. In this
context, the EU took the decision to launch a Police Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and has expressed the EUs availability to take responsibility, following
election in FYROM and at the request of its government, for an operation to follow
that currently undertaken by NATO in FYROM, on the understanding that the per-
manent arrangements on EU and NATO cooperation (Berlin plus) would be in
place by then.
The Council underlined that the SAP is a long-term policy approach in support
of sustainable and EU compatible reform, as it helps the countries of the region pre-
pare for integration with the EU. The speed with which each country moves through
the different stages of the SAP, taking ownership of the process, depends on its
increasing ability to take on the obligations flowing from an ever closer association
with the EU as well as compliance with the conditionality policy defined by the
Council on 29 April 1997.
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The Council called on the SAP countries to devote adequate attention and
resources to the implementation of all EU recommendations, made in its Annual
Reviews. It invited the Commission to assess progress on its recommendations at its
next annual review in March 2003. The existing joint bodies within the SAP will con-
tribute to the ongoing stocktaking.
General Assessment
While noting with satisfaction that the SAP has become a driving force for
political, democratic and economic reforms within the individual countries, the
Council restated that the strengthening of the regional dimension and reinforced
regional cooperation were necessary and went hand in hand with the rapprochement
to the European Union. As potential candidates, the countries of the region should
build on recent progress in their relations and demonstrate their willingness and abil-
ity to interact with their neighbours.
The Council, in this regard, welcomed the increased emphasis on complemen-
tarity of the SAP and Stability Pact activities. The Council reaffirmed that the main
added value of the Stability Pact lies in its ability to promote regional cooperation,
inter alia in the fields of refugee return, media, trade, investment and infrastructure,
and combating organized crime. The Council also welcomed the important contribu-
tions by other relevant regional initiatives, such as the Central European Initiative, the
South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process and the Adriatic Initiative, to enhance
regional cooperation.
The Council further noted that there was an urgent need for all SAP countries
to focus more on justice and home affairs issues, notably strengthening the rule of law
and the judicial system, the fight against corruption, illegal migration and organized
crime. It emphasised that these problems, if left unresolved, would undermine the cre-
ation of a sustainable economy and might become a destabilizing factor in the coun-
tries concerned as well as in the region as a whole.
The Council also stressed the importance for the SAP countries to align their
visa and entry policies with current EU standards, and invited them to pursue and
intensify the cooperation initiated with the 28 March 2001 Sarajevo Joint Declaration
regarding regional cooperation in the area of asylum and immigration. The Council
called on all Governments and authorities in the region to increase their efforts,
including conducting the necessary reforms, adopting the appropriate laws and
strengthening their implementation capacity.
Noting the importance of better understanding of the SAP by the people of the
region, its conditions and obligations as well as its perspectives, the Council agreed
that a greater EU public information effort is needed in coordination with the author-
ities of the countries concerned. It called upon the SAP countries to redouble their
efforts in this regard. It underlined the special contribution of civil society in bringing
out this message. The Council expressed the belief that the implementation of the nec-
essary reforms would be greatly assisted by a clearer perception and understanding
throughout all levels of society in the SAP countries of the aims behind the steps and
efforts requested in moving towards the EU. It also recalled its Guidelines for
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strengthening operational coordination between the Community, represented by the
Commission, and the Member States in the field of External assistance, approved on
21 January 2001.
The Council recalled its Conclusions of 9 April and 11 June 2001 regarding the
instruments of the SAP and agreed that there should be an evaluation of the effec-
tiveness and coherence of the SAP instruments -EC assistance, preparation and
implementation of Stabilization and Association Agreements and autonomous trade
measures -in reaching the objectives of the process. Such analysis should include the
overall impact of EC assistance and how best to use it to advance the EU´s overall pol-
icy, in coordination with other donors. It underlined the substantial contribution that
EC assistance under the CARDS regulation was already making to the development
of the region and the need to adequately use its inherent conditionality. It further
underlined the importance of annual reporting requirements under the CARDS and
European Agency for Reconstruction regulations. The Council also noted the gener-
ous level of trade preferences granted to the region and invited its competent bodies
to examine ways to ensure that the SAP countries benefit fully from those preferences.
The Council invited the Commission to examine these issues in the next Annual
Report on the SAP.
The Council agreed to propose that a new high level political forum  the
Zagreb Process  be established between the EU and the SAP countries. In this con-
text it agreed to hold regular meetings at Ministerial level to discuss key issues of
common concern. The aim is to give a clear signal of the privileged relationship
between SAP participants and the EU, to enhance the political visibility of the SAP,
to provide a supporting political framework for achieving the objectives of the SAP,
including regional cooperation, and to inform and associate the SAP countries on
major developments in the EU.
The Council also agreed to propose to hold meetings of EU Ministers of Justice
and Home Affairs with the countries of the SAP.
The Council welcomed the readiness expressed by the Greek government to
organize, during its Presidency of the EU, a high level meeting between EU Member
States and SAP countries, as a follow-up to the Zagreb Summit. The Council is con-
vinced that this meeting will give further impetus to the cooperation of the EU with
its partners in the region.
Individual Assessment of the SAP Countries
The Council welcomed the country assessments annexed to the Commissions
report endorsing the recommendations for the next 12 months for each SAP country
and calling for swift progress on each of them. The implementation of legal reforms,
the development of functioning and democratically accountable administrations and
moving towards market economies, respect for democratic principles and human
rights, and full implementation of international obligations, including cooperation
with ICTY, as outlined in the individual country assessments, are vital for the States
ability to continue on the path towards European integration.
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Albania 
The Council welcomed the new Governments commitment to quickly re-focus
on the needed reforms and accelerate their implementation, and confirmed its previ-
ous conclusions of 10 December 2001 and 28 January 2002 on the opening as soon as
possible of negotiations of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). It
called upon the Albanian authorities and parties to strengthen further the countrys
administrative and judicial capacities as well as fully functioning democratic institu-
tions. It expressed the importance of a stable and democratic political environment
and the hope that the next presidential election would be conducted in such a manner
that would preserve political stability. Further progress on the ODHIR recommenda-
tions on election management, implementation of the rule of law including the devel-
opment of a national strategy on judicial reform, the fight against corruption, organ-
ized crime and trafficking, including in human beings, and the restructuring of the
energy sector as established by the joint recommendations of the CTF, must be very
promptly achieved.
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The Council welcomed the accession of B&H to the Council of Europe as the
44th member and called for the rapid implementation of post accession criteria.
Recalling its readiness to invite the Commission to undertake a Feasibility Study as
soon as the conditions laid out in the EU Road Map are fulfilled, the Council called
upon the B&H authorities, at state and entity level, to take full responsibility for mov-
ing B&H decisively forward within the SAP in line with its neighbours as wished by
the EU. Were B&H to muster the political will and ownership recently demonstrated
in amending the entity constitutions, the Road Map could be quickly completed and
B&H could make progress in becoming a fully functioning self-sustaining State able to
integrate into European structures. To this end, priority should be given to the
strengthening of the rule of law in line also with the plan currently being prepared by
the High Representative Petritsch, to economic reforms including the single B&H
market and empowering state institutions. The adequate attribution of resources by
the B&H authorities towards the sustainability of refugee and IDP return is necessary.
Full compliance with the international obligation to cooperate with ICTY, notably by
the RS, remains a crucial underpinning of all other efforts.
Croatia 
The Council commended the Government for the progress in its efforts to meet
EUs political and economic conditions. It underlined the need for a successful imple-
mentation of the recently signed SAA, to move closer to Europe. The Council stressed
the need for Croatia to address the continuing shortcomings of the judicial system and
the resulting law enforcement problems in order not to threaten the results of the eco-
nomic, political and social reform. It also stressed the importance of creating a busi-
ness environment conducive to growth. Full cooperation with ICTY as well as issues
related to the implementation of the Dayton/Paris Accords, to Croatian Serb refugee
return and minority rights, including the passing of the constitutional law for the pro-
tection of minorities, are matters that must be properly addressed. The Council in par-
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ticular welcomed the recent steps undertaken by Croatia to normalize its relations
with the FRY and it encouraged Croatia to continue to enhance its cooperation with
all its neighbours since regional cooperation is one of the essential elements of the
SAP.
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
The Council underlined the priority for the country to quickly implement the
14 March Agreement on Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations
between Serbia and Montenegro, in particular the efficient functioning of a single eco-
nomic space within the state. The Council expressed the hope that, following further
meetings of the Consultative Task Force, conditions will soon permit the carrying out
of a feasibility study and that progress will facilitate a prompt decision on the opening
of negotiations for an SAA.
The fulfilment of the FRYs international legal obligations, notably full coop-
eration with ICTY and respect of the Dayton/Paris Accords, as well as the affirmation
of civilian control over the military are vital elements for the states ability to contin-
ue on the path towards European integration. Restructuring of the energy, transport
and telecommunications sectors should be given urgent attention.
The Council called on Belgrade and UNMIK, together with the Provisional
Institutions for Self-Government of Kosovo, to work resolutely, on the basis of the
Constitutional Framework and the Common Document, within their respective com-
petencies, toward the objectives of the SAP within the framework of UN Security
Council Resolution 1244.
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
The Council noted that it was essential, after the serious crises the country
faced in 2001, to rebuild the necessary consensus and stability needed for the reform
efforts to move ahead. While noting the progress made in implementing the Ohrid
Framework Agreement since last October, the Council reiterated its call on all parties
to rapidly implement it fully, including the return of the police, the strengthening of
local government, the holding of free and fair general elections and a census, to refrain
from violence and to implement fully the amnesty law. The complete implementation
of the agreement should be seen as a prerequisite for further European integration.
The Council called on the authorities to continue to address the problem of corrup-
tion, especially in view of the ongoing privatization process. It also stressed the impor-
tance of respect for human rights and freedom of the media. The Council called on the
authorities to urgently ensure an efficient coordination of foreign aid. It felt that every
effort should be made over the next months to refocus the attention on the
EC/FYROM Interim Agreement in order for FYROM to continue on its path towards
Europe.
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II    STABILITY PACT IN SOUTH EASTERN
EUROPE
1.  Regional Conference for South East Europe
Bucharest, 25-26 October 2001
Representatives of 37 countries and 32 international institutions met yesterday
and today in Bucharest for the Regional Conference for South East Europe, hosted by
the Romanian Government. The Conference was organized by the European Com-
mission and the World Bank, represented by Commissioner Chris Patten and Vice-
-President Johannes Linn, in close association with the Stability Pact, represented by
Special Coordinator Bodo Hombach. 
The Conference marked a new stage in the development of the region, which
is moving away from a focus on emergency and reconstruction to medium-term sus-
tainable development strategies. 
The international community made a strong statement of continuing support
for South Eastern Europe. This support has not diminished after the tragic events of
September 11, which in fact reinforced the need for regional cooperation. The coun-
tries of the region issued a declaration of their commitment to enhance and expand co-
operative measures to combat all forms of international terrorism. The countries of
the region made clear their determination to consolidate and expand regional cooper-
ation, and to complete and fully implement on-going economic and institutional
reforms. 
Holding the regional conference in Romania, one of the countries in the region,
was welcomed by participants as a strong signal of regional ownership and increased
commitment. 
The Conference welcomed the progress made towards regional cooperation, in
the framework of the Stability Pact, both on the economic and political front.
Regional initiatives for trade liberalization, refugees and enhancing the climate for
private sector activities, are among the concrete results achieved in this direction.
Total donor funding for South Eastern Europe (including both regional and national
flows) remain substantial, at over Euro 6 billion per annum since 1999. 
The Conference highlighted the progress made towards democratic consolida-
tion, improving the security environment, as well as macroeconomic stabilization and
245
structural reform since the Kosovo crisis, and the ensuing resumption of growth.
Timely and substantial financial flows from the international community contributed
to this outcome, as did greater efforts by the countries of the region. Structural
reforms have made solid progress in most of the countries. Integration with the rest of
the world and within the region itself has also made significant strides, and there is a
continued momentum for trade liberalization. 
The Conference recognized the central role played by the EU pre-accession
strategies and the Stabilization and Association process in setting the direction of eco-
nomic and social policies. The perspective of EU integration that is offered to coun-
tries of South Eastern Europe provides a strong anchor for democratic values and
political expectations in the region. The Stability Pact reinforces this process. 
Achieving further progress toward peace and prosperity requires a renewed
focus on longer-term challenges. Most of the region is already moving beyond urgent
reconstruction and humanitarian relief towards longer-term economic and social
development issues. To this end, the Conference emphasized the need to consolidate
macroeconomic stabilization and move ahead with remaining structural reforms, in
particular in the areas of public finance, fight against corruption, private sector devel-
opment, and trade liberalization. Participants have signalled strong support with
regard to the implementation of the Investment compact, the Stability Pact agenda for
creating a favourable environment for investments. Similarly, participants strongly
supported their intention to implement the commitments they have taken in order to
build a regional free trade zone by the end of 2002. 
Indeed, all participants underlined the increasing role to be played by the pri-
vate sector. Progress in creating an environment that stimulates private sector devel-
opment is significant but uneven, and improvements in the regulatory framework are
not yet fully implemented. Foreign investment inflows to the region have been disap-
pointing. Private investors participating in the Conference stressed in particular the
importance of fighting corruption and removing remaining obstacles to trade and
competition as necessary to improve the business environment. 
The new focus on longer-term challenges was also reflected in the development
of strategies in support of key infrastructure sectors. The Conference discussed long
term strategies for transport, air traffic, energy, and water, and reached agreement on
the need to channel funding to projects consistent with these strategies, which would
continue to be discussed in Working Table II (Reconstruction, Economic cooperation
and Development). It was noted that the process for vetting all new regional infra-
structure projects is now being carried out by the newly formed Infrastructure
Steering Group, under the chairmanship of the European Commission. A new set of
regional infrastructure projects, with secured financing of Euro 2.4 billion has been de-
signated and further projects will be designated, as funding becomes available. In-nov-
ative moves to facilitate private-public partnership in these areas are also necessary. 
The Conference confirmed the need for a more strategic, longer-term approach
to be extended beyond infrastructure. Streamlining of the initiatives under Working
Table I (Democratization and Human Rights) and Working Table III (Security and
Justice) of the Stability Pact was uniformly supported and will be reflected in imple-
mentation. 
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Participants underlined the important contribution of the Stability Pact to help-
ing countries move closer to European standards and enhancing their participation in
the EUs Stabilization and Association process. Cooperation on settlement of politi-
cally divisive issues is essential to improving prospects for integration into Europe.
Working Table 1 of the Stability Pact, will intensify its efforts in this regard, with par-
ticular emphasis on interethnic dialog and cross-border cooperation, refugee ques-
tions, media, education and youth. Strategies in these fields are now formulated and
will move to implementation. The focus will be on achieving tangible results, partici-
pation of all segments of society, especially civil society, and on a sustained process of
confidence building in the region. These priorities were strongly endorsed by repre-
sentatives from the region. 
The comprehensive approach taken by Working Table III in the security and
defence and home affairs issues, was further elaborated. The key priority areas of the
working table were discussed, with detailed discussions of the Tables initiatives and
projects to be considered at the Working Table III meeting scheduled for Budapest
27-28 November 2001. Emphasis was placed on the importance of coordination and
cooperation with other international actors and regional initiatives, including the
SECI crime centre and the Regional Arms Control Verification, Implementation and
Assistance Centre (RACVIAC). 
Considerable progress has been made in the Justice and Home affairs sector
during the last two years. Regional cooperation has become a reality. The main threats
of organized crime and illegal immigration/trafficking of human beings are now begin-
ning to be addressed in a comprehensive way at regional level. National institutional
development is supported by regional training projects and regional professional net-
working. Previous and current efforts need to be extended and co-ordinated. Judiciary
has to become more efficient. In the areas of visa, asylum, migration and border con-
trol, the Stability Pact Migration and Asylum Initiative and the EUs CARDS pro-
gramme, both aim to enable countries to come closer to implementing European stan-
dards. 
All participants recognized the contribution made by the Stability Pact toward
fostering regional cooperation, and underlined their support for the important role
that the Stability Pact will continue to play in the future. In convergent messages, del-
egations to the Conference paid tribute to the tireless involvement of the Special
Coordinator of the Stability Pact, Mr Bodo Hombach, in fostering progress and
reform in South East Europe. 
2. Report of Mr. Bodo Hombach,  Special Coordinator of the
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, to the Permanent Council
of the OSCE , in Vienna on 11 October 2001
The OSCEs sponsorship of the Stability Pact will become particularly relevant
again in the coming weeks and months. As you have heard, my functions as Special
Coordinator will end at the beginning of next year. The terms of the Stability Pact pro-
vide that my successor is to be appointed by the European Union (EU) in consulta-
tion with the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, and endorsed by the OSCE Chairper-son-
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in-Office. In my view, this process cannot be postponed. The work ahead of us is too
important.
But I am not here today to make a farewell address before the OSCE; far from it.
All my energies at the moment are directed towards ensuring that the Regional
Conference to be held in Bucharest on 25-26 October is a complete success. I shall
therefore concentrate my remarks mainly on the preparations for this Conference.
Naturally, I should also like to share with the OSCE participating States the experi-
ence that I have gained in the two and a half years since the Stability Pact came into
existence. I shall do this on the occasion of the Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial
Council to take place in Bucharest on 3-4 December.
I shall therefore attempt now only a brief review of five important develop-
ments relating to the Stability Pact that have taken place since the last OSCE
Ministerial Council Meeting held in Vienna on 27-28 November 2000:
- On 30 March 2001, we took stock of the Quick Start Package adopted at the 
Brussels Conference one year earlier, with 2.4 billion euros pledged for it. 
Out of 244 projects, 201, or 82 per cent, had begun. As a sworn opponent of 
bureaucracy and delays, I was not completely satisfied. But when one is 
aware of the usual procedures and processing times of international bureau-
cracies, this is in fact a respectable result.
- On 27 June 2001, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Ro-
mania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Yugoslavia signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Liberalization and Facilitation. 
The aim is a complete network of free trade agreements between the seven 
States by the year 2002, creating a market of 55 million consumers. Moldova, 
which became a full member of the Stability Pact the next day, has unilater-
ally associated itself with this Memorandum of Understanding.
- Also on 27 June, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia agreed in Brussels on an Agenda for Regional Action, bro-
kered by the Stability Pact, for refugees and internally displaced persons. For 
the first time, the three States mainly affected by the refugee problem have 
agreed on bilateral initiatives for the settlement of questions relating to prop-
erty, housing, pensions, income support and the necessary assistance for 
returning refugees and displaced persons and those who do not wish to return 
at the present time. The donor community immediately rewarded this initia-
tive with its support and is giving strong backing to the Agenda for Regional 
Action.
- The Regional Table, the highest policy-making body of the Stability Pact, 
decided at the end of June - acting on my proposals - in favour of a stronger 
focusing of the Stability Pact on certain priorities for each of the three 
Working Tables. This will permit us to work in a still more concentrated way 
in the area of our core competence - the promotion of regional cooperation.
It is still in the area of regional cooperation that I see the greatest progress 
in South East Europe. This includes the united reaction of the region to the 
crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the increasingly 
strong role played by the South-Eastern Europe Cooperation Process.
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- Particularly welcome is the development of the parliamentary side of the 
Stability Pact. This summer, the Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and 
the Council of Europe and the European Parliament assumed the role of 
sponsors. Under the leadership of the European Parliament, we held a first 
conference of Stability Pact partners on 17-18 September in Brussels, with the 
participation of the EU candidate States. I consider that this Conference gave 
the Stability Pact an important push forward, not only in the specialized sub-
jects dealt with (parliamentary cooperation, economic development and the 
struggle against organized crime) but also in helping to impart the necessary 
political character to its activities. I should also like here particularly to thank 
the OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly for this support and urge them to 
continue their strong involvement.
The OSCE, with its approach based on a process, is much more modern:
Change through rapprochement. The non-paper presented by me at the Regional
Table in Brussels on 28 June on a subregional dialogue for security and cooperation
in South-East Europe, as well as the paper from a member State discussed by the EU
ministers for foreign affairs at their informal meeting in Genval, also start out from the
concept of a process.
It is important in this process that such difficult questions as those relating to
status and sovereignty should be tackled only at the end of a dialogue between partic-
ipants on practical, transboundary questions such as an interconnected energy system,
the combating of organized crime, asylum and migration, trade, etc.
The Regional Conference will include three further important components
alongside this opening meeting at the political level. The first concerns closer eco-
nomic cooperation in South-East Europe, including trade questions. Here the devel-
opment of a transboundary infrastructure undoubtedly has pride of place. In this field,
it has been possible to secure, since the first Brussels Funding Conference, full financ-
ing for a considerable number of additional projects. My conversations with the
European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development in London indicate that, in this area, we can hope even for a better
result than at the Brussels Conference.
3. Speech by Special Coordinator Erhard Busek at the Summit 
of the South East European Cooperation Process 
Tirana, 28 March 2002
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to share with you my perceptions on
how we can best work together to turn into reality local ownership of regional initia-
tives and reform processes. Moving the region firmly on the road to membership in
European and Euro Atlantic frameworks requires tangible progress in this regard,
although we need to recognize that your countries have recently come a long way in a
short period of time. 
As I reported yesterday to your Foreign Ministers and earlier in the month to
EU Foreign Ministers, the Stability Pact, as a mature operation, has entered a new
phase that requires redirecting and refocusing of its actions. 
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I have thoroughly reviewed a large part of the activities undertaken in the
framework of the Stability Pact. I have widely consulted with our main partners.
Major findings and recommendations appear to have found wide support in the
Stability Pact community, including EU and non-EU partners. They can be summa-
rized as fewer meetings, more action. 
However, the strategic direction will remain the same: to lobby for Euro-
Atlantic integration of SEE countries and to promote the necessary reforms along the
way. 
Against this background, the Stability Pact needs to concentrate on two relat-
ed objectives: enhancement of the complementarity between the Stability Pact and the
two main EU strategies towards the region, namely the Stabilization and Association
Process (SAP) and the accession process for candidate countries, and continued con-
struction of cross-border cooperation in practical ways and means. The Stability Pact
will continue to promote the objectives of these processes. 
It is equally important for the Stability Pact to ensure the continued involve-
ment of and coordination with non-EU partners. In particular, the Pact represents a
framework for continued consultation and cooperation with the US, in the context of
diminished US engagement in the Balkans due to new foreign policy priorities and
tangible regional progress. 
The EU has asked me to focus our operation on 5-6 priority objectives to be
achieved within this year. On the other hand, many partners have stressed the need to
continue ongoing work also in other important areas. We expect considerable
progress and concrete results in many initiatives, but I want to highlight the following
achievables which we have undertaken to accomplish over the course of this year.
They build upon the strategies and priorities established by the Regional Table in
June 2001: 
! Trade and investment: completing the network of 21 bilateral FTAs that will 
de facto create a SEE free trade zone; 
! Energy: establishment of a regional electricity market as an initial step; 
! Provide sustainable solutions for at least 100,000 refugees and Displaced 
Persons by the end of 2002. Measures include increasing the level of return 
and integration assistance, accelerating the repossession of properties, creat-
ing jobs and other; 
! Sub-Regional Dialogue: We wish to encourage a new sub-regional political 
process, endorsed by the SEECP, to be held under the auspices of the 
Stability Pact and supported by its Working Tables, on functional issues, e.g., 
energy cooperation. All parties interested should be allowed to participate; 
! We intend to establish a Regional Clearinghouse for SALWs in Belgrade. 
We expect this initiative to develop and implement projects aimed at reduc-
ing the excess supply and illicit trafficking of SALW throughout the region; 
! Organized crime: In an attempt to streamline ongoing initiatives to fight 
organized crime, we will establish a SPOC executive secretariat at the SECI 
Transborder Crime Center at Bucharest to be operational in the region. 
Underpinning all of our efforts is the realization that viable solutions can only
be achieved through enhanced local ownership. We will aim to transfer more and
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more of Stability Pact functions to you, through mechanisms such as the SEECP. Our
goal is to associate your countries closer to the decision making process and so we will
strive to develop closer links with the SEECP and encourage the incoming Chair to
examine ways in which SEECP structures can be strengthened and enhanced. We
want to see the SEECP as a coordinated voice of the region and a forum for regional
cooperation between willing partners. 
In that respect I appreciate the support you have demonstrated today in your
conclusions for the incoming Chair to designate a Regional Representative to work
alongside me and my team and ensure a clear and dedicated voice for regional prior-
ities. 
4. Speech by Special Coordinator Erhard Busek at the Meeting 
of General Affairs Council of European Union
Countries in the region have gone a long way since the Pact was created in mid-
1999, however, the region requires and deserves continued attention and support by
the EU. 
Thanks to the efforts of my predecessor and all that have supported this
endeavour, the Stability Pact is by now a mature operation. However, we are now
entering a new adolescent phase that requires redirecting and re-focussing of its
actions. 
I wish to start a new phase of even more productive relationship with the EU,
in a new spirit of enhanced cooperation, in particular with the Commission. Regular
consultations have started, for instance in the framework of the Informal Consultative
Committee. I would also like to offer my availability to report in more detail on
progress made. In particular, I would like to address the issues of fighting against
organized crime and energy cooperation at a later date.
Following your request, we have thoroughly reviewed a large part of the activ-
ities undertaken in the framework of the Stability Pact. I have widely consulted with
our main partners. Major findings and recommendations appear to have found wide
support in the Stability Pact community, including EU and non-EU partners. They can
be summarized as fewer meetings, more action.
However, the strategic direction will remain the same: to lobby for Euro-
Atlantic integration of SEE countries and to promote necessary reforms. The effi-
ciency and effectiveness of the Stability Pact operation continues to rely on the lead-
ing role of the EU in achieving our common goals in the region. The wish to become
a member of the EU remains a powerful incentive for reform throughout the region. 
Against this background, complementarity between the Stability Pact and the
two main EU strategies towards the region, namely the Stabilization and Association
Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans and the accession process for candidate
countries which also participate in the Stability Pact (Rumania and Bulgaria) need to
be enhanced. 
The Stability Pact will continue to promote the objectives of these processes.
And it will assist countries in the region to make full use of their instruments. What
we need is a clear roadmap to integration.
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It is equally important for the Stability Pact to ensure the continued involve-
ment of and coordination with non-EU partners. In particular, the Pact represents a
framework for continued consultation and cooperation with the US, now that due to
new foreign policy priorities US disengagement from the Balkans is imminent. 
On a more practical note, I suggest to reduce the number of Stability Pact
meetings and rationalise Stability Pact structures. For instance, we will reduce
Working Table sessions to once annually and focus the agenda on specific initiatives.
Moreover, we will strengthen coordination and cooperation of Task Forces and ini-
tiatives that work on related subjects. 
The EU has asked to focus our operation on 5-6 priority objectives to be
achieved within this year. On the other hand, many partners have stressed the need to
continue ongoing work also in other important areas. We expect considerable
progress and concrete results in many initiatives, which, for reasons of time, I will not
highlight today. The following, priority objectives have been selected to honour the
request of the EU. They are described in more detail in the paper distributed to you.
They represent a further elaboration of the strategies and priorities established by the
Regional Table in June 2001: 
Trade and investment: completing the network of 21 bilateral FTAs that will de
facto create a SEE free trade zone,
Infrastructure (including energy): Delivery and timely implementation of the 2
agreed sets of infrastructure projects, 
Provide sustainable solutions for at least 100,000 refugees and Displaced
Persons by the end of 2002. Measures include increasing the level of return and inte-
gration assistance, accelerating the repossession of properties, creating jobs and other. 
Sub-Regional Dialogue: This priority objective has been chosen in light of the
fact that a truly regional strategy to tackling the unresolved questions of national iden-
tity and status that have emerged in the Southern Balkans is still missing. We wish to
encourage a new sub-regional political process, launched by the SEECP, to be held
under the auspices of the Stability Pact and supported by its Working Tables, on func-
tional issues, e.g., energy cooperation. All parties interested should be allowed to par-
ticipate. 
We intend to establish a Regional Clearinghouse for SAWLs in Belgrade.
We expect this initiative to develop and implement projects aimed at reducing the
excess supply and illicit trafficking of SALW throughout the region.
Organized crime: In an attempt to streamline ongoing initiatives to fight organ-
ized crime, we will establish a SPOC executive secretariat at the SECI Transborder
Crime Center at Bucharest to be operational in the region. 
Viable solutions can only be achieved through enhanced local ownership. We
will aim to transfer more and more of Stability Pact functions to the region. SEE coun-
tries shall be associated closer to the decision making process. Therefore, we will
develop closer links with the SEECP and encourage the upcoming Yugoslav chair to
strengthen and enhance SEECP structures, so it can act as a coordinated voice of the
region and a forum for regional cooperation for parties interested.
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III  SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN COOPERATION
PROCESS
1. Summit Declaration
of the Heads of State and Government of Countries of South East
European Cooperation Process
Tirana, March 28th 2002
We, the Heads of State and Government of the countries of South East
European Cooperation Process, Mr. Rexhep Meidani, Mr. Beriz Belki}, Mr. Ion
Iliescu, Mr. Georgi Parvanov, Mr. Boris Trajkovski, Mr. Dragi{a Pe{i}, Mr. Costas
Simitis met in Tirana on March 28, 2002, at the Fifth Summit of the SEECP.
Participated also as observer Mr. Stjepan Mesi}. Present at the meeting were the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of these countries, Mrs. Arta Dade, Mr. Slobodan Casule,
Mr. Ismail Cem, Mr. Mircea Geoana, Mr. George A. Papandreou, Mr. Goran Svila-
novi} and Deputy Ministers Mr. Milovan Blagojevi}, Mr. Ivan Petkov and as obser-
ver, Mrs. Vesna Cvjetkovi}-Kurelec. Also participating as special guests were the
Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Mr. Erhard Busek
and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Kosovo Mr. Michael
Steiner.
We have reaffirmed our strong commitment to further advance the coopera-
tion process of the participating countries through confidence-building measures that
will play a greater role in building a regional security to the benefit of peace, stability
and sustainable development in the region. We have emphasized, within the frame-
work of the SEECP, the indispensable priority for each country to fulfil the high
objectives of democracy, economic development, stability and greater security. The
coordination of broader cooperation with relevant international organizations and
fora also constitutes an important factor for the attainment of these objectives and of
our international commitments. 
We have reaffirmed our countries commitments contained in the Charter on
Good-Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in South Eastern
Europe based on the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, as well as the commit-
ments contained in the Summit and Ministerial Declarations. We have also empha-
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sized the role of the SEECP as an important instrument for regional cooperation and
for the strengthening of peace and stability in the region. 
We have stressed our commitment for the speedy implementation of the
Action Plan for Regional Economic Cooperation, outlining priority areas where
immediate progress is possible. 
We have welcomed the important commitments and all efforts and progress
made by participating countries to overcome the difficult situations and crises experi-
enced in the region during the last year. 
We have expressed our conviction that durable settlement of any crisis can be
achieved only through dialogue, a climate of confidence and overall cooperation. 
We have reconfirmed our commitment to respect the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and the inviolability of our countries borders and reiterated our common
position for the peaceful settlement of disputes, vigorously rejecting the use of force
and for the fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.
We encourage efforts to continue to deepen the processes of democratic
reforms, respect for the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to national minorities, as a fundamental prerequisite to the overall devel-
opment of South East Europe and for the prevention of conflicts. 
We have expressed our concern for the plight of refugees and displaced persons
in the region. We reiterated our commitment that all the necessary steps for their
return home in compliance with the relevant international Agreements and UNSC
Resolutions should be taken.
We have strongly condemned acts of vandalism against cultural monuments
and religious sites in the region and reaffirm our commitment to jointly work for their
preservation and restoration. The richness of the regions cultural heritage lies also in
its diversity.
We have condemned all forms of terrorism, which jeopardise the stability and
security of states and the lives of their citizens. Supporting without reserve the fight
against terrorism and organized crime, we have expressed our countries commitment
to increase our efforts leading to more efficient and fruitful cooperation in combating
terrorist activities at national, regional and international level and in preventing sup-
port and shelter for terrorist organizations and elements. 
We are convinced that the overall economic growth and prosperity in the
SEECP region is impossible without speedy action for rehabilitation, construction and
interconnection of the regional infrastructure. A developed transport, energy,
telecommunication and water infrastructure is essential to the free movement of per-
sons and trade, as well as to the enhancement of social cohesion and integration. 
We have welcomed the two important meetings of the Ministers Responsible
for Energy and of the Ministers of Interior/ Public Order of the South East European
Cooperation Process, which discussed two crucial issues for the entire region: the
establishment of a regional energy capacity and the fight against terrorism and all
forms of organized crime and illegal trafficking. 
Encouraged by the concrete results already achieved, we support the deter-
mined objectives for a continuation of these important dialogues. 
We have commended the results of the Third Conference of Presidents of
Parliaments held in Tirana on March 5th, 2002 and expressed our conviction that the
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deepening of the cooperation process must be constantly based on a sound democrat-
ic framework and the rule of law. We have supported the stated goals of the
Conference of Presidents of the Parliaments for holding regular and frequent confer-
ences and meetings at different levels, as well as the suggestions to consider the possi-
bility for the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly, within the framework of the
SEECP.
We have welcomed the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia and encouraged the countries concerned to continue this
cooperation to bring all persons indicted for war crimes to justice.
We have welcomed the signing of the Agreement between the Federal, Serbian
and Montenegrin leaders on the principles for a single constitutional arrangement for
Serbia and Montenegro.
We believe that this Agreement would consolidate a state union and it would
be an important contribution towards the stabilization of the region. In that regard we
commend the valuable contribution by the High Representative of EU Mr. Solana. 
Underlining the necessity for full and consistent implementation of the
UNSCR 1244 (1999), on Kosovo, FRY, we have welcomed the elections held in 2001
and the inauguration of the Kosovo Assembly and other institutions of self-gover-
nance. 
We have encouraged the provisional institutions to start to function and appeal
to all ethnic communities to participate actively in the self-governance process for the
establishment of a democratic multi-ethnic society with the crucial assistance of
UNMIK, KFOR, OSCE and other international institutions.
We have underlined the need for assuring the safe and unimpeded returns of
internally displaced persons. 
We have welcomed the efforts of the main political forces under the leadership
of the President Trajkovski widely supported by all citizens which brought about the
adoption of the constitutional reforms and legislation changes following the
Framework Agreement.
The activities of the government for the stabilization of the situation were also
appraised.
We have expressed our appreciation for the valuable contribution of the inter-
national community, in particular the EU, NATO and OSCE, to that end. We believe
that all citizens of the country, irrespective of their ethnic origin, will benefit from the
positive results in the future, consolidating a multiethnic society.
In this context, we have reconfirmed our full support and respect for the sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of the borders, condemning the use
of armed violence as a means to achieve political goals.
We have highly appreciated the contribution of the international community,
in particular through UN, NATO, EU, OSCE to security, stability, peace, democracy
and respect for human rights in our region. We consider the presence of NATO, EU
and of the international forces, as mandated by the respective UNSC resolutions and
special arrangements as substantial contributions to regional security. 
We have greeted the efforts and progress made by the countries of the region
in the processes of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration. We have reiterated
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our commitment for the further deepening of the regional cooperation as a very
important element enhancing these processes.
In our efforts to increase security in the region, we have attached special atten-
tion to the efforts of those SEECP countries that aim to join NATO structures.
Supporting the objectives of the aspiring countries to accelerate the process, we have
committed ourselves to further develop our cooperation leading up to the Prague
Summit. We express our strong expectation that at the Prague Summit NATO will
decide the Alliances enlargement to South Eastern Europe.
We consider that the overall development of the states and societies of our
region is closely linked to their efforts to integrate into the EU. We have strongly sup-
ported the acceleration of the accession and Stabilization and Association Processes,
which will lead all the countries of the region to full membership in the EU, in due
time, in accordance with the pertinent criteria.
We recall the importance of regional cooperation in EU policies in South East
Europe and believe that the SEECP can provide a substantial framework in this con-
text.
We have taken note that some SEECP participating countries involved in
Stabilization and Association Process, welcoming the inauguration for the Convention
for the future of Europe expressed their interest to be associated to the extent possi-
ble in the work of this forum.
We have reaffirmed our support for the Stability Pact. We consider that the
enhancement of the SEECP will benefit from the continued development of the
Stability Pact. We view the resulting synergy as an important contribution to further
regional cooperation and economic, political and social developments of our coun-
tries.In this regard, we welcome the willingness of the Stability Pact to develop closer
links with the SEECP as the coordinated voice of the region. We therefore request the
upcoming Chairman in Office to explore the modalities of such a cooperation and to
represent the Process in the Informal Consultative Committee.
Aware of the need to enhance the SEECPs effectiveness as a regional cooper-
ation process, we note with appreciation the contribution of the outgoing Chair in
Office, Albania, under the draft Program for the Further Development of the
SEECP.
We tasked our Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Committee of Political
Directors to review, under the leadership of the new Chair in Office, the activities so
far conducted and the ways for increasing the effectiveness of the existing organiza-
tional arrangements, if necessary with concrete proposals for their improvement. 
The Committee of Political Directors will possibly present a progress report
before the next Ministerial Meeting. 
We have expressed our high appreciation for the role and activities carried out
by our Ministers of Foreign Affairs for addressing the complex challenges facing our
region over this period and for the contacts maintained with various international
organizations.Furthermore, we also commend the valuable work of the Committee of
the Political Directors in the development of this Process and we are looking forward
to the further enhancement of its role.
We welcome the initiative of the incoming Chair in Office to activate, as need-
ed, the SEECP Troika mechanism. 
258
We have expressed our warm thanks for the hospitality of President Rexhep
Meidani in hosting the Fifth Meeting of the South East Europe Cooperation Process
in Tirana. This Summit also attests to the positive role that the Albanian authorities
are playing towards the realization of our common goal in the region.
We have decided that the next meeting of the Heads of State and Government
of the SEECP countries will be held in Belgrade in 2003.
2. South-East European Cooperation Process 
Third Conference of Presidents of Parliaments Declaration
Tirana, 5 March 2002
Mr. Namik DOKLE, Mr. @eljko MIRJANI], Mr. Sejfudin TOKI],
Mr.Ognjan GERXHIKOV, Mr. Apostolos KAKLAMANIS, Mr. Stojan ANDOV,
Mr. Gheorghe BUZATU, Mr. Kamer GENÇ, Mr. @arko KORA], Mr. Milutin
OJDANI] participated at the Third Conference of Presidents of Parliaments of the
participating countries in South-East European Cooperation Process, held in Tirana,
on 5 March 2002. Mr. Mate GRANI] participated also in the capacity of observer. 
Mr. Adrian SEVERIN, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 
Mr. Uluç GURKAN, Vice President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, Mr. Donal KURSCH, Vice-coordinator of Stability Pact, and 
Lord RUSSELL-JOHNSTON, President of the Governing Board of
International Institute for Democracy attended also the Conference as guests. 
The participants adopted the following: 
Reaffirming our common determination to enhance continuously the coopera-
tion among our Parliaments, peoples and states, in the interest of peace, welfare and
common progress and on the basis of the Charter on Good-Neighbourly Relations,
Stability, Security and Cooperation in South-East Europe, 
Emphasising our resolution to participate actively in the construction of the
Europe of the third millennium and reaffirming the whole regions orientation
towards integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, 
Recalling the Conclusions of the previous Conferences of Presidents of
Parliaments of South-East Europe, held in October 1997 in Athens and March 2001 in
Skopje, 
1. Stress that securing peace and stability, while respecting sovereignty, territo-
rial integrity and inviolability of the frontiers, is a pre-condition for successful region-
al cooperation and progress of the countries in the region. 
2. Support efforts being made in achieving and implementing the Framework
Agreement, and welcome the efforts made for the adoption of the subsequent consti-
tutional reforms and legislation changes, and, at the same time, condemn all forms of
violence as means for the settling of problems. 
3. Welcome the establishment of the new Parliament of Kosovo, as one of the
measures envisaged in the UNSCR 1244 and invite all the political forces represented
in it to help in the building of a democratic and multi-ethnic society in favor of peace
and stability in the region. 
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4. Stress the important role played by international organizations and their
Missions in the region, and appraise their contribution to ensuring peace and stability
in South-East Europe. 
5. Condemn fiercely the barbarious terrorist acts perpetrated against the
United States of America and all forms of terrorism that pose a threat to stability and
security. Express also our commitment to promote the widest possible cooperation in
order to deal with the phenomenon of terrorism as well as its consequences in the
financial and social sector, and deprive terrorism and its international networks, or
their supporters, from all possibilities of safe havens. 
6. Reconfirm our support to the consistent individual punishment of the war
criminals for the crimes committed in the territories of Former Yugoslavia, and in that
context, supporting the work of the ICTY in the Hague, as well as all the activities
undertaken in apprehending and bringing all the indictees to justice. 
7. Encourage the holding of regular Conferences of the Presidents of the
Parliaments, meetings of the Chairmen of the Parliamentary Committees on Foreign
Policy and other Committees as fora of multilateral political dialogue embracing all
countries in South-East Europe. In this spirit, it was suggested to consider the possi-
bility for the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly, within the context of
SEECP. These fora would have substantial contribution to the active exchange of
information and experience in order to consolidate cooperation, to foster security and
stability in the region, as well as to promote the efforts aiming at European and Euro-
Atlantic integration 
8. We reaffirm our support for the efforts undertaken by the Stability Pact and
our commitment to enhance our close cooperation with the Stability Pact to the ben-
efit of promotion of regional trade liberalization, creation of infrastructure networks
and identification of other important projects of common interest. 
9. Reaffirm the need to find sustainable solutions to secure the return of all
refugees and displaced persons to their homes in safety, with the necessary interna-
tional assistance. 
10. Welcome the ongoing efforts to further promote and reinforce coordination
between European Union, Stability Pact and SEECP, to the benefit of peace, stabili-
ty and economic development of the region. 
11. Reaffirm our commitment to concrete and specific common actions, within
the scope of parliament competence, to address terrorism, organized crime, all forms
of illicit trafficking, in particular of narcotic substances, and corruption. 
12. Reaffirm our full support to the development of Parliaments as the centers
of the democratic decision-making process, expressing to the greatest possible extent
the opinion and the aspirations of the voters. 
13. Reiterate our commitment to respect the rules and the standards of demo-
cratic, fair and free direct elections, and shall regularly exchange views on improve-
ment of the legislation in this area and its implementation. 
14. Emphasize the priority we place on the full participation in parliamentary
activities by all legitimate and qualifying democratic parties. 
15. Reiterate our commitment to the full respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to national minorities as provided for in the relevant inter-
national texts and documents. 
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16. Shall encourage the sharing of the best practices in parliamentary proce-
dures and parliamentary efficiency in our countries, with a particular emphasis on the
adequate staff training and information services report. 
17. Welcome the process of accession, as well as the Stabilization and
Association Process (SAP) of the countries in the region with the European Union
and shall strengthen the cooperation among our Parliaments regarding the necessary
alignment of legislation with that of the European Union, as well as the supervisory
role of the Parliament over the governmental activities in the economic, legislative,
institutional and other reforms. 
18. Shall support the governments to work closely to further promote the eco-
nomic development of SEECP Region, and stress the need for the implementation of
the Action Plan for Regional Economic Cooperation. 
19. Shall encourage efforts aiming at promoting a sustained culture of cooper-
ation with the non-governmental entities of civil society, including especially educa-
tional, scientific and cultural institutions, considering education and cooperation as
powerful means in the creation of a climate of tolerance and mutual understanding.
The Parliaments are invited to recommend to their Governments to foster dialogue
among the schools and universities in the respective countries for the encouragement
of the educational projects, especially in the field of History and other relevant disci-
plines. 
We, the participants of the Conference, appreciate the efforts of the Presidency
in the framework of the parliamentary dimension of SEECP, and look forward to the
next Conference of Presidents to be held in Belgrade. 
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IV  ORGANIZATION 
OF THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Sixth Meeting of the Council 
of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Kiev, 25 April 2002
Resolutions, Decisions and Recommendations
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC),
Guided by the basic principles and objectives embodied in the Charter of the
Organization of the BSEC, 
Bearing in mind the provisions of the Summit Declaration on Black Sea
Economic Cooperation signed in Istanbul on 25 June 1992, the Statement of the High
Level Meeting of the BSEC Participating States adopted in Bucharest on 30 June
1995, the Moscow Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of the
Participating States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation signed on 25 October
1996, the Yalta Summit Declaration adopted on 5 June 1998 and the Istanbul Summit
Declaration adopted on 17 November 1999,
Emphasizing that the BSEC consolidation on a basis of its transformation into
a fully -fledged international organization requires more forceful and active commit-
ment from each Member State, 
Recognizing that the BSEC needs to develop practical contacts with other
international organizations and institutions for the enhancement of its role in the
Black Sea region in particular and on the international arena in general,
Pursuing the directives and guidance envisaged in the Resolutions, Decisions
and Recommendations adopted at the Second Meeting of the Council of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs held on 27 April 2000 in Chisinau,
Taking note of the Reports of the Meetings of the BSEC Subsidiary and
Related Bodies, Summary Proceedings of Conferences, Seminars and Workshops,
agreed on the following:
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I.   RESOLUTIONS
Summit Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the
BSEC Member States on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary
of the BSEC Initiative
1. The Council welcomed the proposal of the Republic of Turkey to organize
in Istanbul on 25 June 2002 a Summit Meeting of the Heads of State or Government
on the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the BSEC Initiative and thanked the
Turkish Government for this offer. The Council expressed its confidence that the said
Summit Meeting would give impetus to the BSEC process and greatly contribute to
the realization of the BSEC goals.
2. The Council made an overall review of the Draft Decennial Summit
Declaration (Attachment 1 to Annex V to BS/FM/R(2002)1) and agreed that the lat-
ter constitutes a solid basis for the preparation of the final text. The Ministers invited
the Member States and the BSEC Related Bodies to provide the PERMIS with their
proposals and amendments to the text of the said Draft Declaration by 15 May 2002.
While expressing its appreciation to the Delegation of the Republic of Turkey and the
BSEC PERMIS for the elaboration of the first version of the Summit Declaration, the
Council authorized the Committee of Senior Officials to finalize the Draft Decennial
Summit Declaration at a Special Meeting to take place in Istanbul on 27-28 May 2002. 
3. The Council appreciated the information provided by the Delegation of the
Republic of Turkey on main organizational aspects of the forthcoming BSEC Summit.
The Member States, on their part, shall inform the host country on the composition of
their delegations to this event at their earliest convenience.
4. Following the established practice, the Council deemed it appropriate to con-
vene a meeting of the Security and Protocol Officers of the BSEC Member States on
16-17 May 2002 (to be confirmed) to consider in a thorough way the relevant arrange-
ments for the Summit. 
Implementation of the BSEC Economic Agenda
5. The Council reviewed the activities carried throughout the Ukrainian
Chairmanship-in-Office of the BSEC to promote the implementation of the BSEC
Economic Agenda. The Ministers instructed the BSEC PERMIS to follow the pro-
gress of the implementation process and submit relevant information to each Meeting
of the Committee of Senior Officials. To this end, the Member States and the BSEC
Related Bodies shall provide the BSEC PERMIS with inputs relating to their involve-
ment in the realization of the BSEC Economic Agenda at least three weeks prior to
each Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials.
6. The Council valued the efforts of the BSEC Permanent International
Secretariat and Subsidiary Organs, supported actively and at all the stages by the
PABSEC, BSTDB, BSEC BC and ICBSS, in order to set up a new BSEC machinery
on the basis of a set of documents intended to drive forward the project development
process. The Ministers expressed their support for the establishment of the BSEC
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Project Development Fund on the basis of voluntary contributions and endorsed the
following documents finalized by the Working Group on Banking and Finance, the
Working Group on Organizational Matters and the Committee of Senior Officials:
- Rules and Regulations of the BSEC Project Development Fund;
- Role of the BSEC organs in the Project Development;
- Project selection criteria within the BSEC.
7. The Council recommended that the endorsed documents be submitted for
the required internal procedure and to adopt these documents taking into account the
results of the completion of this procedure.
8. The endorsed documents are attached as Attachments 2, 3 and 4 to Annex V
to BS/FM/R(2002)1 respectively. 
BSEC - EU Cooperation
9. The Council expressed its belief that the establishment of the new BSEC
machinery provides for new possibilities of interaction between the BSEC and EU on
a project-oriented basis. Acting in full conformity with the outlines of the BSEC-EU
cooperation, agreed upon on the high-level consultations in Brussels on 21-22 March
2001, the Council encouraged the Secretary General of the BSEC PERMIS to present
the relevant decisions to the European Commission and invited the latter to consider
them. In this respect, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to the BSEC-EU coop-
eration and reemphasized the role and significance of the EU in the facilitation of
regional cooperation in the Black Sea area. The Council requested the incoming
Albanian Chairmanship, other Member States, particularly the Hellenic Republic in
the capacity of a future EU Troika Member, to support the relevant activities of the
BSEC PERMIS. 
Adoption of the Terms of Reference 
of the Institution of Country-Coordinator
10. The Council stressed the importance and pivotal role of the institution of
Country-Coordinator in the BSEC Project Development. In this connection the
Council adopted the Terms of Reference of the Institution of Country-Coordinator,
attached as Attachment 5 to Annex V to BS/FM/R(2002)1. On the basis of the adopt-
ed Terms of Reference, the Council invited the actual Country-Coordinators to inten-
sify their efforts in their respective fields of cooperation. Furthermore, taking into
account that the expiration of the term of office of Country-Coordinators for several
working groups has expired, the Council invited the Member States to manifest their
interest in being appointed Country-Coordinators for the vacant posts and inform
respectively the BSEC PERMIS by 1 September 2002.
Organizational Matters
a) Amendments on Rules 7.2 and 7.4 of the Financial Rules 
and Procedures of the BSEC PERMIS
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11. The Council amended the Rule 7.2 of the Financial Regulations and
Procedures to read as follows:
Savings exceeding 25.000 U.S. Dollars of the budgeted amount in any FY shall
be accounted separately and shall be transferred to the PERMIS Budget following the
current FY. The said savings are to be distributed to the Member States in proportion
to their quotas, which constitute the basis of the Scale of Contributions. Savings less
than 25.000 U.S.Dollars of the budgeted amount shall be transferred to the Reserve
Fund.
12. The following new paragraph is added to the Rule 7.4 of the Financial
Regulations and Procedures.
The arrears of all Member States paid after the closing of the BY should be
included in the Reserve Fund
13. These amendments will be effective as of their adoption. 
b) Protocol Concerning the Privileges and Immunities of the 
PABSEC
14. The Council reviewed the progress in the completion of the required inter-
nal procedure for the Protocol Concerning the Privileges and Immunities of the PAB-
SEC at its present stage. At the same time, the Council was informed of the intention
of certain Member States to submit amendments to the Protocol. In this connection,
the Council requested the concerned Member States to send as soon as possible their
amendments and the PERMIS to circulate them among the Member States with a
view to be considered by the WG on Organizational Matters before the next Meeting
of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
c) Host Country Agreement between the Organization of the BSEC and the
Government of the Republic of Turkey for the International Secretariat of the PAB-
SEC
15. Being informed of the finalization of the Host Country Agreement between
the Organization of the BSEC and the Government of the Republic of Turkey for the
International Secretariat of the PABSEC, the Council, in line with its previous
Resolution, approved the signature of the said Agreement by the Secretary General
of the BSEC PERMIS. The text of the Agreement is attached as Attachment 6 to
Annex V to BS/FM/R(2002)1.
16. The Council expressed the confidence that the signature of the Host
Country Agreement between the Organization of the BSEC and the Government of
the Republic of Turkey for the International Secretariat of the PABSEC will con-
tribute to the more efficient functioning of the PABSEC and of its International
Secretariat.
Financial Matters
a) Approval of the Auditing Report of the 2001 Budget
17. The Council of Ministers appreciated the work accomplished by the Group
of Auditors of the 2001 Budget of the PERMIS and attested its implementation in an
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orderly and effective manner, absolved the Secretariat of its responsibility for the
PERMIS 2001 Budget and declared its files completed and closed.
b) Adoption of the Budget of the Budgetary Year 2003
18. The Council approved the BSEC Budget 2003,which is appended as
Attachment 7 to Annex V to BS/FM/R(2002)1.
Status of the ICBSS
19. The Council of Ministers, appreciating the activities of the ICBSS, whose
role is broader than of an affiliated center, acting as a think-tank of the Organization,
recognizes it as a facilitator of academic cooperation (de facto related body) under
Article 23 of the BSEC Charter. 
20. The Council underlined the importance of overall cooperation in this field
between subsidiary organs of the BSEC and other relevant bodies, such as ICBSS as
well as BSUN. The Council agreed that the modalities of cooperation, role and status
of the relevant bodies to be prepared by the BSEC PERMIS, following the inputs of
the interested Member States and bodies will be submitted to the next meeting of the
Council of Ministers.
Membership to the BSEC
21. The Council resumed the discussion on membership to the BSEC and
decided to continue deliberations on this issue. The Ministers agreed that after the
adoption of the Draft List of Criteria for Admission of New Member States, the PER-
MIS should forward the approved List of Criteria to the States that have applied for
membership to the BSEC, enabling them to consider their interest in joining the
BSEC in line with this development. Moreover, the PERMIS should, in accordance
with Article 20, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure, draft a document indicating
the financial implications arising from the eventual admission of the two candidates
for adhesion and submit it to the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the Council
pointed out that the deepening of the cooperation between the existing Member
States should be taken into account in the process of accepting new members in the
Organization.
Observer Status to the BSEC
a) Criteria for Observer Status in the BSEC
22. The Council considered the issue of Criteria for Observer Status and decid-
ed to continue deliberations on this issue. The Ministers agreed that after the eventu-
al approval of the Draft List of Criteria for Observer Status, the PERMIS should for-
ward the approved List of Criteria to the States that have applied for Observer Status
in the BSEC, enabling them to consider their interest in obtaining the respective sta-
tus in line with this development. 
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b) Observer Status to the Commission on the Protection of the 
Black Sea Against Pollution
23. Being informed of the request of the Commission on the Protection of the
Black Sea Against Pollution (Black Sea Commission, BSC) in obtaining Observer
Status and noting the efficient relationship established between the two organizations,
which goes in line with the relevant provision of the BSEC Economic Agenda on
establishing and further promoting the cooperation with the BSC on the implementa-
tion of the Strategic Action Plan for the Rehabilitation and protection of the Black
Sea, as well as taking into account the principle of reciprocity (the observer status
offered by the BSC to the BSEC), the Council of Ministers decided to grant the BSC
an observer status in the BSEC for a period of two years.
Renewal of Sectoral Dialogue 
Partnership Status
24. Taking into consideration the applications of the Black Sea International
Ship Owners Association (BINSA), the Black Sea Region Association of Shipbuilders
and Shiprepairers (BRASS) and the Black Sea Universities Network (BSUN) for
renewal of the sectoral dialogue partnership status expiring in April 2002, the Council
decided to renew the said status of the applicant NGOs for another period of two
years.
25. With respect to the request of the BSUN to upgrade its status, the Council
agreed that the BSUN should communicate to the Member States through the PER-
MIS its founding documents as any other documents the BSUN deems supportive to
its request, by 20 September 2002. The Council further requested the PERMIS to
review the sent documents and submit to the Member States before the Seventh
Meeting of the Council a background paper related to the institutional aspects of the
BSUN. 
Cooperation with International Organizations and Regional
Groupings
a) BSEC - FAO Cooperation 
26. In pursuance of relevant resolutions of the Council at its Third, Fourth and
Fifth Meetings on continuing collaboration with FAO, the Council, appreciated the
latest efforts of the FAO and the PERMIS on the finalization of the Project Proposal
on Institutional Strengthening to Facilitate Intra- and Inter-regional Agricultural
Trade of the BSEC and recommended to the relevant Working Group to elaborate
the implementation after its final approval by the FAO.
b) BSEC - UNEP Cooperation
27. Following the relevant resolution of the Council of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs (Third Meeting, Moscow, 27 April 2001) the Council welcomed the signing of
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the Cooperation Agreement between the BSEC and the UNEP, which will further
intensify the already existing level of cooperation. 
28. They also appreciated the efforts of the UNEP in organizing a Regional
Training Seminar for Port Enforcement Officers in Constanza, Romania and instruct-
ed the PERMIS to further enhance the collaboration in the activities relating to
information exchange and provision of information to users, creation of environmen-
tal information systems and implementation of joint programs for the assessment and
monitoring of the environment, within the frame of the Cooperation Agreement.
c) BSEC - BSC Cooperation
29. The Council noted with appreciation that further steps on efficient cooper-
ation between the two organizations have been initiated. It also expressed confidence
the mutual observership will serve at its utmost for a stronger collaboration. 
30. The Council also noted the activities of the Secretariat on strengthening the
cooperation with the BSC, especially the holding of the Joint Meeting of the BSEC
Working Group on Organizational Matters and the Black Sea Commission (BSC)
where the concept on the future Draft Convention on Fisheries and Protection of the
Marine Living Resources was finalized and instructed PERMIS to further activate the
collaboration.
Draft Agreement on Simplification of VISA Procedures for the
Businessmen Nationals of the BSEC Member States
31. The Council took note of the readiness of a number of Member States to
sign the Draft Agreement on Simplification of Visa Procedures for the Businessmen
Nationals of the BSEC Member States. Being informed of the fact that in several
Member States the internal procedures in order to sign this Agreement are not com-
pleted, the Council invited the concerned Member States to complete the required
domestic procedures with a view to signing the said Draft Agreement at their earliest
convenience.
32. The Council instructed the BSEC PERMIS to follow the process of com-
pletion by the Member States of the internal procedure and report to the Committee
of Senior Officials on that score by the next Meeting of the Council.
Black Sea Champions CUP
33. The Council welcomed the project of holding the Black Sea Champions
Cup as an event that may raise the public awareness for the BSEC. The Council
approved the Organization of the BSEC being an official supporter of the said sports
event. To this end the Council authorized the Secretary General to negotiate, in line
with the offer of the organizers of the Black Sea Champions Cup, and to sign an agree-
ment on the terms and conditions of granting the BSEC official support and of the
assistance to be provided by the BSEC PERMIS to the organization of the tourna-
ment. The above Agreement shall be concluded for one year and shall be reviewed
after its expiration in accordance with the guidelines to be given by the Council. 
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II. DECISIONS
Review of the State of Cooperation Among the Member States 
a) Troika Meeting
34. The Council reviewed the Report of the Troika Meeting held in Kiev on 22
January 2002. The Council underlined the importance of the Troika system as, inter
alia, a tool for smooth and efficient transition from one Chairmanship to the other.
Furthermore, the Council took note of the proposals made by the Troika Members
and instructed the Committee of Senior Officials to consider their implementation,
taking into account the ideas expressed by the Ministers.
b) Second International Black Sea Transport Conference 
(Kiev, 6-7 March 2002) 
35. The Council expressed its appreciation of the results of the Second Black
Sea Transport Conference held in Kiev on 5-6 March 2002 and instructed the WG on
Transport to take in its future work due account of the Declaration of Conference.
c) WG on Transport
36. The Council appreciated the work done by the WG on Transport so far and
instructed it to take concrete steps for the achievement of the goals set out in the
Transport Action Plan.
37. The Council welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding
on Facilitation of Road Transport of Goods in the BSEC Region by eight Member
States and invited the Member States, which have not yet done so, to undertake the
necessary steps for signing the MoU. The Council instructed the WG to work out a
plan of activities aimed at proper implementation of the MoU.
38. The Council instructed the BSEC PERMIS to continue its efforts on the
achievement of a better coordination with organizations, initiatives and programs
active in the transport field in the region and report to it regularly on the progress
achieved.
39. The Council decided to prolong the mandate of the Ad-Hoc Meeting of
Experts on Shipbuilding, Shiprepairing and Shipping, given the necessity to pay more
attention in the said industries. The Council also instructed the PERMIS to consider
other possible modalities of cooperation on this matter in the BSEC, taking into
account the interdependence of maritime industry and maritime transport.
40. The Council appreciated the transport activities of BRASS, BINSA,
BASPA and BSEC URTA aimed at strengthening transport cooperation in the
region.
d) Fifth Meeting of the Ministers of Interior/Public Order 
(Kiev, 14-15 March 2002 and WG on Cooperation in Com-
bating Crime (Istanbul, 10-11 December 2001)
41. Being apprised of the outcome of the Meeting of the Ministers of
Interior/Public Order of the BSEC Member States held in Kiev on 14-15 March 2002,
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the Council expressed its satisfaction for the signature, by nine countries, of the
Additional Protocol to The Agreement among the Governments of the BSEC
Participating States on Cooperation in Combating Crime, in particular in its organized
forms, concerning the establishment of the Network of the Liaison Officers, and
expressed the hope that the Additional Protocol will be signed as soon as possible and
by the other two Member States after the fulfillment of their internal legal procedures.
In the same time, they expressed the conviction that the law enforcement bodies of the
Member States will nominate as soon as possible their Liaison Officers, so that the
Network can start its activities.
42. The Council endorsed the Joint Statement signed by the Ministers of
Interior/Public Order, which reasserted the determination of the BSEC Member
States to make their contribution to the further development of the fruitful coopera-
tion within BSEC, with other international and regional organizations in order to com-
bat organized crime and international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. 
43. The Council took note of the proposal of the Russian Federation to con-
clude an Additional Protocol concerning cooperation in combating international ter-
rorism and, to that effect, requested the Chairman-in-Office to convene the meeting
of the Working Group on Cooperation in Combating Crime for drafting the above-
mentioned Additional Protocol.
44. In order to extend the cooperation with SECI Center for Combating Trans-
border Crime, with a view to avoid duplication, the Council authorized the Working
Group on Cooperation in Combating Crime to elaborate modalities for close cooper-
ation between the BSEC Network of Liaison Officers and SECI Center.
e) WG on Banking and Finance
45. The Council reviewed the reports of the two Meetings of the WG on
Banking and Finance devoted to the preparation of documents related to the BSEC
Project Development Fund and expressed its satisfaction for the work accomplished
by the WG on Banking and Finance.
46. Furthermore, the Council endorsed the Model Protocol of Intent designed
for the institutionalization of relations between the BSEC and interested financial
institutions to serve as a general pattern for the conclusion agreements between BSEC
and banks or other financial institutions, interested in the implementation of regional
BSEC projects.
f) Joint Meeting of the BSEC Working Group on Organiza-
tional Matters and the Black Sea Commission (BSC) 
(Istanbul 20 February 2002) 
47. The Council welcomed the decision of the Joint Meeting attended by the
BSEC Member States and BSC Member States on the Draft Convention for
Fisheries and Conservation of Living Resources of the Black Sea to be finalized
among the Black Sea Coastal States within the framework of the BSC in cooperation
with the relevant national authorities.
48. The Council also noted with satisfaction the new phase of relationship
between the two organizations, further reinforcing the environmental cooperation in
the Black Sea region. 
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g) WG on Cooperation in Tourism (Istanbul 5-6 March 2002)
49. The Council noted with satisfaction the work done for the elaboration of
the new Tourism Action Plan and expressed the opinion that this document should be
finalized at the Meeting of Ministers of Tourism to be convened by the incoming
Albanian Chairmanship-in-Office.
50. The Council approved the Memorandum of Understanding between the
BSEC PERMIS and the Bosphorus University Applied Tourism Administration and
Research Center (ATARC) in its capacity as an official World Tourism Organization
Education and Training Center and authorized the Secretary General of the BSEC
PERMIS to sign it. The text of the Memorandum is attached as Attachment 8 to
Annex V to BS/FM/R(2002)1.
h) Working Group on Communications
51. The Council took note of the report of the WG on Communications held in
Istanbul on 15-16 April 2002 and instructed the WG to elaborate a set of activities for
the implementation of the Plan of Action for the Development of Communication in
the BSEC Area.
i) Conference of the BSEC National Academies of Sciences
52. The Council greeted with satisfaction the Conference of Representatives of
the National Academies of Sciences of the BSEC Member States and expressed the
view that such cooperation was an important step in the realization of the BSEC
objectives and that would effectively contribute to the collaboration in the field of sci-
ence and technology in the BSEC region helping thus to put knowledge to the fore-
front of the BSEC activities. 
53. The Council appreciated the role and contribution of the ICBSS in con-
ceiving and organizing the afore-said Conference as well as the generous financial
assistance of the European Commission.
54. Being apprised of the Report and the Declaration of the Conference of
Representatives of the National Academies of Sciences of the BSEC Member States,
the Council welcomed the decision of the Conference of Representatives of National
Academies of Sciences to set up a Council of the Presidents of the National Acade-
mies of Sciences and a Committee of National Coordinators representing the National
Academies of Sciences of the BSEC Member States and took note of the recommen-
dation to hold next year a Meeting of the Ministers of the BSEC Member States
Responsible for Science and Technology.
j) Workshop on Poverty Alleviation Through Micro-Credit-
ing and Family-based Entrepreneurship Development.
55. The Council took note of the Report of the Workshop on Poverty Allevia-
tion through Micro-Crediting and Family-based Entrepreneurship Development
organized in Tirana on 8-9 November 2001 by the BSEC, KAF and Albanian Center
for Economic Research and endorsed the recommendations of the Workshop.
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k) Workshop on the Role of the Chambers of Industry and 
Trade in Supporting SMEs.
56. The Council took note of the Report of the Workshop on the Role of the
Chambers of industry and Trade in Supporting SMEs organized in Bucharest on 21-
22 March 2002 by the BSEC, KAF, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of
Romania and Bucharest and endorsed the recommendations of the Workshop.
Coordination Meetings of the BSEC
57. The Council reviewed the conclusions of the two Coordination Meetings
held under the Ukrainian Chairmanship and took note of their proposals and recom-
mendations. 
58. The Council assessed positively the institution of the BSEC Coordination
Meetings as a useful instrument for consultations allowing reciprocal flow of informa-
tion and interaction of activities in the BSEC framework, in line with the relevant pro-
vision of the BSEC Economic Agenda. To this end, the Council decided that the
BSEC Coordination Meeting should be convened on a regular basis and invited the
successive Chairman-in-Office to implement the afore-said decision.
Activites of the BSEC Permis
59. The Council took note of the Progress Report of the Secretary General of
the BSEC PERMIS, Ambassador Valeri CHECHELASHVILI since the Fifth
Meeting of the Council of Ministers, appended as Attachment 9 to Annex V to
BS/FM/R(2002)1 and expressed its high appreciation for the valuable work done by
the Secretary General and his staff to promote the BSEC activities and, in particular,
ensure the implementation of the BSEC Economic Agenda. Furthermore, it acknowl-
edged the efforts of the Secretary General to give a new structure to the Progress
Report and encouraged him to streamline this document as well as of the Document
File of the Meeting of the Council in order to make the latter more easily manageable. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
BSEC-PABSEC Interaction
a) Consideration of the PABSEC recommendations
60. The Council underscored the creative potential of the BSEC parliamentary
dimension, the efforts of the PABSEC and of the National Parliaments to offer a leg-
islative framework meeting the challenges of the BSEC Member States cooperation in
economic, political and humanitarian fields.
61. The Council appreciated the PABSEC recommendations relevant to the
BSEC activities (approved by the Eighteenth Plenary Session of the PABSEC
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General Assembly, held in Sofia on 4-6 December 2001) on promoting sustainable
agriculture and rural development, cooperation in promoting political stability
through economic integration, contribution of the Black Sea Universities Network to
the BSEC Academic cooperation, the organization of the Children and Youth festival
of the BSEC-Member States.
62. The Council greeted the efforts of PABSEC in promoting the BSEC aims
in its relationship with other Parliamentary Assemblies, in particular through the first
PABSEC mission to the European Parliament.
63. The Council took note with satisfaction of the Declaration of the PABSEC
on combating international terrorism, which reaffirms the readiness of the BSEC
Member States to cooperate closely, on combating terrorism at regional level and
together with the international community, by taking all necessary measures in con-
formity with the international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
64. Furthermore the Council welcomed the initiatives of the PABSEC in con-
vening the first Forum of the Presidents of Constitutional Courts, in laying down a
solid basis for an effective and pragmatic mechanism of cooperation among the Public
Broadcasters and in establishing the Black Sea Capitals Association.
Activities of the BSEC Business Council
65. The Council took note of the information on the various activities of the
Business Council over the last six-months period, especially those focused on the pro-
motion of the Black Sea Investment Initiative in cooperation with the BSEC and
OECD.
66. Taking into account the budget financing problems of the BSEC BC, the
Ministers decided to include the issue of the internationalization of the budget of the
BSEC Business Council into the draft agenda of the next Meeting of the Committee
of Senior Officials and the Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to
be held in Tirana, tentatively in October 2002. 
BSEC-BSTDB Cooperation
67. The Council appreciated the contribution of the BSTDB to the elaboration
of the Rules and Regulations of the BSEC Project Development Fund and welcomed
the Resolution no. 30 adopted by the Board of Governors of the BSTDB on 14 April
2002. The Ministers encouraged the further development of the BSEC-BSTDB coop-
eration seeking synergies in their activities.
68. The Ministers expressed their appreciation for the readiness of the Bank to
finance 50% of the costs relating to the publication of the Almanac on the occasion of
the Tenth Anniversary of the BSEC.
Activities of the International Center for Black Sea Studies
69. The Council noted with satisfaction the substantial contribution of the
ICBSS in promoting the objectives and goals of the BSEC.
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70. The Council welcomed the Inaugural Meeting of the International Center
on Water Research in the Black Sea Region, held in Kiev, Ukraine on 19-20
November 2001. This meeting was convened by the joint contribution of ICBSS,
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Education and Sciences of Ukraine and
the Dumansky Institute of Colloid Chemistry and Water Chemistry of Ukraine. 
71. The Council also appreciated the initiative of the ICBSS in organizing an
essay competition for young people from BSEC region on the topic BSEC in the 21st
century: Past, Present and Future. This competition, organized on the occasion of the
10th Anniversary of the BSEC, is aimed at raising awareness of the representatives of
the young generations of the BSEC Member States towards BSEC regional problems.
72. The Council took note of the efforts of ICBSS for the establishment of
BSEC Center for Innovation Technologies, a new Center for the Use of the Plasma
Technology for Waste Treatment, the initiative to launch a series of Workshops on
Institutional Renewal and Good Governance. The Council appreciated also the pub-
lication of a study on Scientific and Technology Potential of the BSEC Member
States by the ICBSS together with the Dobrov Center of the National Academy of
Sciences of Ukraine and took note of the preparation of the study on The realities of
Caspian Oil development and their impact on the Black Sea region.
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V  ADRIATIC - IONIAN INITIATIVE
Split Declaration
Members of the Adriatic and Ionian Council: 
! Albania, represented by Vice Minister Pellumb Xhufi 
! Bosnia and Herzegovina, represented by Minister Zlatko Lagumd`ija  
! Croatia, represented by Minister Tonino Picula  
! Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, represented by Minister Goran Svilanovic    
! Greece, represented by Deputy Minister Grigoris Niotis 
! Italy, represented by Deputy Minister Umberto Ranieri 
! Slovenia, represented by State Secretary Magdalena Tovornik 
! with participation of the European Commission represented by Per Vinther, 
Head of Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Croatia 
Guided by the http://www.mvp.hr/jji/ancona.html Ancona Declaration of May
19/20, 2000 and its basic principles: 
I
emphasize the significance and concrete benefits of the political dialogue with-
in the AII as an incentive for regional cooperation and strengthening of bilateral rela-
tions between the AII participating States; 
recommend the continued consultations among the participating States on all
issues pertaining to the AII cooperative framework in the spirit of good neighbourly
relations, international law, the UN decisions and the decisions of other relevant inter-
national fora; 
express their openness to and interest in establishing cooperation with the
States and regional fora in Europe and in the Mediterranean; 
underline the importance of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, the
Zagreb Summit and the EU? Stabilization and Association Process as well as individ-
ual efforts undertaken by AII participating States aimed at their gradual integration
into the EU and strengthening of stability in this part of Europe; 
express their satisfaction with the initialling of the Stabilization and
Association Agreement between Croatia and the European Union, and encourage
other States in the Adriatic and Ionian area involved in the Stabilization and
Association Process to persevere in their efforts to conclude agreements; 
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express interest of AII participating States undergoing the process of stabiliza-
tion and association to negotiate in the foreseeable future the associated status with
European Union; 
underline that a new opportunity for strengthening their cooperation can be
offered through coordination between the coming EU initiative Interreg III Adriatic
Cross-border and CARDS. 
II
Welcome the progress made in developing the organization of the Adriatic-
Ionian Initiative, especially the adoption of the AII Rules of Procedure and the Joint
Statement from the Extraordinary AIC Meeting in Zagreb, 24 November 2000, as well
as the implementation of the working programme of the Croatian chairmanship; reit-
erate their determination to improve cooperation among the local and regional level
authorities within the AII, and in this context welcome the Conclusions of the meet-
ing of mayors in Split, 22 September, 2000; 
in particular, give credit to: 
! Memorandum of Understanding from the Rome meeting devoted to illegal 
border crossing of December 21, 2000; 
! Conclusions of the Ancona Meeting of the ministers of environment of 
March 16, 2001; 
! Ravenna Declaration on establishment of the Interuniversity Network UNI-
ADRION of December 16, 2000; 
! Conclusions of the 1st Meeting of the Presidents/Speakers of Parliaments of 
the Countries Participating in the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative held in Za-
dar, 27 April 2001  
are pleased with the reports of Round Tables discussing small and medium-
sized entrepreneurship, economic cooperation and tourism, environmental protection
and sustainable development, maritime economy and traffic, inter-university, scientif-
ic, cultural and educational cooperation, security and combating all forms of organized
crime, and, with the help of experts, defining possibilities and proposing initiatives for
the development of concrete cooperation in specific areas; 
strongly condemn illegal trafficking in human beings and reconfirm that the
AII participating States are fully prepared to intensify their cooperation in combating
all forms of organized crime, money laundering and illicit trade, as well as interna-
tional terrorism. 
III
Welcome the results of the Ancona Declaration conclusions of May 20, 2000
and the Memorandum of Understanding from Rome adopted on December 21, 2000,
related to the fight against illegal migrations across and into the countries of the
Adriatic and Ionian region, as well as the UN Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime signed in Palermo on December 15, 2000, and fully support the fol-
lowing projects: 
! those suggested for financing to the European Commission through the 
CARDS programme and which at the same time make an integral part of the 
V. Round Table Joint Statement 
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! the operationalization of all the efforts regarding the State Contact Points 
with the aim of conducting prevention activities in combating the illegal 
migrations; 
stress the importance of small and medium-sized businesses, tourism, econom-
ic and rural development as key elements for the stability and economic development
in the entire region and support direct cooperation of corporate entities, giving par-
ticular preference to the priority projects chosen among those projects mentioned in
the lists attached to the II Round Table Statement. As concerns individual sectors, the
objectives to be attained are as follows: 
! promoting the setting up and expansion of SMEs with a view to creating the 
most favourable conditions for enterprises by providing both services to busi-
nesses and technical assistance to central and peripheral institutions; 
! developing the industrial cooperation, notably in sectors such as agro-indus-
try and fishery, textil, construction, woodwork industrial equipment and 
machinery; 
! exchange of tourist information within the AII countries, especially concern-
ing legislation in tourism (adjustment), quality standards in tourism, invest-
ment possibilities, training of staff; 
! strengthening the cooperation in the energy sector in order to enhance local 
infrastructure and improving management; 
support a closer cooperation in the field of maritime economy and transport,
giving preference to the following projects: 
! safety of navigation; 
! intensifying port links in the region; 
! cooperation in the area of seamens education, including application of 
international standards, and promotion of seamens education; 
! Adriatic-Ionian traffic corridor which participating states will submit as the 
common proposal to the European Commission and to ECMT in order to 
include it in the Pan European Transport Network, namely the Adriatic-
-Ionian PETrA; 
! implementation of the bilateral and trilateral agreements signed by the 
Participating States of the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative in order to increase 
the level of safety of navigation, particularly regarding navigation of ships 
carrying dangerous or polluting substances; 
emphasize the importance of encouraging inter-university, scientific, cultural
and educational cooperation to improve mutual understanding and confidence and to
preserve shared cultural and natural heritage, undertaking initiatives in the following
areas: 
! supporting the development of the inter-university network UNIADRION, 
including also the establishment of the virtual university UNIADRION, shar-
ing the knowledge and experience of all member countries and improving 
their cooperation in the higher education and research area; 
! promoting networks of Centres of Excellence in the fields of environmental 
sciences, medical and biomedical sciences, molecular biology, marine ecolo-
gy, information technology, etc.; 
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! improving the development of information society in the Adriatic and Ionian 
region; 
! encouraging research in field relating to the historical and cultural heritage of 
the region, including in the first phase specific areas like those of archives, 
ancient theatres, and of abandoned schools along the coast and islands 
accompanied by the revival of old crafts, artistic youth centres, eco-centres 
etc.; 
! establishing networks that shall develop and implement ecological research 
and environmental education; 
! examining the possibility to promote primary and secondary school-level 
Centres of Excellence with special regards to vocational education, e.g: stan-
dards, certification and evaluation indicators; 
aware of the need to ensure sustainable growth and environmental protection,
attach exceptional importance to greater ecological awareness and cooperation in the
prevention of ecological disasters, and lend their support to the following projects in
particular: 
! sub-regional contingency plan in case of accidental marine pollution of the 
Adriatic Sea; 
! programme on monitoring and research of the Adriatic Sea Quality with 
emphasis on the CAOS (Coordinated Adriatic Observing System) and 
ADRICOSM projects, contained in the Conclusions of the Ancona meeting 
of the ministers of environment; 
! preparation of the RBMP (River Basin Management Plan) for the Adriatic 
region in line with EU/WFD and Coastal Area Management Plan (CAMP), 
taking into consideration the ADRICOSM project as well; 
reiterate trust in EU approval to the LIFE-Third Countries project proposal
called Strengthening Croatian Capacity in Environmental Data Gathering presented
jointly by Italy and Croatia, aimed also to disseminate its outcomes to all AII Third-
Countries; 
urge the expert groups to continue their valuable work and report at the fol-
lowing session of the Council on the implementation of the accepted projects and, in
cooperation with the EU institutions and member states, propose new ideas for coop-
eration of similar scale. 
IV
Stress their readiness to co-ordinate the AII activities with other initiatives in
Central and South-Eastern Europe; 
express their interest in exchanging information with the Council of Baltic Sea
States (CBSS), the Vi{egrad Group or the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
and Central European Initiative (CEI); 
welcome the interest shown by the European Union in an improved coopera-
tion in the Adriatic and Ionian area and express their conviction that the AII will con-
tinue to provide significant contribution to the EUs integration and stabilization pol-
icy in this part of Europe; 
welcome the European Commissions intentions to take due account of AII
priorities in the programming and project identification exercises for CARDS. 
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invite the EU to continue the cooperation already undertaken within the
Adriatic and Ionian Initiative; 
express their gratitude for the participation of the experts from the participat-
ing states in the work of the round tables and support the implementation of common
projects included in the Joint Statement of the Round Tables; 
express their gratitude to the Republic of Croatia for its contribution to the
Initiative over the period of its presidency and for the successful organization of this
meeting of the Council, and entrust Greece with the next AII Chairmanship until May
2002. 
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VI CENTRAL EUROPEAN INITIATIVE
1.  Final Document
Meeting of the Heads of Government of the
Member States of the Central European Initiative
Trieste, 23 November 2001
1. The Heads of Government of the Member States of the Central European
Initiative (CEI) held their annual Summit meeting in Trieste on 23 November 2001.
The meeting was chaired by H.E. Mr. Silvio Berlusconi, Prime Minister of the
Republic of Italy, holding the CEI Presidency for the current year.
2. The meeting was attended by the Heads of Government or their representa-
tives ofAlbania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), theStability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the Council of Europe, the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII), the
Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Danube Commis-
sion, the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP), the European
Investment Bank (EIB) and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)
attended the meeting in their capacity of special guests.
The meeting was also attended by the representatives of the CEI Parliamentary
Assembly and of the Central European Chambers of Commerce Initiative (CECCI).
The Head of the CEI - Executive Secretariat (CEI-ES) and the Head of the
Secretariat for CEI Projects also participated in the meeting.
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Political Part
3. The Heads of Government condemned the terrorist attack of 11 September
2001 and declared their full solidarity to the innocent victims and to the American
people. These attacks are an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicul-
tural societies. They are a challenge to the conscience of each human being and are
regarded by the UN Security Council as a threat to international peace and security.
The Heads of Government reiterated the will of the CEI countries to fully cooperate,
within the global coalition against terrorism, in bringing to justice and punishing the
perpetrators, sponsors and accomplices of such barbaric acts. At the same time, they
expressed their conviction that the regional cooperation and the integration of all
countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and development is a condi-
tion for a strong and sustainable community for combating terrorism.
Responding to the appeal issued by the Extraordinary European Council held
in Brussels on 21 September 2001, they reiterated the importance of pursuing, in all
multilateral fora,dialogue and negotiation with a view to build a world of peace and
tolerance. In this respect they emphasized the need to combat and eradicate terrorism
as well as any racist and xenophobic drift and rejected any equation of terrorism with
the Muslim world.
4. The Heads of Government reiterated their full support to the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Macedonia.
They welcomed the recent adoption of the changes in the Constitution by the
Macedonian Parliament and supported the full implementation of the Framework
Agreement.
They also welcomed the commitment of political forces in the country to the
integration into European structures.
The Heads of Government called for an efficient action for the returning of the
internally displaced persons and condemned in the strongest terms all attempts to use
violence to achieve political goals.
They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen international efforts to assist
Macedonia to overcome the consequences of the crisis, including the organization of
a Donors Conference.
5. The Heads of Government welcomed the 17 November 2001 elections in
Kosovo as an important step in realizing a democratic and multi-ethnic society.
Expecting that a provisional self-government will be established expeditiously and
that all Kosovos communities will participate in the political process, they reaffirmed
the validity of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.
The Heads of Government also called for the continuation of a constructive
dialogue between Belgrade and Podgorica in order to achieve a mutually acceptable
constitutional arrangement within the FRY.
6. The Heads of Government took note of the result of the presidential elec-
tions held on 9 September 2001 in Belarus and shared the conclusions of the
OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report published on 3
October 2001. They also took note of the conclusions of other observation missions of
the European organizations. The Heads of Government emphasised that strengthen-
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ing of the democratization process in the country must continue with the view to bet-
ter integrate Belarus in the standards and values shared by the European countries.
7. The Heads of Government welcomed the very substantial progress in the
process of the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Council of Europe. They
also welcomed the efforts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to join the Council of
Europe.
Regional Cooperation
8. The Heads of Government reaffirmed their conviction that closer regional
cooperation is the most effective tool to foster political stability, democracy, econom-
ic progress and social development in the South Eastern Europe region. A successful
regional cooperation is conducive to accelerate the integration of the region into
European structures.
9. The Heads of Government reiterated the crucial role which the Stability Pact
for South Eastern Europe is playing for the stability and progress of this part of the
CEI region, and the support of CEI Member States to the implementation of SP pro-
grammes and projects. They encouraged all CEI working bodies to contribute to the
transferring of the experiences gained by the SP to CEI MS which are not taking full
part in the SP, in particular in trade liberalization.
The Heads of Government welcomed the results of the Second Regional
Conference for South East Europe, held on 25-26 October 2001 in Bucharest, organ-
ized jointly by the Stability Pact, European Commission, World Bank and the
Romanian Government.
The Heads of Government supported that the Czech Republic, Poland and the
Slovak Republic be admitted as participants of the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe during its next Regional Table to be held in 2002.
10. The Heads of Government expressed their satisfaction with the progress
made by the CEI Member States in the process of integration to the European main-
stream organizations, in particular to the European Union. They stressed the impor-
tance of the process of enlargement of the EU as a fundamental contribution to the
stability, democracy and economic development in Europe. They also reiterated the
importance of maintaining the roadmap defined at the European Council in Nice for
the conclusion of the accession negotiations of the most advanced candidate countries
by the end of 2002.
The Heads of Government also appreciated the progress in implementing the
criteria of the EU Stabilization and Association Process made by individual CEI
Member States. They complimented Croatia on the signing the Stabilization and
Association
Agreement which is a crucial step in further preparations for joining the EU.
Being it fully in line to the CEI strategy of cohesion and solidarity in Europe, the CEI
will further encourage and support its other Member States (Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, FRY) in complying with the conditions laid down by the EU for the
opening of negotiations for the conclusion of a Stabilization and Association
Agreement. They welcomed, in particular, the progress achieved by Albania in this
process.
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The Heads of Government welcomed the political readiness of Moldova to join
the EU Stabilization and Association Process. They also expressed their full support
for the efforts undertaken by the Moldovan authorities towards strengthening border
control and re-establishing the common customs area in the Republic of Moldova.
They also welcomed Göteborg European Council decision on the participation of
Ukraine and Moldova in the European Conference which opened further prospects
for closer European cooperation.
11. The Heads of Government recognized the comprehensive role the OSCE
plays in enhancing stability and security in Europe and reaffirmed the readiness of the
CEI to develop further the cooperation with the OSCE in conflict prevention and
post-conflict rehabilitation, particularly in easing the tensions in South Eastern
Europe.
The Heads of Government commended the work done by Romania as the
Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE.
CEI cooperation
12. The Heads of Government expressed their satisfaction with the CEI
Summit Economic Forum, organized this year in Trieste with the active participation
of the Ministers of economic sectors, and its role in mobilising representatives of all
sectors of economic activity, and the private sector in particular, from any country in
the world interested in the development of the CEI region. This economic develop-
ment can be an instrument of stability, welfare and peace in the region if accompanied
by regional cooperation.
The Heads of Government noted that new proposals for cooperation have
been discussed by the SEF and they encouraged the organizers to follow up the sug-
gestions made by the participants and to involve a broader European and interna-
tional audience in the economic cooperation of the CEI.
The Heads of Government took note of the Final Declaration of the annual
meeting of the Presidents of the Chambers of Commerce of the Central European
Chambers of Commerce Initiative (CECCI) held in Trieste on 21 November 2001.
13. The Heads of Government welcomed the first CEI Youth Forum which was
initiated by Poland during the CEI Summit 2000 in Budapest. They took note with
appreciation of the final Declaration of the Youth Forum and expressed their full sup-
port to the objectives of the Declaration, recognizing in particular the need of young
people to have ensured physical and intellectual development as well as social inte-
gration into the societies of their countries and into wider European structures.
They expressed their appreciation for the idea to create a CEI University,
bringing together the young people from all the countries of the region, in order to
contribute to the European integration.
14. The Heads of Government noted with appreciation the CEI Plan of
Action 2000-2001 Implementation Report prepared by the CEI -Executive Secre-
tariat for this CEI Summit which illustrate a substantial increase in CEI activities dur-
ing the past two year period. The CEI Plan of Action 2000 -2001 Implementation
Report is attached to the Final Document.
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The Heads of Government also took note of the WG activities report of 23
November 2001.
15. The Heads of Government, approving the CEI Plan of Action 2002-2003,
called upon all responsible CEI working bodies and structures to implement the activ-
ities listed in the PoA, and to promote new initiatives for CEI cooperation. In partic-
ular, they reminded theWG chairpersons of their responsibility for the implementa-
tion of the PoA.
16. The Heads of Government welcomed the progress made on several pro-
grammes and projects by the Secretariat for CEI Projects using the CEI Fund at the
EBRD provided by the Italian Government. They expressed satisfaction with the
planned replenishment of the Fund, to be provided by the Italian Government for
approximately Euro 5 millions. They also welcomed the wide range of international
events sponsored by the CEI for 2001, comprising workshops, seminars, training
courses, and conferences.
They noted with satisfaction the important role of the EBRD for the develop-
ment of investment in the CEI region and the opportunities that this provides for CEI-
EBRD cooperation initiatives.
17. The Heads of Government took note of the progress in cooperation
between the CEI and other European and international organizations and regional
initiatives. In particular, they stressed the fruitful implementation of the Memoran-
dum of Understanding and Cooperation Programme between the CEI and the
UN/ECE, especially in the field of SME development and investment promotion; the
results of the cooperation between the CEI and the ICS-UNIDO for sustainable tech-
nological development of CEI countries; the importance of activities organized joint-
ly with the OECD, especially in the framework of the LEED programme; the new
cooperation with FAO in the agricultural field; the readiness for more coordination in
planning with the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, Black Sea Economic Cooperation and
SECI.
18. The Heads of Government welcomed the cooperation of Parliaments of
CEI Member States and took note of the Final Document of the CEI Parliamentary
Committee Meeting held in Rome on 9 March 2001, the results of the meeting of
Speakers of Parliament in Budapest on 29-31 March 2001 and of the Final Declaration
issued by the CEI Parliamentary Assembly in Rome on 26 October 2001. They
stressed the crucial importance of the CEI Parliamentary Dimension as an essential
and fundamental instrument that interacts and cooperates with the bodies of the CEI
governmental dimension. 
19. The Heads of Government welcomed the appointment by the Meeting of
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Trieste on 22 November 2001 of Ambassador
Dr. Harald Kreid as the new Director General of the CEI  Executive Secretariat
starting from 1 January 2002 for a three-years mandate with the option for a one time
renewal of up to three more years. The Heads of Government expressed their great
appreciation for the excellent guidance provided by Amb. Dr. Paul Hartig to the CEI
 Executive Secretariat as its Director General since his appointment in 1995.
20. The Heads of Government expressed their gratitude to the Italian Govern-
ment for the excellent organization of the Meeting of the Heads of Government of the
CEI Member States, the Summit Economic Forum and the CEI Youth Forum in
Trieste. 
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Decision
The Heads of Government approved, in accordance with Art. 12 of the CEI
Guidelines and Rules of Procedure, the Plan of Action for 2002-2003.
2. CEI Plan of Action 2002 - 2003
(Meeting of the Heads of Government
of the Member States of the Central European Initiative
Trieste, 23 November 2001)
Introduction
Cooperation developed over the years within the framework of the CEI
extends to a wide range of activities, programmes and projects in different areas of
common interest.
The CEI Plan of Action 2002-2003 constitutes a framework for concrete pro-
grammes and projects proposed or initiated by individual Member States or by CEI
bodies for implementation within the CEI cooperation structures, using existing or
newly established implementation mechanisms and funds. As the meetings of the CEI
Heads of Government and of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the meantime con-
firmed the topicality of the CEI strategy of cohesion and solidarity based on the
Sarajevo Declaration 1997 the structure and basic elements of the Plan of Action
2002-2003 remain those of the previous one.
The adoption of the CEI Plan of Action 2002-2003 by the CEI Summit 2001 in
Trieste shall offer to Member States an appropriate framework for new initiatives
which can contribute to further the realization of the three principal CEI objectives
within the overall CEI strategy of cohesion and solidarity.
I. Strengthening cooperation among and between Member States
I.1. Neighbourhood cooperation initiatives
I.1.1. Fostering the political dialogue, strengthening good neighbourly 
relations and stability in the CEI region
I.1.1.1 Troika fact-finding missions on CEI Presidencys initiative in case of 
threats of peace in the CEI region, in particular by relying on the 
CEI experience in handling problems in cooperation with the inter-
national community
I.1.2.  Cooperation among CEI Member States in view of an imminent EU 
enlargement for avoiding possible new dividing lines
I.1.2.1. Travel regimes and harmonization of visa policy in CEI countries, in 
particular in regard to the new EU external borders (WG on Mi-
gration)
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I.1.2.2. People-to-people contacts in new EU border areas (WG on 
Interregional and Cross-border Cooperation)
I.1.2.3. Cross-border cooperation and development of Euro-regions in CEI 
countries (WG on IRCBC) 
I.1.2.4. Consequences of new Schengen borders in possible new divisions of 
minorities from mother countries and common CEI measures (WG 
on Minorities)
I.1.2.5. Possibilities of employing the inhabitants of border regions of CEI 
Member States aspiring for integration with the EU  bypassing 
existing work permits and visa requirements (WG on HRD&T; 
other WGs)
I.2. Human dimension
I.2.1. Strengthening democracy (Expert Group on Human Dimension)
I.2.1.1. Cooperation with the CEI Parliamentary dimension
I.2.1.2. Cooperation among Ombudsman institutions
I.3.1.3. Twinning and cooperation among local communities
I.2.2. Protection of minorities (WG on Minorities)
I.3.2.1. Implementation of the CEI Instrument for the Protection of 
Minority Rights
I.2.3. Cooperation in the field of information and media (WG on 
Information and Media)
I.2.3.1. Training programmes for journalists of CEI member countries
I.2.3.2. Establishment of a regional cross-border television
I.2.3.3. International Conference on Public Diplomacy and Media
I.2.4. Gender issues (see III.1.3)
I.2.5. Promotion of cooperation with NGOs
I.3. Combating organized crime, international terrorism, drugs 
and arms trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in human 
beings, cyber-crime
I.3.1. Implementation of the Trieste Declaration on Organized Crime 
1998 (WG on Combating Organized Crime)
I.3.2. Preparation and implementation of the CEI Manual on Combating 
Organized Crime (WG on Combating Organized Crime)
I.3.3. Reporting on computer crime in CEI countries (WG on Combating 
Organized Crime)
I.3.4. Reporting on exploitation of prostitution in CEI countries (WG on 
Combating Organized Crime)
I.3.5. Training programmes (WG on Combating Organized Crime)
I.3.6. Implementation of the Trieste Declaration on Judicial Cooperation 
and Legislative Harmonisation 2001 (Subgroup on Judicial Coope-
ration)
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I.3.7. Cooperation with the Stability Pact WT III SPOC
I.3.8. International CEI Diplomatic Conference on Diplomacy and 
Security
I.4. Civil Protection (WG work-programme)
I.4.1. CEI Cooperation Agreement on the forecast prevention and mitiga-
tion of natural and technological disasters
I.4.2. CEI Operational Manual on Civil Protection
I.4.3. Training courses on Fire Prevention
I.4.4. Establishing a data-bank system of national regulations in the field 
of civil protection
I.4.5. Establishment of cross-border procedures and intervention in case 
of disaster
I.4.6. CEI cooperation on studying environmental security and risks
I.4.7. Cooperation with the relevant EU structures
I.5. Promotion of Tourism (WG work-programme)
I.5.1. Preparation of promotional documentation (Tourism in Key 
Figures; Image Brochure)
I.5.2. Promotion of investment in tourism
I.5.2.1. Selected itineraries routes in CEI countries and issuing of the rele-
vant brochures
I.5.3. Presentation of the CEI at Tourism Fairs
I.5.4. Seminars, Conferences, Training Programmes in the field of tourism
I.5.4.1. Organization of a conference to discuss and elaborate a common 
plan of action of CEI Member States in the field of tourism
I.5.6. Eco-Tourism
I.5.7. Realization of linkage among the Homepages of the Tourist 
Agencies of CEI countries
I.6. Science and Technology (WG work-programme)
I.6.1. Central Europe Regional Geo-dynamics development line - CER
GOP related activities
I.6.2. Implementation of Unification of Gravity Systems in Central and 
Eastern European countries -post-UNIGRACE actions
I.6.3. University Education Standards (activities of Section C group)
I.6.4. Development of satellite navigation systems in CEI countries (activ-
ities of section C group)
I.6.5. Development of cross border cooperation in geodesy and geo-
-dynamics
I.6.6. Cooperation with other scientific organizations  European 
Geophysical Society and International Association of Geodesy
I.6.7. Cooperation in geophysics: Continuation of the EUROPROBE-
PAN-CARDI Project and application of shallow high resolution 
geophysical methods for environmental, engineering and other pur-
poses
I.6.8. Cooperation in geology: GEOHAZARDS in Central Europe
I.6.9. Modification of materials by low and medium energy ion beams
I.6.10 Importance of the Innovation and Technological Centres, Industrial 
Parks, Centres for Entrepreneurs
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I.6.11. Technology transfer with a specific attention to the SMEs needs
I.6.12. Science and Technology Enterprise Programme
I.6.13. Information society development. Preparation of national informa-
tion systems on labour markets in CEI countries and their integra-
tion with the European system EURES
I.6.14. Implementation of the Convention between the CEI and the Inter-
national Centre for Science and High Technology of UNIDO (ICS-
UNIDO), with a specific attention to the researches focused to the 
sustainable development in the CEI Countries.
I.6.15. Cooperation with the International Centre for Genetic Engineering 
and Biotechnology (ICGEB) of Trieste
I.7. Cooperation in the field of culture and education
I.7.1. Implementation of the projects and programmes proposed by 
Member States (WG on Culture and Education)
I.7.2. Cooperation among CEI national museums (CEI Museum 
Network)
I.7.3. Extension of the Transfrontier Television established by Italy and 
Slovenia to other CEI countries (joint activity of WG on Culture and 
Education and WG on Information and Media)
I.7.4. Extension of the Central European Exchange Program for 
University Studies (CEEPUS) to other CEI countries4
I.7.5. Seminars on management of cultural institutions
I.7.6. Cooperation activities in the field of education also with respect to 
employability
I.7.7. Cultural events held under the CEI patronage (Mittelfest, Vilenica, 
CEI International Music Camp, etc.)
I.8. Cooperation initiatives in the field of youth affairs
I.8.1. CEI Youth Forum (CEI Presidency, WG on Youth Affairs)
I.8.2. WG on Youth Affairs:
I.8.2.1. Analysing consequences of EU enlargement on youth mobility, 
planning of CEI measures (joint activity with the WG on Migration)
I.8.2.2. Training Programmes and projects proposed by the CEI Countries
I.8.2.3. CEI International Music Camp (in cooperation with the WG on 
Culture and Education)
I.8.2.4. CEI Summer School of Architecture
I.8.3. Mechanisms of facilitating young people starting studies and enter
ing the labour market. Adaptation of the profile of studies to the 
changing labour market requirements (WG on Youth Affairs, WG 
on HRD&T)
I.8.4. Preparing young people for the competition on the European labour 
market. Access to scholarships offered by the EU Member States 
and addressed to the youth from the CEI countries (WG on Youth 
Affairs, WG on HRD&T)
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I.8.5. Training of employment institutions employees via internet (WG on 
Youth Affairs, WG on HRD&T)
I.9. Cooperation among universities and research organizations
I.9.1. CEI academic network (University of Bologna/Centre for Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans with other institutes from CEI countries)
I.9.2. Participation in regional programmes funded by international orga-
nizations (WG on Science and Technology, Culture and Education)
II. Strengthening the participation of all Member States 
in the process of European integration
II.1. Cooperation among CEI MS in harmonizing the integra-
tion strategy and strengthening activities for avoiding new 
dividing lines in Europe
II.1.1. Political dialogue with the European Union
II.1.1.1. Joint meetings/consultations of the CNC and/or the CEI Troika with 
the representatives of the European Union
II.1.2. Cooperation in the process of liberalization of trade among CEI 
countries
II.1.2.1. Joint action of the CEI with the EU SAP countries, SP WG on 
Trade Liberalization and Facilitation and CEFTA for expanding 
free trade experences to the CEI region
II.1.3. Cooperation in the field of pan-European transport
II.1.3.1. WG on Transport :Pan-European Transport Corridors V, VII, VIII 
and X
II.1.3.2. CETIR (Central European Transport Information Reporting 
System)
II.1.3.3. Cooperation with international organizations on investment prepa-
ration methodologies (e.g. TINA-Transport Infrastructure Needs 
Assessment)
II.1.3.4. Northern Adriatic Ports Area Network (NAPAN)
II.1.4. Cooperation in rehabilitation and development of the Danube basin
II.2. Cooperation with international, European and regional 
organizations
II.2.1. Cooperation with the OSCE (WGs on Information and Media, 
Human Dimension)
II.2.2. Cooperation with the OECD (SEF, WG on SME, LEED)
II.2.3. Cooperation with the UN/ECE (implementation of the Memoran-
dum of Understanding, SEF, WG on SME)
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II.2.4. Cooperation with the Council of Europe (WGs on Interregional and 
Cross-border Cooperation, Human Dimension, Minorities, Culture 
and Education)
II.2.4.1. Follow-up of the Budapest Conference (2-6 December 2001) on 
Impact of International Trade Contracts to the Cultural Policies of 
the CEI Member States
II.2.5. Cooperation with regional cooperation initiatives, in particular 
Adriatic Initiative, BSEC, SECI, etc. (CEI-ES, WGs on Energy, 
SME, COC, Civil Protection, Culture and Education)
II.2.6. Cooperation with the Stability Pact bodies (CEI Advisory Board, 
WGs on COC, Civil Protection, Culture and Education, Information 
and Media, Minorities, SMEs, Youth Affairs, SEF)
II.2.7. Cooperation with FAO (WG on Agriculture)
II.3. Cooperation with international financial institutions
II.3.1. Cooperation with the EBRD (Secretariat for CEI Projects)
II.3.1.1. Assistance to the countries in special need, in particular assistance to 
Chernobyl affected areas in Belarus and Ukraine; CEI micro-financ-
ing programme in Albania, and projects being lasting under imple-
mentation in Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova)
II.3.1.2. Cooperation with the EBRD Balkan Region Action Plan
II.3.2. Cooperation with other international financial Institutions 
(Secretariat for CEI Projects)
III.      Strengthening economic transformation of the CEI countries 
in transition
III.1. Small and Medium Enterprise Development
III.1.1. Implementation of the Budapest CEI Declaration on Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises at the Dawn of the 21st Century (WG 
on SME)
III.1.2. Extension of BAS programme (now operating in Croatia and 
Slovenia) to other CEI countries (Secretariat for CEI Projects)
III.1.3. Implementation of the Final Statement of the Brijuni Conference 
Women Entrepreneurship  East-West Co- operation (WG on 
SME, IMO Zagreb, OECD, UN/ECE)
III.1.4. Development of the SME Support Institutions and Fostering Job 
Creation in Rural Areas in the countries of South Eastern Europe 
under the Pact of Stability (WG on SME, Slovenia, Secretariat for 
CEI Projects)
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III.2. Human Resources Development and Training
III.2.1. Implementation of the training programme (WG on Human 
Resource Development and Training)
III.2.2. Cooperation among CEI diplomatic services in training (CEI 
Diplomatic Training Network, Croatian Diplomatic Academy)
III.2.2.1. Specialized International Diplomatic Training Seminars for Diplo-
mats from Countries in Transition
III.2.3. CEI contribution to the Szeged Training Programme (Hungary)
III.2.4. Other training programmes
III.2.4.1 Supporting the implementation of the E-Commerce among Central-
European Firms (program/seminar to be held by Hungarian 
Institute of Vocational Training)
III.2.4.2. Training in the Field of Economic and Business Diplomacy as a 
Follow-up of the CEI International Conference Economic 
Diplomacy in Countries in Transition
III.3. Agriculture  work-programme of the WG
III.3.1. Implementation of the Verona Ministerial Statement 2001
III.3.2. CEI Wholesale Markets Programme
III.3.3. Utilization of Geographic Information System Technology to deve-
lop  information system on agricultural land in CEI countries
III.3.4. Development of ecological agriculture in CEI countries
III.4. Energy  work-programme of the WG
III.4.1. Establishment of practical mechanisms for energy conservation and 
energy efficiency in CEI countries in connection with the WG on 
Environment
III.4.2. Establishment of a network of national and regional centres for 
energy efficiency in CEI countries
III.5. Investment, infrastructure and business development
III.5.1. Support to investment in Romanian railways (Secretariat for CEI 
Projects)
III.5.2. Other infrastructure and investment initiatives in CEI countries
III.6. Environment
III.6.1. Implementation of the Ministerial Declaration Towards Sustain-
able Transport in CEI Countries (Sub-group on Environment and 
Transport)
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III.6.2. Implementation of the OECD/UNEP/Austrian Joint Pilot Study on 
EST in the CEI Countries in Transition, Pilot Actions EST goes 
EAST (Sub-group on Environment and Transport)
III.6.3. Environmental protection of the Tisza and Danube basin (Romania, 
Hungary, WG on Environment)
III.6.4. Implementation of the Declaration on environment and sustainable 
development in the Carpathian and Danube region (Bucharest 
Summit Declaration, April 2001)  (WG on Environment)
III.6.5. Other investment projects in environment (Secretariat for CEI 
Projects)
III.6.6. Conference on Energy and Transport  Challenges and Possible 
Sustainable Solutions in the CEI Region in preparation of the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development, Vienna, November 
2001
III.7. Reconstruction and Development  work-programme 
of the WG
III.7.1. Establishing a data-bank system of key infrastructure investment 
projects and country investment guides
III.7.2. Enhancement of regional cooperation through regional and cross-
-border dimension economic development projects
III.7.3. Workshops, seminars and training courses on economic develop-
ment issues
III.7.4. Economic dimension of stability of the region and relations among 
Member States -reconstruction and development as a factor of con-
fidence-building, multicultural society,  reconciliation and a lasting 
peace
III.8. Cooperation through information technology
III.8.1. International Computer Networks
III.8.2. Directory of experts and projects
III.8.3. Information system for training events
III.8.4. Internet assistance to CEI countries
III.8.5. CECCI information network
IV. CEI Summit Economic Forum (SEF) and related 
international events
IV.1. CEI Summit Economic Forum (SEF)
IV.1.1. Meeting of the Ministers of Economic Affairs/Foreign Trade
IV.1.2. Meeting of the Presidents of the Chambers of Commerce/Economy 
(CECCI)
IV.1.3. Meeting of the heads of Investment Promotion Agencies
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IV.1.4. Meeting of the CEI Women Entrepreneurship initiative
IV.1.5. Meeting of International Financial Institutions
IV.1.6. Meeting on South Eastern Europe reconstruction
IV.1.7. Meeting of the Infrastructure Agencies of CEI countries
IV.1.8. Meeting of Technology Institutes of CEI countries
IV.2. CEI International Events
IV.2.1. Events related to economic subjects and investments
IV.2.2. Events related to non investment subjects (e.g. culture)
3.  Memorandum of Understanding
between
the Central European Initiative
Regional grouping comprising 16 States in Central and Eastern Europe, repre-
sented by the CEI Chairman-in-office
and the CEI -Executive Secretariat based in Trieste, Italy, represented by the 
Director General,
Thereinafter called CEI and CEI -Executive Secretariat (CEI-ES) respectively
and
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
Regional Commission of the United Nations based in Geneva, Switzerland, 
represented by the Executive Secretary,
Thereinafter called UN/ECE
Considering that the cooperation within the CEI shall include inter alia the fol-
lowing areas 1:
- economic and technical cooperation;
- development of infrastructure in transport, energy, telecommunications, agri-
culture;
- strengthening the democratic institutions and observance of human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities as well as 
humanitarian matters;
- protection of human environment;
- cooperation in the field of science and technology, media, culture, education, 
youth exchange, tourism;
- cross-border and interregional cooperation;
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- consultations on political matters of mutual interest; and shall aim at imple-
menting the comprehensive CEI strategy as defined in the Sarajevo Decla-
ration, adopted by the CEI Summit, Sarajevo, 29 November 1997;
Considering also that the CEI Member State which chairs the CEI is support-
ed by the CEI - Executive Secretariat 2 which operates in accordance with the
Guidelines for Operations of the CEI-ES, specifying its mandate;
Considering that the mandate and aims of the UN/ECE include the following
principles contained in the ECE Plan of Action adopted at its 52nd jubilee session:
- to support activities which are initiated by sub-regional groupings and which 
relate to the ECE areas of expertise;
- to facilitate the dissemination and implementation of ECE norms and con-
ventions through cooperation with sub-regional groupings;
- to develop further the cooperation with organizations which have specific 
activities or projects in the same field of work and in the same countries as 
ECE, on the basis of comparative advantages. This include activities sup
ported by financing institution such as EBRD, World Bank, European 
Investment Bank and UNDP;
- to provide a forum for dialogue aimed at bringing about a better understan-
ding of different aspects of the transition process and for the negotiation of 
normative frameworks in these areas;
- to involve the private sector in its activities, taking particular account of the 
development of the business sector in countries in transition;
- to further diversify its activities and methods designed to assist the integration 
of Central and East European countries into the European and world econo-
mies especially through seminars, workshops and advisory services in such 
fields as economic analysis, statistics, transport, environment, human settle-
ments, population, trade facilitation, investment promotion and energy;
The CEI, supported by the CEI - Executive Secretariat, will:
- keep the UN/ECE informed of its current and planned activities of common 
interest to both organizations, in particular those relating to:
- the country specific strategies
- trade and transport facilitation
- small and medium enterprises
- transport
- environment
- secure continuous interaction between UN/ECE and the CEI Working
Groups/Project Groups and the Secretariat for CEI Projects at the EBRD
- exchange information, publications and work programmes, as well as sched-
ules of meetings so as to secure UN/ECE attendance at the meetings of mutu-
al interest;
- give public information coverage to those meetings or activities organized 
jointly by the UN/ECE and the CEI;
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- make arrangements in concert with the UN/ECE regarding the appointment 
of a UN/ECE staff member who shall act as focal point for cooperation 
with the CEI, its Executive Secretariat, the Secretariat for CEI Projects at the 
EBRD (CEI/EBRD Secretariat) and the various Working/Project Groups. 
The function of the focal point will start as soon as appropriate financial 
resources covering also support costs are made available to the UN/ECE by 
the EBRD through its Secretariat for CEI Projects and recruitment of the 
focal point is completed in accordance with UN rules and regulations. Its 
terms of reference are specified in  the relevant Cooperation Agreement 
between the UN/ECE and the CEI/EBRD Secretariat on Technical Support 
to the CEI. Any other financial implications of the cooperation agreed upon 
will be the subject of separate agreements.
The UN/ECE will:
- within the limits of its own resources and in line with the policy of the Com-
mission and the Economic and Social Council make available its expertise 
especially in the fields of economic analysis, statistics, environment, energy, 
transport, trade facilitation and enterprise development;
- make available the ECE conventions, norms and standards, as well as other 
technical knowledge relevant for the agreed areas of cooperation;
- invite the CEI, through the CEI - Executive Secretariat to take part in the 
UN/ECE meetings of mutual interest;
- provide advisory services and professional support to the CEI Wor-
king/Project Groups within the limits of its own resources;
- secure synergies between its cooperation with the CEI and other subregional 
groupings and special initiatives.
- meet the requirements specified in the cooperation agreement between the 
UN/ECE and the CEI/EBRD Secretariat related to the use of the CEI Italian 
Trust Fund at the EBRD, and aimed at the development of CEI project ideas 
into bankable projects.
The Memorandum of Understanding will be renewed each year by tacit
Agreement unless either Party advises otherwise in writing.
For the CEI Presidency: For the UN/ECE:
For the CEI-Executive Secretariat:
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VII  DANUBE COOPEARION PROCESS
DECLARATION
On the Establishment of the 
Danube Cooperation Process
1.The Republic of Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bulgaria, 
the Republic of Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, Ukraine and the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia, as the States from the hydrological basin of Danube 
(hereinafter referred to as Danubian countries), the European Commission 
and the Stability Pact for South East Europe, 
2.Considering that, for the first time in history, these countries share the same 
democratic principles and values, 
3.Recognizing that all the Danubian countries, EU member States, candidates 
for accession to the Union, countries taking part at various stages in the Sta-
bilisation and Association process and countries anchored to the EU through 
other specific ties, wish to cooperate to help bring stability, prosperity and 
better economic and social cohesion to the entire region,
4.Noting that building prosperous societies in all these countries will in part 
depend on good bilateral and regional cooperation,
5.Noting that the natural flow of the Danube, from its origin in the very heart 
of Europe to the Black Sea, clearly shows this European waterways poten-
tial as a force for integration and observing that it has always been inextrica-
bly part of Europes history, evolution, and that it will continue to be so in the 
future,
6.Taking into account the existing momentum, in favour of broadening co-
operation in the Danube region, and noting recent various initiatives as well 
as the results already achieved in this field, 
7.Considering that the new political conditions in the Danube region are con-
ducive to better cooperation among the countries of the area, as an addi-
tional contribution to the process of building the European identity,
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8.Aware of the fact that, through common action, these can contribute to the 
development and the prosperity of Europe, as well as to overall European 
security, 
9.Noting with satisfaction the decisive steps taken to reach the full reestablish-
ment of free navigation at Novi Sad, which will be a valuable contribution to 
the development of the potential of the Danube and the Danube region,
10. Recognizing the important and continuing role of the European Commission 
and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in enhancing cooperation 
among the countries from the Danube region,
11. Acknowledging also the responsibilities and the work of the Danube Com-
mission and the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube 
River in their respective fields of activities,
12. Welcoming the initiatives of various organizations aiming at promoting sus-
tainable development in the area, like, for instance, the Council of Europe 
initiative for the quinculateral cooperation in the Tisa river basin or the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe initiative on the Sava river basin,
13. Stressing that the regional character of cooperation in the Danube region is 
a vital tool for the development of the whole region, 
Agree to
14. broaden and deepen present Danube cooperation and give to it clear politi-
cal and economic dimensions, without creating new institutions, but taking 
stock of and using the existing structures and, where necessary, harmonising 
their objectives and efforts, providing a focus, where appropriate, for their 
efforts within the Danube region;
15. address common concerns, interests and objectives of all the Danubian coun-
tries; 
16. highlight issues related to Europe and the European integration process, 
which are of great importance to the Danubian countries; 
17. develop further the various initiatives already launched in different fields of 
present Danube cooperation, taking particular account of the regional objec-
tives being pursued by the European Union and the Stability Pact for South-
-Eastern Europe in the region and with a view to bringing greater coherence, 
pragmatism and added value to these;
18. give the Danube Cooperation Process (the Process) a multi-dimensional 
character, whose main feature shall be its political dimension which will 
establish priorities for action within the Process, in accordance with the spe-
cific objectives and concerns of the Danubian countries and which will pro-
vide the necessary impetus to effective implementation of various concrete 
forms of cooperation, as well as to improving the security of the region. 
Further Agree That
19. cooperation among the Danubian  countries under the aegis of the Process 
towards sustainable development, should be pursued in the following fields:
! the economic dimension, with appropriate attention given to transport 
issues in their various forms, taking into account existing cooperation in par-
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ticular the work in the framework of the Pan-European transport Corridor 
VII, and of Corridors IV, V and X connected to it; 
! the navigation dimension, whose main core will be the activities developed 
under the responsibilities of the Danube Commission which should be sup-
ported in its efforts aiming at redrafting the 1948 Belgrade Convention;
! the environmental dimension, which will contribute to enhanced coopera-
tion between the Danubian countries  in the field of environmental protec-
tion, thereby adding value to the effective activity of the International 
Commission for the Protection of the River Danube in Vienna;
! the tourism dimension, which will develop the tourism potential of the 
region, from the source of the Danube to its Delta, including an appropriate 
role for agro-tourism and eco-tourism; 
! the cultural  dimension, which will promote the expression of each Danu-
bian countries culture and help highlight the common cultural ties of the 
Danube region, stemming from our common history and different traditions;
! the sub-regional dimension, by which the Process shall encourage sub-
regional initiatives and projects, such as developing the potential of the 
already existing Euro-regions of the Danube and establishing new Euro-
regions or different forms of cross-border and interregional cooperation.
Are Determined That
20. the Process should not lead to duplication with other existing forms of co-
operation in the region and its initiatives where relevant should be devised 
and implemented within the framework of priorities that have already been 
developed for the South-East European region, notably by the European 
Commission and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. The Process 
should add value to these existing efforts by providing a new channel for 
regional ideas and initiatives, thus focusing greater energies and resources at 
the Danube basin.
Invite
21. all states which have genuine interests in the region and in activities initiated 
by the Process, as well as international organizations and financial institu-
tions, to bring a valuable and practical contribution to the activities of the 
Process.
Agree to 
22. establish a new framework for cooperation in the Danubian region, in the 
form of a constant process based on biennial conferences, at the level of min-
isters of foreign affairs of these countries.
Decide to 
23. convene the next high-level conference of the Danubian countries in Bu-
charest, in 2004.
Done in Vienna on May 27, 2002.
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